Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) Izquierdo on Universals (Part 5 of 6)
0334 So, what is a universal?
0335 The intellect is capable of using reason3c to actualize a primal triad2c, judgment2c, within the possibilities inherent in intellectual understanding1a. Thus, the intellect itself is a universal structure.
0336 Whatever goes into each slot of the primal triad is a universal in a different sense. ‘What is’ goes with existence. ‘What ought to be’ goes with predication. Relation goes with meaning.
0336 Aristotle formulated the universal in terms of the many. A universal is held in common by many existents or many predicates.
0337 The category-based nested form turns this around, since the many may also refer to those who hold universals within their intellects. The sharing of a cognitive space among many potentiates organized activities. Universals, as objective concepts, potentiate the sharing of a single cognitive space that opens avenues for organizing our human world.
0338 A universal is an opportunity to organize our world.
0339 What is the nature of the intellect-dependent universal?
Or: What kind of unity does this universal (generated by the intellect) have?
0340 As Novotny recounts, Izquierdo lists and critiques various approaches before detailing his own favored treatment, T4.
T4 goes like this: A universal, by nature, is common to individuals only in the intellect. It is indivisible.
0341 From T4, Izquierdo offers four propositions.
P1. Confused acts of cognition do not constitute a universal.
P2. The objective unity of a universal is generated by a substitute phantom.
P3. The unity of reason supports the unity of a universal. All other supports are fictions.
P4. Future philosophers may consider the disposition of the universal to existence-in-many and predicability-of-many.
0342 Novotny discusses each proposition in detail.
0343 My question is: How well does the diagram of the primal triad of judgment2c fit these propositions?
0344 Proposition P1 and P4 pertain to the primal triad2c.

0345 The first proposition (P1) runs against nominalism, which takes universals as whatever the name evokes. Nominalism argues that a universal is merely an act of cognition, as if the act of cognition had no real constraints (hence the term “confused”).
0346 The primal triad provides a real constraint. Each universal must be a whole (as either a whole quality of existence, a whole predicate, or a whole operation) within a congruent triadic relation. The two elements identified by Aristotle as universals are thus constrained by their capacities to enter into relation with one another.
The resulting judgment is intersubjective. Others can generate similar primal triads (that is, judgments). Why? The constraints on the universals are real. This holds even when each universal cannot be fully symbolized (in speech-alone talk).
0347 For example, let me say this, “I am king of Bohemia.”
When asked why, I reply, “I like Bohemian beer.”
0348 Surely, the subject (the existence of lovers of Bohemian beer) is a universal. What the subject is supposed to be(the king of Bohemia) is also a universal. If Bohemia is a monarchy, then it has a king or queen or both. All monarchies are predicated on this.
That leaves the relation, to which I exclaim, “The king of Bohemia must love Bohemian beer!”
0349 Surely, this act of cognition cannot be reduced to a universal. Why? There are many existents (beer lovers) but only one predicate (king of Bohemia). The operation of loving beer is not sufficient to serve as a universal relation between ‘the subject’ and ‘what the subject is supposed to be’.



















