08/2/24

Looking at Josef Pieper’s Book (1974) “Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power” (Part 7 of 8)

0817 What about the abuse of power?

Here is a picture of the virtual nested form in the realm of normal contexts.

0818 As already noted, there are two nested forms contesting the content (or citizen) level.  One goes with the unsophisticated citizen.  The other associates with the “educated” sophist.

The normal context of rhetorical discourse3b does not respect the integrity of traditional spoken-word associations.  Tradition builds language.  Sophism3b manipulates what it did not create. Indeed, if the chances of victory1a were not enhanced by the clever use of spoken words, then the situation-level would not flourish and the perspective-level would not attain the fusion of money and persuasion that builds unimaginable fortunes.

0819 How so?

Why else would the one who pays3c, hiding behind the veil of refined reason3c, be willing to suffer the price commanded by the sophist who can get the job done2b?

For example, a trader who has cleared the roads to Thebes pays a sophist to advocate for a war between Athens and Syracuse, which will stop transport between Syracuse and Athens, but not stop transport between Syracuse and Thebes.  If a declaration of war2c between Athens and Syracuse is passed, even if it only means a cessation of direct trading, then the Thebes-connected trader can now be the sole importer into Athens from Syracuse through Thebes, with the additional benefit of higher prices due to rarity… er… supply-chain challenges.

After all, there is no substitute for the raisins of Syracuse.

0820 The sophist3b will offer convincing reasons for why Athens should declare war2b, which is different from actually conducting a war, because this declaration will merely decree that no ships that have ported in Syracuse may dock in Athens for certain period of time.  Yes, this is a “limited war”, an “economic war”, a “war sanctioning Syracuse” for its offensive behaviors, including undercutting raisin production around Athens by offering dried grapes of higher quality at lower price.

What reasonable citizen would not vote for such a “war”?

0821 What happens after the “war” is enacted?

The citizen’s wife later complains that the price of those delicious and affordable raisins from Syracuse has skyrocketed, and the slaves who are supposed to pick the dried grapes around Athens have been tasked with other labors.

Will the reasonable citizen now vote for a decree demanding that the Athenian slaves who once picked raisins must now return to their old jobs?

No, that would be crazy.

0823 Perhaps, the reasonable citizen will realize, too late, that he voted for a decision2c that makes no sense.

0824 So, he goes to the sophist to complain and finds that the sophist has changed.  His consort is not longer this plain-looking woman from a wealthy family.  His consort is incredibly beautiful and obviously trained in the arts of…

Well never mind that!

0825 Meanwhile, the trader, whose clandestine meeting with his sophist has been interrupted by this “reasonable citizen”, stands behind a curtain and overhears the conversation.  The trader silently feels the power inherent in what he has done.  He has brought Athens to its knees.  Over dried grapes, no less.  Such a little thing presages greater things.  Soon, Athens will be on its knees to this trader, who will then demand the war that he desires.  Yes, the trader angles for a real war, not with Syracuse, but with unsuspecting Thebes, whose trading business is ripe for takeover.

08/1/24

Looking at Josef Pieper’s Book (1974) “Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power” (Part 8 of 8)

0826 Needless to say, the trader with refined reason3c belongs to one of the finest families in Athens.

The ancients have a saying, “The best, corrupted, become the worst.”

Abuse of power goes hand in hand with abuse of language.

Abuse of language manifests in the realm of possibility1.

Abuse of power develops in the realm of normal contexts3.

0827 Here is a picture.

0828 The actualities2 of the sophist interscope are topics of gossip and conversation.

0829 Does the sophist really believe what he says?

Is the idea that Athens should economically sanction Syracuse not the same as “war”?

Well, it is and it isn’t.

What is the definition of the word, “war”?

And finally, what about the enforcement of the sanctions?

Of course, Athenian troops can stop ships from Syracuse from docking, but is that enough?

I hear rumors that ships are now simply bypassing Athens and going to Thebes.

0830 In the forum, the bought-off… er… well-paid sophist hears what people are saying.  He has a ready reply, “Thebes is causing a problem.  We should think about going to war with Thebes.  Not, this weak-kneed sanction business, but full-fledged conquest.”

0831 It’s like selling candy to a baby.

This is what Plato sees.

0832 What is there to stop the sophists3b and their behind-the-scenes sponsors3c?

If a reasonable person3a,1a adopts the sophist terminology, then the reasonable person3a,1a buys into the way that the sophist3b has framed the citizen’s reality and understanding.

Consequently, even the reasonable person’s thoughts are tainted, because what he says (using a word whose meaning, presence and message has been tweaked by the sophist) cannot correspond to what he thinks (because he thinks in terms of the traditional meaning, presence and message of the spoken word).

0833 A citizen may ask, “Would sending a delegation to Thebes asking what is going on be a way to avoid war?”

The sophist replies, “No, Athena forbid!  Sending a delegation would be an act of war.  Obviously, the traders in Thebesalready are trying to take advantage of our conflict with Syracuse.  We all know that ships from Syracuse are docking in Thebes.  Sending a delegation would only tip them off, so they would attack us, with the assistance of Syracuse, before we can attack them.”

0834 The sophist interscope supports ruinous political decisions. 

But, does the sweetness of refined reason3c turn to bitterness?

Or does the fish rot from the head, down?

0835 The one who pays to support refined reason3c no longer believes that refined reason3c is right reason.  Instead, it is a way to gain advantage1c by promoting political decisions2c that favor the elite, rather than all citizens.  Without a doubt, the most advantageous political decision2c is the one2c where public citizens bear the risks and costs and private elites gain the benefits. 

0836 Today, experts2b call these arrangements, “public-private partnerships”.  The arrangement sounds attractive, “the public” (that is, a government bureaucracy) works with “private” citizens (that is, very wealthy operators) in order to accomplish goals that neither can achieve alone, such as an active war with Thebes while engaging in sanctions with Syracuse.

Finally, the citizen becomes confused and starts saying what the sophist says as if it is his own thought.  Sanctions are war.  Diplomacy is war.  Thebes and Syracuse must be defeated.  No one quite knows why, because reason3a,1a itself has fallen into sophistry2b.

0837 Tyranny is near when reason3a,1a falls into sophistry2b, because a dictator and his allies may declare what one can say, as if that is the gateway to what one can think.  Citizens who have fallen into sophistry have no defense and end up blaming those who speak against sophistry.

0838 Weirdly, this is the topic is covered from a completely different approach, in the ninth and tenth primers of the series, How To Define the Word “Religion” and Related Primers, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  The titles are A Primer on Classical Political Philosophy and A Primer on Another Infrasovereign Religion.

0840 So, what was Plato’s problem?

We all know what happened to Socrates.

His admirers and compatriots, including Plato, were devastated.

Plato could only stop, and lay flat, and look into the empty sky.

And, an interventional sign-relation comes to be.

07/31/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 1 of 26)

0023 The full title of the book before me is A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition: The Name of the Game (Anthem Press: London and New York). The book seems brief, but it packs a lot of material in sixteen short chapters… well… technically, an introduction, fourteen chapters and a conclusion.

0024 Professor Steve Fuller introduces the topic with the headline, “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Post-Truth Condition”.  The headline is a tongue in cheek reference to Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 intellectually pleasing masterpiece, “Dr. Strangelove”.

Yet, one has only to trace Kubrick’s career trajectory to envision a conclusion beyond worry and love.  Kubrick dies in 1999 after wrapping up a homage to the will, titled “Eyes Wide Shut”.

0025 What matters is not whether something is true or false.

What matters is how something is decided.

The first statement concerns the intellect.  The second statement concerns the will.

0026 So, how is a matter to be decided?

Shall we call upon the experts?

Consider the issues of anxiety and affection.  An expert may reduce diverse and unsettling experiences to phenomena that can be observed and measured.  Then, the expert may build a model, using a specialized disciplinary language.  Next, with that model in hand, the expert will consider avenues to control the phenomena.

0027 For example, in a casual academic encounter at a university, I meet a needy and uncertain scholar who constantly nags her compatriot and (most likely) lover about the importance of managing her anxiety.  Of course, the university setting is full of people making odd demands, so I think nothing of it.  Later, I find out that her “husband” is a pharmaceutical salesman.

Indeed, she learned how to stop worrying about her field of inquiry and to love her husband with his briefcase full of Valium samples.

0028 So, is there a problem?

Fuller suggests that the “distance” between the layperson and the expert shrinks, because a layperson can become acquainted with the disciplinary language of any field of expertise well enough as to ask apparently intelligent questions. Yes, a question may be posed to the pharmaceutical salesman that goes like this, “I can see that your lover is addicted to Valium.  Could you tell me exactly the mechanism for how this drug operates on the love-centers of the brain?”

To which the expert in marketing scoffs, “The human brain has frontal, parietal and occipital lobes.  The human brain has a cerebellum.  These anatomical structures perform various specialized neurological functions.  Okay?  The human brain does not have a ‘love-center’.  What an ignorant question.”

0029 Indeed, the salesman goes on to testify before a legislative committee on the need to monitor and reduce the amount of medical disinformation on the internet.  When laypeople read books on the neurological underpinnings of sexual attraction and drug addiction, they think that they’ve learned something.  They think that they can ask revealing questions. So, they stupidly ask about “cerebral love centers”.

A law must be passed to deter this conduct.

0030 What does Fuller predict?

Just as during the Reformation, when Bibles printed in the layperson’s language opened the opportunity for any layperson to interpret sacred text, the current internet allows anyone who can read to become familiar with the language of any specialized discipline.  Then, that layperson may publish a podcast that asks… um… revealing questions about what experts are supposed to know best.

The cost of entry into the market is astonishing low. So, many experts argue that it is the responsibility of the state to increase that cost through regulation and censorship.

07/30/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 2 of 26)

0031 Fuller’s introduction continues to set the scene.

First, this player’s guide is a follow up to the foundational text, published in 2018, titled, Post-Truth: Knowledge as a Power Game.

0032 Second, the post-truth condition is not merely an exercise in relativism.  It is more.  Relativism makes the most sense when one (the holder of the relativist position) is outside of all relativized jurisdictions.  Imagine the advantages that the relativist one must have in order to make that presumption.  There is only one absolute and that is me, acting as a disinterested observer and declaring that all other opinions are relative… er… not absolute.

Well, if the post-truth condition is more than an exercise in relativism, and if the relativist one has the very attractive advantage of being able to account for all other stances as part of a relativist system, then what is the problem?

What about those who remain in the relativized jurisdictions?

I suppose that the scrappy player needs see things from the standpoint of his opponents, and if possible, turn that to an advantage.

And, that is not easy to do when one’s “opponent” does not dwell in one’s jurisdiction… or any relativized jurisdiction, for that matter.

So, I wonder, “Where does the expert appear in this exercise in more-than-relativism?”

Well, the expert must be located between the relativist one and the scrappy player.

0033 If I think in terms of category-based nested forms, then the following nested form applies.

I say, “The perspectivec of the relativist one virtually brings the situationb of expertise on a specific topic into relation with contenta produced by scrappy players exercising their reason.

Or, maybe, I can say, “The relativist one3c relativizes all jurisdictions… or ‘turfs’… of academic expertise3b.  Then, diverse fields of expertise3b virtually situate scrappy players3a.”

0034 This nested form is protean because each element immediately expands into its own nested form.  See A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

In brief, this protean nested form expands into a three-level interscope.

Is this how the relativist one socially constructs a post-truth world?

07/29/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 3 of 26)

0035 Educational institutions issue credentials.  Credentials associate to expertise.  Credentials are metaphorical keys (situation-level actualities2b) to metaphorical locks (perspective-level potentials1c).  Credentials2b are key for opportunities1c that lead to success2c.

Here is how these elements enter a post-truth interscope, where the perspectivec, situationb and contenta levels are denominated by the protean nested form.

0036 In chapter one, Fuller dwells upon the central term, “post-truth”.

Reason imposes chains on itself.  How so?  Well, knowledge gets formalized.  For example, what is worth knowing is divided from what is not worth knowing.  Well, then, what is worth knowing?  Formalized knowledge is so much worth knowing that it1b supports the awarding of credentials2b by an educational institution3c.

0037 Back in the introduction, Fuller recalls Willard Quine’s insight. A knowledge claim that requires a massive change to the overall “web of belief” will be considered dubious until academically domesticated.  In other words, a novel notion that is true will stand as just another opinion that is on offer on the content level until academics make it their own.

This implies that a “web of belief” constitutes the expert level.

 Plus, the expert level situates the scrappy (or is it “crappy”?) player level.

0038 These developments are entered into the following diagram.

0039 Well, if formalizing knowledge1b domesticates a knowledge claim2a that might call for a massive cognitive change,then the ‘something’1a that underlies opinions2a must be ‘something’ to be reckoned with.  ‘Something’1a may be too creative to process.  ‘Something’1a may be too destructive.  Or, ‘something’1a may change the status quo.

0040 Look at the content-level nested form.  There are two aspects.  One associates to the normal context3a.  The other associates to potential1a.  Both aspects concern reason.

Fuller offers a psychological formula.  Reason equals intellect plus will.

Are these the two aspects?

If so, then intellect3a is the normal context3a that chains the creative and destructive potential of the will1a.  The  actuality of facts and claims2a (that is, opinions2a) emerges from (and situates) the creative and destructive potential of the will1a, within the normal context of the intellect3a.

0041 Here a picture of the ongoing post-truth interscope.

0042 The question now arises, asking, “Who or what goes into the perspective-level normal context?”

If the perspective-level normal context is the relativist one3c, then this particular element becomes a safe-haven, outside of all traditional (credentialed) jurisdictions, yet holding all the metaphorical locks and keys to success.  All educational institutions3b, as well as all forums for discourse3b, are relative, according to the relativist one3c.

0043 Here is how the interscope may be spoken.

On the content (or scrappy player) level, the normal context of the intellect3a brings the actuality of diverse facts and claims (that is, opinions)2a into relation with the potential of the will1a.

On the situation (or expert) level, the normal context of an educational institution3b brings the actuality of credentials2binto relation with the potential of ‘formalizing knowledge’1b.

On the perspective (or relativist one) level, the normal context of one who stands above all relativized jurisdictions3cbrings the actuality of success2c into relation with the potential of opportunities1c.

Perspective brings situation into relation with content.

07/27/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 4 of 26)

0044 One implication of the complete three-level interscope for the post-truth condition takes the title of chapter two, “Post-Truth Is About Finding A Game One Can Win”.

The relativist one3c operates a justified “true” belief system.

The key term is not “true”.

The key term is “operates”.

0045 Yes, “operates” has the same first syllable as “opportunity”.

What is opportunity1c beyond the potential of putting credentials2b into perspective?

0046 According to Fuller, the operational game of “axiology” starts with a continuum, such as the continuum between what must be done and what cannot be done, then explicitly divides the continuum according to two labels: “necessity” and “impossibility”.

In terms of on-the-ground impact, such a division may be regarded as nonsense, even when applied to a single topic.

0047 Consider a nagging issue faced by ancient Athenians.  The Kingdom of Syracuse!  What do we do about it?  When hearing the diverse facts and claims around the market2a, one would conclude that war with Syracuse is both necessary and impossible.  But, once a sophist3b opportunistically formalizes the issue in terms of an either/or proposition1b, then one party gathers under the banner of “necessity” and one party gathers under the banner of “impossibility”2b

The result is a hylomorphic structure, where the party of impossibility standing against the party of necessity occupies the slot for credentials2b.  At this juncture, the solution to the contention between the two parties becomes obvious.  The party saying that war is not possible does not want to do anything.  But, doing nothing is not an option.  Doing nothing will only make war more necessary.

0048 Does that sound like an opportunity1c?

Here is a picture of this unfolding drama.

Go from left to right.

0049 Now, I wonder, “Does the relativist one3c care whether Athens decides to go to war with Syracuse?  Or, does the relativist one3c only care about arriving at… what may be called… the actions associated with a justified belief… that is… success2c?”

07/26/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 5 of 26)

0050 Here is the the post-truth interscope for the ongoing example.

Diverse claims about Syracuse2a are virtually situated by one party under the banner saying that war is necessary2b and another party under the banner saying that war is not possible2b in the normal context of a public forum3b operating on the potential of ‘situating rumors about what to do about Syracuse’1b.

Does the relativist one3c know what will happen after Athens gathers a fleet and sails to Syracuse?  Or, is the relativist one3c clever enough to cast a veil of ignorance1b over a cauldron of irreconcilable claims2a thus constituting a post-truth game2b that results in a particular organized endeavor2c?  See page 21 of Fuller’s text for that question.

0051 Remember, for the post-truth condition, what matters is not whether something is true or false.

What matters is how something is decided.

The first statement concerns the intellect.  The second statement concerns the will.

0052 This reminder suggests a flaw in a preceding figure.

The starting point for a virtual nested form in the realm of firstness (the column in the realm of possibility) is not the various opinions of the people in Athens2a, it is their will1a.

Here, the virtual normal context is on the left and the virtual potential is on the right.

0053 The normal context of a resolution of contradictions between the parties of impossibility and necessity1c virtually brings the actuality of the formalization of impossibility in contrast to necessity1b into relation with the possibility of the wills of the people of Athens in regards to Syracuse1a.

Success2c takes the form of a judgment that leads to action.

07/25/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 6 of 26)

0054 “What type of guide is this?”, I ask myself as I turn to chapter three.

What are the fates of truth, reason (as we commonly imagine it to be, rather than as the normal context and potential of the scrappy player) and reality, when the post-truth condition is a game2b to arrive at a judgment2c that leads to action?

So let me leave the image of the ships of Athens burning in the harbor at Syracuse in favor of a more recent example.  Some contemporaries call this example, “The Cold War”, technically ranging from 1945 to 1989 anno domini.  I prefer to call it The Third Battle Among the Enlightenment Gods: The Cold War Among Materialist Ideologies.

Materialist ideologies?

Think capitalism versus communism.

0055 In this example, the opponents are mirror images.  Just swap USSR for USA, then swap them back.

0056 Both parties agree that a nuclear war must be ruled out, because neither party can achieve the victory of a completely nullifying first strike.

Both parties agree that war is necessary in order to advance a materialist ideology.

0057 Success2b turns out to be a series of proxy wars that leaves many relativized jurisdictions in ruin.  Success2b turns out to be an inversion of what “capitalism” means, because the USA markets are regulated in such a fashion as to maximize positive publicity for the “capitalist” materialist ideology and negative publicity for the opposing “communist” materialist ideology.  That means, for the most part, fighting the commies is good for business.

Plus, creating false flags into order to validate the so-called domino theory turns out to be advantageous.

One can say the same for the USSR, because “communism” turns out to be state-capitalism. Or, maybe “capital” has been redefined as “party membership”.  The state regulates every level of the organization tier in order to conduct various proxy wars that the proxies would rather not participate in.  That means, for the most part, pay is not so good to fight the capitalists.  

Such as the Taliban?

Or anti-materialist ideologies such as Christianity?

0058 I know that this is difficult to fathom.

Truth, reason and even, reality, must be sacrificed in order to maintain the opportunity1c underlying success2c, which may be defined as a judgment that leads to a course of action2c, rather than… what most scrappy players3a consider to be “success2a“.  

0059 Here is what happens after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Yes, the USA continues to conduct proxy wars, even after the USSR disintegrates.

Weirdly, established players in the USA preserve their Cold War post-truth success2cby confabulating a novel materialist ideology2b that weirdly distorts capitalist truth, reason and reality1b and then conducting a crusade2c as if their dynamic hybridization of materialist ideologies2b is more righteous than what capitalism used to be.

0060 Say what?

What is the name of this novel materialist ideology that preserves the necessity of proxy wars even though the USSR has fallen?

More on that, later.

07/24/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 7 of 26)

0061 Chapter four introduces two apparently successful attempts to construct value2b in the post-truth condition.  Value2band credentials2b are not identical.  But, they do not contradict one another.  They both fit into the slot for the situation-level actuality.

The two successful attempts are capitalism and scientism.

0062 I start with capitalism.  Capitalism substitutes the institution of the market3b for the situation-level forum for discourse3b.  Shall I say that money talks?  What is money saying?  It is formalizing knowledge as price1b.

Here is a picture of the resulting interscope.

0063 Of course, the experts3b are all about the market, but certain other elements stand out.

Yes, some elements stand out in comparison to other elements.

In the following figure, I put boxes around the most illuminating elements.

I call the result, “the questionable box of capitalism”.

0064 For Americans, the questionable box of capitalism has been a field of intense investigation by academics promoting both capitalism (as a materialist ideology that opposes communism) and the conceptual structure of social construction.

Why “social construction”?

I ask, “What creates value2b?  How can the term, ‘value’2b, occupy the slot for actuality2 on the level that corresponds to actualityb, when value2b seems to be anything but actual?”

Maybe, I can look at the four corners of the box.

The four elements that characterize the questionable box are the capitalist one3c, opportunity1c, intellect3a and will1a.

Maybe, they create value2b.

0065 But, does the box contain the actualities of success2c and diverse facts and claims2a that virtually contextualizes and virtually underlies value2b?

What a questionable box!

When I look into the box, I see that the normal context of the market3b brings the actuality of value2b into relation with the potential of price1b.

0066 According to Fuller, when Count Saint-Simon (1760-1825 AD) challenges the game of the capitalist one by promoting what he calls “socialism”.  He tries to re-enact Plato’s truth-regime as an alternative to the then-current unregulated market in capitalist sophistry.

Yes, the capitalists, like the sophists, promote minimal, but clear constraints.  Each individual may promote his or her own rightfulness, as long as others are not directly harmed and the social order is not disturbed.

No, the socialists, like the Platonists, proclaim the righteousness of order in conjunction with… you know… um… other manifestations of righteousness.  If I declare that these other manifestations of righteousness are “true”, then I can see why Fuller welcomes the post-“truth” condition.

0067 Here is the even more questionable box of socialism.

Order3b, value2b and righteousness1b govern the will1a and the intellect3a.  They define opportunity1c in the regime of the socialist one3c.

07/23/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 8 of 26)

0068 Chapter four is wonderful.  Fuller’s prose carries the reader on a rollercoaster of ideas, where each sudden twist and change of direction leaves unexplored territory.  I wonder, “What would Fuller say, had he not fashioned a turn at that particular moment?”  Further exploration is suspended.  But, I retain a snapshot of the Count Saint-Simon turn, and it looks like this.

How do capitalist and socialist ones3c exclude one another?

Each dwells within its own questionable box. 

Inside its respective box, each conjures its own expertise.

0069 On the cover of Fuller’s small paperback, a drawing of the head of a rabbit (or is it a duck?) appears.  Well, if I see the drawing as a rabbit, then the figure is a rabbit.  If I see the drawing as a duck, then the figure is a duck.

Taking the word, “value2b“, in the preceding figure, as the drawing, then the normal contexts of market3b and order3b are like gestalt recognitions for their respective potentials, price1b (which, to me, is like a rabbit) and righteousness1b (which, to me, is like a duck).  And if what is inside the questionable box changes, so does the box.

0070 Does that mean that the forty-year conflict, The Third Battle Among The Enlightenment Gods, The Cold War Between Materialist Ideologies (1945-1989 AD) can be reduced to a contest between The Packaging of the Rabbit and The Packaging of the Duck?

According to the nature of gestalts, opportunity1c resides in fixating on one or the other party, because that leads to an actionable judgment2c, which is the very definition of success2c to the relativist one3c, who really does not care whether it carries the banner of the rabbit or the duck, as long as it3c is the one who is in charge of actualizing the judgment2c.

0071 At this point, I return to the two elements that stand outside the questionable boxes of capitalism and socialism.

Success2c and diverse facts and claims2a are the two elements for capitalism that are not built into the box of questionability.

0072 In the capitalist game, success is capital2b defined, in the old fashioned way, as “money” (however one wants to define the word, “money”).  That is not questionable, is it?

Those with money2c aim to use that money to obtain more money2c.  In this regards, money2c defines the capitalist2c.  On the crappy-player level, people ask, “What do I need to do to earn a living?”  What is a living?  Well, it is certainly not absolute devotion to money, that is for sure.  Life is all about adventures and friends and romance and babies and growing old and dying nobly.  How do you put a price on that?

Can I sell you simulated versions of these items?

0073 So, how am I supposed to make a living?

This question does not concern the elements that compose the questionable box.  This question concerns my participation in capitalism.  I am within a post-truth game, trying to make my way.

The employment of capital2c by those with capital2c is like an interventional sign-vehicle (SVi) that cannot be directly witnessed by any scrappy player, except in so far as it manifests as action.  Action implies that a judgment has been made.  Look in the want ads.  Look what other people are doing.  I hear that someone is hiring down the street.  To the scrappy player, that judgment2c stands for a pursuit of success2a, a project2a or something to do2a, that defines “success2a” as getting ahead (that is, making a good living) (SOi), according to the intellect3a operating on the will1a (and remember that reason is the employment of intellect3a and will1a) (SIi).

0074 Uh-oh.  Am I suddenly talking about sign-relations?

A sign-vehicle (SV) stands for a sign-object (SO) in regards to a sign-interpretant (SI).

The interventional sign-relation is counterintuitive, to say the least.

0075 The interventional sign vehicle (SVi) is an actionable judgment2c (capital is put into action) that stands for opinions about what I need to do2a (SOi) in regards to the intellect3a operating on the will1a (SIi).

I may ask the opinions of others2a (SOi).  I may have my own opinions2a (SOi).  Furthermore, I can discern the intellects3a and wills1a (SIi) of myself and those around me.  But, I cannot actually see the sign-vehicle (SVi), because it2cresides on the perspective level. It is as if…

The interventional sign-vehicle (SVi) dwells inside someone’s head.  It is mind-dependent.

But, it2c (SVi) is mind-independent as well.

A judgment2c leads to actions (SVi), and because these actions become the source of various opinions, the interventional sign-object (SOi) comes into being through the working of people’s reason3a,1a (SIi).  These opinions2a (SOi) are about the possibility of ‘something happening’1a in the normal context of what is happening3a (SIi).  These opinions2a frame perceptions based on imagination working with the question, “What does this mean to me?”.  And, sometimes, these opinions2a will weigh one’s impressions and one’s perceptions, while asking, “Does this make sense?”

I suppose that this is the way that humans think.

What is happening (SIi1)?

What does it mean to me (SIi2)?

Does this make sense (SIi3)?

0076 Overall, the interventional sign-relation is the inverse of how a sign-relation ought to be.

For familiar sign-relations, the sign-vehicle is mind-independent and its sign-object is mind-dependent.

Here is an example of a specifying sign-relation.  The expert says that opinions about what people think that they need to do2a (SVs) stands for value2b (SOs) in regards to the market3b operating on the potential of pricing1b (SIs).

0077 Here is a picture of a capitalist expert’s specifying sign-relation.

Note how the specifying sign-vehicle (SVs) is mind-independent phenomena (what people say2a) of a mind-dependent noumenon (SOi) (what people think2a).