0450 The era of joint intentionality begins with bipedalism as an adaptation to a changing environment and ecology.  In eastern Africa, tropical forest gives way to mixed forest and savannah.  The individual “southern ape” is less likely to successfully forage alone.  So, for some lineages, collaborative foraging offers an option.  Then, it becomes a preferred option.  Then, it becomes the only option.

The team_2b is the group that is culturally selected for in the environment and ecology of mixed forest and savannah_3boperating on the potential of  ‘obligate collaborative foraging’_1b.

0451 Here is how the era starts.

0452 Chapter three is titled, “Second-Person Morality”.

0453 Here, a key insight from British anthropology comes into play, as delineated in Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  With speciation to Australopithecus (transliterated “southern ape”), bipedalism frees the hands and enslaves the feet.  The feet do the walking.  The hands do the talking.  At this point in hominin evolution, adaptations into the niche of triadic relations enter into the picture.

Social circles differentiate.  Love and affection characterizes family (5) and intimate friends (5).  Joint attention and shared intentionality typifies teams (15).  Teams are the active agents for obligate collaborative foraging.  Avoidance of predation underlies bands (50).

0454 What does that imply?

The groups of interest for the era of individual intentionality are family (5), intimate friends (5) and band (50).

The group that is of interest in the era of joint intentionality is the team (15).

0455 I ask, “Is a team_2b the intersection of power_2H and affiliation_2V?”

Yes, and no.

Yes, if the meanings of the words change.

No, if the meanings of the words remain the same.

0456 According to Tomasello, second-person morality develops as “you” and “me” act in concert as a “we” (team).  “We” have the motivations and skills required to pursue a joint goal, guided by shared intentions.  Joint attention structures individual perceptions of others’ actions.  Joint attention calls for judgment.  Habitual perceptions and judgments define “roles” in team activities.

0457 Roles are not pre-defined slots, arranged into organizational charts.  “Roles” label recurring patterns of habitual perceptions and judgments of one’s teammates.  These perceptions and judgments are in flux. However, they tend to fall into a stable pattern, making accommodation easier.  Individuals with perceptions and judgments that cannot be accommodated by other team-members are not invited to participate in team actions.

Say what?

0458 Hominins compete to cooperate.

0459 A team is a web of you-me relationships that perform as a single agent towards a single goal.  Power_2H and affiliation_2V are bound to a social contract that appears present to a disinterested observer, but cannot be pictured or pointed to by the hand-talking participants.  Indeed, power_2H and affiliation_2V are explicit abstractions that paper over the living collaborative “we” in the slogan, “We work for food.”

0460 Do early hominins collaborate in joint-attention activities for purely practical reasons?

Surely, “we”, this web of “you-me” relationships, with each “me” accommodating each “you” in order to say… gather much more food than any one of us could gather alone, cannot possibly be… may I say it?… fun?

0461 Practical reasons dictate that each “you-me” relationship is powered by productivity_2H.

At the same time, fraternal enjoyment dictates that each “you-me” relationship is affiliated with a certain savoir faire.  Having fun_2V is more than getting along_2V.

0462 If an evolutionary anthropologist from today could go back in time to Homo habilis, she would be shocked at the things that our ancestors ate.  Homo habilis and its next of kin, Homo erectus, are on the lookout for any food that other species ignore or cannot get to.  They compete with giraffes, who specialize in getting food that is high up, and zebras, who specialize in getting food growing out of the ground.  They also compete with baboons, hyenas, large cats and other dangerous critters.

So, where is hominin food supposed to come from?

0463 Neither giraffe, zebra, hyena or baboon can find food that is not edible, but becomes edible after being hidden.  Decay is like digestion.  Bugs can do the work, if the bugs are themselves edible.  So can fungus.

In mixed forest and savannah, food is always abundant, at the right location and not for long.  So, mixed forest and savannah selects for teams that forage when the time is right.  In addition, many teams figure out how to store… er… hide food after sharing with other teams in the band.  How is today’s evolutionary anthropologist supposed to figure out the diverse ways of obtaining, preparing, sharing and hiding food?

Even more incredibly, over generations, each successful team gets better and better at whatever they figured out, because a successful team leads to one’s genes getting into the next generation.  Neuronal tracts sensitive to whatever a successful team figures out are laid down in order to make team actions more and more intuitively natural, innate, and more likely to be spontaneously discovered under novel environmental and ecological conditions.

0464 Yes, today, if we even glanced at a menu composed of what these folks ate, we would immediately barf.

0465 Fortunately, Tomasello’s topic is morality, rather than culinary magic.

Tomasello sees team joint-activities as supporting an inclination to help one another.

Is this the first expression of what we call, “sympathy”?

He relates this expression to three sets of psychological processes, (1) a network of “you-me” relations, (2) partner choice and control and (3) self-regulation.  The first (1) constitutes the “we” of the team.  A team is not simply 15 “me”s.  A team is composed of over 100 “you-me” relations.  The second (2) claims that deservingness_1H and mutual respect_1V are crucial for a coherent team.  The third (3) suggests that everyone innately knows (1) and (2).  Indeed, all three psychological processes are observed in the cognitive development of newborns and infants.

0466 In teams, power_2H entails productivity_2H.

Affiliation_2V goes with having fun_2V.

The team has a slogan, declaring, “We work for food.”

But, hand-talk cannot explicitly abstract the word, “work”.  So, maybe the word, “do”, will suffice.  We do food?   Okay, I am sticking with the first team slogan.

0467 Here is a picture.

Note how the intersection maintains continuity.  The normal contexts remain the same.

Note how the constituting actualities and their associated potentials change.

Cultural selection_3b favoring obligate collaborative forgaging_1b alters the character of the intersection_2b, from power_1Hand affiliation_1V to productivity_1H and having fun_1V.

0468 We work for food_2b is the primary actuality_2b undergoing cultural selection_3b for nearly three million years, from the start of bipedalism (around 3.5Myr) to the start of the domestication of fire (0.8My).  The Homo genus, the intention of humans, is conceived and born in the era of joint intentionality.

0469 Here is a list of significant archaeological markers for this era.

0470 In the subsection titled, “Collaboration and Helping”, Tomasello calls the emergence of the Homo genus, “self-domestication”.

Self-domestication weaves three strands into one rope.

First, human pair-bonding is recognized as productive, thereby formalizing the role of father (and assuring his paternity of his mate’s children).  The slogan, “We work for food.”, extends to “We work for one another in the family.”

Second, new subsistence strategies evolve.  The Oldowan and Acheulean stone tools serve as an example.  Oldowan stone tools are made rapidly and on location.  Acheulean stone tools require preparation.  They are made at one location then carried to another.  The Oldowan and the Acheulean stone-tool teams are one among many.  Successful teams become better and better over generations as the neural architecture that supports the relevant behavioral skills and cognitive capacities evolves.

Third, cooperative childcare becomes a style of teamwork, in addition to collaborative foraging.  Childcare teamworkbroadens the nature of “you-me” relationships into new arenas of joint attention.  Shared intentionality becomes more and more…what is a good word for it?… ah… “domestic”.

0471 Tomasello envisions these three strands weaving together into a metaphorical rope that tames hominins.

Hominins self-domesticate.

0473 In the subsection titled, “Joint Intentionality”, Tomasello explores the nature of agency for a team.  The team is aweb of “you-me” relations.

Here is another picture of the team as a social circle.

0474 The team is not a thing.  The team is a being.  The team is a purely relational structure composed of “you-me” relations.  Each pair is a site of joint attention.  It is also the occasion for joint agency.  Each one of a 15 member teamjuggles 14 “you-me” relations.  I estimate the number of unique relations to be over one-hundred.  No wonder predators get confused.

0475 Each herd animal is only concerned with self and maybe a youngster.  So, even though there are many animals in a herd, the trajectory of each can be reliably calculated.

Not so a team of hominins.  No single predator can calculate the trajectory of one because the trajectories of the otherswill change in response to a predator pursuing one.  They are bound by multiple “you-me” relations, making their behaviors difficult to predict.

Plus, these hominins carry rocks.  Some carry sticks as well.  These rocks and sticks present additional dangers that are difficult to anticipate.

0476 So, may I say that each “you-me” relation is a joint agent?

Each joint agent works towards a single end.

May I call this end, “an organizational objective”?

0477 Tomasello endeavors to discern the common ground underlying each joint agent.

Does the word, “trust”, suffice?

What about adding the word, “normative”?

Does that help?

0478 What does “normative” mean?

If I know that you are slow at throwing your rock at a predator, then I throw my rock a little earlier than I otherwise would, certain that your slowness will achieve good timing if I do so.

Tomasello explicitly abstracts these accommodations using terms, such as “roles” and “perspectives”.

Do Tomasello’s spoken words suffice?

0479 How should one describe the team?

Each team member serves as a node in a web of dyadic relations.  Each dyad is a “you-me” relation.  Each dyad operates within one web, the “we” of the team.

Tomasello struggles with explicit abstractions.  Are these dyads “social contracts” or “extensions” or “second-person bonds” or what?

0480 Plus, there is another difficulty.

Which is more important, productivity_2H or having fun_2V?

By focusing on one, the researcher tends to neglect the other.

This difficulty explains the two titles for “team”.  “We work for food” emphasizes productivity_2H.  “Web of ‘you-me’ relations” highlights having fun_2V.

0481 Plus, there is the lure of further explicit abstraction.  “Roles” and “perspectives” are gateways to “collaborative role-ideals” that become archetypal attractors for “you-me” arrangements.  Examples include explorer-supporter, teacher-mentor, pusher-go along, leader-follower, daring-cautious, and so on.  Each team activity contains its own suite of archetypal attractors.  Can I go on to philosophize about how the principle of other-self equivalence applies?

How many rabbits of explicit abstraction can one pull out of the hat labeled either “we work for food” or “web  of ‘you-me’ relations?

Read for yourself.

0482 Tomasello chops a good deal of philosophical wood.

His labors are complicated by the fact that the word, “team_2b“, is constituted by two actualities, productivity_1H and having fun_2V, causing the single term to polarize.  The two poles are captured in two slogans, “we work for food” and “web of ‘you-me relations”.

Here is a picture of the polarization of the intersection of team₂.

0483 In order to visualize the roots and the branches of Tomasello’s task, consider projecting  the polarization of the teamback in time from the era of joint intentionality to the era of individual intentionality.

The results are remarkable.

0484 Tomasello’s woodpile is now starting to look like it is full of explicit abstractions that will demand further explicit abstractions that will demand further explicit abstractions.

Did Tomasello axe for this complicated mess?

0484 On top of that, if one substitutes the underlying potentials for the constituting actualities, within the paradigm of polarity, then the explicit abstractions that Tomasello chops in the first session transmogrify into a pile of philosophical wood ready for a second session.

It may take a second to figure out the two preceding diagrams.

Just saying.

0485 With the difficulties embedded within Tomasello’s woodpile now visualized, I turn to the subsection titled, “Second Person Agency”.

The initial challenge of the era of joint intentionality concerns good and fun collaborative partners choosing good and productive collaborative partners.

The axe comes down and this log splits into guilt (for when one denies mutual respect to others) and responsibility (for being productive).  What about labels for when one provides others with mutual respect and when one is not so productive?

Uh-oh.  Now, Tomasello has two more logs to chop.

0486 Adding to this philosophical woodpile, consider the question of how joint intentional activity arises in the first place.  

Here, Tomasello offers a figure, depicting two cooperating individuals facing an elevated gray triangle, emblazoned with the words, “Joint commitment to role ideals”.  To me, that means “we”.  We encompass our joint commitment to well… whatever the team is supposed to do.  From the bowels of the triangle, an arrow descends, bearing the words, “legitimately self-regulate”.  The arrow terminates, hitting the ground (so to speak) with the words, “according to our responsibility”.  Then, the impact of the arrow spreads to the feet of the cooperating individuals, and emerges from each head as an arrow returning to we, the embodiment of a joint commitment to role ideals.

0487 Here is my parody of Figure 3.1.  

Hmmm.  Tomasello’s stick figures have turned into meditative circle-heads.

0488 Why depict the individuals as circle-heads, weighed down by explicit abstractions that characterize “we”, “legitimate”, “self-regulate” and “responsibility”?

These spoken labels are not available to team members collaboratively foraging in the era of joint attention.  What is there to picture or point to using hand-talk?  Instead, whatever these spoken labels refer to are adaptations that end up as phenotypic traits, expressions of hominin neural and physiological architecture.

The meditative figures reflect the two minds of Tomasello. One is committed to the role ideal of evolutionary anthropologist.  One is devoted to concocting explicit abstractions in accordance with that ideal.  These two guide Tomasello’s philosophical axe in order to chop purely relational beings into label-worthy fragments.

0489 Towards the end of chapter three, concerning the era of joint intentionality, Tomasello launches into a subsectiontitled, “The Original Ought”.

What is moral psychology?

What is second-person morality?

The answer, of course, depends on how one defines these labels.

Or, does it?

0490 Chapter four is titled, “Objective Morality”.

Why apply the qualifier, “objective”, instead of “third-person”?

0491 Here is a picture of Tomasello’s three interlocking movements, once again.

To me, the pattern is obvious.  But, what is the difference between Tomasello’s qualifier, “objective” and the pattern-completing qualifier, “third-person”.

Who could the third person be?

0492 Before addressing this question, I must step back and consider the primary social circle under cultural selection for each era of intentionality.

Of course, every social circle undergoes cultural selection.

Yet, it is crucial to recall which social circles are under more intense selection.

Which social circle stands in the place of interdependence_2b?

In each era, one social circle_2b stands out as the primary site where interdependence_2b emerges from and situates cooperation_1b in the normal context of cultural selection_3b.

0493 For the era of individual intentionality, the band_2b must maintain a balance between power_2H and affiliation_2V in the face of predation_1b.  The normal context is cultural selection_3b, in the always productive tropical forest_3b.

0494 For the era of joint intentionality, the team_2b must balance productivity_2H and having fun_2V in meeting the demands of obligate collaborative foraging_1b.  The normal context is cultural selection_3b, in seasonally and locally productive mixed forest and savannah_3b.

0495 For the era of collective intentionality, the community_2b must balance between something more powerful than productivity_2H and something more worthy of affiliation than having fun_2V.  Tomasello does not name these contributing actualities.  Instead, he covers both with the blanket term, “objective morality”.

Why does this work?

Well, isn’t something that is objectively moral more powerful than productivity and more worthy of affiliation than having fun?

Yeah, why not?

0496 Something that is objectively moral_2b emerges from and situates the potential of competing tribes, migrating due to a varying climate, and settling novel environments and ecologies_1b in the normal context of cultural selection during the Pleistocene_3b. 

0497 I ask, “If the band is a congery of family and intimate relations, at most, and one-person intentionality, in general, then the term, ‘first-person morality’ seems appropriate.  If the team is a web of ‘you-me’ relations and shared intentionality, then the descriptor, ‘second-person’ morality should apply.  If the community is a web of team relations,where ‘you-me’ relations abound and influence the operations of every social circle, then why doesn’t the label, ‘third-person morality’ apply?”

Why use the qualifier, “objective”. 

0498 Tomasello offers Figure 4.1 as an illustration.

Three stick figures dance around the totem that appears in Figure 3.1 (the one that more-or-less says, “We legitimately self-regulate according to our responsibility”).  But, now the triangle is an ellipse that basically says, “We express a collective commitment to right versus wrong”. A double arrow passes between each stick figure.  Then, a single dotted arrow passes from the head of each stick figure to the former triangle, now ellipse.  Then a solid arrow descends to the double arrows between each figure, showing that individual awareness proceeds to the ellipse and the ellipse fortifies the double-arrow binding each “you-me” relation.

I suppose that the triangle, now ellipse, represents objective morality.

0499 I could say that Figure 4.1 illustrates third-person morality because there are three stick figures.  But, that would be a cheap comment.

Instead, I offer an alternate picture, since the two figures in 3.1 represent a “you-me” relation.  Indeed, the two figures in 3.1 now represent every “you-me” relation in all the social circles, but most crucially, the community.

One third-person encompasses the two individuals in each and every “you-me” relation.

0500 Surely, something that is third-person moral is more powerful than productivity and more worthy of affiliation than having fun.

Plus, this third-person can be expressed as a fully grammatical hand-talk statement.

[POINT to self][POINT to others in conversation][PANTOMIME bringing sticks together and tying a string around them][POINT to my lips][POINT to sky]

Of course, the statement is nonsensical.

Perhaps, I can roughly translate the statement as, “We belong to the one who binds us together like sticks, without us knowing why.”

0501 What does the prior blog imply?

As far as hand talk is concerned, the era of joint intentionality corresponds to the evolution of sensible construction and the era of collective intentionality corresponds to the evolution of social construction.

0502 Social construction is not sensible, yet, it leads to sensible constructions that otherwise would have never been imagined using sensible construction alone.  How else can one culturally select for something more powerful than productivity_2H and for something more worthy of affiliation than having fun_2V?  When it comes to communities, mega-bands and tribes, sensible thinking is not enough.

Of course, if this sounds a little crazy, then consider A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah.  Also, consider the complementary views presented in How To Define The Word “Religion”.  Both are available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0503 Meanwhile, know this.  As a man of science, the evolutionary anthropologist, Michael Tomasello, cannot model the natural history of human morality using the imagery of third-person morality.  Why?  The third-person is not “objective, in the modern sense of the word, but “suprasubjective” in the medieval scholastic sense of the word.

For the modern, “objective” is a proposition that holds despite what any of us think of it.  The objective proposition stands outside ourselves.

For the scholastic, “suprasubjective” is a proposition that both contains and transcends the subjectivity (or attitudes of) every one of us.  The suprasubjective proposition resides within and encompasses ourselves.

There is a difference.  Plus, this difference is most apparent with explicit abstraction.

0504 In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, hand-talk and hand-speech talk cannot perform explicit abstraction.  They can only facilitate implicit abstraction.  Therefore, long-lived traditions sustain intentional implicit abstractions that, for example, promote the harmony of social circles and select for individuals inclined to cogitate those collective implicit abstractions.  Those inclined are blessed with reproductive success.

So, what am I saying?  Where am I going with all this?

The era of collective intentionality must have the same relational structure as the previous eras.

However, because Tomasello hides what he is trying to discern behind the word, “objective”, the intersection is obscured.

Here is what I expect to see.

The slogan is a sign from a third person.

This slogan presents itself in the milieu of hand talk.

0505 Hand talk is very visual.

Today, railroads are very visual.

So, in order to keep on track, railroads will be my metaphor of choice.  

Imagine that railroads, everything about them, is owned by a third person, and that person talks to us through… um… the meaning, presence and message of… hmmm… trains and rails and schedules and all that stuff.

To this third-person track, I attend.  The following discussion runs on the third-person track through the same academic territory as chapter four, titled “Objective Morality”.   The tracks are as as different as the terms, “objectivity” and “suprasubjectivity”, yet the territory is still the era of collective intentionality.

0506 The third-person track begins with an implicit judgment that becomes embodied during the era of joint attention.  The team and its organizational objectives are inseparable.  They are one thing.

This inseparability coheres to Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  In this case, the real elements are the team and its organizational objectives.  Can I say that the team might associate to having fun_2V and the organizational objectives may associate to productivity_2H?  If so, the contiguity, which stands between the two real elements and therefore gets placed in brackets (for good nomenclature), is the term, [inseparable].

0507 Here is a comparison of the team hylomorphe with Aristotle’s hylomorphe, from which the term, “hylomorphe”, comes.  “Hyle” translates from Greek into English as “matter”.  “Morphe” translates as “form”.

0508 Okay, that will not do.  Let me try a different, more medieval sounding, hylomorphe.

0509 Ah, that is better.  The contiguity, [inseparable], matches the contiguity, [animates].

Of course, this hylomorphe presents a challenge for modern evolutionary anthropologists who hold the Scottish philosopher, David Hume, in high regard.  Only the operations of the team can be observed and measured.  The organizational objective must be inferred.

Does this make sense?

A scientist builds models on the basis of observations and measurements of teams.  So, I suppose that it is easy for the scientist to imagine that these models correspond to organizational objectives.  Such projections are plausible when organizational objectives must be sensible.  In other words, the organizational objectives and the team are [inseparable] in ways that make sense.  [Animates] relies on sensible construction in the era of joint intentionality.

0510 What about the era of collective intentionality?

A community may be regarded as a team of teams.  Each team has a single animating organizational objective.  Can I label this objective, “subject”?  Each team has an animating subject.  When I scale up to the community, an organizational objective contains the objectives of each team as animating subjects.  Can I label this monstrous organizational objective,“subject”?  If I can, then each community has an animating subject that encompasses all the team-subjects and, hopefully, resolves their contradictions.

0511 The slogan, “we work for food”, unfolds into “we work for something more than food”.

The slogan, “we are a web of ‘you-me’ relations” expands into “we are a web of ‘team-team’ relations”.

May I now present a massive parody of Figure 4.1?

Each triangle represents a team.

The third person is the team of teams.

0512 Imagine trying to elaborate the nature of the preceding figure using explicit abstraction?

Spoken words pile onto spoken words in a litany of statements, qualifications, and oh-that-reminds-me-ofs.

Tomasello is a disciplined scientist.  He is very organized.  But, the above image breaches every item on his list because it composes the medium upon which the list is inscribed.  Even though each and every one of us appears to be a tabula rasa, a blank slate, at the time of birth, evolution has already contoured that slate so that cultural traits that conform to its apparently blank surface will absorbed like ink into parchment.

0513 Does collective intentionality bring diverse teams into harmony by putting their team organizational objectives into perspective?

Does collective intentionality bring different social circles into harmony as well?

0514 Chapter four strives to explain how second-person morality lays the groundwork for later hominin’s group-minded “objective” morality, characterized by (1) the creation of “objective” normative values of right and wrong, (2) nascent institutions (broadly described as conventions, manners and traditions) and (3) the obligation of a person with a moral identity to the moral community.

0515 In Razie Mah’s framework, two actualities reflect one another.  One is an actuality₂ that makes an institution within the community into a person writ large.  The other is an actuality₂ that makes an individual within the community into an institution writ small.

0516 Where do I get these metaphors?

Consider A Primer on How Institutions Think, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  This primer reviews a book by anthropologist Mary Douglas.

0517 Here is a picture of those two actualities.

0518 The three characteristics listed by Tomasello may be found within these two hylomorphes.  Surely, without a sense of right and wrong (1), an organizational objective cannot animate an institution…. er… organization.

Institutions are not the same as organizations.  A team is an organization that has an obvious mission.  The mission is captured in the slogan, “we work for food”.  Everything about the team concerns sensible construction.  Only later, when the community overflows with normative values, not only of right and wrong, but of all sorts of dichotomies, do teams engage in works of art (that is, social construction).

0519 Institutions put organizations into perspective (2). If an organization works to get a job done, then the institution puts that job into the perspective of right and wrong, or some other dichotomy.  In short, institutions have souls.  Organizations have bodies.  So, when an organizational objective [animates] an organization, the entire being acts like a person writ large.

0520 Finally, an institution’s organizational objective interpellates a person’s perceptive soul (3).  The term “interpellates” is composed of two Latin words.  “Inter” is often translated as “between” and “pellates” means “to call someone”.  The call comes from the third person, the institution, and is received by a person in community.  After receiving the call, the perceptive soul brings the reactive body into an act of collective intentionality (that is, into an organization).  Thus, a person becomes like an institution writ small.

0521 Well, the term, “third-person morality” is not what it first appears to be.

It may be also be called, “third-category morality”.

If second-person morality concerns the rights and the wrongs that go into productivity_2H and having fun_2V, in the sensible constructions of team activities, then this third-person morality must concern the rights and wrongs that go into something more than productivity_2H, such as an organizational objective_2H, and that go into something more than having fun_2V, such as the joy of being called_2V or the satisfaction of a moral identity_2V.

0522 The third-person of third-person morality is not a third individual, as depicted in Figure 4.1.  It is a person writ large, belonging to Peirce’s category of thirdness.

Third-person morality_C brings the actuality of second-person morality_B into relation with the potential of first-person morality_A.

Here is a picture of how each hylomorphe associates to an element in the nested form.

0523 Now, I portray a the third-person morality of Figure 4.1.

Does this look familiar?

Each gray figure in the preceding cartoon, if released from the “you-me” relationship of the team (in blue) and the institutional relationship (in green), could easily return to a primal world of power_2H and affiliation_2V.  To any person in our current Lebenswelt, this return would be experienced as a nightmare beyond imagination.

The individuals in team-related “you-me” relations (the figures in gray) live in a world of productivity_2H and having fun_2V (the figures in blue).  This is the sweet spot for many in our current Lebenswelt.  This is a world of sensible construction.  Everything makes sense because spoken words refer to things that can be pictured or pointed to.

Obviously, we all agree

Don’t we?

Sensical things consist in matter [substantiating] form.  Implicit abstractions are obvious.  Explicit abstractions are technical.  And yet, the run-of-the-mill person senses that, if there is no third-person, our world of sensible constructionmay be swamped by inner conflict or external threat.

So, what is a common person to do in our current Lebenswelt?

Join a congregation.

Especially, join a team within that congregation.

0524 Each green figure puts more than one “you-me” relation (blue figure) into perspective.  A congregation manifests something more than productivity_2H and something more than having fun_2V.

A government agency does not.  Government does something less than productive and something less than having fun. Taxation is not the same as spontaneously sharing abundance.

Faith is the more than sweet spot for many in our current Lebenswelt.  Faith is a world of social construction.

Yet, faith faces a difficulty.  Nothing makes sense, because spoken words refer to things that cannot be pictured or pointed to.  Nonsensical things consist in being [substantiating] form, which seems a lot like matter [substantiating] form, but who knows?  Beings are relational structures, which may or may not entangle matter. So, beings can be… um… difficult to comprehend, yet seem real.  Yes, spoken words can name beings, that seem actual and support implicit abstractions.  These implicit abstractions then support convictions that resist analysis through explicit abstraction (using spoken words).

Which is to say, spoken words can be misleading and slippery.

And… what does that mean?

In our current Lebenswelt, a snake resides in the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

0525 Institutions_C become persons writ large.  Individuals in community_A become institutions writ small.

Clearly, my discussion of third-person morality runs on a parallel track to Tomasello’s discussion of objective morality in chapter four.  They run through the same anthropological territory, but they stop at different stations.

At this junction, I am tantalizingly close to articulating the intersection for Era 2.

Here is the general version.

0526 The community has a slogan.  What that slogan is, I do not know.

0527 What do I know?

The community latches all the productive_2H and fun-loving_2V teams behind the locomotive of one big slogan.

Also, the community spawns its own teams.  These teams are more than productive_2H and more than fun-loving_2V.  Teamsare interpellated into being by institutions within the community.

In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, the community (150) harmonizes all other social circles: family (5), intimates (5), teams (15), bands (50), mega-bands (500) and tribe (1500).

0528 What is a good substitute for more than productivity_2H?

Does an interpellating organizational objective_2H fit the slot?

0529 What potentiates an organizational objective_2H?

Perhaps, the power of deservingness_1H will do.  An organizational objective_2H emerges from the power of deservingness_1H that comes from serving the “me” of a person writ large. An organizational objective_2H situates the potential of the power of deservingness_1H with a recognition_2H that an individual deserves power_2H within the institution_3H.

So, the power of deservingness_1H is situated as deserving of power_1H.

Is that confusing enough?

I love explicit abstractions.

0530 What is a good substitute for more than having fun_2V?

Well, congregations are about more than having fun.

Tomasello discusses these types of issues in the subsection titled, “Culture and Loyalty”.

An institution_C calls the individual_A to align his or her individual perceptions_A with the perceptions of a person writ large_C.

0531 Surely, interpellation brings a common cultural ground_C into relation with individual cultural practices_A (or “conventions”).

Interpellation keys into Tomasello’s explicit terminology, including “identification”, “loyalty”, “legitimization” and “moralization”.

0531 Interpellation offers a societal identity_2V to the person_A who aligns his or her judgments, perceptions and feelings to the person writ large_C.  The Germans have a word for this.  The word is “denkalign”.  “Denk” means “thought”.  If a person may be characterized as a perceptive soul [animates] a reactive body, then denkalignment offers a way for the perceptive soul to train its body’s emotions.

0533 Oh, now I can start to appreciate what Tomasello means by the term, “objective morality”.

Through denkalignment, I train my emotions according to a worldview that exists independently of what anyone thinks of it.

0534 Here is a picture of the substitutions.