03/25/25

Looking at Abir Igamberdiev’s Chapter (2024) “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings…” (Part 1 of 4)

0434 The text before me is chapter twelve in Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (2024, edited by Alexei Sharov and George E. Mikhailovsky, pages 265-278). The full title is “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings in the Relational Universe of Intercommunicating Agents”. The author is a biologist at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, at St. John’s.

0435 The introduction places the term, “agent”, on stage.

How does one know whether “an agent” is an agent?

Well, the agent should be obvious. An agent is physical. An agent is the repository of – what Aristotle calls – “final causality”. Final causality associates to another metaphysics-laden term, “teleology”.

What is the meaning of this term, “repository”.

0436 I only ask this because the thing that we encounter in science associates to what is for the Positivist’s judgment. Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay pertains to what is, and it describes semiotic agency. Semiotic agency (as the noumenon) gives rise to phenomena that are observed and measured by biologists, then the resulting models are attributed, not to agency₂ itself, but to the agent₃ and the agent’s intentions₁ (that is, final causalities).

0437 “Repository” plays out as a category-based nested form.

The normal context of an agent₃ brings the actuality of semiotic agency₂ into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘final causality’₁.

The agent₃ puts semiotic agency₂ into context. Semiotic agency₂ emerges from (and situates) the potential of ‘teleology’₁.

These basics are found in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0438 The image of “the agent” as “an obvious repository of final causality” treats the category-based nested form diagrammed above as a thing.

The author presents the image without hesitation, as if that is what human naturally do. Humans not only treat a thing as a thing, but we also treat a corresponding category-based nested form as a thing. Not the same “thing”, but still, a thing.

We observe semiotic agency₂. We visualize the agent₃ as a physical repository of final causality₁.

0439 What does this imply?

Consider the title of the chapter, Evolutionary Growth of Meanings in the Relational Universe of Intercommunicating Agents.

Where do I slip the category-based nested form into this title?

Do category-based nested forms slide into the author’s designation of “relational universe”?

If so, then the substitution brings this examiner face to face with where the author seems to be going, the recovery of Aristotle’s causalities within the milieu of biosemiotics.

0440 If that is the case, let me present a more hylomorphic version of the category-based nested form.

0441 Notice that actuality₂ corresponds to Peirce’s category of secondness. Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements. In the figure, the contiguity is placed in brackets for the purposes of notation.

For example, for Aristotle, when I encounter a thing, the two real elements that come to mind are matter and form. Matter is necessary for presence. Form is necessary for shape. What is the contiguity between matter and form? Here, I snatch a term that has been much abused, because it has been so difficult to grasp. The term is “substance”. I now assign a very specific, technical definition to the term in hand. “Substance” is the contiguity between matter and form.

0442 Aristotle’s hylomorphe is an exemplar of Peirce’s category of secondness.

Thus, the recovery of Aristotle’s terminology in the biosemiotic milieu begins.

0443 Abir Igamberdiev is not the only one to imagine a recovery of Aristotle’s causality in light of the postmodern compromise of the positivist intellect.

Mariusz Tabaczek pursues a recovery in the field of emergence. Emergence endeavors to account for the constellation of higher-order noumena that could not be predicted on the basis of lower-level noumena. Like biosemiotics, the goal is understanding, rather than prediction and control.

See Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Much of this commentary may be found in Razie Mah’s blog for March, April and May 2024. Tabaczek’s work is discussed in this examination in points 0276 to 0300.

03/21/25

Looking at Abir Igamberdiev’s Chapter (2024) “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings…” (Part 4 of 4)

0460 Section 12.3 covers meaningful information in autopoetic systems.

“Auto” means “self”. “Poetic” means “powered”.

0461 To start, the universe is full of spontaneous processes that may be modeled by truncated material and efficient causes. Entropy increases. Agency does not need to be present.

Autopoetic systems are not really self-powered. Instead, they entangle a spontaneous process (where entropy increases) in a triadic relation, so that, as movement towards thermodynamic equilibrium proceeds, some of the free energy is diverted to the maintenance and construction of an “autopoetic” being. This is the nature of emergence. Emergence associates to life.

0462 Igamberdiev notices that biological dynamics include both low-energy and high-energy processes separated by an epistemic cut. The epistemic cut becomes obvious when visualizing the way that formal and final causes envelope material and efficient causes. Formal and final causes associate to “low-energy”. Material and efficient causes go with “higher-energy”.

In the above figure. Low-energy describes the ontolon (in purple). Higher-energy describes the vortices (in green).

0463 Now, it seems that the low-energy and the high-energy dynamics must work in tandem. For example, models of self governance and potential courses of action and of salience should capture basic structural interactions between a living organism and its environment. Jacob von Uexkull (1864-1944 AD) coins the term, “Functionkreis”. Functionkreis may be regarded as systems of reflexive loops (vortexes) generating a network of biological codes(ontolons).

0464 Codes?

Yes, the concept of codes is already discussed in points 0409 through 0433.

0465 The high-energy, hard work of Functionkreis is investigated in biological laboratories throughout the world. What are the truncated material and efficient causalities that go into… say… whether a mitochondria is operating properly or malfunctioning? Laboratory scientists aim for mechanistic answers, but the terminology that frames their research questions betray the biosemiotic reality that they cannot allow to infect their methodologies.

The low-energy, epistemologically relevant work of codes is investigated by biosemiotics, as shown in the following figure.

0466 In section 12.4, Igamberdiev introduces the term, “codepoesis”.

Codepoesis contrasts with autopoesis.

“Codepoesis” labels an intrinsic property of biological entities, where the holistic living system maps out onto a finite set of constituent… um… semiotic agents. Yes, the organism maps (through codepoesis) onto its organs and systems as semiotic agents. Then, organs and systems as semiotic agents map onto tissues and anatomical arrangements.

0467 The list continues downwards towards physical poesis.

Upwards, the list ends with a holistic terminus that exhibits the rewards of codepoesis, but itself is not so bound by a superior level of code. In autopoesis, the “soul” is the kinetic perfection (substitute the word, “completion”, for “perfection”) of the body and the body is the holistic terminus of codepoesis. The levels of codepoesis may also be called “subagencies”.

0468 In section 12.5, Igamberdiev adds one more level of poesis. The autopoesis of the individual human occurs within a super-organism that has its own autonomy.

0469 Here, at the end of Part II of Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (2024, edited by Alexei Sharov and George E. Mikhailovsky, pages 187-278), the value of the category-based nested form comes to the fore as a style of semiotic inquiry within the category of sociopoesis.

Igamberdiev lays out a hierarchy as well as a frame for that hierarchy.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s semiotic agency captures what is common in all biological processes.

Sharov and Tonnessen propose their noumenal overlay within the hierarchy of sociopoesis.

So, Abir Igamberdiev seems to get the last word.

0470 This concludes my examination of Part II of Pathways, containing chapters nine through twelve titled and “Meanings in the Evolution of Life”. My thanks to each author and the editors for publishing these challenging essays.

03/12/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Agency In Non-Human Organisms” (Part 1 of 7)

531 The text before me is chapter four of Semiotic Agency (2021). Details on the text may be found on point 0473. Chapter four covers pages 95-122.

0532 This chapter is an overview of both hierarchy and the evolution of living systems composed of hierarchies of sub-agents.

0533 Section 4.1 concerns a gradation of competence in semiotic agency. The gradation arises from the intuitively obvious structure of animals.

0534 The above picture suggests that each level of semiotic competence both encompasses and transforms the adjacent lower level.

0535 Does the adjacent lower level come under the control of the higher level?

It makes me wonder about the term, “control”.

Does “control” assume the functionality of adjacent lower-level subagents?

Does “control” indicate that the higher-level agent uses lower-level subagents in order to achieve its goal?

0536 Well, here is one way to diagram the relation between agent and subagent.

The agent relies on the subagent to behave like its supposed to behave.

Does that accord with the meaning, the presence and the message of the word, “control”?

Yes, the agent uses the subagent and assumes the functionality of the subagent.

But “control”?

0537 Is there any other term that applies to the metasystem transition implied by the above figure?

Take a look at the normal contexts.

The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.

How do these apply to the above figure?

Obviously, the relation between the agent and subagent is one of alignment. This implies that the possibility of ‘final causality’₁ for the agent₃ is included in the possibility of ‘final causality’₁ for the subagent₃. Otherwise, the subagent₃would be excluded from the agent₃.

0538 Well, what about the other two logics?

Surely, exclusion and complement must have roles to play.

They do, in an evolutionary schema.

Recall, biological evolution is a mystery, consisting of the intersection of adaptation and phenotype. If evolution starts with an agent, and ends up as agent with subagents, then the subagents differentiate (exclusion), specialize (complement) and then align (alignment). If evolution starts with an independent agent (exclusion), who ends up as a subagent within another agent, then maybe some sort of phenotypic change comes into play (compatibility), leading to incorporation (alignment).

0539 Here is a picture of both routes.

0540 Consider the domestication of the dog.

Can I imagine the logics of exclusion, complement and alignment in play?

The agent is like an Umwelt to the subagent. The subagent participates in the Innerwelt of the agent.

03/5/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Agency In Non-Human Organisms” (Part 7 of 7)

0592 What is Pavlov up to?

He is a modern scientist, who has adopted the precepts of the Positivist’s judgment.

0593 At the end of this chapter on non-human agency, the authors warn against anthropomorphic theories.

Clearly, that is not the only danger facing biosemiotics.

The fact that a word in common use is used as the label for a class of psychological models attests to the way that (for triumphalist science) models may be used to overshadow and occlude their noumena.

Pavlov’s experiment is widely regarded as foundational in psychological empirical science. Yet, this examination suggests that, even before designing his experiment, Pavlov might have imagined that “anticipation” is what the noumenon must be, when it came to animal behavior.

0593 If correct, Pavlov’s work demonstrates that phenomenology is practiced in the formation of social sciences long before Husserl develops an explicit methodology for arriving at what the noumenon must be. This is discussed in points 0120 to 0129.

The word, “anticipation” papers over the noumenon for a wide variety of psychological phenomena. But, some scientists treat the word as if it is only a technical term in the scientific discipline of psychology.

0594 This conclusion is far more difficult to grasp that any warning about anthropomorphic theories.

Why?

Today’s psychologists think that “anticipation” is the thing itself when it comes to operant and instrumental conditioning.

0596 On top of that, neither “anticipation as noumenon” nor models of conditioned responses are semiotic. They do not face the reality that the thing itself can only be recognized within a purely relational structure. The noumena for biology, psychology and sociology are not as obvious as the noumena of the empirical sciences. They are not obvious because they are actualities₂ that only manifest in their proper normal contexts₃ and potentials₁.

Indeed, at some level of awareness, both social scientists and phenomenologists have always known this. Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay may be the first attempt to ground noumena in the biological and social sciences in the realness of triadic relations.

0597 This brings me back to agency in non-human organisms. The interactions between agents and subagents, as well as between agents, has been a focus on dyadic research for the modern era. These interactions will need to be reframed for the postmodern era of triadic relations.

0598 Indeed, take a look at the following figure, depicting the semiotic agency of Pavlov and his dogs as if they are subagents in a scientific institution.

Both the apparatus and the dog in the sling cohere to the relational structure of semiotic agency (as formulated by the S&T noumenal overlay).

0599 But, look at that dashed line arrow.

I wonder, “Is that arrow dyadic? Or does it hide a triadic relation?”

So concludes this examination of chapter four of Semiotic Agency.

12/30/23

Looking at Joseph Farrell’s Book (2020) “The Tower of Babel Moment” (Part 1 of 10)

0001 The full title of the work before me is The Tower of Babel Moment: Lore, Language, Leibniz, and Lunacy. The author is one of the wandering stars of our current age, an era when academics award more doctorates than any job market can absorb. Professors with sharp elbows occupy the few available academic positions, leaving brilliant and successful graduates, the ones with sharp minds, to find places in heaven knows where.

Farrell finds a spot on the internet, that once verdant pasture of free expression, and establishes his own scholastic exploration outside of modern institutional constraints. In short, he founds his own school. Those who listen to his voice offer remuneration. God bless all concerned.

0002 The work before me offers speculation on the nature of the titular biblical story.

Farrell proceeds by way of a spiral staircase of observations and… may I say?.. expansive “measurements”. Measurements of what? The literature of the seventeenth century? The titans of the late Renaissance? Yes, that will do.

0003 My goal in this examination is to shoehorn Farrell’s exploration into a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms. The interscope is elaborated in A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Of all procrustean beds that I have at my disposal, the interscope is most accommodating.

Here is a diagram of the interscope.

0004 The method is simple. First, associate features of Farrell’s argument to elements in the above matrix. Second, discuss the implications.

Each nested form consists of four statements, the most paradigmatic of which goes like this. A normal context₃ brings an actuality₂ into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘something’₁. The subscripts refer to the categories of Charles Peirce. Thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness.

The nested form is fractal. An interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms. A two-level interscope associates with sensible construction. A three-level interscope corresponds to social construction. Note how the labels change from 1, 2 and 3 to a, b, and c.

The three-level interscope allows the visualization of virtual nested forms, composed of elements within one column. For example, the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality turns the second column into a category-based nested form,where a perspective-level actuality_2c (as virtual normal context) brings a situation-level actuality_2b (as virtual actuality) into relation with a content-level actuality_2a (as virtual potential).

0005 Farrell opens chapter one with his personal discovery of Leonard Bernstein’s recorded lectures, titled “The Unanswered Question”. In these lectures, Bernstein discusses Noam Chomsky, who has his own unanswered questions. Chomsky, in turn, provokes Farrell to ask his own unanswered question, “How do linguists go about demonstrating linguistic universals?”

A universal may be regarded as an observable feature “measurably” appearing in all spoken languages.

0006 Phonologists find common observable features in the sounds of speech. Common sounds are attributed to the anatomy of the head and neck.

Etymologists find common observable features in closely related words in different languages. The words are similar and not identical, because they arise from isolation and drift among speaking populations, in a manner similar to biology’s slogan, “descent with modification”.

0007 The key?

Universals imply common origins. For phonologists, the universal is biological. For the linguist, the universal is… perhaps lost… in the recesses of time.

0008 A dramatic hypothesis stands against this key. A sudden change may destroy the common language of humanity. That change may be labeled, “A Tower of Babel Moment”.

0009 Years ago, Farrell proposes a wider context to this type of hypothesis. The scenario includes ancient cosmic wars and world grids. But, these are other books, and other matters, than the text at hand.

0010 So, before going on to chapter two, let me draw some associations.

On the content level, the normal context is language_3a. The actuality may be called a “topology”, or a map of all spoken languages_2a. The potential is that universals imply common origins_1a.

The normal context of language_3a brings the actuality of cross-language maps_2a into relation with the potential of ‘the idea that universals imply common origins’_1a.

On the situation level, the normal context is a civilizational moment_3b. The actuality is the Tower of Babel (the biblical story)_2b. The possibility is ‘discontinuity’_1b.

The normal context of a civilizational moment_3b brings the actuality of the story in Genesis 11₂_b into relation with the potential of a discontinuity_1b that corresponds to God confounding the common language of the plains of Shinar.

0011 Here is the two-level interscope.

12/26/23

Looking at Joseph Farrell’s Book (2020) “The Tower of Babel Moment” (Part 10 of 10)

0109 Farrell dares to worm a way into the fruit of the knowledge of the natural and the social sciences.

What does this examiner see?

Welcome to the postmodern version of the Tower of Babel.

0110 There is a new science in town. It is the science of psychometrics.

If the natural sciences stand for “science” for commoners, and if the social sciences constitute “science” for the technocrats running the modern administrative state, then the psychometric sciences define “science” for the movers and shakers constructing the modern Tower of Bab-ilim on the banks of the river, Potomac. Turn on corporate television. It is your gate to the gods.

0111 I leave to the reader, the exercise of transmuting the following figure with the social construction of the postmodern west in mind.

0111 With this transmutation, the spiral of Farrell’s speculation becomes a vision to behold. How does one worm into the fruit of the contemporary tree of knowledge, with all of its exoteric and esoteric dispositions and powers? One proceeds just as Farrell does, with an open heart and and an imaginative mind, in the conviction that, in the end, God reveals all truth.

0112 My thanks to Joseph Farrell for publishing such a wonderful and provocative book, with arguments worthy of the procrustean bed of the three-level interscope.

10/2/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 22 of 22)

0172 Deely concludes with a sequel concerning the need to develop a semioethics.

The meeting of the two semiotic animals in the previous blog is a case study.

Surely, that brief clash of objective worlds entails ethics, however one defines the word, “ethics”.

Perhaps, the old word for “ethics” is “morality”.

0173 Deely publishes in 2010.

Thirteen years later, his postmodern definition of the human takes on new life. This examination shows how far semiotics has traveled, swirling around the stasis of a Plutonic publishing world where Cerebus guards the gates. Please throw a sop to the editors in order to publish, rather than perish. While academics guard the way to the underworld of professional success, Deely looks down from the heavens above.

And what does he say?

Humans are semiotic animals.

0174 Okay, I have to correct myself.

I don’t know whether Deely is looking down from a heavenly perch.

Surely, many will sheepishly testify to his devilish, as well as his angelic, qualities.

As a shepherd, he is always trying to lead his rag-tag flock of semioticians, explorers and Thomists. He gets so far as to impress upon every one in his flock the validity of his claim that humans are semiotic animals.

0175 Razie Mah takes that lesson to heart and asks, “If humans are semiotic animals, then how did they evolve?”

The resulting three masterworks are available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

An Archaeology of the Fall appears in 2012, followed by an instructor’s guide.

How to Define the Word “Religion” appears in 2015, followed by ten primers.

The Human Niche appears in 2018, along with four commentaries.

As it turns out, no contemporary scientist takes Deely’s claim seriously. Yet, the implications are enormous. If humans are semiotic animals, then triadic relations must be key to understanding human evolution.

0176 This examination of Deely’s book takes that lesson one step further.

The specifying and exemplar signs step out from Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings as expressions of premodern scholastic insight.

The interventional sign steps out from Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols” and establishes a postmodern life of its own.

0177 Humans are semiotic animals and how we got here shines like a revelation.

09/29/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 1 of 18)

0028 This is the second blog in a series.

Looking at Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “Intersection” appears in Razie Mah’s blog from May 15 through 18, 2023. In that brief examination (points 0001-0027), a technical category-based definition of the term, “intersection” is shown to mesh with the theme of Kemple’s book, whose full title is The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).

To me, that is fascinating.

0029 In this series of blogs, I examine Kemple’s appendices.

Yes, he has more than one appendix.

Plus, there are subdivisions.

0030 Appendix 1.1 is titled, “Presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence”. My associations will draw upon A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, as well as A Primer on Natural Signs, Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, and Comments on Newell Sasha’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”. These primers and comments touch base with Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion”, which is available, along with the other mentioned e-works, at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0031 The title of Appendix 1.1 contains two technical terms.

“Presentative forms” is a term coined by Jacques Maritain and literally means a form that is substantiated by its presentation, rather than by matter. The hylomorphe is presentation [substantiates] form, rather than matter [substantiates] form.

“The grounding of transcendence” is a phrase used by Martin Heidegger. It conveys what the presentative form accomplishes. The presentative form accomplishes more than matter-substantiated form, because it leads to (grounds) another form, which is located at a higher categorical level (transcendence).

0032 Surely, this implies that presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence coincide in a particular way. The “matter” of the presentative form associates to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”.

Is this is a general feature of presentative forms?

Well, the claim is a good working hypothesis.

09/28/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 2 of 18)

0033 So why are presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence important?

It seems that they govern the ways in which the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness appear. The process is not straightforward. After all, if one category associates with what is expressed and the adjacent higher category goes with what is experienced (with the caveat that thirdness in what is presented wraps around to firstness in form), then each presentative form expresses two categories.

Oh yeah, that makes sense.

0034 But, it does not make sense.

Kemple quotes from Peirce’s 1903 essay, “Sundry Logical Conceptions”, concerning the modes of appearance for the categories of experience. In the following table, nine presentative forms are listed. Vertical columns correspond to the category of experience for the presentative form. The rows correspond to expression according to category.

The columns denote forms and the rows denote appearance (presentation).

0035 For example, consider the form of firstness (first column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to an idea of secondness. Here, I depict it as ‘something’ in the realm of actuality. An idea pertains to ‘something’ actual.

Here is another example from the above table. The form of secondness (second column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to the fact of relations. To me, these relations are hylomorphic, consisting of two contiguous real elements, characterizing Peirce’s category of secondness. A thing is a fact of (hylomorphic) relation.

One more example will help. The form of thirdness (third column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to signs of secondness. Actions are signs of secondness. So are modes of conduct.

0036 Each element in the above table embodies a form in one category and an appearance in another category. So, two categories are involved for each item in the table. Plus, the matrix is exhaustive.

0037 What about the idea that transcendence is grounded in crossing categories?

My head swims. But, it’s not Kemple’s fault. It is the idea that the presentative form has a hylomorphic structure and that the element that corresponds to “matter” belongs to one category and the element that corresponds to “form” belongs to the adjacent higher category.

This idea is not apparent in Peirce’s table, pictured above.

Kemple continues…

0038 Going down the first column, forms in firstness may be labeled as “ideas”. So, the element in the first row and the first column, is an idea of possibility (or, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility). Likewise, ‘something’ in the realm of actuality corresponds to the idea of secondness. ‘Something’ in the realm of normal context goes with the idea of thirdness.

Going down the second column, forms in secondness may be labeled as “facts”. So, qualia are facts of firstness. Relations in the style of hylomorphes are facts of secondness. Signs and other triadic relations are facts of thirdness.

Going down the third column, forms in thirdness may be labeled as “signs”. Feelings, such as awareness of a thing of beauty, are signs of firstness. Actions, such as modes of conduct, are signs of secondness. Thoughts are signs of thirdness.

0039 Still, I have a problem.

Even though each element in the above table references two categories. The rows and columns do not highlight the hypothesis about transcendence developed in the previous blog, where the “matter” of a presentative form belongs to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”.

Is there a ghost of a chance that Heidegger’s ground of transcendence haunts Perice’s table of presentative forms.

0040 Perhaps, I can conjure its specter by coloring a sequence of presentative forms, following the proposed hypothesis.

For each transition, from idea to fact, from fact to sign, and from sign to idea, there is a corresponding transition from firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.

The result is a seqence of novel presentative forms that are composed of elements of the table. The lower category presentative form for both appearance (row) and form (column) serves as “matter”… er, I mean “presence”… and the higher-category presentative form in both appearance (row) and category (column) serves as “form”.

0041 In the following diagram, sequences appear in color.

0042 The hylomorphic structure, lower-category presence [substantiates] higher-category form, embodies transcendence, defined as moving from one category to the adjacent higher category in both form and appearance. So, ways to imagine the coincidence of presentative forms and grounds of transcendence track the colors in the table above.

09/27/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 3 of 18)

0043 Okay, allow me to explore the most obvious diagonal.

0044 Consider ‘something’ in the realm of possibility [substantiates] the form of a hylomorphic relation. According to the hypothesis on grounding transcendence, the novel presentative form is ‘something’ possible [substantiates] a thing. An idea in firstness causes (or is contiguous with) the facts of a cause-and-effect relation. Element (column 1, row 1) substantiates element (column 2, row 2).

0045 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Moglichkeit (translated into English as “possibility”)?

Yes, Moglichkeit applies when ‘something’ in the realm of possibility serves as grounds for a cause-and-effect fact.

‘Something’ presents itself as a thing.

Okay, that sounds plausible.

0046 Let me consider the next novel presentative form.

Consider hylomorphic relations [substantiate] thoughts. A fact of secondness grounds a sign of thirdness. The thing is like matter. The thought is like form. Element (column 2, row 2) substantiates element (column 3, row 3).

Facts of secondness [substantiate] signs of thirdness. Things [substantiate] thoughts.

0047 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Ausweisen (previously rendered as “account” and now translated by Kemple into “pointing out”)?

A thing has significance.

Okay, here are two successes in a row. But, the trend is making me nervous.

The form of the first movement, presents itself as a fact and that presentation substantiates a sign in the realm of thirdness,corresponding to a thought.

I am afraid that this trend will end up as a tortuous run-on sentence.

0048 One more step.

Consider thoughts [substantiate] ‘something’ in the realm of possibility. A sign of thirdness grounds an idea of firstness. Thoughts are like matter. ‘Something’ in the realm of possibility is like form.

0049 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Boden (previously translated as “basis” and now translated by Kemple as “surroundedness”)?

Is the originating ‘something’ in the realm of possibility subsumed into a form that is substantiated by a thought?

Okay, I am not nervous anymore.

I am perplexed, yet intrigued.

0050 Of course, the questionable character of the following hypothesis cannot be doubted.

Otherwise, I could present the following claims as fiat accompli.

First, presentative forms in the table in Appendix 1.1 are hylomorphes, where the column conveys experience (form) and the row represents appearance (presentative).

Second, presentative forms may contribute to a novel presentative form, corresponding to Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence.

Third, tabular presentative forms that cross adjacent categories constitute a grounding of transcendence. This is a hypothesis.

In other words, the grounding of transcendence follows diagonals within Kemple’s table of presentative forms.

0051 What transitions do Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden correspond to?

How about passages from idea to fact, fact to sign, and sign to idea?

Another option is firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.

One more option is that both passages are implicated.

0052 In section 6.3.1, Kemple notes that Peirce’s categories and Heidegger’s groundings do not map onto one another perfectly. Peirce’s categories pertain to semiosis. Heidegger’s labels are contained within a framework of ontic-ontological transcendent grounds that are specific to human beings.

0053 So far, my associations to Kemple’s appendix 1.1 yields a hypothesis and a challenge.

The hypothesis is that Maritain’s presentative forms and Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence coincide with the construction of novel presenative forms, composed of presentative forms. A tabular element in one categorysubstantiates the tabular element in the adjacent higher category, for both columns and rows, with a wrap-around at thirdness.

The result is three sequences of three transitions, depicted in colors in the above table.

0054 If this result is plausible, the elements in the table are not only presentative forms, but they are also elements in a novel hylomorphic structure: presentative (column A, row B) [substantiates] form (column A+1, row B+1).

Heidegger’s terms seem to jive with these novel presentative forms.

0055 Is that confusing? If so, then I wonder.

Does Moglichkeit (possibility) start with the column of idea or with the row of firstness?

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