Category Archives: Defining Religion

04/22/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 4 of 4)

0680 Now I can draw another association between category-based nested forms.

0681 If biosemiotics is what all biological processes have in common, and if the authors are biologists who both study and participate in biological processes, then a technical discussion concerning how bacterial regulate their functions in response to various signals should contain a certain irony.

0682 So, it is no surprise that these biosemiotic researchers define3 “complexity”2 as situating the potential of ‘biological explanations of bacterial cues and signals using semiotics’1.

0683 The normal context of definition3 compares to how any biological organism defines itself within its Umwelt3.

0684 The actuality of the spoken word, “complexity”2, compares to what any biological organism is figuratively “conscious of”2 (especially in regards to a model of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness).  Or maybe, “complexity” describes what we are conscious of when we regard the semiotic interplay within any biological organism.

Plus, in the discussion section (14.5), “complexity” touches base with the “subjective experience” of an organism, from the point of view of a disinterested observer (the biosemiotician) looking in.  Perhaps, the organism is “conscious” of its “phenotype”.

0685 The potential of ‘explanations (meaning) of cues & signals (message) using semiotics (presence)’1 compares to the potential of ‘identity (meaning), competitive coherence (presence) and events within the Umwelt (message)’1 for any biological organism.

0686 Surely, this implies that Norris and Sharov’s hypothesis applies to any biological organism, not just bacteria.

How so?

In points 0634 and 0635, the category-based nested form for definition meshes with the actuality2 of semiotic agency.

Here is the same diagram applied to the bacterium.

Does it seem that speech-alone talk infiltrates semiotic agency?

It is as if a bacterium3 speaks2 its identity1.

0687 At the same time, I must keep in mind that biosemiotics dwells in the house of science.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, that is semiotic agency2, is objectified by biological phenomena in regards to meaning, presence and message1.  Or, should I say, “…in regards to SOe, SOs [&] SVe, and SVs.”?

These phenomena (what is for the Positivist’s judgment) are observed and measured in order to produce models using the disciplinary languages (including diagrams) of biosemiotics (what ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment).

All this occurs under the auspices of a positivist intellect (relation for the Positivist’s judgment) who would rather do without metaphysics  But hey, semiotic agency2 is an actuality2 within a triadic relation.  Without a normal context3and potential1 for semiotic agency2, biosemiotics simply does not register.

0688 Perhaps, “the temporal phenotype that the agent seems to be conscious of”2(2) corresponds to what needs to be explained in the S&T noumenal overlay.  If so, then the agent is “conscious” by way of its specifying and exemplar sign-interpretants (SIs and SIe).

That is to say, two sign-interpretants constitute an organism’s figurative “consciousness”.

Surely, these sign-interpretants3((1)) cannot be reduced to actuality2 because they reside outside of Peirce’s category of secondness.  However, because the entire nested form in the above figure meshes with the actuality of semiotic actuality2, these sign-interpretants3((1)) are incorporated into the realm of secondness2 by an agent3 (say, a bacterium) on the basis of the potential of ‘a final causality’1.

So, what does a scientist do?

The scientist reaches for the label, “complexity”.

It is sort like asking a familiar civilized term to execute a tricky cognitive manipulation.

0689 Who would anticipate that?

Surely, Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov propose a worthy hypothesis on on how bacterial cells sustain and change their lives in response to various signals.  The phenomenon of competitive coherence is worth elevating, along with the phenomena of identity and cues within the Umwelt. These phenomena are observable and measurable sign-elements ofthe S&T noumenal overlay.

0690 At the end, I am left with the ambiguity of “definition”.

What compares to definition?

In general, the normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of a spoken word (or term)2 into relation with the potential of meaning, presence and message1.

For this chapter, the normal context of the agent defining itself with its Umwelt2(3) brings the actuality that the agent is “conscious” of its “phenotype”2(2) into relation with the potentials of ‘identity (meaning), competitive coherence (presence) and signals and cues (message)’2(1).

For the unfolded empirio-schematic judgment, the normal context of disciplinary language3 brings the actuality of (complex) models for “the phenotype”2 into relation with the potential of ‘observations and measurements of biological phenomena’1.

0691 Here is a picture of the last two category-based nested forms in the previous point.

Clearly, a comparison between a definition that meshes with semiotic agency and the empirio-schematic judgment is provocative.

Yet, that provocation is in tune with the author’s proposal.

0692 That proposal is constructed with spoken words.

Speech-alone talk can label anything.  And, now we can label the meanings, presences and messages within biological organisms as if they are phenomena.  We can also model our observations and measurements of these phenomena using spoken words that describe what needs to be explained, the sign-interpretants themselves.

0693 Here is one implication.

Biosemiotics is the field of inquiry3 that brings definitions that mesh with semiotic agency2 into relation with the potential of empirio-schematic inquiry1.

Perhaps, this is why the field of biosemiotics seems to be older than science as configured by modern Positivists (beginning with the mechanical philosophers of the 1600s).

And younger.

0694 For the modern Positivists, empirio-schematic inquiry (what ought to be, secondness) belongs to the realm of actuality and the noumenon [and] its phenomena (what is, firstness) belongs to the realm of possibility.

For the postmodern biosemiotician, empirio-schematic inquiry opens up to the categories of thirdness and firstness,which are the same categories encountered in Aristotle’s formal and final causalities.

The implications are difficult to fathom.

0695 I thank the authors for this chapter and hope this examination adds value to their inquiries.

04/21/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 1 of 5

0696 The text before me is chapter fifteen in Pathways.  Details on the book are found in point 0474.  Chapter fifteen covers pages 325 through 344.  This is the third chapter in Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”, which is a long way of saying, “Non-human Agency”. The chapter’s full title is “Self-Reinforcing Cycles and Mistakes: The Emergence of Subjective Meaning”.

0697 Hmmm, I wonder, “Does the structure of the chapter’s title offer an example of a self-reinforcing cycle and a mistake?”

After all, the topic is the emergence of subjective meaning.

The proposed mechanism for the emergence is self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes.

0698 Putting the mechanism before the subject is like putting a cart before the donkey.  The cart contains the mechanism.  The donkey represents the emergent being.

This reminds me of the way that modern scientists are all about mechanistic and mathematical models (the cart).  They disregard the noumenon (the donkey).  They go so far as to say that the cart should take the place of the donkey.  But, who ever heard of a cart that pulls itself? 

0699 As far as the category-based nested form pictured below goes.  The donkey goes with agent3.  The cart associates to semiotic agency2.  The donkey3 contextualizes the cart2.  The donkey3 brings the cart2 into relation with the potential of ‘final causality’1, which does not appear in the title.  Or does it?

0700 The chapter’s title contains the terms “self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes”.  These go with actuality, just like the cart.

The chapter’s title contains the term “subjective meaning”.  I suppose that this goes with the normal context3, just like the donkey.  

0701 Okay, what about the word, “emergence”, where does that fit in?

Uh-oh.

0702 Let me step back and ask myself, “How could a cart reveal the donkey as a normal context, rather than an actuality?”

How could self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes reveal subjective meaning as a normal context, rather than an actuality?”

0703 Hmmm.  I suppose some adjustments are in order.

Emergence3 must be the normal context that brings the actuality of the dyad, donkey [pulls] cart2, into relation with well… the potentials that historically puts the donkey and the cart together1.  Now, there’s an empedoclement.

Also, emergence3 must be the normal context that brings the actuality of the dyad, subject [experiences] meaning2, into relation with the potentials of ‘self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes’1.  Ah, that suggests opportunities for empedoclements to happen.

0704 Usually, mistakes are impediments.

Occasionally, a mistake will be an empedoclement, which is the inverse of an impediment.

On top of that, some empedoclements seem (after the fact) to be inevitable.  During the Uruk period of southern Mesopotamia, the donkey is domesticated for long-distance trade.  The wheel is invented to make pottery.  In retrospect, the actuality of donkey [pulls] cart2 seems destined.

0704 Now, all that I need to do is to realize that subjective meaning2 is an actuality.  Actuality2 is dyadic.  So, subjective meaning2 can be rendered as a dyad, consisting of two contiguous real elements.  The two real elements?  I suppose they must be the subject and the experience.  After all, both are real.  That leaves [meaning] as the contiguity.

In the following figure, the lower category-based nested form parallels the upper.

0705 Okay, by analogy, the title of “Self-Reinforcing Cycles and Mistakes: The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” reminds me of an anthropological story about the invention of the donkey pulled cart during the Uruk archaeological period of southern Mesopotamia.

0706 Having concluded my examination of the author’s prowess is synthesizing titles, I proceed directly to the conclusion (section 15.8), where the author makes three points (and maybe, one more) by way of summary (S, T U and maybe, V).

0707 First (S), NeoDarwinism may be a factor in evolution.  But, it is not the only one.

On one hand, tell that to a modern biologist and watch the listener’s body-language say, “Oh no, am I talking to one of those intelligent design advocates?”

On the other hand, if I say, “Neodarwinism does not take triadic relations in account.  If it did, then biological evolution would have to be called ‘mysterious’.”

Then, the modern biologist might think, “Oh worse! It’s a postmodern semiotician!”

But, it is not my mission to point out that biosemiotics performs what Christian intelligent design enthusiasts want to do, but cannot.  Biosemiotics brings all of biology into the gambit of triadic relations, including Neodarwinism.

0708 How so?

In Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome, (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), Razie Mah shows that the living being (individual, species or genus) is the intersection of adaptation and phenotype.  Then, in How To Define The Word “Religion”, Razie Mah shows that intersections are mysterious, fulfilling the expectation that the word, “mystery”, accounts for the message underlying the word, “religion”.

0709 Here is a picture of where I am going with this.

One category-based nested form is horizontal.  The other is vertical.

Several steps are required to get there.

But, once I am there, the author’s claim that neodarwinism is insufficient will make sense in terms of semiotic agency.

04/8/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 5 of 5)

0735 How is biology… er… NeoDarwinism… incomprehensible?

0736 First of all, neodarwinism is an intersection.  An intersection contains contradictions that cannot be resolved.  That is why intersections are mysteries.  Philosophers can elucidate the contradictions, but they can never resolve them without cognitively reconfiguring the single actuality.

0737 For example, there are two major branches of evolutionary science.  For the most part, natural historians ignore the vertical axis and geneticists ignore the horizontal axis.  Everyone else ends up confusing niche1H and genotype1V as if these potentials1b situate “equivalent” actualities2a.

0738 The mystery within neodarwinism may be of interest to those concerned about mysteries.

After all, the Positivist’s judgment does not anticipate anything like this.  How can terms for two radically different models for the origins of species simply be clapped together?  I suppose that speech-alone talk can label anything, even mysteries… even, “neodarwinism”.

Well, “neo” is not exactly “genetic”.

Genodarwinism?

Perhaps, “neodarwinism” should be called out for what it is.

0739 Another reason why neodarwinism is incomprehensible is because the (hidden) content-level actualities2a do not have normal contexts3a and potentials1a.  They are the foundations2a of situation-level potentials1b that support situation-level normal contexts3b (natural selection3b and body development3b).  Does ecology and environment (as actualities independent of the adapting species)2a have anything to do with DNA2a (as the template for reproduction and cellular organization)?

I think not.

0740 So, how does one make biology… er, the evolution of subjective meaning on Earth… comprehensible?

This is the question that the author wrestles with.

The answer is in the title.  It must have something to do with the operations of self-reinforcing cycles.  How does biological meaning evolve?

Occasionally, mistakes do not act as impediments, but serve as empedoclements.

0741 Plus, the answer may have something to do with Peirce’s natural signs and how brainless creatures behave according to what we expect in terms of these natural signs.  When the behavior of brainless creatures is regarded through the lens of Peirce’s natural-sign typology, directionality and originality are obvious.  These obvious concepts must be indispensable for an explanation of the evolution of subjective meaning within biological entities.

0742 Neodarwinism will not do (S, T, U).

That much is for sure.

The role of Peirce’s natural signs (V) is a guess.

Or, should I say, “an intelligent guess”?

0751 For me, one of the pleasures of examining these chapters comes from the fact that the authors do not have a diagram of the S&T noumenal overlay before them, but they write like they are fishing around for the diagram.

In this case, the author does not catch, but almost hooks, a much bigger fish than neodarwinism.  Indeed, directionality (the horizontal axis) and originality (the vertical axis) are built into the diagram of the semiotic agent as a mystery, in the style of neodarwinism.

0752 Remember, the author discusses non-human, or rather, brainless organisms and ends up with an alluring line for appreciating the evolution of meaning in the universe.

My thanks to the author for the fishing expedition.  What a wonderful cast.

04/7/25

Looking at Hongbing Yu’s Chapter (2024) “…Danger Modeling…” (Part 1 of 7)

0753 The text before me is chapter seventeen of Pathways (2024, see point 0474 for details. pages 363-375).  This chapter concludes Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.  The related title in Semiotic Agency (2021, see point 0473) is “Nonhuman Agency”.  The author works at Toronto Metropolitan University, in the Department of Languages, Literatures and Cultures.

The full title of chapter seventeen is “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning Generation in Three Dimensions”.

0754 Of course, danger offers great examples for semiotics.  The abstract says as much.  In 2022, Marcel Danesi publishes a book on the topic, titled Warning Signs: The Semiotics of Danger.

For example, when a dog growls at me2a, that serves as a sign-vehicle (SVs) that is interpreted by my self-governance3bcontextualizing the potentials of various courses of action1b (SIs) in order to construct information2b (SOs).

0755 Here is a picture, using the S&T noumenal overlay.

0756 Yes, semiotic agency looks like a noumenon that exhibits observable and measurable facets (phenomena) that may be used to construct models of [self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b (SIs)] and[sentience3c((1c)) (SIe)].

Does the reader notice my sleight of hand in the preceding statement?

I substitute “sentience” for “salience” in SIe.

0757 The substitution is justified because information2b (SOs [&] SVe) says, “Danger is present.”

The “danger” goes with SOs.  Its “presence” is what I am sentient of (SVe).

The exemplar sign-relation goes like this.  The danger2b (SVe) that I am sentient of3c,1c (SIe) stands for something that I can avoid or safely ignore2c (SOe).

0758 So, what is the problem?

The author does not have the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay, which is foundational for the Positivist’s judgment, when it comes to biosemiotics.

Consequently, the author proposes that Thomas Sebeok’s concept of modeling may be used as a productive approach.  After all, modeling offers a highly integrative framework for meaning generation.

0759 Shall we see?

If highly integrative frameworks for meaning (that is, Sebeok’s models) are um… “natural”… for humans, then they should support implicit abstractions, characteristic of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Implicit abstractions are holistic.

0760 But, there is a problem.

We no longer live in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices hand- and hand-speech talk, which is holistic and relies on Peirce’s natural sign-relations of icon and index.  Of course, symbols operate in the background, allowing hand talk to become linguistic.

0761 Our current Lebenswelt practices speech-alone talk.

0762 How is this relevant to the current discussion?

With speech-alone talk, different aspects of a holistic implicit abstraction can be explicitly labeled.

The author identifies three dimensions to Sebeok’s models (as highly integrative frameworks of meaning): existential, representational and interpretational.

0763 These three dimensions are explicit abstractions.  They label “dimensions” of a model that frames message{SVs}2a and integrates presence {SOs [&] SVe}2b into meaning {SOe}2c.

In short, these dimensions bring this examiner right back to semiotic agency.

0764 Say what?

These dimensions bring this examiner right back to specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

So, the direction that this examiner will take, with plenty of creativity (hence, mistakes), calls to mind the S&T noumenal overlay, as the purely relational structure that all biological entities and processes have in common, including the case of me, surprising an unfamiliar dog, who is snarfing something already dead, found in a pile of autumn leaves.  The incident occurs on my morning walk with Daisy (who is taken by surprise herself, along with me).

04/1/25

Looking at Hongbing Yu’s Chapter (2024) “…Danger Modeling…” (Part 7 of 7)

0819 In the interventional sign-relation, the agent3 and final causality1 are exposed in the same way that a helium balloon, suddenly rising above a carnival crowd, says, “Someone just let go of their balloon (SOe).” 

Semiotic agency reaches a terminus (SOe).  That terminus is contiguous with an interventional sign-vehicle (SVi).  The contiguity is [meaning, mn].  The balloon rises from a perspective-level actuality2c (SVi) into the mundane atmosphere of a content-level actuality2a (SOi) in the normal context of say, what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a (SIi).

The rising balloon2a sends a message [mg] that says, “Now that I’ve caught your attention3a((1a)), I will serve as the next real initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs).”

0820 Here is a picture.

0821 The interventional sign relation occupies the existential dimension.

The existential dimension seems so much more dangerous than the other two.

0822 The representative and interpretive dimensions belong to semiotic agency.

0823 I suppose I may say that – if I must choose the second most dangerous dimension – the interpretative dimensioncomes next.

Why?

If I have poor information2b (SVe) and have an unworthy goal (SOe), then {SOe [meaning] (SVi)}2c may yield an intervention that misses the mark.

I suppose I am trying to say, “If the interpretative dimension is wayward, then the existential dimension becomes more dangerous.”

0824 Section 17.5 concludes the article by dwelling on the three dimensions and their roles in modeling danger.

0825 However, the existential dimension contains a hidden and disturbing discovery.  The existential dimension is outside of semiotic agency.  The existential dimension contains the interventional sign-relation.  The existential dimension may reveal the agent3 and the final causality1 that make semiotic agency2 an actuality2.

0826 Here is a picture of how semiotic agency (containing the representative and interpretive dimensions) entangles the interventional sign-relation (constituting the existential dimension).

0827 I thank the author for this wonderful chapter, fully titled “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning-Generation in Three Dimensions”, marking the conclusion of Part III of Pathways, titled “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.

This chapter marks the end of this examination of the biosemiotics of nonhuman agency and opens a portal to an examination of human agency.

0828 Biosemiotics is more than semiotic agency.  Biosemiotics includes the interventional sign-relation.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, more creative and productive than any noumenal overlay that biology has seen so far, now entangles an existential dimension.

03/25/25

Looking at Abir Igamberdiev’s Chapter (2024) “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings…” (Part 1 of 4)

0434 The text before me is chapter twelve in Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (2024, edited by Alexei Sharov and George E. Mikhailovsky, pages 265-278).  The full title is “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings in the Relational Universe of Intercommunicating Agents”.  The author is a biologist at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, at St. John’s.

0435 The introduction places the term, “agent”, on stage.

How does one know whether “an agent” is an agent?

Well, the agent should be obvious.  An agent is physical.  An agent is the repository of – what Aristotle calls – “final causality”.  Final causality associates to another metaphysics-laden term, “teleology”.

What is the meaning of this term, “repository”.

0436 I only ask this because the thing that we encounter in science associates to what is for the Positivist’s judgment.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay pertains to what is, and it describes semiotic agency.  Semiotic agency (as the noumenon) gives rise to phenomena that are observed and measured by biologists, then the resulting models are attributed, not to agency2 itself, but to the agent3 and the agent’s intentions1 (that is, final causalities).

0437 “Repository” plays out as a category-based nested form.

The normal context of an agent3 brings the actuality of semiotic agency2 into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘final causality’1.

The agent3 puts semiotic agency2 into context.  Semiotic agency2 emerges from (and situates) the potential of ‘teleology’1.

These basics are found in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0438 The image of “the agent” as “an obvious repository of final causality” treats the category-based nested form diagrammed above as a thing.

The author presents the image without hesitation, as if that is what human naturally do.  Humans not only treat a thing as a thing, but we also treat a corresponding category-based nested form as a thing.  Not the same “thing”, but still, a thing.

We observe semiotic agency2.  We visualize the agent3 as a physical repository of final causality1.

0439 What does this imply?

Consider the title of the chapter, Evolutionary Growth of Meanings in the Relational Universe of Intercommunicating Agents.

Where do I slip the category-based nested form into this title?

Do category-based nested forms slide into the author’s designation of “relational universe”?

If so, then the substitution brings this examiner face to face with where the author seems to be going, the recovery of Aristotle’s causalities within the milieu of biosemiotics.

0440 If that is the case, let me present a more hylomorphic version of the category-based nested form.

0441 Notice that actuality2 corresponds to Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  In the figure, the contiguity is placed in brackets for the purposes of notation.

For example, for Aristotle, when I encounter a thing, the two real elements that come to mind are matter and form.  Matter is necessary for presence.  Form is necessary for shape.  What is the contiguity between matter and form?  Here, I snatch a term that has been much abused, because it has been so difficult to grasp.  The term is “substance”.  I now assign a very specific, technical definition to the term in hand.  “Substance” is the contiguity between matter and form.

0442 Aristotle’s hylomorphe is an exemplar of Peirce’s category of secondness.

Thus, the recovery of Aristotle’s terminology in the biosemiotic milieu begins.

0443 Abir Igamberdiev is not the only one to imagine a recovery of Aristotle’s causality in light of the postmodern compromise of the positivist intellect.

Mariusz Tabaczek pursues a recovery in the field of emergence.  Emergence endeavors to account for the constellation of higher-order noumena that could not be predicted on the basis of lower-level noumena.  Like biosemiotics, the goal is understanding, rather than prediction and control.

See Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  Much of this commentary may be found in Razie Mah’s blog for March, April and May 2024.  Tabaczek’s work is discussed in this examination in points 0276 to 0300.

03/21/25

Looking at Abir Igamberdiev’s Chapter (2024) “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings…” (Part 4 of 4)

0460 Section 12.3 covers meaningful information in autopoetic systems.

“Auto” means “self”.  “Poetic” means “powered”.

0461 To start, the universe is full of spontaneous processes that may be modeled by truncated material and efficient causes.  Entropy increases.  Agency does not need to be present.

Autopoetic systems are not really self-powered.  Instead, they entangle a spontaneous process (where entropy increases) in a triadic relation, so that, as movement towards thermodynamic equilibrium proceeds, some of the free energy is diverted to the maintenance and construction of an “autopoetic” being.  This is the nature of emergence.  Emergence associates to life.

0462 Igamberdiev notices that biological dynamics include both low-energy and high-energy processes separated by an epistemic cut.  The epistemic cut becomes obvious when visualizing the way that formal and final causes envelope material and efficient causes.  Formal and final causes associate to “low-energy”.  Material and efficient causes go with “higher-energy”.

In the above figure.  Low-energy describes the ontolon (in purple).  Higher-energy describes the vortices (in green).

0463 Now, it seems that the low-energy and the high-energy dynamics must work in tandem.  For example, models of self governance and potential courses of action and of salience should capture basic structural interactions between a living organism and its environment.  Jacob von Uexkull (1864-1944 AD) coins the term, “Functionkreis”.  Functionkreis may be regarded as systems of reflexive loops (vortexes) generating a network of biological codes(ontolons).

0464 Codes?

Yes, the concept of codes is already discussed in points 0409 through 0433.

0465 The high-energy, hard work of Functionkreis is investigated in biological laboratories throughout the world.  What are the truncated material and efficient causalities that go into… say… whether a mitochondria is operating properly or malfunctioning?  Laboratory scientists aim for mechanistic answers, but the terminology that frames their research questions betray the biosemiotic reality that they cannot allow to infect their methodologies.

The low-energy, epistemologically relevant work of codes is investigated by biosemiotics, as shown in the following figure.

0466 In section 12.4, Igamberdiev introduces the term, “codepoesis”.

Codepoesis contrasts with autopoesis.

“Codepoesis” labels an intrinsic property of biological entities, where the holistic living system maps out onto a finite set of constituent… um… semiotic agents.  Yes, the organism maps (through codepoesis) onto its organs and systems as semiotic agents.  Then, organs and systems as semiotic agents map onto tissues and anatomical arrangements.

0467 The list continues downwards towards physical poesis.

Upwards, the list ends with a holistic terminus that exhibits the rewards of codepoesis, but itself is not so bound by a superior level of code.  In autopoesis, the “soul” is the kinetic perfection (substitute the word, “completion”, for “perfection”) of the body and the body is the holistic terminus of codepoesis.  The levels of codepoesis may also be called “subagencies”. 

0468 In section 12.5, Igamberdiev adds one more level of poesis.  The autopoesis of the individual human occurs within a super-organism that has its own autonomy.

0469 Here, at the end of Part II of Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (2024, edited by Alexei Sharov and George E. Mikhailovsky, pages 187-278), the value of the category-based nested form comes to the fore as a style of semiotic inquiry within the category of sociopoesis.

Igamberdiev lays out a hierarchy as well as a frame for that hierarchy.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s semiotic agency captures what is common in all biological processes.

Sharov and Tonnessen propose their noumenal overlay within the hierarchy of sociopoesis.

So, Abir Igamberdiev seems to get the last word.

0470 This concludes my examination of Part II of Pathways, containing chapters nine through twelve titled and “Meanings in the Evolution of Life”.  My thanks to each author and the editors for publishing these challenging essays.

03/12/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Agency In Non-Human Organisms” (Part 1 of 7)

531 The text before me is chapter four of Semiotic Agency (2021).  Details on the text may be found on point 0473.  Chapter four covers pages 95-122.

0532 This chapter is an overview of both hierarchy and the evolution of living systems composed of hierarchies of sub-agents.

0533 Section 4.1 concerns a gradation of competence in semiotic agency.  The gradation arises from the intuitively obvious structure of animals.

0534 The above picture suggests that each level of semiotic competence both encompasses and transforms the adjacent lower level.

0535 Does the adjacent lower level come under the control of the higher level?

It makes me wonder about the term, “control”.

Does “control” assume the functionality of adjacent lower-level subagents?

Does “control” indicate that the higher-level agent uses lower-level subagents in order to achieve its goal?

0536 Well, here is one way to diagram the relation between agent and subagent.

The agent relies on the subagent to behave like its supposed to behave.

Does that accord with the meaning, the presence and the message of the word, “control”?

Yes, the agent uses the subagent and assumes the functionality of the subagent.

But “control”?

0537 Is there any other term that applies to the metasystem transition implied by the above figure?

Take a look at the normal contexts.

The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment. 

How do these apply to the above figure?

Obviously, the relation between the agent and subagent is one of alignment.  This implies that the possibility of ‘final causality’1 for the agent3 is included in the possibility of ‘final causality’1 for the subagent3.  Otherwise, the subagent3would be excluded from the agent3.

0538 Well, what about the other two logics?

Surely, exclusion and complement must have roles to play.

They do, in an evolutionary schema.

Recall, biological evolution is a mystery, consisting of the intersection of adaptation and phenotype.  If evolution starts with an agent, and ends up as agent with subagents, then the subagents differentiate (exclusion), specialize (complement) and then align (alignment).  If evolution starts with an independent agent (exclusion), who ends up as a subagent within another agent, then maybe some sort of phenotypic change comes into play (compatibility), leading to incorporation (alignment).

0539 Here is a picture of both routes.

0540 Consider the domestication of the dog.

Can I imagine the logics of exclusion, complement and alignment in play?

The agent is like an Umwelt to the subagent.  The subagent participates in the Innerwelt of the agent.

03/5/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Agency In Non-Human Organisms” (Part 7 of 7)

0592 What is Pavlov up to?

He is a modern scientist, who has adopted the precepts of the Positivist’s judgment.

0593 At the end of this chapter on non-human agency, the authors warn against anthropomorphic theories.

Clearly, that is not the only danger facing biosemiotics.

The fact that a word in common use is used as the label for a class of psychological models attests to the way that (for triumphalist science) models may be used to overshadow and occlude their noumena.

Pavlov’s experiment is widely regarded as foundational in psychological empirical science.  Yet, this examination suggests that, even before designing his experiment, Pavlov might have imagined that “anticipation” is what the noumenon must be, when it came to animal behavior.

0593 If correct, Pavlov’s work demonstrates that phenomenology is practiced in the formation of social sciences long before Husserl develops an explicit methodology for arriving at what the noumenon must be.  This is discussed in points 0120 to 0129.

The word, “anticipation” papers over the noumenon for a wide variety of psychological phenomena.  But, some scientists treat the word as if it is only a technical term in the scientific discipline of psychology.

0594 This conclusion is far more difficult to grasp that any warning about anthropomorphic theories.

Why?

Today’s psychologists think that “anticipation” is the thing itself when it comes to operant and instrumental conditioning.

0596 On top of that, neither “anticipation as noumenon” nor models of conditioned responses are semiotic.  They do not face the reality that the thing itself can only be recognized within a purely relational structure.  The noumena for biology, psychology and sociology are not as obvious as the noumena of the empirical sciences.  They are not obvious because they are actualities2 that only manifest in their proper normal contexts3 and potentials1.

Indeed, at some level of awareness, both social scientists and phenomenologists have always known this.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay may be the first attempt to ground noumena in the biological and social sciences in the realness of triadic relations.

0597 This brings me back to agency in non-human organisms.  The interactions between agents and subagents, as well as between agents, has been a focus on dyadic research for the modern era.  These interactions will need to be reframed for the postmodern era of triadic relations.

0598 Indeed, take a look at the following figure, depicting the semiotic agency of Pavlov and his dogs as if they are subagents in a scientific institution.

Both the apparatus and the dog in the sling cohere to the relational structure of semiotic agency (as formulated by the S&T noumenal overlay).

0599 But, look at that dashed line arrow.

I wonder, “Is that arrow dyadic?  Or does it hide a triadic relation?”

So concludes this examination of chapter four of Semiotic Agency.

12/30/23

Looking at Joseph Farrell’s Book (2020) “The Tower of Babel Moment” (Part 1 of 10)

0001 The full title of the work before me is The Tower of Babel Moment: Lore, Language, Leibniz, and Lunacy.   The author is one of the wandering stars of our current age, an era when academics award more doctorates than any job market can absorb.  Professors with sharp elbows occupy the few available academic positions, leaving brilliant and successful graduates, the ones with sharp minds, to find places in heaven knows where.

Farrell finds a spot on the internet, that once verdant pasture of free expression, and establishes his own scholastic exploration outside of modern institutional constraints.  In short, he founds his own school.  Those who listen to his voice offer remuneration.  God bless all concerned.

0002 The work before me offers speculation on the nature of the titular biblical story.

Farrell proceeds by way of a spiral staircase of observations and… may I say?.. expansive “measurements”.  Measurements of what?  The literature of the seventeenth century?  The titans of the late Renaissance?  Yes, that will do.

0003 My goal in this examination is to shoehorn Farrell’s exploration into a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.  The interscope is elaborated in A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  Of all procrustean beds that I have at my disposal, the interscope is most accommodating.

Here is a diagram of the interscope.

0004 The method is simple.  First, associate features of Farrell’s argument to elements in the above matrix.  Second, discuss the implications.

Each nested form consists of four statements, the most paradigmatic of which goes like this.  A normal context3 brings an actuality2 into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘something’1.  The subscripts refer to the categories of Charles Peirce.  Thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness.

The nested form is fractal.  An interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.  A two-level interscope associates with sensible construction.  A three-level interscope corresponds to social construction.  Note how the labels change from 1, 2 and 3 to a, b, and c.

The three-level interscope allows the visualization of virtual nested forms, composed of elements within one column.  For example, the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality turns the second column into a category-based nested form,where a perspective-level actuality2c (as virtual normal context) brings a situation-level actuality2b (as virtual actuality) into relation with a content-level actuality2a (as virtual potential).

0005 Farrell opens chapter one with his personal discovery of Leonard Bernstein’s recorded lectures, titled “The Unanswered Question”.  In these lectures, Bernstein discusses Noam Chomsky, who has his own unanswered questions.  Chomsky, in turn, provokes Farrell to ask his own unanswered question, “How do linguists go about demonstrating linguistic universals?”

A universal may be regarded as an observable feature “measurably” appearing in all spoken languages.

0006 Phonologists find common observable features in the sounds of speech.  Common sounds are attributed to the anatomy of the head and neck.

Etymologists find common observable features in closely related words in different languages.  The words are similar and not identical, because they arise from isolation and drift among speaking populations, in a manner similar to biology’s slogan, “descent with modification”.

0007 The key?

Universals imply common origins.  For phonologists, the universal is biological.  For the linguist, the universal is… perhaps lost… in the recesses of time.

0008 A dramatic hypothesis stands against this key.  A sudden change may destroy the common language of humanity.  That change may be labeled, “A Tower of Babel Moment”.

0009 Years ago, Farrell proposes a wider context to this type of hypothesis.  The scenario includes ancient cosmic wars and world grids.  But, these are other books, and other matters, than the text at hand.

0010 So, before going on to chapter two, let me draw some associations.

On the content level, the normal context is language3a.  The actuality may be called a “topology”, or a map of all spoken languages2a.  The potential is that universals imply common origins1a.

The normal context of language3a brings the actuality of cross-language maps2a into relation with the potential of ‘the idea that universals imply common origins’1a.

On the situation level, the normal context is a civilizational moment3b.  The actuality is the Tower of Babel (the biblical story)2b.  The possibility is ‘discontinuity’1b.

The normal context of a civilizational moment3b brings the actuality of the story in Genesis 112b into relation with the potential of a discontinuity1b that corresponds to God confounding the common language of the plains of Shinar.

0011 Here is the two-level interscope.