0039 The vertical axis of biological evolution goes with body development3b, the phenotype2b and the genome1b. The genome1b is the potential1b of DNA2a, an internal actuality that is defines the lineage. DNA2a manifests descent with modification.
0040 How that translates into a metaphor for cultural development depends on the species… er… I meant to say… the institution.
An institution2b is like the phenotype2b. Traditionally, an institution2b virtually situates a traditional mission2a. So, a mission statement1b manifests the potential1b of a traditional mission2a and supports the institution2b.
Here is the corresponding two-level interscope.
Figure 13
0041 All this changes, leading to the trauma of 2017 at Evergreen State College.
Rather than a mission2a, whose normal context3a and potential1a should be protected by long-standing tradition, the content-level actuality2a changes to advocacy.
What is advocacy2a?
I could say advocacy2a is a type of mission2a. However, it is the type of mission where the normal context3a and potential1a are generated by another institution (safely hidden offstage, so to speak). Advocacy2a is like modified DNA2a. Advocacy2a supports indoctrination under the name of “education”. Advocacy statements1b manifest the potential1b of advocacy2a.
Here is a picture of the two-level interscope.
Figure 14
0042 Now, I combine the above situation-level nested forms to visualize interscopes for pre-2017 and post-2017 higher education.
The following diagram presents the system that selected for Heather Heying and Bret Weinstein as professors2H.
Figure 15
After the resignation of these professors, Evergreen State College may be portrayed by the following intersection.
Figure 16
0043 Higher education is a single actuality.
Before 2017, faculty2H are selected on the basis of their expertise1H.
After 2017, administrators2H are selected for on the basis of their ability to manage instructors1H (as well as other abilities).
The metaphorical niche1H changes and so does the metaphorical genome1V.
0001 Professor Gad Saad is an expert in applying evolutionary psychology to contemporary consumer behavior. He publishes a book, titled, The Parasitic Mind: How Infectious Ideas Are Killing Common Sense. The cover of the book is adorned with a graphic. A hand holds one end of a thread that goes on to become a line drawing of the human neocortex. Is the thread going into the head? Or, is the thread (of common sense) coming out of the head?
I suppose I have to read the book to find out.
0002 Saad gets into the push-pull operation in chapter four, titled, “Anti-Science, Anti-Reason and Illiberal Movements”. He lists four contemporary academic beings… er… parasites: postmodernism, social constructivism, radical feminism and transgender activism. Each movement… er… parasite is founded on a demonstrable falsehood. Each desires to be free from reality.
For these comments, I use gender as an example.
0003 In order to diagram these statements, I consult A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction. These primers, by Razie Mah, are available at smashwords and other e-book venues. They are not long. They are very informative.
0004 A parasite feeds off a host.
The host goes with the content-level. The parasite places content in an alternate situation.
0005 I begin with the host. The host takes the actuality of men and women2a, which emerges from a biological distinction (which, in turn is an actuality in another nested form)1a in the normal context of an orthodox view3a. The term, biological distinction1a, is short for the potential of sexual dimorphism, as expressed in humans1a. Roughly, “ortho” means “right” and “dox” means “doctrine”.
Figure 01
0006 Obviously, this content-level is scientifically, reasonably and liberally situated by cognitive psychology and its companion discipline, evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists explain the findings of cognitive psychologists in terms of natural selection and genetics: adaptations and phenotypes.
0007 The social constuctivist approach runs opposition to cognitive (and evolutionary) psychology. The social constructivist claims to situate the orthodox view, with the possibility that biological distinctions are irrelevant. Instead, only the human will is relevant. Gender is a personal choice. Gender is an act of the will.
The resulting situation-level nested form looks like this.
0110 Even weirder, what if the organizational objective2aC of the postmodern academy3aC, arising from the righteousness of radical individualism, marxist worldviews, and big government (il)liberalism1aC, is, as Dr. Saad claims, a self-deceiving parasitic syndrome?
What if the organizational objective2aC triggers susceptible individuals to identify as “oppressed”(2b)2aC because the privileges(2c)2aC of social justice(3c)2aC coincide with what one expects from participating in harmonious social circles?
0111 Wouldn’t that be freaky?
It is like drinking the Flavor-Aid.
0112 These comment bring the arguments in Dr. Gad Saad’s book into a strange revelation.
The reason why Dr. Saad is the target of animosity from colleagues in the postmodern multiversity unites with his chosen topic of expertise, evolutionary psychology.
Evolutionary psychology applies lessons about the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.
In doing so, it raises post-postmodern questions concerning the adaptive natures of human will(1a)2aC, systems(1b)2aC and protection(1c)2aC and their maladaptive expressions in our current Lebenswelt.
Plus, none of these topics can be discussed in the College of Social Construction.
0113 My thanks to Professor Saad for his excellent work.
0114 Our curent Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
Cheers for an expanded range of inquiry for evolutionary psychology.
The three masterworks of Razie Mah offer a treasure trove for those interested in human evolution: The Human Niche, An Archaeology of the Fall, and How To Define the Word “Religion”.
These are all available as electronic books. Just search for the author’s name, Razie Mah, along with the title.
0115 A Course on the Human Niche is a series, available at smashwords and other e-book venues, containing the masterwork, a primer, and commentaries, including the following.
Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big
Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) The Prehistory of The Mind
Comments on Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky’s Book (2016) Why Only Us?
Comments on Derek Bickerton’s Book (2014) More Than Nature Needs
Any literate adult can conduct a seminar class that reads and discusses these works.
0116 Another series, titled Buttressing the Human Niche, contains comments on articles and books on the topic of human evolution.
Here is a sample.
Comments on David McNeill’s Book (2012) How Language Began
Comments on David Reich’s Book (2018) Who We Are and How We Got Here
Comments on Christ Sinha’s Essay (2018) “Praxis, Symbols and Language”
Comments on Kim Sterelny’s Essay (2011) “From Hominins to Humans”
Comments on John Barrett and Krystalli Amilati’s Essay (2004) “Some Light on the Early Origins of Them All”
Comments on Stella Souvatzi, Adnan Baysal and Emma Baysal’s Essay (2019) “Is there Prehistory?”
These works may be purchased at smashwords and other e-book venues. They explore topics and demonstrate the practice of association and implication. They are ideal for throwing into an established study (or curriculum) on human evolution, in order to demonstrate the realness of triadic relations. Triadic relations are real enough to constitute a niche.
0117 Finally, the Razie Mah’s blog at www.raziemah.com looks at other publications. Each “looking at” blog consists of one to twenty parts. These may be used to spread the word, for enjoyment, discussion and erudition.
For example, the following appears in March 2021
Looking at Daniel Turbon’s Article (2020) “…Human Being in Evolution”
In May 2021
Looking at Chris Sinha’s Essay (2018) “Praxis, Symbol and Language”
0118 Currently, evolutionary psychology is narrowly practiced as an adjunct to cognitive psychology. Evolutionary psychology attempts to explain findings, models and evidence from cognitive psychology in terms of natural selection in the environment of evolutionary adaptation.
Now comes the Course on the Human Niche, Buttressing of the Human Niche, and other productions by Razie Mah,proposing that the ultimate human niche is the potential of triadic relations.
Yes, humans also evolve into very many proximate niches. But, all our proximate niches are bundled together by our ultimate niche. Proximate niches are like the various wooden rods bound together in the ancient Roman artifact called “religio”. This artifact serves as a metaphor for the human’s ultimate niche. Our ultimate niche binds all adaptations into proximate niches together.
0119 Professor Gad Saad’s book takes the reader outside of a narrow and closed practice of evolutionary psychology. However, since Saad does not know the hypothesis of the ultimate human niche, he cannot cross from complaining and demanding action to a wide-open practice of evolutionary psychology. Thus, he cannot fully comprehend what he is encountering in postmodern academics and elsewhere. He is moving towards a realization. It is just around the corner.
A wide-open evolutionary psychology examines our current Lebenswelt through the lens of adaptations accrued in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
That revolution in thought begins with Razie Mah’s masterwork, The Human Niche.
0001 Last month, the Razie Mah blog presented the end of Comments on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues). The blog is titled Looking at Graeber and Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “The State Has No Origins”.
The question arises, “Does the weird confounded diagram developed in this commentary have relevance to other inquiries covering the human condition in our current Lebenswelt?”
0002 This blog offers an answer, by way of example.
Three years before the conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter in the constellation of Aquarius, Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson publish an article in the Journal of International Political Theory (2017, Vol. 13(3) 282-295). The British scholars are experts in communication and sociology. Thier article investigates the role of anarchy… er, “anarchy”… in state securitization.
0003 The weird and confounded diagram that appears in the commentary on Graeber and Wengrow’s book looks like this.
Figure 01
The goal of this blog is to briefly review Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article and to demonstrate that a derivation of this figure maps onto the topic.
0004 What is this article about?
The full title is Schizorevolutions versus Microfascisms: The fear of anarchy in state securitisation. Needless to say, the terms are specialized descriptors. But of what?
0005 According to the above figure, academics may confound the state2b with sovereign acts and decrees2bC. The “state”2b is defined. What is defintion? Definition3 is the normal context bringing the actuality of a spoken word2 into relation with the potential of meaning, presence and message1.
The state2b‘ is a term arising from the presence of domination1b‘. But, domination2a must also be defined. The term, “domination”2a, emerges from (and situates) the possibilities inherent in the sole legitimate use of violence (similar to presence)1a’, the administration of information (like meaning)1a and the promotion and guidance of charismatic influence(like message)1a. I call policing, bureaucracy and maintaining reputation, “the three imperatives1a“. The three imperatives1a underlie domination2a.
0006 Here is a picture of the way that Graeber and Wengrow define “state”. This is the path of definition (P).
Figure 02
0007 The way of differentiation is developed in the chapter on presence in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues). Even though the differentiation of an originary, undifferentiated, social world follows the logic of Peirce’s categories, the process is also historic. Since the start of our current Lebenswelt, the societyC, organizationB and individuals in communityA have historically differentiated into three tiers of interscopes. As a result, realization of the two types of religion, corresponding to organizational objects2aC and a relational object2cC, follows the logic of the differentiation of category-based nested forms and occurs in history.
Here is a picture of the three-level interscope for the societyC tier. This is the path of differentiation (Q).
Figure 03
0008 Needless to say, neither Graeber and Wengrow nor Karatzogioanni and Robinson are aware of the the path of differentiation. So, they are not aware that they confound P and Q.
For example, in the introduction, the latter authors suggest that the securitisation discourse (the administration of information, P21a) by the state2b’ arises from the perception of “new threats” (charismatic influence outside of state supervision, P31a) and attempts to fix network flows (through violence, P11a). This also means that the normal context of sovereign power3bC brings the actuality of sovereign acts and decrees2bC into relation with the potential for ‘order’1bC. However, now sovereign power2bC is confounded with definition3b. The state2b is mixed up with sovereign acts and decrees2bC. Plus, ‘domination’1b is entangled with ‘order’1bC.
0009 Here is a picture of how the confounding seems to play out.
Figure 04
0010 Karatzogianni and Robinson immediately go on to say that their argument is based on a distinction between states and networks. Furthermore networks divide into two forms, such as affinity-active and non-affiliating-reactive, as well as between schizoid (non-affiliating active) and paranoic (non-affiliating reactive). Then, they discuss the ramifications in detail.
To me, the distinction between the state2b and its domination2a of organizational objectives2aC of insitutions3aCredefines3b institutions3aC as networks3a. Order1bC melds with efforts to control the content level1b. While “order” sounds legitimate. “Control” does not.
Order1bC establishes peace among instituions3aC working2aC independently based on their own righteousness1aC. Plus, that righteousness1aC does not pay tribute to the perspective level actuality2bC of fear.
Control1b envisions threats emanating from the open space of active desire1aC and aims to moderate these through domination2a (using P1, P2 and P3 of the three imperatives underlying the definition3a of domination2a). Consequently, attempts2b to supervise2b and narrow the space1b of righteousness1aC, sanction2b and outlaw2b objectsorg2aC, and wage war2b on institutions3aC that do not conform to state2b control1b expand into the fabric of everyday life.
0011 The state’s2b acts and decrees2bC are not oriented to protecting civilians or non-state actors. So, the normal context is not sovereignty3bC, but a defining power3b (responsible to a higher loyalty2cC, so to speak). Yet, this defining power3bspeaks the language of sovereignty3bC, just as Graeber and Wengrow do.
0012 But, who is doing the defining here?
Look at the perspective-level actuality2cC.
Fear2cC is not an emotion. Fear2cC is a demiurge, a relational object, an object that brings everyone into relation.
0028 This article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory (2017, vol 13(3), 282-295). So far, my examination describes how the weird confounded diagram developed in the commentary on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” is relevant to Karatzogianni and Robinson’s argument. This blog retells the story.
The weird diagram confounds two independent paths of articulation. The path of Graeber and Wengrow is the way of definition (P). After all, they are academics. Academics are devoted to defining their terms. The path of Razie Mah is the way of differentiation (Q). The differentiation of a nested form into the societyC, organizationB and individual in communityA tiers takes place in the chapter on presence in the masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.
Here is a picture of the situation and content levels of definition (P) confounded with the same levels of the societyC tier (Q).
Figure 08
0029 The above diagram does not include the perspectivec level of the societyC tier (Q). Karatzogianni and Robinson open by describing the securitisation state as exploiting and promoting an atmosphere of fear. Fear is the object that brings everyone into relation2cC.
Consequently, this confounding (P and Q) is put into perspective by a demiurge2cC, an entity standing above sovereign power, and this demiurge2cC defines the state2b.
Figure 09
0030 This configuration produces a split in the content level of defined3a institutions2aC.
Figure 10
Some institutions3b’ attempt to work with the state2b. These conforming institutions3b’ bring sanctioned organizational objects2b’ into relation with the potential1b’ of the three imperatives of domination1c’ as well as the institution’s original righteousness1b. This is useful for the state2c’, which relies on conforming institutions3b’ to situate institutions3a’ that (for whatever reason) cannot or will not conform.
Conforming institutions3b’ perform microfascist activities for the state2c’, increasing the possibility of state control1c’through forcing choices, limiting and misleading information, as well as protecting reputations. These activities are built into sanctioned organizational objectives2b’ that presumably emerge from (and situate) the potential of the institution’s original righteousness1b’. According to my reading this article, Karatzogianni and Robinson do not clearly ideate this side of the splitting.
Other institutions are downgraded (often, by state interference) into networks3a’. Nonconforming networks3a’ bring unsactioned organizational objectives2a’ into relation with the potential of ‘unsupervised righteousness’1a’. Conforming institutions3b’ are ofted viewed by the anarchy level as state apparatuses3b’ whose organizational objectives2b’ are compromised by the fact they follow the rules, even when not necessary, lie and cover up1b’.
0031 How do nonconforming networks3a’ respond?
Not as the state2c’ would like them do. The state2c’ now occupies the perspective level of an interscope that expresses the path of definition. Remember, the perspective level typically comes into play on;y when there is a failure on the situation level. In other words, the perspective level is taken for granted, until something goes wrong.
Here is the interscope of securitisation2cC.
Figure 11
0032 Once again, what about the response of noncomforming networks3a’ on the anarchy level?
Unsupervised righteousness1a’ inspires organization objectives2a’ that appear schizophrenic (they are listening to the voices in thier heads instead of the state) or paranoid (they think that the state is the one to fear, rather than the demiurge that defines the state). Consequently, the two actors of importance in Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article belong to the state and the anarchy levels.
0033 So, what is lacking in this article?
Situation-level institutionsb’ end up being drained of their original righteousness1b’ due to their compromise with the defining power3c’. Conforming institutions3b’ lose respectability by enforcing the three imperatives that underlie the word, “domination”1b’. Conforming institutions3b’ lose respectablity by sacrificing their original righteousness1b’ in the process of enforcing the three imperatives1b’. Yet, conforming institutions3b’ maintain respectablility by being the only ones whose organizational objectives2b’ are sanctioned by state decree2c’ and therefore less likely to suffer capricious state action2c’.
0034 It makes me wonder what the word, “respectable”, really means.
The sociological and psychological dynamics of the compliant level are ripe for exploration.
Coloration tells the story.
Figure 12
0035 So much for the political theory aspect of Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article, what about the “international” aspect?
After all, the article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory.
Well, in the introduction and the conclusion, the authors speculate that the security state may be a response to the anarchy generated by… or may be a strategy to control the wealth and innovations produced by… or may aim to wrest control from…
… global capitalism.
Which makes me wonder, “Could global capitalism be a demiurge, just like securitisation?”
If so, then Graeber and Wengrow’s weird confounding diagram is relevant.
And, the prior steps should apply to the following perspective-level nested form.
Figure 13
0036 The rest is left as an exercise for the intrepid inquirer.
0001 This chapter appears in Michael Millerman’s Book (2020) Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (Arktos Press). The composition of the book sends a message. A forty-nine page introduction is labeled as a preface, complete with Roman numerals. The first chapter covers Heidegger and stands in the center of the book. Then, chapters two through five covers the responses of four political philosophers to Heidegger’s academic labors (as well as his political affiliation).
Richard Rorty is discussed in the third chapter. This chapter serves as a transition from the weighty chapters on Heidegger and Strauss to the surprising chapters on Derrida and Dugin.
0002 Rorty offers a change of style. Rorty is an American philosopher. This pleases me, since I write like an American, too. I roll, roll, roll down the river of literary endeavors. My paddles are purely relational structures, such as the category-based nested form and the Greimas square.
Consequently, Millerman refers to movies, rather than books. And, if books must be mentioned, then novels come first.
0003 Oh, I should add, the first novel comes from the pen of Cervantes. Don Quixote marks the start of the Age of Ideas. In seventeenth-century Spain, two movements coincide. On one hand, Baroque scholastics finally articulate the causality inherent in sign-relations. On the other hand, Cervantes creates a new literary genre.
Perhaps, these two hands belong to a single entity. The novelist represents the scholastic behind the mask of modernity. Like the heroic character in V for Vendetta, there is no removing the mask. The Spanish innovator spins away from truth (the scholastics were all about mind-independent being) and leaps towards happiness (the novelists are all about mind-dependent beings).
Is it any surprise that, in the next century, France produces a revolution with a similar attitude? Then, two centuries later, today’s social democratic politics perform the same routine.
0003 Richard Rorty wrestles with a strange duality. Politics is contextualized by two distinct masters, truth and reality. Politics emerges from the potential of good (which goes with truth) and the potential of what can be done (which goes with reality).
Here is a picture of two nested forms.
Figure 01
0004 Of course, Rorty wants to step away from truth3 and find happiness in reality3. But, one cannot take the mask without the face or the face without the mask. One cannot say, “Look at the mask without thinking about the face.”
Here is where Rorty flounders. His social democratic politics tell him that viable options are the only things that matter. But, as a philosopher, he must face the question as to which options are good.
0005 In short, politics is a single actuality that is composed of two distinct nested forms. Neither nested form can situate the other. So, the actualities for both nested forms fuse, creating one single contradiction-filled actuality, as described in the chapter on message in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.
I call the following diagram, “an intersection”.
Figure 02
0006 Right away, I spy that the single actuality of politics2 veils two unspoken actualities that emerge from (and situate) the vertical and horizontal potentials. These two actualites are overshone by politics2, in the same way that Mercury and Venus appear to disappear within the Sun in astrological conjunctions. The technical term is “combustion”.
Here is a Greek parody of politics2.
Figure 03
0007 Yes, truth3V and reality3H exhibit different orbits around politics2.
According to Millerman, Rorty is a social democrat advocating for truthlessness and hopefulness.
0008 How does that statement mesh with the above intersection? Rorty distains Heidegger’s romance with language and says that there is no such thing as a thing itself that can be put into language. So forget esse_ces (beings substantiating) and essences (substantiated forms). Indeed, forget righteousness. The question is whether the thing is useful. Or not.
At first, it seems that Rorty is only interested in the horizontal axis.
0009 But then, Rorty writes that there are three conceptions of the aim of philosophizing in the modern era. These three are Husserl’s scientism, Heidegger’s poetics and Dewey’s pragmatism. The latter two respond to the former. Husserl idealizes scientists. Heidegger extols poets. Pragmatists, like Rorty, Dewey and James, prefer engineers.
Now, if I associate these embodiments into the above mystery, then I replace Mercury with the engineer and Venus with the poet, resulting the the following intersection.
Figure 04
0010 Once I diagram this, the contradictions become more apparent. The Heideggerian venusian poet2V and the pragmatist mercurial engineer2H orbit an all encompassing solar politics2. From the point of view of an astrologer, sometimes these inner planets run ahead of the solar presence, sometimes they lag behind the solar presence, and sometimes they are in conjunction with the solar presence. Combustion! The Sun’s transit through the constellations, plays this celestial drama over and over again, for those who watch the heavens. For those who watch politics, the Earth orbits the sun.
0012 Rorty’s condundrum becomes all the more visible.
Rorty, a pragmatist mercurial engineer2H, is trapped by the same gravitational field of politics2 as Heidegger, a visionary venusian poet2V.
0013 Rorty is a social democrat, concerned with implementation of policies that work. He has lots of options, but no philosophical heft when it comes to figuring out the truths of political matters, much less the question, “What is a political good?”
Heidegger is an anti-democratic phenomenologist, whose vision of the truth amazingly allows him to pursue the only political option available to a professor of philosophy at the University of Freiberg during the Third Reich. If Heidegger wants to keep the job, there not many options. The German people march, like Don Quixote on his quest, towards a political good that is a figment of their leader’s imagination.
0014 What does this add up to?
Well, I suspect that Rorty, having no sympathy for Heidegger, wants to replace the political philosophical poet with a nice automated coffee dispenser. First, the dispenser does not talk. Second, everyone agrees that coffee is needed in departments of philosophy. Its utility is guaranteed.
Of course, Millerman does not agree with this utopian solution.
Utopian solution?
Brew a cup of coffee and think about it.
0015 One problem lies in the nature of the intersection. One actuality overshines two. Intersections are filled with contradictions.
On top of that, an intersection may serve as actuality in a nested form.
Rorty sees no other options for political philosophy than social democracy. His vision serves as a clue that Rorty works within social democracy3 as a normal context. Normal contexts tend to exclude other normal contexts. But, social democracy3 cannot exclude the normal contexts of reality3H and truth3V.
Why?
Reality3H and truth3V belong to politics2.
What about potential?
Well, not unlike Voltaire’s Candide, Rorty aims for the best of all possible worlds.
That means utopia is possible, today.
0016 Here is the nested form for Rorty’s politial philosophy.
Figure 06
0017 This nested form dovetails into Rorty’s views concerning the contingency of language2V and the absence of foundation1V. Rorty needs truth3V. But, his utopia1 comes on the wings of viable options1H, not from claws sharpened by debates over the good1V. So, the philosophical question boils down to figuring out options1V, without being gouged by the claws of do-gooders2V.
0018 Other philosophers hone in on Rorty’s dilemma. Obviously, Rorty evades the contradictions inherent in politics2. How so? Rorty cannot offer a persuasive resolution to a mystery that is as old as Mercury and Venus and the Sun. Surely, the beauty of a mystery does not dwell in avoiding its contradictions. Theologians know this. Modern philosophers have forgotten this lesson. Astrologers remember.
0019 This nested form allows me to appreciate Millerman’s claim that Rorty does not respond to Heidegger philosophically. He responds politically.
To Rorty, the vertical axis of the intersection2 corresponds to Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological reactionary politics of nostalgia2, which is just another metaphorical language game. Indeed, such nostalgia arises from the potential of another no-where1 (the transliteration of the Greek term, “utopia”). Rorty accuses Heidegger of trying to step onstage in a decisive event in the History of Being, when a new philosophy emerges from the ashes of the old, on the possibility of a new know-where1. Know-where1 does the truth3V bring that coffee-making appliance2 into relation with the good1V than in the dispensation of Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological nostalgia3.
0020 Here is a picture of Rorty’s view of Heidegger’s political philosophy.
0021 Of course, Heidegger would (if he could) return the insult, by calling Rorty a liberal propagandist.
After all, Rorty is not concerned with questions of truth3V, preferring issues concerning social consequences3H.
0022 Plus, Heidegger (if he could) would have regarded the imprisonment of Rorty and other social democratic philosophers as a matter of “petty details”.
Petty details?
In Heidegger’s view, the West has exhausted its options1H. And, proof comes later in the title of Rorty’s book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Are these options? Or, are they signs of exhaustion? Compare that title to Being and Time.
0023 The squishiness of the former title is made worse when Rorty’s dichotomy of choice, private versus public, appears to align with the potentials of good1V and options1H, respectively. Is truth3V private? Is reality3V public? If so, then I ask, “Are these affirmations the poisonous fruits of the Treaty of Westphalia?” The Treaty of Westphalia marks the start of the modern era, almost four hundred years ago.
Perhaps, Rorty inadvertently testifies to Heidegger’s proposition. The West has exhausted its options1H. Politics2 is the intersection of the actualities of reality3H and truth3V, arising from the potential of viable options1H and good1V. Without a good1V, there are no options1H. So, politics2 is dead. But, our love (philo-) of wisdom (-sophy) endures. So, it is only a matter of time before politics2 rises again.
Shout it from the rooftops!
Politics2 is dead. Long live politics2.
0024 My thanks to Michael Millerman for his excellent chapter into how Rorty views Heidegger, chapter three in Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (2020, Arktos Press, London), pages 97-134.
0001 Many home and private schoolers face a difficulty.
They want to teach their children and students about God and nature.
At the same time, they want their children and students to pass standardized tests constructed by government agencies that declare themselves to be “not religious”.
Can a “not religious” sovereign establish a religion?
I like to call this apparent anomaly, “Big Government (il)Liberalism”.
Other names also apply.
0002 Indeed, parents and teachers suspect that the standards… or perhaps, the norms… of these godless educational… er, indoctrinating agencies do not allow a type of thinking that has been common to Christian civilization since its inception. This type of thinking is both analytic and synthetic and is promulgated by the schoolmen (or “scholastics”) of the so-called “Middle Ages”.
As it turns out, scholastic debates concerning mind-independent and mind-dependent reality end up with a definition of sign-relation that incorporates modern science, while at the same time transcending it.
Of course, the mechanical philosophers of the 1600s don’t know this. Modern scientists try to model observations and measurements of phenomena, using their highly specialized disciplinary languages. These models break down into two elements: cause and effect.
But, material and physical cause and effect cannot describe the causality inherent in sign relations.
0003 Surely, there are three elements to all existence.
Charles Peirce (1839-1914 AD) reads Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), a Baroque Scholastic, and comes up with the idea that there are three categories. Firstness has one element. Secondness (which includes mechanical science) has two elements. Thirdness has three. These three categories describe the causality inherent in a sign relation.
These three categories are also the foundation for the category-based nested form.
0004 So, what does this mean to parents and teachers?
None of the government agencies, who declare themselves to be “scientific”, can define the sign as a triadic relation.
So, perhaps that is a good place to start.
0005 Semiotics encompasses the natural sciences, not the other way around.
Teaching your students the analytic and synthetic practices of the category-based nested form and semiotics will prepare them for technology, engineering and mathematics. Science typifies secondness. And, secondness stands between thirdness and firstness.
Say what?
Take a look at the following figure. Even without familiarity with Peirce’s categories, the diagram tells a story concerning the relevance of triadic relations1 in regards to inquiry3 and science2. Understanding is not the same as scientific determination.
Figure 01
0006 What about the social sciences?
I wonder, can modern social scientists observe and measure social phenomena?
Can they model observations of religious behavior, when they describe themselves as “not religious”?
If everyone can be religious and if social scientists choose not to be religious in order to build models of their observations of those who are, then isn’t there some sort of contradiction?
Or, is that the nature of specialization?
Speaking of specialization, sociologists do not study psychology. Psychologists do not study sociology. Plus, sociology and psychology ignore biology. All these disciplines are alchemically sealed within their own academic echo-chambers. They cannot hear one another.
Say what?
0007 The category-based nested form is a triadic relation, that is both synthetic and analytic. It is useful for reading texts. It is a powerful tool for picturing the purely relational characteristics of psychology, sociology, cognition and evolution.
A Course on How to Define the Word “Religion” offers a unique path into topics covered by the so-called “social sciences”, without the blinders of BG(il)L.
Please consider this course when developing a curriculum for your children and your students.
