11/5/24

Looking at Daniel Houck’s Book (2020) “Aquinas, Original Sin and the Challenge of Evolution” (Part 23 of 23)

0236 Augustine’s mechanism captures the essence of the first singularity. It does not capture the esse_ce. Augustine treats the Garden of Eden as if it is a real story. Instead, the fairy tales of Adam and Eve point to the first singularity.

Similar mythologies from the ancient Near East, revealed during the past three centuries from archaeological excavations, give the same impression. Humans do not have a deep past. Humans are recently manufactured by differentiated gods, who arise out of a foggy, undifferentiated nowhere.

0237 These ancient writings are not known during the Latin Age, so the scholastics do not contest Augustine’s mechanism. Yet, they find that the mechanism is not sufficient, because of those damned dead infants. How can infants express concupiscence?

The concern is both mechanistic and conditional. It can be portrayed as a dyad in the realm of actuality. This actuality corresponds to original sin₂.

0238 How to describe the contiguity?

Houck lists three scenarios that gain prominence during the Latin Age: disease theory, a legal connection, and a realist view.

These three approaches tie into the above actuality.

0239 Augustine’s conflation of concupiscence and procreation provides a disease mechanism for how Adam’s rebellion infects us.

The legal framework corresponds to God’s Will, which is contained in the command, not to eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The status of humanity changes from blessed to cursed. A change in legal status puts Augustine’s conflation into context₃.

The realist view is that humans lost something with Adam’s rebellion. The Story of the Fall indicates that humans lost access to the tree of life. A better way to put it is: The tree of life is no longer a possibility₁. The Garden of Eden is no longer possible. So, God is no longer present as He once was.

0240 In sum, the scholastics, following Aristotle’s four causes, place Augustine’s mechanism into a complete category-based nested form.

0241 Perhaps, the reader can predict my next move.

I wonder, “Can this nested form go into the perspective level of divine suprasubjectivity?”

Or, does it correspond to what Christian doctrine projects into perspective-level elements?

Here is how the perspective level changes.

Note how the normal context_3c and potential_1c have changed character, they are now qualified.

Note how the judgment of original justice_2c (belonging to thirdness) changes into a mechanistic dyad_2c (belonging to secondness).

What are the implications?

0242 A change in perspective for God passes into a change of perspective for humans.

Our commitment_2c does not make sense without God’s orientation (grace).

0243 Adam disobeying God’s command changes our legal status_3c.

The ejection of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden changes God’s Presence_1c from open to hidden.

And worse, a mechanism connects Adam’s rebellion to our own lives_2c. Augustine’s hybridization of concupiscence and procreation is one mechanism that captures crucial features of the contiguity. However, modern evolutionary science argues for its implausibility. Adam and Eve are not the first human beings. Therefore, they are not the parents of all humans today.

0244 Is there a mechanism that will meet the qualifications of cause-and-effect and offer us (in our current Lebenswelt) a glimpse into who we evolved to be?

Augustine’s mechanism coheres to a literal interpretation of the Story of the Fall. Consequently, the mechanism is not independent of the biblical text.

The mechanism of the first singularity coheres with an interpretation of the Story of the Fall that is appropriate for the genre. The stories of Adam and Eve are fairy tales. Fairy tales are stories that are told to children. Often, they are preserved with remarkable precision over hundreds (and for these stories, thousands) of years. They may point to some primal event. That event cannot be reconstructed from the fairy tale itself. That event must be postulated independently of the fairy tale.

The hypothesis of the first singularity fits the criteria of (1) cause-and-effect and (2) a connection to the Genesis text. But, it does not allow us to appreciate how the twist in human evolution touches base with the doctrine of original sin.

0245 This is why Aquinas’s postulation of original justice_2c is so crucial.

Original justice_2c pertains to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

Original sin_2c pertains to our current Lebenswelt.

Original sin_2c is the privation of original justice_2c.

Speech-alone talk is the privation of the hand-component of hand-speech talk.

Speech-alone talk attaches labels to the elements within the perspective-level actuality_2c.

Why stop there?

Spoken words can label every element on the perspective level, as well as the situation level, as well as the content level.

This is not possible in iconic and indexal hand-speech talk.

0246 The Story of the Fall tells a tale, rich in details that call to mind the first singularity.

With the assistance of the serpent, Eve attaches spoken labels to the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Then, her spoken words generate the reality of Adam’s rebellion.

0247 Thousands of years later, scholastics refine the Story of the Fall into a perspective-level category-based nested form for original sin.

They know nothing about the content level, as it currently is configured by modern science.

They know that the content level pertains to crucial questions, “Where does the world come from? Where do we humans come from?”

They know that the situation-level addresses the question, “What went wrong?”

They figure that we cannot return to the Garden of Eden. We cannot go back to the original justice_2c, enjoyed by Adam before his rebellion.

This explains why revelation is necessary.

0248 Jesus Christ fills the emptiness inherent to original sin. No one, not even infants, can avoid that emptiness. Original sin is the privation of original justice.

From this, Latin-Age scholastics cobble together a normal context_3c and a potential_1c for the mechanism connecting Adam’s rebellion to our current lives_2c.

0249 Speech-alone talk facilitates the scholastic’s exercise in exemplar extrinsic formal causality. Speech-alone talk permits the articulation of exemplar signs.

The sign-vehicle (SV_e) consists of phantasms that arise from the recitation of the Story of the Fall_2b.

The sign-object (SO_e) is the perspective-level actuality_2c.

The sign-interpretant (SI_e) is as shown below.

0250 In this exemplar sign, Augustine’s version of original sin_2c initially stands where original justice_2c used to be. Original sin_2c overwrites original justice_2c. This is what spoken words do. Our verbal rhetoric can never recapture the wholeness of the commitment_2c that we evolved to sense and feel_2a. But, it sure can trigger our longing for that wholeness.

Yet, Augustine’s vision captures an essential feature of our own lives_2c. We are fallen.

0251 Similarly, the proposed confluence of Adam’s rebellion and a change in Lebenswelt may occupy the contiguity in the dyad where original justice_2c used to be. Again, this proposal somehow distorts the judgment. But, it does so in a way that scientists cannot dismiss out of hand. The hypothesis of the first singularity is not the second doctrine of original sin. However, it offers a mechanism that reflects quite nicely in the mirror of theology.

See Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues (also appearing in Razie Mah’s blog from April through June 2024).

0252 Not unlike Augustine’s first version of original sin, the first singularity offers a suite of insights that are difficult to ignore. First, it is mechanistic in the way that science is mechanistic. Second, it challenges current paradigms on human evolution, but not the data that support them. Neodarwinism has not come to grips with the possibility that the human niche is not material. Modern evolutionary science has yet to entertain the idea that human evolution comes with a twist. Plus, the twist is metaphysical.

And, what better place to look for the metaphysical tools to construct the second doctrine of original sin, than those formulated by Thomas Aquinas and re-formulated by Charles Peirce, who is about to be baptized in the same way that Aquinas baptized Aristotle and Averroes?

0253 So, I conclude my comments on Daniel Houck’s Book (2020) Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution. My thanks to the author and apologies for wandering far and wide.

0254 And, what about the turtle?

When I place the apparently dead turtle into the pond. Its head and feet poke out from under the shell. It swims away. The pond is its Umwelt.

We (humans) are not so fortunate. We can never return to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. Nor can we create our own utopia. The most we can hope for is some miraculous redemption of our current Lebenswelt. This is precisely what God delivers.

06/29/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2024) “Theistic Evolution” (Part 1 of 21)

0644 The full title of the book before me is Theistic Evolution: A Contemporary Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: UK). The book arrives on my doorstep in October 2023. The copyright is dated 2024.

How time flies.

0645 This examination builds on previous blogs and commentaries.

Here is a picture.

0646 A quick glance backwards is appropriate.

Tabaczek’s story begins in the waning days of the Age of Ideas, when the Positivist’s judgment once thrived.

0647 The Positivist judgment holds two sources of illumination. Models are scientific. Noumena are the things themselves. Physics applies to models. Metaphysics applies to noumena. So, I ask, “Which one does the positivist intellect elevate over the other?”

The answer is obvious.

So, the first part of the story is that the positivist intellect dies, and lives on as a ghost (points 0001-0029).

0648 Tabaczek buries the positivist intellect and places the two sources of illumination against one another. It is as if they reflect one another.

But, the two sources also have their advocates.

In Emergence, Tabaczek argues that models of emergence require metaphysical styles of analysis.

In Divine Action and Emergence, he sets out to correct metaphysical emanations reflecting scientific models of emergence. It is as if these emanations are reflections of science in the mirror of theology. Intellectuals inspired by science want to see ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment in the mirror of theology. But, note the difference between the picture of the Positivist’s judgment and the two hylomorphes in Tabaczek’s mirror (points 0039-0061).

0649 Why do I mention this?

In the introduction of the book before me, Tabaczek discusses his motivations. He, as a agent of theology, wants to exploit an opportunity. That opportunity is already present in the correction that he makes to what an agent of science sees in the mirror of theology (pictured below).

0650 What an opportunity!

Tabaczek offers the hope of a multidimensional, open-minded, and comprehensive (say nothing of comprehensible) account of evolutionary theory.

How so?

The positivist intellect is dead. The positivist intellect ruled the Positivist’s judgment with the maxim, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”

0651 Now that the positivist intellect is dead, the two illuminations within the former Positivist’s judgment may transubstantiate into the realm of actuality and become two hylomorphes, standing like candles that reflect one another in Tabaczek’s mirror.

Tabaczek, as an agent of theology, witnesses how a scientist views himself in the mirror of theology. The scientist sees the model as more real than the noumenon (the thing itself, which cannot be objectified as its phenomena). Indeed, the scientist projects ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment into the mirror of theology.

0652 Tabaczek wants to project his philosophical construction of the noumenon (in concert with its dispositions and powers, as well as its matter and form) into the mirror of science.

But, I wonder whether any agent of science is willing to stop listening to the ghost of the positivist intellect long enough to discern what theologians project into the mirror of science.

0653 Yes, Tabaczek’s inquiry is all about optics.

0654 So, who are the players involved in the intellectual drama of Tabaczek’s mirror.

Tabaczek identifies three.

To me, there must be four.

0655 The first is the agent of science. The science^agentis the one that makes the models. Two types of science^agent stand out in the study of biological evolution: the natural historian and the geneticist.

0656 The second is the agent of theology. Tabaczek limits theology^agents to experts in Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.).

In a way, this self-imposed limit is a handicap, since Aristotle and Aquinas philosophize long before Darwin publishes On The Origin of Species (1859).

In another way, this self-imposed limit is a blessing, since it provides me with an occasion for examining his argument from the framework of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). According to the semiotician and Thomist John Deely (1942-2017), Peirce is the first postmodern philosopher. Peirce is also a co-discoverer of the triadic nature of signs, along with the Baroque scholastic (that is Thomist) John Poinsot (1589-1644), otherwise known as John of Saint Thomas.

Peirce’s semiotics begins where Baroque scholasticism leaves off.

0657 The third is the image that the scientist projects into the mirror of theology. I label this image: theology^mirror, in contrast to science^agent. The theology^agent can see the image in theology^mirror, but is not the source of that image. I have already shown the initial image that the agent of science sees in the mirror of theology. I have also noted that Tabaczek aims to correct that projection.

0658 The fourth is the image that the theologian casts into the mirror of science. I label this image: science^mirror, in contrast to theology^agent. The science^agentcan see the image in science^mirror, but is not the source of that image. I have already indicated that the science^agent (more or less) does not care what is in science^mirror, because the ghost of the positivist intellect whispers in the ear of science^agent, “All that metaphysical stuff is completely unnecessary.”

06/6/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2024) “Theistic Evolution” (Part 21 of 21)

0824 Even though the bill is paid, and the public curtain closes on this examination of Tabaczek’s book, the flavors of the dessert still linger.

The associations in chapter seven suggest a retrogression into the house of evolutionary creation.

At the same time, the associations intimate a moment when the author can go direct into the house of theistic evolution.

0825 How so?

Can a scientist observe and measure the actuality₂ within a category-based nested form?

Yes.

What about the normal context₃ and potential₁?

No, the scientist can only observe and measure phenomena associated with a category-based nested form. Phenomena go with the actuality₂. The noumenon associates to the normal context₃ and potential₁.

0826 Well, if that is the case, and if the Kantian slogan of the noumenon applies (that is, the noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena), then the normal context₃ and potential₁ [cannot be objectified by] the actuality₂.

But, this is what human constantly do. Humans understand actuality₂ in terms of its₂ normal context₃ and potential₁. So humans intuitively sense that the normal context₃ and potential₁ can be objectified by the corresponding actuality₂.

0827 Indeed, the fact that the four causes work together to elucidate a category-based nested form constitutes one reason why Aristotle’s four causes are superior to attributions to the four elements (earth, water, fire and air).

Aristotle’s four causes are built into human nature.

0827 So, let me re-imagine the dessert, even as I digest it.

To start, a theology^agent (B1) realizes that Aquinas’s use of primary, secondary and instrumental causation in evolutionary creation can be formulated in terms of a category-based nested form.

Next, the agent of theology (B1) begins to appreciate the reason why Aristotle’s four causes are so appealing. The four causes work together to elucidate all three elements of a category-based nested form. The category-based nested form is the first step in understanding.

Yes, the category-based nested form is a purely relational structure that is independent of the human mind.

But, it seems that the category-based nested form is embedded in the human body and brain.

0828 A question appears in the science^mirror (C2), asking, “Is our capacity to intuitively construct category-based nested forms adaptive? Is the human niche the potential of category-based nested forms, in particular, and triadic relations, in general?”

0829 An answer is already prepared for the slot for science^agent (A3).

Razie Mah’s e-book, The Human Niche, is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

The claim?

The human niche is the potential of triadic relations.

0830 This is what theistic evolution can produce that evolutionary creation cannot.

In order to taste what Tabaczek’s meal (B1) does to the mirror^science (C2) consider two of Razie Mah’s blogs (A3), both of which claim that current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us how humans evolved to recognize the noumenon, the thing itself, through implicit abstraction.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us where we came from.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us what we evolved to be.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us what went wrong.

0831 Here is a picture of one Greimas square for the optics of Tabaczek’s mirror.

0832 Oh, the two blogs?

Looking at Mark S. Smith’s Book (2019) “The Genesis of Good and Evil”, appears in Razie Mah’s blog from Jan 13 through 31, 2022.

Looking at Carol Hill’s Article (2021) “Original Sin with Respect to Science”, appears from February 7 through 25, 2022.

With that said, I thank Dr. Mariusz Tabaczek O.P. for this wonderful banquet for thought.

But, my work is not done. I now retreat to Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) in order to examine chapter eight.

05/31/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2021) “Divine Action and Emergence” (Part 1 of 22)

0155 I turn to the book that follows Emergence (2019).

The book before me is titled Divine Action and Emergence: An Alternative to Panentheism (2021, Notre Dame Press). The book divides into two parts. Part one concerns emergent phenomena (and looks back upon the previous book). Part two covers divine action in emergence.

But, is not there already a number of theories in our Age of Ideas concerning the topic of divine action in a world full of truncated material and efficient causalities?

0156 Oh, there is more than a number, which reminds me of the earnestness and ambition of Tabaczek’s graduate project.

Most graduate students, after being lured into an advanced program in science by the philosophical side of Tabaczek’s mirror, figure out that the noumenon, the thing itself, is an inaccessible reflection of the agent-side of science, the side where all the difficult and detail-oriented laboratory work gets done. That realization takes one or two years. Then, the rest of one’s graduate career consists of grinding out the data and wondering why doing science is not as fun as thinking about doing science.

In short, most graduate students in the natural sciences learn to live as agents on the science side of Tabaczek’s mirror.

0157 I suspect that the same process should have happened to Tabaczek, entering a graduate program in philosophy of science and getting introduced to diverse machinations of science-agent philosophers, explaining how the hylomorphe on the science side is reflected by the noumenon side of Tabaczek’s mirror as a sort of “cloud of unknowing”, that conforms to the ghost of the positivist intellect.

But, it does not.

0158 Perhaps, it is a miracle that those agents of science who supervise his doctoral studies do not sabotage and destroy this creature, who seems to absorb the soul-breaking literature, yet remains eerily constant in his vision.

Perhaps, Tabaczek holds the element of surprise because he stands in a tradition that loves science, yet despises the positivist’s intellect, which has one rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.

Most students coming out of the Christian tradition simply get confused and wander into specialized technical fields of either science or modern philosophy. Will they ever get the memo? The positivist intellect is dead.

05/6/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2021) “Divine Action and Emergence” (Part 22 of 22)

0331 My sudden turn to semiotics does not occur in Tabaczek’s text.

Such is the examiner’s prerogative.

At this point, I stand at the threshold of section 1.3.4, almost precisely in the middle of the book.

My commentary on this book is significant.

Shall I review?

I represent the Positivist’s judgment as a content-level category-based form and discuss how it might be situated (points 0155 to 0184).

I suggest how reductionists can game emergent phenomena. Plus, I follow Tabaczek back to the four causes (points 0185 to 0239).

I present a specific example of an emergent phenomenon, building on the prior example of a hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell. Then, I return to Deacon’s general formula for emergence (points 240 to 0276).

Finally, I examine Tabaczek’s “philosophical history of panentheism” up to the section on Hegel (points 0277 to 0330).

0332 These are notable achievements.

But, my commentary is not more significant than Tabaczek’s text.

At this point, it is if I look through Tabaczek’s text and see something moving, something that catches my eye. It is not for me to say whether it is an illusion or a registration. It is enough for me to articulate what I see.

0333 At this point, I draw the veil on Razie Mah’s blog for April and May of 2024 and enter the enclosure of Comments on Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024), available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Comments will cover the rest of Part Two of Divine Action and Emergence. June 2024 will look at the start of Tabaczek’s next book, Theistic Evolution and Comments will complete the examination.

My thanks to Mariusz Tabaczek for his intellectual quest.

0334 But, that is not to say that I abandon Tabaczek’s text.

No, my slide into sign-relations is part of the examiner’s response.

This occurs in Comments.

There is good reason to wonder whether the response is proportionate.

I let the reader decide.

04/30/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2019) “Emergence” (Part 1 of 22)

0001 Philosophers enamored of Aristotle and Aquinas tend to make distinctions. So, what happens when such philosophers wrestle with modern science as it confronts the realness of apparently irreducibly complex systems, such as um… hydrogen-fuel cells and the Krebs cycle, which serves as the “fuel cell” for eukaryotic cells?

On the surface, Tabaczek fashions, yet does not articulate, a distinction between… hmmm…

0002 Consider a sentence, found on page 273 of Emergence, midway in the final chapter, seven, saying (more or less), “I hope that my re-interpretation of downward causation and emergent systems, in terms of old and new Aristotelianism, will help analytical metaphysicians sound more credible to scientists and philosophers of science, who employ, analyze and justify methodological reductionism.”

….what?

Philosophers of science and analytialc metaphysicians?

0003 Philosophers of science attempt to understand the causalities inherent in the ways that each empirio-schematic discipline applies mathematical and mechanical models to observations and measurements of particular phenomena. In terms of Aristotle’s four causes, their options are few. Science is beholden to material and efficient causalities, shorn of formal and final causation. So, they end up going in tautological circles. What makes a model relevant? Well, a model accounts for observations and measurements of phenomena. What are phenomena? Phenomena are observable and measurable facets of their noumenon. What is a noumenon?

Ugh, you know, the thing itself.

If I know anything about the Positivist’s judgment, then I know this. Science studies phenomena, not their noumenon.

Everybody knows that.

Except, of course, for those pathetic (analytical) metaphysicians.

0004 …what?

A noumenon and its phenomena?

0005 Tautologies are marvelous intellectual constructions.

In a tautology, an explanation explains a fact because the fact can be accounted for by the explanation. For modern science, mathematical and mechanical models explain observations and measurements because observations and measurements can be accounted for by mathematical and mechanical models.

Scientific tautologies are very powerful. Important scientists ask for governments to support their empirio-schematic research in order to develop and exploit such tautologies… er… technologies. Philosophers of science tend to go with the flow, so they end up employing, analyzing and justifying the manners in which mathematical and mechanical models account for observations and measurements, along with other not-metaphysical pursuits. One must tread lightly. First, there is a lot of money on the line. Second, the positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.

0006 …hmmm…

Does Tabaczek offer a way out of the rut of not-metaphysics, without noticing that the rut is what distinguishes scientific inquiry from experience of a thing itself? Aristotle will tell me that the rut is not the same as the world outside the rut. The scientific world is (supposedly) full of mind-independent beings. Ours is a world of mind-dependent beings.

0007 …aha!

Now, I arrive at the yet-to-be-articulated distinction between what science investigates and what we experience.

For the modern philosopher of science, models are key. Disciplinary language brings mathematical and mechanical models into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena.

For the estranged modern metaphysician, the thing itself is key. The thing itself, the noumenon, gives rise to diverse phenomena, facets that are observable and measurable.

Consequently, the distinction that Tabaczek does not name looks like this.

Figure 01

04/5/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2019) “Emergence” (Part 22 of 22)

0149 In chapter five, Tabaczek starts to develop the noumenal side of his mirror, beginning with dispositions and powers. Tabaczek wants to use these terms interchangeably. Perhaps, it is better to regard them as two contiguous real elements, where the contiguity is [properties].

Disposition [property] power is a hylomorphe that is slightly different than Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter [substance] form. Even though they differ, they both belong to Peirce’s category of secondness.

To me, Peirce’s secondness opens the door to expressions of causality that reflect Aristotle’s hylomorphe in so far as they have the same relational structure.

Currently, no modern philosopher views Aristotle’s hylomorphe as a prime example of Peirce’s category of secondness.

How so?

As soon as a modern philosopher recognizes the point, then he or she becomes a postmodern philosopher.

Labels can be slippery.

0150 In chapter six of Emergence, Tabaczek introduces forms and teleology (that is, formal and final causes). The operation of these causes within the category-based nested form has already been presented.

0151 In chapter seven, Tabaczek labors to apply his dispositional metaphysics to Deacon’s formulation of dynamical depth. Perhaps, the results are not as coherent as the application found in this examination, but his efforts are sufficient to earn him his doctorate in philosophy.

Amen to that!

0152 Overall, Emergence is a testimonial to the resilience of a graduate student who completes his doctorate in philosophy of science without knowing that the model and the noumenon are two (apparently competing) illuminations within the Positivist’s judgment.

0153 Why doesn’t he know?

Well, no one knows, because philosophers of science are not paying attention the traditions of Charles Peirce or of Jacques Maritain. As noted in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, Maritain uses the scholastic tool of three different styles of abstraction to paint a picture of science displaying the structure of judgment. Peirce’s semiotics and categories clarify Maritain’s painting by resolving two integrated yet distinct judgments: the Positivist’s judgment and the empirio-schematic judgment.

Plus, another reason why no one knows is because philosophers of science still think that the positivist intellect is alive. All laboratory scientists obey the dictate of the positivist intellect. Metaphysics is not allowed. So, if well-funded scientists are correct, then philosophers of science must project what is for the Positivist’s judgment from science into their own image in Tabaczek’s mirror. They do not realize that Tabaczek inadvertently de-defines the positivist intellect by not getting the Positivist’s memo and regarding a noumenon as the thing itself and its phenomena as manifestations of dispositions [properties] power.

0154 Say what?

Tabaczek’s “dispositional metaphysics” disposes with the positivist intellect by vaporizing the relation of the Positivist’s judgment and condensing what ought to be (the empirio-schematic judgment) and what is (the noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena) as two distinct illuminations. Both enter secondness. Two hylomorphes stand juxtaposed. In Tabaczek’s mirror, each hylomorphe sees its own image in the other.

12/15/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 8 of 20)

0067 The year, 1935 AD, stands in the interim between the “First World War” and the “Second World War”.

Remember, these terms are modern labels for two brief historical periods.

Jacques Maritain publishes his book in the interim. He lives in France, where Christendom faces an apparently mortal enemy: Modernity.

0068 Modernity has modern science in its arsenal. Christendom has… um… a newly revived Thomism, apparently ill-suited for the intellectual fashions coming from allegedly “scientific” movements, such as Darwinism, Marxism, Saussure’s linguistics, Husserl’s phenomenology, quantum physics, and so on. Catholic intellectuals in Paris, a former epicenter of medieval scholasticism, ask, “What is the nature of science?”

Maritain’s answer may be diagrammed according to the triadic structure of judgment. A judgment contains three interlocking elements: relation, what is and what ought to be. A judgment is a relation between what is and what ought to be. When each element is assigned one of Peirce’s categories, then the judgment becomes actionable. Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.

0069 Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment.

0070 A positivist intellect (relation) brings a noumenon […and…] its phenomena (what is) into relation with an empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be).

0071 Note that two judgments are entangled. The empirio-schematic judgment is embedded within the Positivist’s judgment. The empirio-schematic judgment is what ought to be. It is also imbued with the category of secondness, the realm of actuality. To the scientist, a model is more real than its supporting observations and measurements. How so? One may make predictions about future observations and measurements based on the model.

0072 Also note that what is has a hylomorphic structure, even though it belongs to the category of firstness, the realm of possibility. Aristotle presents an exemplary hylomorphe: matter [substantiates] form. This hylomorphe fits Peirce’s category of secondness. Secondness consists in two real contiguous elements. For Aristotle’s hylomorphe, the real elements are matter and form. The contiguity is labeled “substance”. For clear nomenclature, I place the contiguity in brackets.

In the above figure, the substance labeled “…and…” is far more complicated than it appears. The full hylomorphe is a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena. […And…] is short for […cannot be objectified as…].

Perhaps, it will be no surprise that the noumenon associates to Dennett’s term, “manifest image”.

0073 Dennett’s scientific image is located in what ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment. Here is a picture of the empirio-schematic judgment.

0074 How do diagrams of the Positivist’s and empirio-schematic judgment illuminate Dennett’s subliminal… or is it sublime?… defense of the Positivist’s judgment?

To start, I wonder, “What elements associate to the manifest image and to the scientific image?”

Well, obviously, the manifest image and the noumenon go together.

The scientific image matches mathematical and mechanical models.

0075 Here is a result of the substitutions.

0076 Ah, the manifest image is already proscribed by the rule of the positivist intellect. The manifest image is not the thing itself. It is a sensation_2a, a phantasm_2b or a judgment_2c concerning the thing itself. The manifest image calls to mind the actualities within the scholastic interscope about what is going on in an individual’s mind.

Plus, the scientific image is constructed from observations of phenomena that cannot fully objectify the manifest image… er… our mind’s response to a noumenon, a thing itself.

0077 Here is a comparison of what is for the standard version and for the adjusted version of the Positivist’s judgment.

0078 What does this imply?

Dennett’s defense of the Positivist’s judgment is neither subliminal nor sublime. It is subtle, in precisely the way that philosophers employ subtlety. The fact that the phenomena of neural synapses and (I will get to this later) cultural memessupport the manifest image as a multifaceted evolutionary adaptation (that may be modeled using neuronal and cultural Darwinian paradigms) implies that the manifest image may be dispensed with, because it is an user-illusion of the scientific image.

Does this tell me that the noumenon, the thing itself, is what humans are conscious of?

Or is the noumenon what humans adapt to according to neuronal and cultural Darwinian paradigms?

0079 My user-illusion is an adaptation, as substantial as a dog’s fierce jaws and a cat’s sharp claws. It cannot be dispensed with, lest I die.

In the face of subtle distinctions between the noumenon and the manifest image and between the manifest image and the scientific image, the betting man would place his money on the manifest image, as that which will endure… er… survive, rather than the scientific image. Dennett argues against this bet, but he cannot speak directly, because his scientific discussion supports the betting man’s conclusion.

0080 If our consciousness of species impressa_2a and species expressa_2b is an adaptation, then how is the proposed scientific accounting of our impressions_2a and perceptions_2b supposed to make them more adaptive? And if Dennett’s argument succeeds, and a scientific image based on Darwin’s paradigm overlays our feelings_2a and phantasms_2b, then what about what humans think?

0081 The long-debated scholastic picture of the way humans think cannot be lightly discarded.

Only a subtle argument will suffice.

12/5/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 17 of 20)

0174 When Dennett says that words are great examples of memes, he considers only spoken words. He does not suspect that language (that is, grammar) evolves in the milieu of hand talk. He knows that, today, all civilizations practice speech-alone talk. Plus, his reading audience is civilized.

Consequently, Dennett’s claim that words play a role in cultural evolution carries an ironic overtone. His assertion is much larger that he supposes. In southern Mesopotamia, speech-alone is first realized by the Ubaid culture.

(This is discussed in The First Singularity and Its Fairy Tale Trace, as well as An Archaeology of the Fall, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.)

Outside of southern Mesopotamia, early civilizations are potentiated by the adoption of speech-alone talk. After exposure to a speech-alone talking culture, hand-speech talking cultures drop the hand-component of their hand-speech talk. Mimesis is key. Speech-alone talks spreads from a single site to the entire world.

0175 The different semiotic qualities of hand talk and speech-alone talk play a key role in human evolution. Human evolution comes with a twist. I label that twist, “the first singularity”.

The first singularity illustrates Dennett’s key point. Speech-alone talk offers affordances that hand-talk lacks. The consequences are obvious. Cultures practicing speech-alone talk exhibit greater wealth and power than cultures practicing hand-speech talk.

Yes, the advantages are obvious.

The dangers are hidden.

0176 I wonder.

Is one of the main tasks of postmodern philosophers, such as Dennett, to reveal the dangers inherent to speech-alone talk? Or, is their main task to conceal them?

Indeed, Dennett’s postmodern philosophical approach distracts me from the manifest image of the scholastic interscope of how humans think and substitutes a scientific image of memes replicating and being selected through cultural evolution.

This is very similar to how I got the dead cat out of Daisy’s mouth, by offering one of her favorite treats as a substitute.

0177 Has the author come to a judgment_2c?

0178 The species impressa intelligibilis_2c, the universal aspect a content-level species impressa_2a, corresponds to what is_2c.

According to Dennett, the meme is a basic unit of culture, a word-like being, carrying semantic information, and offering ‘something’ that makes a difference. The meme is the source of behavioral phenomena observed and measured by social scientists, who then build models, using the specialized languages of psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics and so on.

0179 The species expressa intelligibilis_2c, the intelligible aspect of a situation-level species expressa_2b, corresponds to what ought to be.

The meme offers models neglected by social scientists. The meme offers models couched in the disciplinary language of the biological sciences. Can a meme be accounted for by way of a Darwinian model of descent with modification, in the normal context of cultural selection? Yes, a meme is a replicator that survives only because it replicates. Therefore, the differential replication of memes offers a scientific image for cultural evolution.

0180 The relation between what is and what ought to be passes from biological evolution (“Bacteria”) to the pinnacle of human creative engineering (“Bach”) and back to cultural evolution (“and Back”).

0146 Here is a picture.

0181 If this judgment serves as a sign-vehicle for an interventional sign, then the resulting sign-object is a scientific account of the evolution of human brains (SO_i).

Part III of Dennett’s book is titled, “Turning Our Minds Inside Out”.

Inside is the noumenon, the thing itself, the human mind.

Outside is a scientific model of a brain, the observable and measurable conjurer of the thing itself.

Or do I have that backwards?

Does the mind conjure the brain?

Or does the brain conjure the mind?

0182 Here is a picture of Dennett’s work as a meme.

12/4/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 20 of 20)

0196 Razie Mah offers three masterworks on human evolution.

The Human Niche concerns the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

An Archaeology of the Fall dramatizes the first singularity, the transition from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.

How To Define The Word “Religion” concerns our current Lebenswelt.

These works sustain this examination of Dennett’s book.

0197 In these blogs, the term, “meme”, is technically defined using the scholastic interscope for how humans think. This interscope is also in play in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”. A “meme” corresponds to a species impressa_2a with a hylomorphic structure whereby the sign-object of an interventional sign substantiates a sign-vehicle for a specificative sign.

0198 According to Dennett, a spoken word is a good example of a meme.

Notably, our current Lebenswelt must face the question, asking, “What is the nature of spoken words?”

Why?

Spoken words facilitate explicit abstraction, while hand-talk words allow only implicit abstraction. We innately expect that spoken words image and point to their referents. But, they do not. Symbols are natural signs whose sign-objects are defined by convention, habit, law, tradition and so on. Yet, no hand-talk language has words that can picture or indicate these terms. “Convention”, “habit”, “law” and “tradition” label explicit abstractions that cannot be articulated using hand talk. They may exist, but cannot be named, while using hand talk.

0199 Recall that actualities₂ are encountered.

Such actualities₂ are understood by ascertaining an appropriate normal context₃ and potential₁.

0200 How To Define The Word “Religion” applies these lessons to a familiar and contentious term. This examination of Dennett’s book applies these lessons to the word, “meme”.

Here is a picture.

0201 The message? The meme exemplifies cultural evolution.

The presence? The meme embodies neural selection.

The meaning? A scientific image of the word, “meme”, should overlay what is going on in my mind, that is, the manifest image. My consciousness is an user-end illusion produced by the message and the presence of cultural and neural selection.

0202 My thanks to the author. This well-documented work conveys that impression that inquiry into memes may account for the evolution of the human mind. Whether this impression is productive or unproductive depends on how one defines the word, “meme”.

An Archaeology of the Fall

A Horror Story by Razie Mah

Category Archives: Empirio-schematics