0209 It’s funny how academics can turn disappointments around.
0210 Triumphalist science establishes a pattern. If one considers a model to be the noumenon, then one can look for phenomena that objectify that model. This is how the social sciences are born. Since their inception in the late 1700s, social scientists have argued that the mechanical philosophies that gave birth to the natural sciences also apply to the study of people and society.
How do social scientists identify social and psychological noumena?
Social sciences pull noumena out of holes in the ground. In other words, if a social scientist observes and measures activities that must correspond to a noumenon, then all the investigator needs to do is to dig a little and find the thing that their phenomena must be objectifying.
0211 This process gets formalized by phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl develops a method by which common opinions about a thing are bracketed out, because they cannot reveal what the noumenon must be. The models of natural science must also be bracketed out, because triumphalist scientists will insist that, if their models replace the noumenon, then everything becomes a controlled experiment, like in a college laboratory.
Phenomenology is precisely the formal process that self-identifying social scientists are informally practicing with the construction of the social sciences in the 1800s and 1900s.
0212 Yes, phenomenologists formalize the process by which noumena are formulated by the social sciences.
What do they get for their labors?
Established social scientists say that phenomenologists are pulling noumena out of their asses.
0213 How rude!
Okay, a lot of money is on the line. How so? Both social scientists (on their own) and phenomenologists (by way of a well-characterized method) ascertain what the noumenon must be, by considering associated phenomena. The intent is to activate the Positivist’s judgment. As soon as what is of the Positivist’s judgment constellates, it stands as a robust possibility worthy of empirio-schematic inquiry.
Empirio-schematic inquiry takes time and effort.
Is that the same as money?
Of course, social-science research requires so much money as to attract intellectuals who cannot tell their asses from holes in the ground.
In that regard, they are not so different from the laboratory sciences.
0214 Oh, on second thought, social scientists pull ideas out of holes in the ground.
Phenomenologists should not compete with that.
So, phenomenology takes a cultural turn. Husserl is hired to sit in the same professorial chair as Kant at the University of Freiberg. In 1916, Husserl is 56 years old. The (soon to be Catholic) philosophy student, Edith Stein, works as his personal assistant. In 1926, one of his students, Martin Heidegger, takes modern Western philosophy to the next level with the publication of Being and Time.
0215 All I can say is, “Look at what phenomenologists pulled out of their asses.”
0216 In Part III of their book, the authors dance through a philosophical critique without Peircean tools to depict triadic relations.
Uh oh. Without figures, is this critique philosophical or scientific or phenomenological?
0217 Here is the bottom line.
There is a method to the madness of the phenomenologists.
This is why Catholic philosophers long to engage in discourse with phenomenologists, even as phenomenologists reject discourse, on the um… grounds… that phenomenology follows the mandate of the positivist intellect. Metaphysics is not allowed.
0218 Catholic philosophers see that there is a method to phenomenology that can be articulated (somehow) by scholastic tradition (following Aquinas, not Poinsot). But, they do not appreciate how phenomenology is historically embedded in the modern Age of Ideas. Also, they do not appreciate what the scholastic tradition has achieved. John Poinsot writes in the 1600s and Thomas Aquinas writes in the 1200s. Poinsot figures out that signs are triadic relations. Aquinas mentions signs as things that signify other other things.
Razie Mah opens the lid to this can of worms in the series, Phenomenology and the Positivist Intellect (articles available at smashwords and other e-book venues).
0219 Yes, there is a method to the madness of the phenomenologists.
Phenomenologists intuitively generate (through their prescribed methods) noumenal overlays that coincide with semiotic agency, as articulated by Sharov and Tonnessen.
0220 What does this imply?
Sharov and Tonnessen’s formulation of semiotic agency, as a noumenal overlay, allows the inquirer to consider the prescribed methods of phenomenology as ways for examining natural and social phenomena arising from… the noumenal overlay of semiotic agency.
0221 Am I saying that phenomenological determinations of what the noumenon must be are really models that phenomenologists triumphantly overlay upon S&T’s noumenon?
I suppose… if what I say is correct… then biosemiotics is a science that belongs to a new age of understanding.
What age is that?
John Deely (1942-2017) thought long and hard about the proper label.
0222 With that said, here is a quick wrap-up of the four chapters in Part III.
For chapter six, Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay conceptualizes semiotic agency.
For chapter seven, semiotic agency is considered an actuality2. In order to understand an actuality2, the actuality2 must have a normal context3 and potential1.
0223 Here is the nested form for semiotic agency2.
Semiotic agency2 presents a sign-relation as a dyadic actuality. This is shown in Part I.
Semiosis2 does not occur without an agent3 and the possibility of ‘significance’1.
0224 For chapter eight, the evolution of agents3 and the possibility of ‘significance’1 proceeds in tandem with the evolution of semiotic agency2.
0225 For chapter nine, phenomenology serves as a precursor to biosemiotics, just as the social sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries serve as intimations of phenomenology.
0226 Without a doubt, Sharov and Tonnessen build upon the insights of philosophers writing a century earlier, as seen in two of Razie Mah’s e-books: Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy and Comments on Nicholas Berdyaev’s Book (1939) Spirit and Reality. Both Maritain and Berdyaev are interested in understanding the nature of scientific inquiry. And now, their works inform biosemioticians.
0001 Daniel W. Houck juggles five challenges in his attempt to recover Thomas Aquinas’s teachings on original sin.
0002 One, Aquinas does not challenge Augustine’s mechanism of original sin. Original sin descends through Adam to all humans through human reproduction. Augustine’s speculation is now on the chopping block, because modern biologists observe no large genetic bottleneck, as required by Augustine’s proposed scenario. Concupiscence may be undeniable. But, it does not plague humans due to descent from a single ancestral pair.
On one hand, original sin cannot be accounted for as a sexually transmitted disease.
On the other hand, sexually transmitted diseases can, in part, be accounted for by original sin.
0003 Two, original sin is inextricably tied to a difficult conversation about the fate of the souls of infants and fetuses, who tragically die. Where do the souls of aborted fetuses go? To the city dump?
0004 Three, the doctrine of original sin does not appear in Scripture. Instead, original sin comes from interpreting Scripture. It’s like the smell of the rotting food. If one reads Scripture and follows the unfolding theodrama with care, one cannot help but conclude with Paul, in his notorious Letter to the Romans, that Adam and Christ are linked. The Scriptures stink of original sin. Yet, the fragrance of redemption overcomes the sordid aromas. That is the Good News. Jesus is a breath of fresh air.
0005 Four, despite recent attempts to revive the theology of Thomas Aquinas, his account of original sin remains neglected. There is a reason. Thomas never locks onto a clear and concise reckoning. A hundred years ago, Aquinas’s thoughts on the matter are debated. Jean Baptiste Kors publishes an in-depth examination under the title, La Justice primitive et le peche originel d’apres S. Thomas (1922). Now, it is crickets.
0006 Five, Houck consigns even the crickets to silence, because the crickets never considered Neodarwinism and how it puts Augustine’s speculation on the chopping block. In light of the shimmering axe of negation poised above the City of God, much less the City of Man, the crickets may silently snicker at Houck’s promise to tie together Aquinas’s account of original justice with other areas of the great medieval theologian’s thought. Does a synthesis matter? After the blade of scientific expertise comes down on the idea that Adam and Eve are the first humans, will the executioner call out, “Next, original justice.”?
0006 Already modern theologians slink away from the historicity of the Fall.
Can they do without this non-scientific nonsense?
Houck does not think so. No responsible Christian theologian thinks so.
Houck must juggle these five juggernauts, as if each does not have a life of its own. What is the secret that brings them into obedient motion, where one goes up while another comes down?
It is not to be found in his book.
0007 It is to be found in the hypothesis of the first singularity.
The stories of Adam and Eve, along with all currently known written origin stories of the ancient Near East, point to a recent time-horizon, beyond which civilization cannot see.
They point to the first singularity.
They cannot see beyond this event.
The ancient myths say, “Humans are made right before civilization starts.”
Now, archaeologists testify to humans before the time horizon of the first singularity.
Humans walk the earth long before the dawn of history.
0008 Is Adam the first human, as suggested by Augustine, as well as by the Genesis text?
If Adam is not the first human, then who is Adam?
Adam must be a figure in a fairy tale. The fairy tale may be about an event, or something like an event, hidden in time. We (moderns) do not know much about what came before this event. We know more than nothing. Neolithic stone tools that tell us that, after 12,000 years ago, plants become very important as food. The remains of sedentary villages tell us that we learned to give plants as food to the animals.
The Neolithic marks the invention of agriculture.
The Developed Neolithic combines stockbreeding and agriculture.
0009 There is an intimation, in Genesis 1:26-30, of a humanity before Adam. If that is the case, then why does the Story of the Garden of Eden start with God creating Adam from dust and Eve from Adam’s rib?
Oh yeah, the story of the Garden of Eden is a fairy tale. And, a fairy tale may be about an event, or something like an event, hidden in time. At the start of this event, Adam busies himself with the garden and names the animals. He gets to contribute a rib to make Eve. He is innocent. So is Eve. Together, they portray everything that the hominins evolved to be.
In the garden, there is the tree of life. This tree is a metaphor for Thomas Aquinas’s notion of original justice. It is also a metaphor for the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
The tree of life is a metaphor for the Lebenswelt where humans are what they evolved to be.
0010 The noumenon of humans, like all animals, is hylomorphic.
The word, “hylomorphe”, combines two words, “hyle” (matter) and “morphe” (form). According to Comments on Daniel De Haan’s Essay (2018) “Hylomorphism and the New Mechanist Philosophy…”, Aristotle’s hylomorphe associates to Peirce’s category of secondness. Peirce’s secondness consists in two contiguous real elements. Here, the two real elements are matter and form. The contiguity? May I use the word, “substance”?
The contiguity is placed in brackets. Secondness is denoted by the subscript.
0236 Augustine’s mechanism captures the essence of the first singularity. It does not capture the esse_ce. Augustine treats the Garden of Eden as if it is a real story. Instead, the fairy tales of Adam and Eve point to the first singularity.
Similar mythologies from the ancient Near East, revealed during the past three centuries from archaeological excavations, give the same impression. Humans do not have a deep past. Humans are recently manufactured by differentiated gods, who arise out of a foggy, undifferentiated nowhere.
0237 These ancient writings are not known during the Latin Age, so the scholastics do not contest Augustine’s mechanism. Yet, they find that the mechanism is not sufficient, because of those damned dead infants. How can infants express concupiscence?
The concern is both mechanistic and conditional. It can be portrayed as a dyad in the realm of actuality. This actuality corresponds to original sin2.
0238 How to describe the contiguity?
Houck lists three scenarios that gain prominence during the Latin Age: disease theory, a legal connection, and a realist view.
These three approaches tie into the above actuality.
0239 Augustine’s conflation of concupiscence and procreation provides a disease mechanism for how Adam’s rebellion infects us.
The legal framework corresponds to God’s Will, which is contained in the command, not to eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The status of humanity changes from blessed to cursed. A change in legal status puts Augustine’s conflation into context3.
The realist view is that humans lost something with Adam’s rebellion. The Story of the Fall indicates that humans lost access to the tree of life. A better way to put it is: The tree of life is no longer a possibility1. The Garden of Eden is no longer possible. So, God is no longer present as He once was.
0240 In sum, the scholastics, following Aristotle’s four causes, place Augustine’s mechanism into a complete category-based nested form.
0241 Perhaps, the reader can predict my next move.
I wonder, “Can this nested form go into the perspective level of divine suprasubjectivity?”
Or, does it correspond to what Christian doctrine projects into perspective-level elements?
Here is how the perspective level changes.
Note how the normal context3c and potential1c have changed character, they are now qualified.
Note how the judgment of original justice2c (belonging to thirdness) changes into a mechanistic dyad2c (belonging to secondness).
What are the implications?
0242 A change in perspective for God passes into a change of perspective for humans.
Our commitment2c does not make sense without God’s orientation (grace).
0243 Adam disobeying God’s command changes our legal status3c.
The ejection of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden changes God’s Presence1c from open to hidden.
And worse, a mechanism connects Adam’s rebellion to our own lives2c. Augustine’s hybridization of concupiscence and procreation is one mechanism that captures crucial features of the contiguity. However, modern evolutionary science argues for its implausibility. Adam and Eve are not the first human beings. Therefore, they are not the parents of all humans today.
0244 Is there a mechanism that will meet the qualifications of cause-and-effect and offer us (in our current Lebenswelt) a glimpse into who we evolved to be?
Augustine’s mechanism coheres to a literal interpretation of the Story of the Fall. Consequently, the mechanism is not independent of the biblical text.
The mechanism of the first singularity coheres with an interpretation of the Story of the Fall that is appropriate for the genre. The stories of Adam and Eve are fairy tales. Fairy tales are stories that are told to children. Often, they are preserved with remarkable precision over hundreds (and for these stories, thousands) of years. They may point to some primal event. That event cannot be reconstructed from the fairy tale itself. That event must be postulated independently of the fairy tale.
The hypothesis of the first singularity fits the criteria of (1) cause-and-effect and (2) a connection to the Genesis text. But, it does not allow us to appreciate how the twist in human evolution touches base with the doctrine of original sin.
0245 This is why Aquinas’s postulation of original justice2c is so crucial.
Original justice2c pertains to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
Original sin2c pertains to our current Lebenswelt.
Original sin2c is the privation of original justice2c.
Speech-alone talk is the privation of the hand-component of hand-speech talk.
Speech-alone talk attaches labels to the elements within the perspective-level actuality2c.
Why stop there?
Spoken words can label every element on the perspective level, as well as the situation level, as well as the content level.
This is not possible in iconic and indexal hand-speech talk.
0246 The Story of the Fall tells a tale, rich in details that call to mind the first singularity.
With the assistance of the serpent, Eve attaches spoken labels to the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Then, her spoken words generate the reality of Adam’s rebellion.
0247 Thousands of years later, scholastics refine the Story of the Fall into a perspective-level category-based nested form for original sin.
They know nothing about the content level, as it currently is configured by modern science.
They know that the content level pertains to crucial questions, “Where does the world come from? Where do we humans come from?”
They know that the situation-level addresses the question, “What went wrong?”
They figure that we cannot return to the Garden of Eden. We cannot go back to the original justice2c, enjoyed by Adam before his rebellion.
This explains why revelation is necessary.
0248 Jesus Christ fills the emptiness inherent to original sin. No one, not even infants, can avoid that emptiness. Original sin is the privation of original justice.
From this, Latin-Age scholastics cobble together a normal context3c and a potential1c for the mechanism connecting Adam’s rebellion to our current lives2c.
0249 Speech-alone talk facilitates the scholastic’s exercise in exemplar extrinsic formal causality. Speech-alone talk permits the articulation of exemplar signs.
The sign-vehicle (SVe) consists of phantasms that arise from the recitation of the Story of the Fall2b.
The sign-object (SOe) is the perspective-level actuality2c.
The sign-interpretant (SIe) is as shown below.
0250 In this exemplar sign, Augustine’s version of original sin2c initially stands where original justice2c used to be. Original sin2c overwrites original justice2c. This is what spoken words do. Our verbal rhetoric can never recapture the wholeness of the commitment2c that we evolved to sense and feel2a. But, it sure can trigger our longing for that wholeness.
Yet, Augustine’s vision captures an essential feature of our own lives2c. We are fallen.
0251 Similarly, the proposed confluence of Adam’s rebellion and a change in Lebenswelt may occupy the contiguity in the dyad where original justice2c used to be. Again, this proposal somehow distorts the judgment. But, it does so in a way that scientists cannot dismiss out of hand. The hypothesis of the first singularity is not the second doctrine of original sin. However, it offers a mechanism that reflects quite nicely in the mirror of theology.
See Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues (also appearing in Razie Mah’s blog from April through June 2024).
0252 Not unlike Augustine’s first version of original sin, the first singularity offers a suite of insights that are difficult to ignore. First, it is mechanistic in the way that science is mechanistic. Second, it challenges current paradigms on human evolution, but not the data that support them. Neodarwinism has not come to grips with the possibility that the human niche is not material. Modern evolutionary science has yet to entertain the idea that human evolution comes with a twist. Plus, the twist is metaphysical.
And, what better place to look for the metaphysical tools to construct the second doctrine of original sin, than those formulated by Thomas Aquinas and re-formulated by Charles Peirce, who is about to be baptized in the same way that Aquinas baptized Aristotle and Averroes?
0253 So, I conclude my comments on Daniel Houck’s Book (2020) Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution. My thanks to the author and apologies for wandering far and wide.
0254 And, what about the turtle?
When I place the apparently dead turtle into the pond. Its head and feet poke out from under the shell. It swims away. The pond is its Umwelt.
We (humans) are not so fortunate. We can never return to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. Nor can we create our own utopia. The most we can hope for is some miraculous redemption of our current Lebenswelt. This is precisely what God delivers.
0644 The full title of the book before me is Theistic Evolution: A Contemporary Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: UK). The book arrives on my doorstep in October 2023. The copyright is dated 2024.
How time flies.
0645 This examination builds on previous blogs and commentaries.
Here is a picture.
0646 A quick glance backwards is appropriate.
Tabaczek’s story begins in the waning days of the Age of Ideas, when the Positivist’s judgment once thrived.
0647 The Positivist judgment holds two sources of illumination. Models are scientific. Noumena are the things themselves. Physics applies to models. Metaphysics applies to noumena. So, I ask, “Which one does the positivist intellect elevate over the other?”
The answer is obvious.
So, the first part of the story is that the positivist intellect dies, and lives on as a ghost (points 0001-0029).
0648 Tabaczek buries the positivist intellect and places the two sources of illumination against one another. It is as if they reflect one another.
But, the two sources also have their advocates.
In Emergence, Tabaczek argues that models of emergence require metaphysical styles of analysis.
In Divine Action and Emergence, he sets out to correct metaphysical emanations reflecting scientific models of emergence. It is as if these emanations are reflections of science in the mirror of theology. Intellectuals inspired by science want to see ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment in the mirror of theology. But, note the difference between the picture of the Positivist’s judgment and the two hylomorphes in Tabaczek’s mirror (points 0039-0061).
0649 Why do I mention this?
In the introduction of the book before me, Tabaczek discusses his motivations. He, as a agent of theology, wants to exploit an opportunity. That opportunity is already present in the correction that he makes to what an agent of science sees in the mirror of theology (pictured below).
0650 What an opportunity!
Tabaczek offers the hope of a multidimensional, open-minded, and comprehensive (say nothing of comprehensible) account of evolutionary theory.
How so?
The positivist intellect is dead. The positivist intellect ruled the Positivist’s judgment with the maxim, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”
0651 Now that the positivist intellect is dead, the two illuminations within the former Positivist’s judgment may transubstantiate into the realm of actuality and become two hylomorphes, standing like candles that reflect one another in Tabaczek’s mirror.
Tabaczek, as an agent of theology, witnesses how a scientist views himself in the mirror of theology. The scientist sees the model as more real than the noumenon (the thing itself, which cannot be objectified as its phenomena). Indeed, the scientist projects ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment into the mirror of theology.
0652 Tabaczek wants to project his philosophical construction of the noumenon (in concert with its dispositions and powers, as well as its matter and form) into the mirror of science.
But, I wonder whether any agent of science is willing to stop listening to the ghost of the positivist intellect long enough to discern what theologians project into the mirror of science.
0653 Yes, Tabaczek’s inquiry is all about optics.
0654 So, who are the players involved in the intellectual drama of Tabaczek’s mirror.
Tabaczek identifies three.
To me, there must be four.
0655 The first is the agent of science. The scienceagent is the one that makes the models. Two types of scienceagent stand out in the study of biological evolution: the natural historian and the geneticist.
0656 The second is the agent of theology. Tabaczek limits theologyagents to experts in Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.).
In a way, this self-imposed limit is a handicap, since Aristotle and Aquinas philosophize long before Darwin publishes On The Origin of Species (1859).
In another way, this self-imposed limit is a blessing, since it provides me with an occasion for examining his argument from the framework of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). According to the semiotician and Thomist John Deely (1942-2017), Peirce is the first postmodern philosopher. Peirce is also a co-discoverer of the triadic nature of signs, along with the Baroque scholastic (that is Thomist) John Poinsot (1589-1644), otherwise known as John of Saint Thomas.
Peirce’s semiotics begins where Baroque scholasticism leaves off.
0657 The third is the image that the scientist projects into the mirror of theology. I label this image: theologymirror, in contrast to scienceagent. The theologyagent can see the image in theologymirror, but is not the source of that image. I have already shown the initial image that the agent of science sees in the mirror of theology. I have also noted that Tabaczek aims to correct that projection.
0658 The fourth is the image that the theologian casts into the mirror of science. I label this image: sciencemirror, in contrast to theologyagent. The scienceagent can see the image in sciencemirror, but is not the source of that image. I have already indicated that the scienceagent (more or less) does not care what is in sciencemirror, because the ghost of the positivist intellect whispers in the ear of scienceagent, “All that metaphysical stuff is completely unnecessary.”
0824 Even though the bill is paid, and the public curtain closes on this examination of Tabaczek’s book, the flavors of the dessert still linger.
The associations in chapter seven suggest a retrogression into the house of evolutionary creation.
At the same time, the associations intimate a moment when the author can go direct into the house of theistic evolution.
0825 How so?
Can a scientist observe and measure the actuality2 within a category-based nested form?
Yes.
What about the normal context3 and potential1?
No, the scientist can only observe and measure phenomena associated with a category-based nested form. Phenomena go with the actuality2. The noumenon associates to the normal context3 and potential1.
0826 Well, if that is the case, and if the Kantian slogan of the noumenon applies (that is, the noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena), then the normal context3 and potential1 [cannot be objectified by] the actuality2.
But, this is what human constantly do. Humans understand actuality2 in terms of its2 normal context3 and potential1. So humans intuitively sense that the normal context3 and potential1 can be objectified by the corresponding actuality2.
0827 Indeed, the fact that the four causes work together to elucidate a category-based nested form constitutes one reason why Aristotle’s four causes are superior to attributions to the four elements (earth, water, fire and air).
Aristotle’s four causes are built into human nature.
0827 So, let me re-imagine the dessert, even as I digest it.
To start, a theologyagent (B1) realizes that Aquinas’s use of primary, secondary and instrumental causation in evolutionary creation can be formulated in terms of a category-based nested form.
Next, the agent of theology (B1) begins to appreciate the reason why Aristotle’s four causes are so appealing. The four causes work together to elucidate all three elements of a category-based nested form. The category-based nested form is the first step in understanding.
Yes, the category-based nested form is a purely relational structurethat is independent of the human mind.
But, it seems that the category-based nested form is embedded in the human body and brain.
0828 A question appears in the sciencemirror (C2), asking, “Is our capacity to intuitively construct category-based nested forms adaptive? Is the human niche the potential of category-based nested forms, in particular, and triadic relations, in general?”
0829 An answer is already prepared for the slot for scienceagent (A3).
Razie Mah’s e-book, The Human Niche, is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
The claim?
The human niche is the potential of triadic relations.
0830 This is what theistic evolution can produce that evolutionary creation cannot.
In order to taste what Tabaczek’s meal (B1) does to the mirrorscience (C2) consider two of Razie Mah’s blogs (A3), both of which claim that current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us how humans evolved to recognizethe noumenon, the thing itself, through implicit abstraction.
Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us where we came from.
Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us what we evolved to be.
Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us what went wrong.
0831 Here is a picture of one Greimas square for the optics of Tabaczek’s mirror.
0832 Oh, the two blogs?
Looking at Mark S. Smith’s Book (2019) “The Genesis of Good and Evil”, appears in Razie Mah’s blog from Jan 13 through 31, 2022.
Looking at Carol Hill’s Article (2021) “Original Sin with Respect to Science”, appears from February 7 through 25, 2022.
With that said, I thank Dr. Mariusz Tabaczek O.P. for this wonderful banquet for thought.
But, my work is not done. I now retreat to Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) in order to examine chapter eight.
0155 I turn to the book that follows Emergence (2019).
The book before me is titled Divine Action and Emergence: An Alternative to Panentheism (2021, Notre Dame Press). The book divides into two parts. Part one concerns emergent phenomena (and looks back upon the previous book). Part two covers divine action in emergence.
But, is not there already a number of theories in our Age of Ideas concerning the topic of divine action in a world full of truncated material and efficient causalities?
0156 Oh, there is more than a number, which reminds me of the earnestness and ambition of Tabaczek’s graduate project.
Most graduate students, after being lured into an advanced program in science by the philosophical side of Tabaczek’s mirror, figure out that the noumenon, the thing itself, is an inaccessible reflection of the agent-side of science, the side where all the difficult and detail-oriented laboratory work gets done. That realization takes one or two years. Then, the rest of one’s graduate career consists of grinding out the data and wondering why doing science is not as fun as thinking about doing science.
In short, most graduate students in the natural sciences learn to live as agents on the science side of Tabaczek’s mirror.
0157 I suspect that the same process should have happened to Tabaczek, entering a graduate program in philosophy of science and getting introduced to diverse machinations of science-agent philosophers, explaining how the hylomorphe on the science side is reflected by the noumenon side of Tabaczek’s mirror as a sort of “cloud of unknowing”, that conforms to the ghost of the positivist intellect.
But, it does not.
0158 Perhaps, it is a miracle that those agents of science who supervise his doctoral studies do not sabotage and destroy this creature, who seems to absorb the soul-breaking literature, yet remains eerily constant in his vision.
Perhaps, Tabaczek holds the element of surprise because he stands in a tradition that loves science, yet despises the positivist’s intellect, which has one rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
Most students coming out of the Christian tradition simply get confused and wander into specialized technical fields of either science or modern philosophy. Will they ever get the memo? The positivist intellect is dead.
0331 My sudden turn to semiotics does not occur in Tabaczek’s text.
Such is the examiner’s prerogative.
At this point, I stand at the threshold of section 1.3.4, almost precisely in the middle of the book.
My commentary on this book is significant.
Shall I review?
I represent the Positivist’s judgment as a content-level category-based form and discuss how it might be situated (points 0155 to 0184).
I suggest how reductionists can game emergent phenomena. Plus, I follow Tabaczek back to the four causes (points 0185 to 0239).
I present a specific example of an emergent phenomenon, building on the prior example of a hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell. Then, I return to Deacon’s general formula for emergence (points 240 to 0276).
Finally, I examine Tabaczek’s “philosophical history of panentheism” up to the section on Hegel (points 0277 to 0330).
0332 These are notable achievements.
But, my commentary is not more significant than Tabaczek’s text.
At this point, it is if I look through Tabaczek’s text and see something moving, something that catches my eye. It is not for me to say whether it is an illusion or a registration. It is enough for me to articulate what I see.
0333 At this point, I draw the veil on Razie Mah’s blog for April and May of 2024 and enter the enclosure of Comments on Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024), available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Comments will cover the rest of Part Two of Divine Action and Emergence. June 2024 will look at the start of Tabaczek’s next book, Theistic Evolution and Comments will complete the examination.
My thanks to Mariusz Tabaczek for his intellectual quest.
0334 But, that is not to say that I abandon Tabaczek’s text.
No, my slide into sign-relations is part of the examiner’s response.
This occurs in Comments.
There is good reason to wonder whether the response is proportionate.
0001 Philosophers enamored of Aristotle and Aquinas tend to make distinctions. So, what happens when such philosophers wrestle with modern science as it confronts the realness of apparently irreducibly complex systems, such as um… hydrogen-fuel cells and the Krebs cycle, which serves as the “fuel cell” for eukaryotic cells?
On the surface, Tabaczek fashions, yet does not articulate, a distinction between… hmmm…
0002 Consider a sentence, found on page 273 of Emergence, midway in the final chapter, seven, saying (more or less), “I hope that my re-interpretation of downward causation and emergent systems, in terms of old and new Aristotelianism, will help analytical metaphysicians sound more credible to scientists and philosophers of science, who employ, analyze and justify methodological reductionism.”
….what?
Philosophers of science and analytialc metaphysicians?
0003 Philosophers of science attempt to understand the causalities inherent in the ways that each empirio-schematic discipline applies mathematical and mechanical models to observations and measurements of particular phenomena. In terms of Aristotle’s four causes, their options are few. Science is beholden to material and efficient causalities, shorn of formal and final causation. So, they end up going in tautological circles. What makes a model relevant? Well, a model accounts for observations and measurements of phenomena. What are phenomena? Phenomena are observable and measurable facets of their noumenon. What is a noumenon?
Ugh, you know, the thing itself.
If I know anything about the Positivist’s judgment, then I know this. Science studies phenomena, not their noumenon.
Everybody knows that.
Except, of course, for those pathetic (analytical) metaphysicians.
0004 …what?
A noumenon and its phenomena?
0005 Tautologies are marvelous intellectual constructions.
In a tautology, an explanation explains a fact because the fact can be accounted for by the explanation. For modern science, mathematical and mechanical models explain observations and measurements because observations and measurements can be accounted for by mathematical and mechanical models.
Scientific tautologies are very powerful. Important scientists ask for governments to support their empirio-schematic research in order to develop and exploit such tautologies… er… technologies. Philosophers of science tend to go with the flow, so they end up employing, analyzing and justifying the manners in which mathematical and mechanical models account for observations and measurements, along with other not-metaphysical pursuits. One must tread lightly. First, there is a lot of money on the line. Second, the positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
0006 …hmmm…
Does Tabaczek offer a way out of the rut of not-metaphysics, without noticing that the rut is what distinguishes scientific inquiry from experience of a thing itself? Aristotle will tell me that the rut is not the same as the world outside the rut. The scientific world is (supposedly) full of mind-independent beings. Ours is a world of mind-dependent beings.
0007 …aha!
Now, I arrive at the yet-to-be-articulated distinction between what science investigates and what we experience.
For the modern philosopher of science, models are key. Disciplinary language brings mathematical and mechanical models into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena.
For the estranged modern metaphysician, the thing itself is key. The thing itself, the noumenon, gives rise to diverse phenomena, facets that are observable and measurable.
Consequently, the distinction that Tabaczek does not name looks like this.
