02/1/25

Looking at Gustavo Caetano-Anolles’ Chapter (2024) “Evolution of Biomolecular Communication” (Part 10 of 10)

0388 I conclude this examination of Gustavo Caetano-Anolles’ chapter with a brief discussion on the third item appearing in section 10.3, titled, “Communication”.

0389 The first item that the author mentions is Peirce’s tradition of inquiry. Peirce’s three categories offer a variety of ways to portray triadic relations.

Biosemiotics is all about triadic relations. This examination has shown that secondness tends to associate to phenomena. Thirdness and firstness tends to associate to what models need to explain.

0390 The second item that the author mentions is Shannon’s information theory.

I wonder about the implications of the virtual nested form in the realm of secondness that Shannon’s information theory generates.

What if the associations are more than mere analogy?

What if my neighbor, getting that new-fangled lumber treatment and all, is not sending me a message through a channel_2b that conducts wood-eating insects that are not happy, and frankly, fed up with the wooden food-fare that my neighbor’s shed now offers?

How weird and disturbing is that?

0391 The third item that the author mentions is Chomsky’s hierarchy of formal languages. Formal language consists of operations within a finite symbolic order.

0392 Finite symbolic order?

Think of how Charles Peirce might rebrand Ferdinand de Saussures’s key term, system of differences.

0393 Ultimately, symbols enter into a picture of the evolution of biomolecular communication.

And, when they do, they seem to associate to “a receiver_2c” in Shannon’s virtual nested form in secondness.

0392 Here is a picture.

0393 But that is not all, in the evolution of biomolecular communication, symbols overflow destination_2c and cascade down into the bucket that the transmitter_2a works from.

The author spends sections 10.4 through 10.8 discussing the implications of this imaginary overflowing, which reminds me of a Tarot card, the ace of cups, where a hand appears out of cloud overhanging an idyllic landscape.

The hand holds a water-filled cup that overflows, in a very biomolecular-cascading fashion, from a perspective-level that associates to love. Is love an empedoclement? Only after the empedoclements (which are the inverse of impediments) come together, in the right sort of way, does strife arrive to both hone and diversify the new creation.

0394 Here is the cup of organic biosemiosis.

01/31/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Book (2021) “Semiotic Agency” (Part 1 of 24)

0001 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. Series editors are Kalevi Kull, Alexei Sharov, Claude Emmeche and Donald Favareau. These editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

Points 0001 to 0226 cover Parts I and III of this book. These Parts are titled, (I) Overview and Historiography and (III) Theoretical Considerations. These two sections set forth the rationale for scientific inquiry into semiotic agency.

0002 Chapter one begins with a question.

Can agency be a scientific subject?

To me, the question, “What is science?”, must be addressed.

0003 Scientific inquiry involves a judgment within a judgment.

0004 Okay, then what is a judgment?

A judgment is a triadic relation containing three elements: relation, what is and what ought to be. When each of these three elements uniquely associates to one of Peirce’s categories, then the judgment becomes actionable. Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.

What am I talking about?

Consult A Primer on The Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0005 Here is a diagram of judgment as a triadic relation.

A relation (belonging to one category) brings what ought to be (belonging to another category) into relation with what is (belonging to the one remaining category). Peirce’s three categories are firstness, secondness and thirdness. Firstness is the monadic realm of possibility. Secondness is the dyadic realm of actuality. Thirdness is the triadic realm of normal contexts, mediations, judgments, sign-relations, and so forth.

0006 If scientific inquiry involves a judgment within a judgment, then the larger judgment is called the Positivist’s judgment. A positivist intellect (relation, thirdness) brings an empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be,secondness) into relation with the dyad, a noumenon [and] its phenomena (what is, firstness).

Here is a diagram.

0007 In regards to the relation, the positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.

0008 What is “metaphysics”?

Aristotle proposes four causes: material, efficient, formal and final. The first two are (more or less) physical. The second two are (more or less) metaphysical. So, the second two causes are ruled out in the seventeenth century by the mechanical philosophers of northern Europe.

0009 Of course, ruling out formal and final causes truncates material and efficient causalities. Imagine a material cause (such as the flow of ink onto a piece of paper) without its formal cause (the piece of paper will then be folded and put into an envelope). Imagine an efficient cause (the role of glue in sealing an envelope) without its final cause (the envelope will be put in the mail).

So, the rule of the positivist intellect has the effect of truncating physical material and efficient causalities from their metaphysical companion causalities. The positivist intellect is assigned to the category of thirdness, the realm of normal contexts.

0010 In regards to what ought to be, the empirio-schematic judgment belongs to the category of secondness (the realm of actuality), even though it obviously belongs to the category of thirdness, because judgments are triadic relations. In other words, to think in terms of the Positivist’s judgment, one must disregard the obvious and regard the empirio-schematic judgment as an exercise in the realm of actuality, if that makes any sense.

0011 It may help to consider the empirio-schematic judgment as a tool for producing scientific models. Disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness).

Here is a picture.

These figures are initially constructed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

01/6/25

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 1 of 4)

0201 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. The editors of this series have Razie Mah’s permission for use of following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

Part III concerns theoretical considerations, addressing the headliner question.

Here is a list of the chapters, along with their titles.

Each title labels a labor of biosemioticians.

0202 So far, from Part I, Sharov and Tonnessen propose a philosophical dyad that serves as an overlay for the noumenon of biosemiotics. The authors’ proposed noumenon constitutes what is for the Positivist’s judgment and contains what all biosemiotic phenomena have in common.

This is significant.

0203 The Positivist’s judgment is constructed, starting in the 1600s, by mechanical philosophers. Mechanical philosophers aim to bracket out metaphysics, in favor of models based on observations and measurements.

So, what is science?

0204 Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) “Natural Philosophy” shows that the scholastic ideation of three styles of abstraction comes close to a satisfying answer. But, no one can capitalize on that answer until a hidden knot is unraveled. A knot? Two judgments are entangled. This becomes clear when the abstractions are pictured as elements of judgment.

0205 The following diagram of the Positivist’s judgment is a satisfying way to portray what the mechanical philosophers created in the 1600s and what Kant corrected in the late 1700s.

In 2025, no definition of science compares to this diagram.

0206 In the Positivist’s judgment, the positive intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the dyad, a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena (what is, firstness).

In the empirio-schematic judgment, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is,firstness).

0207 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) forces natural scientists to concede that they investigate the observable and measurable facets of the thing itself. Plus, their observations and measurements cannot fully objectify the subject of inquiry.

0208 Over the next two centuries (1800s and 1900s), scientists promote their successful models, saying, “Our models are more illuminating than the thing itself. Indeed, our models can take the place of the noumenon. Once that happens, then our models can be objectified by their phenomena. Observations and measurements validate the successful model.”

The academic laboratory sciences are born. For example, a chemistry laboratory and its accompanying lecture belong to the laboratory science of chemistry. In contrast, the science of chemistry is the study of natural processes, that is, things themselves. The key to science is to make an observation and then explain it. The model is an explanation, rather than the thing itself.

12/1/23

Information on the Series: Phenomenology and the Positivist Intellect

In the Fall of 2021, the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly publishes three essays on phenomenology. Each author asks, “Why does phenomenology exclude other philosophical traditions, such as Thomism, when they share similar concerns?” The essays are not only remarkable for what they say, they are also remarkable for what they do not say. None mention natural science.

Of course, this lacunae demands exploration. Edmund Husserl (1856-1938 AD) lives in the heyday of modern science. He calls for a “return to the noumenon”. He names his method, “phenomenological reduction”. So, phenomenology concerns the noumenon and its phenomena.

The series on empirio-schematics serves as a resource. The noumenon and its phenomena appear in the Positivist’s judgment, initially derived in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy.

Contributions to this series are listed below, in order of production. Most are available at smashwords and other electronic book vendors. Those that appear on the blog at www.raziemah.com are noted, along with dates.

Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions” (e-article, note on blog September 2021)

Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean-Luc Marion and … First Philosophy” (e-article, note on blog October 2021

Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology” (e-article, note on blog October 2021)

Comments on Jack Reynolds’ Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”. (e-article, note on blog March 2022)

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (blog only, www.raziemah.com, April 2022)

01/27/23

Looking at Daniel Estulin’s Book (2021) “2045 Global Projects at War” (Part 1 of 5)

0001 Daniel Estulin holds a notable resume. He is a doctor of conceptual intelligence and a foreign policy advisor to sovereign states in Latin America and Eurasia. He has authored many books, and hosted a Spanish language TV show on RT (formerly, Russia Today). The subtitle of the book is “Tectonic Processes of Global Transformation”.

This look is a teaser for a more extensive examination, Comments on Daniel Estulin’s Book (2021) “2045 Global Projects At War”, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0002 Estulin formulates the concept of global project and applies it to a number of civilizations, nations and international cabals. His approach is intuitive and relies on his considerable experience and knowledge. Estulin’s book is not structured in a manner that the reader learns a particular technique. Consequently, the above-mentioned comments add value. Perhaps, there is a method to Estulin’s approach.

0003 Certainly, the concept of global project is valuable, especially when applied, by Estulin, to the world in the present day. Estulin is so well informed that he exercises the concept without trouble. Does he want the rest of us to wield this tool without his years of experience, trials and reflection?

I don’t know.

0003 All I know is that humans tend to think in the ways of purely relational structures, often without realizing that fact. So, I read Estulin’s text with two purely relational structures in mind, the Greimas square and the category-based nested form.

I start with a Greimas square and focus on the key word of “capitalism”. A quick introduction to the Greimas square may be found in the other blog for this month (at www.raziemah.com for January 2023).

0004 Here is the result.

0005 The four elements are clarified by the following statements.

A is the focal term. A is also the social head. A goes with economics.

B contrasts with A. B is also the social body. B goes with politics.

C contradicts B and complements A. C is capital. Capital goes with information, intelligence and conspiracy system. Anyone who gets an investment newsletter appreciates this. The stuff of investment letters scale up when considering prices, markets and monetary policies. C is what the social head fixates on. C functions as a mind-independent being. C is what the social head thinks about.

D contrasts with C, contradicts A and complements B. D is communion. Communion (D) is the object that brings us together. Communion (D) is not a mind-independent being, even though it appears to be. It (D) is mind-dependent, in the same way that a stomach and lungs are mind dependent. We don’t just want to eat or breath. We want to eat and breathe well. Communion (D) is aesthetic, while economics (A), politics (B) and conspiracy system (C) are calculating.

04/29/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 1 of 18)

0001 Three faculty at the Universidad Santo Tomas, Columbia, publish an article with the title, “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Human and Social Sciences Research”, in the journal, Civilizar: Cienceas Sociales y Humanas(volume 20(38), 2020, 137 to 146, DOI: https//doi.org/10.22518/jour.ccsh./2020.1a10). I thank the authors for presenting in English.

0002 In this series of blogs, the above article serves as a testing ground for four commentaries on phenomenology, contemporary Thomism and science. The commentaries, available at smashwords and other electronic e-book vendors, follow.

Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”

Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean-Luc Marion and … First Philosophy”

Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology”

Comments on Jack Reynolds’ Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”

0003 Testing ground?

These commentaries contain particular category-based nested forms, interscopes and judgments, constructed from (or in reverie to) the essay and book under consideration. These synthetic structures are abductions, constructed on Peircean frames.

So, what to do with a guess?

Test it.

04/28/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 2 of 18)

0004 My aim is to test the diagrams and arguments developed in four commentaries on phenomenology.

Perez Vargas, Nieto Bravo and Santamaria Rodriguez offer a suitable work. Their article is composed of five sections, starting with an introduction (Part 1) and ending with a conclusion (Part 5). The three central parts address three questions.

How are phenomenology and hermeneutics used in research (Part 2)?

How does phenomenology provide an epistemological setting for research (Part 3)?

How does hermeneutics provide an epistemological setting for research (Part 4)?

0005 Yes, here is a testing ground for the commentaries listed in the previous blog.

04/27/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 3 of 18)

0006 Test one.

In the conclusion (Part 5), the unspoken agenda of the authors becomes apparent.

Why are hermeneutics neglected in phenomenological inquiry?

0007 The authors offer several good reasons for why hermeneutics should be employed.

First, in history, Husserl’s project differentiates out of nineteenth century hermeneutic traditions. Both refuse to accept the triumph of positivism. So, if these two traditions have common ancestry, then why are they apparently not compatible?

Second, hermeneutics situates texts, in the same way that a reader situates an author’s writing. So, hermeneutics situate the same phenomena as phenomenology.

Third, hermeneutic practices arise out of the potential of interpretation. Phenomenological reductions arise out of the potential of identifying what the noumenon must be. Why are these not complementary processes?

0008 An answer starts with the Positivist’s judgment, initially diagrammed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy. Judgment has a triadic structure consisting of three elements: relation, what is and what ought to be. When these elements are assigned to Peirce’s categories, the judgment becomes actionable.

0009 The relation is a positivist intellect, who has a rule, saying, “Metaphysics is not allowed.” This relation belongs to thirdness, the realm of normal contexts.

What ought to be is an empirio-schematic judgment, consisting of a disciplinary language (relation), mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be) and observations and measurements (what is). What ought to be belongs to secondness, the realm of actuality.

What is is a dyad, consisting of two contiguous elements. The elements are a noumenon, the thing itself, and its phenomena, its observable and measurable facets. The contiguity expresses a logical necessity. In natural science, a noumenon cannot be reduced to its phenomena. No arrangements of phenomena fully objectify their noumenon. I place the contiguity in brackets. A noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena.

0010 Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment.

This figure does not answer test one completely. But, it is a start.

04/26/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 4 of 18)

0011 The first test posed by the authors concerns the apparent lack of compatibility between hermeneutics and phenomenology.

The lack is explained by the rule of the positivist intellect, saying, “No metaphysics.”

0012 Both phenomenology and hermeneutics are capable of situating the Positivist’s judgment.

However, hermeneutics arises from interpretation, which is necessarily metaphysical. Interpretation is not physics.

0013 Can the same be said for phenomenology?

Phenomenological reduction self-identifies as not metaphysical, even as it elucidates what the noumenon ought to be.

0014 The positivist intellect’s rule gives permission to phenomenology, but not to hermeneutics.

Phenomenology, not hermeneutics, situates the Positivist’s judgment.

This answer is portrayed in Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”.

04/25/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 5 of 18)

0015 Test two.

What is the latent dilemma between phenomenology and hermeneutics?

Both phenomenology and hermeneutics are able to situate the Positivist’s judgment. However, since the rule of the positivist intellect disallows metaphysics, only phenomenology is allowed to situate scientific discourse. Hermeneutics is programmatically excluded.

0016 How am I to diagram this answer?

First, the Positivist’s judgment unfolds into a content-level nested form, according to the categorical assignments of the elements. Here is a picture.

0017 According to Comments on Jack Reynolds’ Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”, another latent problem stands between science and phenomenology. Practicing scientists are perfectly happy to work within this content level, as the mechanical philosophers of the 17th century intend. Hands-on natural scientists_3a build models_2a of observations_2a of phenomena_1a. They take the noumenon_1a for granted.

But, by the 20th century, visionary scientists lobby to situate the Positivist’s judgment with a glorified unfolding of the empirio-schematic judgment.

Edward Husserl (1859-1938) counters visionary scientists with phenomenology. Husserl’s project_3b brings the actuality of phenomenological reduction_2b into relation of the possibilities inherent in a return to the noumenon_1b.

0018 Here is a diagram of the resulting two-level interscope. The situation-level nested form virtually situates (and emerges from) the content-level nested form.

An Archaeology of the Fall

A Horror Story by Razie Mah

Category Archives: Phenomenology

Looking at Gustavo Caetano-Anolles’ Chapter (2024) “Evolution of Biomolecular Communication” (Part 10 of 10)

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Book (2021) “Semiotic Agency” (Part 1 of 24)

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 1 of 4)

Looking at Daniel Estulin’s Book (2021) “2045 Global Projects at War” (Part 1 of 5)

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 2 of 18)