0156 The second version of Disputation 19 appeared a little less than a decade after the first.  It is two and one half times longer.  The word “fact” appears occasionally in Novotny’s summary.  It also looms in the background, like some ship-destroying aquatic monster just offshore.

0157 Hurtado focuses on what produces fictions.  Mental objects and propositions that represent mind-independent facts are ruled out.

‘Beings of reason’ are mental objects and propositions that do not represent mind-independent facts.  They go with fictions, not facts.

0158 Beings^{in reason} appear in speech-alone statements.  Statements are decoded and situated as fact or fiction.  Reckonings based on fictions are misleading.  These go with beings of reason.  Reckonings based on facts do not involve beings of reason.

Misleading ‘beings of reason’ do not produce properly defined words.  They give rise to false or self-contradictory statements.  Facts produce properly defined words.  They give rise to true and consistent statements.

0159 To me, the following interscope models what Hurtado is labeling ‘a being of reason’.

0160 The ‘being of reason_2a’ is a fiction that is reckoned_2b as a fact.

0161 What are the natures of this being of reason_2a?

H2N1: The expression ‘being of reason’ may be used in more than one sense.  These senses include (1) effective and subjective_2b, (2) denominative_2a, (3) foundational_{3a(_(1a))} and (4) proper_2c.

To me, these so-called senses correspond to various structures within the interscope.  The effective and subjective sense goes with the intellect initiating the second element in the dyad of actuality_2a.  The denominative sense goes with the presence of the statement_2a and the logic of decoding.  The foundational sense goes with the content-level nested form.  This form_3a((1a)) accompanies the decoded statement_2a.  As such, it is foundational. Finally, the proper sense goes with judgment_2c.

0162 Hurtado’s perspective differs from Suarez’s.

For Suarez, the perspective is not well defined.  It is exploratory.  It sets up the thought experiment.  It asks: What is happening on the content and situation levels?

For Hurtado, the perspective_2c defines ‘being of reason’ as decoded statements that are fiction, but may be reckoned as fact_2b.

0163 This fits Hurtado’s other claims:

H2N2: ‘Beings of reason’ are unreal in the proper sense.

H2N3: Extrinsic denomination is not sufficient for explaining the ‘being of reason’ in the proper sense.

H2N4: A being of reason is what posits nothing intrinsic to any one thing.

H2N5: Beings of reason are not founded in reality.

H2N6: Real beings are not analogous to beings of reason.

0164 The nature of the real encounter_2a has changed from an encountered real being_2a and truly referential (iconic and indexal) hand and hand-speech talk_2a to purely symbolic speech-alone talk_2a.  The content-level normal context has gone from what is happening? to what does the statement say?  Does the statement say something about mind-independent existence (ens reale)?  Or does the statement say something that is purely mind-dependent (ens rationis)?

0165 The concept of mind-dependent beings fits the following causes:

H2C1: ‘Beings of reason’ have no physical causes.

H2C2: ‘Beings of reason’ may have material and formal causes in the fictitious sense.

H2C3: The intellect is the intentional efficient cause of ‘beings of reason’.

H2C4: The final cause of ‘beings of reason’ is not direct.

0166 These mind-dependent beings should be recognized as fiction.

H2C5: ‘Beings of reason’ consist of false acts, by which we claim that something exists. or can exist, that in fact cannot.

H2C6: ‘Beings of reason’ are necessarily made up of false mental acts.

0167 H2C7: Sometimes the false judgment is due to contingency.  So, the label may not apply to these cases.

Clearly, these mind-dependent beings associate to fiction as it is and fiction that is mistaken as fact.  Plus, they are generated spontaneously by the efficient intellect.

H2C8: ‘Beings of reason’ are not made by abstraction.

H2C9: ‘Beings of reason’ can be made through the simple apprehension of unity between incompatible items.

0168 Curiously, the last two causes expand the concept of mind-dependent being.  A ‘being of reason’ may be more than mere fiction.  A mind-dependent being may also be the simple (without abstraction) apprehension of unity between incompatible items.  This simple apprehension may be true in a way that a fact is not.

0169 The fusion of two actualities into one is discussed in the chapter on message in How To Define the Word “Religion”.  Two nested forms may intersect in the realm of actuality, yielding a single actuality.  This single actuality can only be placed in the content level of an interscope.  Thus, it could occupy the slot designated 2a (the decoded statement).  More on that later.

0170 Finally, my discussion on Hurtado is not complete without mentioning the single claim about the nature of ‘beings of reason’ that I did not mention.  This claim is strangely ethereal, given that his perspective grounds facts as true and fictions as false.  ‘The very idea that speech-alone statements must be reckoned as fact or fiction’ suggests that the sorting itself involves truth.  Thus, the following claim stands out:

H1N10: True judgment can destroy ‘beings of reason’.

0171 Perhaps, there are two axes to consider.  These are true as opposed to false and true as opposed to deception.

0182 In Chapter 7; Section A; Part 1, Novotny uses the word “real” for “fact”.  This is curious.  In Hurtado’s (explicitly abstract) model, situational potential is fact versus fiction_1b.  In contrast, the situational potential in implicit abstraction is realness_1b.

0183 Even more revealing is the terminus of the reflective act_2c.

For Hurtado, the reflective act arrives at true, as opposed to false, premises.  This includes the identification of a statement as fiction.  The identification must be regarded as true, even though the statement itself is fiction.

0184 How does this work?

An encountered explicit abstraction_2a triggers action by the efficient intellect_2b.  I suppose that one could say that the being of reason_2a arises from the potential of whatever processes a speech-alone statement_1a.  It could be the potential of automatic decoding_1a.  Or it could exist as an object_2a that necessarily fits the normal context of ‘this must be a proposition’_3a.

0185 I suggest that the encountered explicit abstraction_2a could also be called “an extrinsic denomination_2a”.  Originally, the latter term suggests that all beings of reason_2a are somehow pegged to encountered real beings_2a.  This accords to that intuition.

0186 However, look at the term closely.  “Extrinsic” means from outside the intellect of the subject.  It could also mean from outside the subject.  “Denomination” means to apply a name or value to this or that.  A spoken proposition_2acould fit the bill.

0187 So the idea of extrinsic denomination could shift, from an image where beings of reason are tags on encountered forms_2a or acts of reason_2a to a picture where beings of reason are decoded versions of propositions that are spoken to me_2a.

With that shift, spoken statements_2a (one element in the content-level actuality) may trigger the efficient intellect_2b to produce a being of reason_2a (the other element of the dyad) that is virtually proper (truly defined)_2c and appropriate(factually reckoned)_2b.  Such objects must already reside in the vocabularies of the efficient_2b and formal_2c intellects, even though only the occasion of the encountered speech-alone statements_2a makes them actual.

0188 This scenario matches Mastri’s and Belluto’s fourth claim:

MBN4: Before they are actual objects of the intellect, beings of reason exist as virtual and potential objects.

Yet, they do not exist as actual or possible real beings.

MBN5: Beings of reason cannot exist in actual reality.

However, they fill a slot in the realm of actuality.  Consequently…

MBN6: Beings of reason are not pure nothingness.

0189 By filling in the empty slot of the dyad of actuality_2a, the efficient intellect_2b imposes a being of reason_2a into the content-level nested form.   This being of reason_2a will get classified as fact or fiction_1b, depending on the situation_3b. However, the default situation is real, so:

0190 MBN7: Beings of reason are thought of in the manner of facts (true and real beings), even though they may be fiction.

This implies that facts are not beings of reason.  Beings of reason are fictional, even though they may be regarded as facts.  Once the formal intellect ascertains that a being^in_reason_2a is fiction, then the situation changes, and the efficient intellect may now grasp the being of reason_2a as fiction_1b.

(Perhaps, this goes with the fact that Cervantes published Don Quixote, the first fictional novel of the Age of Ideas, in Spanish in 1607 AD.)

0191 MBN8: The formal intellect may reflexively (or reflectively) think of ‘beings of reason’ as ‘fictions’.

The formal intellect_2c does this through analogy: Beings of reason are to thought as beings are to existence.

MBN9: Beings of reason exist (are beings) in an analogical sense of existence (being).

0192 What does this imply?

Novotny sums it up.  Mastri’s and Belluto’s treatment is more mature than Suarez’s set up.

0193 The question is: Why?

Mastri and Belluto run Suarez’s thought experiment.  They take Hurtado’s perspective, valuing true over false, and arrive at a similar entanglement with fact and fiction.  Yet, Mastri and Belluto re-work Hurtado’s jarring change of perspective and re-establish the importance of the ‘being of reason’:

The being^in_reason is important because it allows the formal intellect to identify it as fiction, thereby arriving at a truth. That truth is not available to fact, which is already true.

0194 In their narrative arc, the being of reason_2a is transcribed into a type of decoded statement_2a.  The being^in_reason_2ais a decoded statement that will be classified as fiction, even though, at first, the efficient intellect_2b grasps it as fact.  When the formal intellect_2c discerns the decoded statement_2a as false, it_2c arrives at a truth: This reckoning_2b is false_2c, so it must situate_2b a fiction_1b.

The situation changes.  Once the decoded statement_2a is labeled a ‘being of reason_2a’, the efficient intellect may grasp the decoded statement_2a as fiction and truthfully entertain its falsehood.

0195 Mastri’s and Belluto’s perspective_2c looks like this:

0196 Amazingly, the Baroque scholastics arrive at a counterpoint to the emerging Age of Ideas.  The Age of Ideastheorizes how facts produce true definitions.  The Baroque scholastics discover how fictions are false, until the moment that the formal intellect recognizes them as false.  Then, that recognition introduces truth.  So, now a being^in_reason may be regarded as fact in a situation conditioned by a truthful acknowledgment of fiction.

As such, Mastri and Belluto (as well as other Baroque scholastics) justify modern literature as written words that are false unless regarded as fiction.  They do so before modern literature is written.  Who could anticipate that?  Is the Age of Ideas also the Age of Fiction?

0050 What does the following statement imply?

Impressions of communal spaces must be received by a blank-slate capable of receiving impressions as integral to a map of narodal cognition.

How does a denkfurher go about teaching a student to serve as a blank slate?

0051 The scholastic interscope for how people think may assist in imagining the process.

For a derivation, see Looking At John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”, in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023.

0052 On the content level, the normal context of what is happening_3a brings the actuality of an impression_2a (or sensation_2a) into relation with the potential of ‘something happening’_1a.

On the situation level, the normal context of what it means to me_3b brings the actuality of a perception_2b into relation with the potential of ‘situating content’_1b.

On the perspective level, the normal context of does this make sense_3c brings the actuality of a judgment_2c into relation with the potential of ‘contextualizing the situation’_1c.

0053 Obviously, the ethnographer enters a narod (a community) with the aim of mapping its cognitive space, then publishing that map in a monograph.

0054 So, I suppose that the initial interaction between ethnographer (who does not belong to the community) and the narod consists of sensations_2a and impressions_2a.

But, what is an impression_2a?

The scholastics propose a dyadic actuality that corresponds to what the ethnographer encounters.

An impression_2a consists of the dyad, {active body [substantiates] sensate soul}_2a.

0055 Here is a comparison of impression_2a to ethnography₂.

How do these two relate to one another?

One can almost assign philosophers to each real element.  Merleau Ponty goes with “active body”_2a.  Carl Jung goes with “sensate soul”_2a.  The external and internal senses, including the automatic decoding of words, goes with active body.  Feelings and qualia associate to sensate soul.

0056 In this comparison, the presence of the ethnographer, participating in the activities of a narod, is like an active body.  This active body substantiates a sensate soul, which, through training as an anthropologist, is capable of receiving the matter of the active body_2a and the form of an impression_2a.

0057 How does this contribute to the ethnographer’s construction of the narod’s cognitive space?

Well, look at the corresponding normal context_3a and potential_1a.  The cognitive space opens into the question, “What is happening”_3a, operating on the possibility of ‘something’ happening_1a.

0058 The same story line applies in a comparison of perception_2b to ethnography₂.

The ethnographer’s participation allows reception of {the narod’s perceptive souls [informing] their reactive bodies}_2b.  The ethnographer will record the people’s phantasms and emotions.

0059 The ethnographer, ironically, cannot sit in judgment_2c of the community, because the ethnographer does not enjoy or suffer the narod’s commitments.  Yet, an implicit Hippocratic Oath characterizes the commitment of the ethnographer.  First, do no harm.  This responsibility… this oath… is what makes an ethnographer a true professional.  The ethnographer professes that the recorded cognitive maps will not be used for nefarious purposes.

0060 The scholastic map of how humans think allows me to ideate the following comparison, where the narod (the community under investigation) consists of a summation of the content and situation levels, in such a fashion that each person in the community matters and contributes to the forms of the narodal cognitive space.

0061 In sum, the actuality of the narod_2a is situated by ethnography_2b, as shown in the figure below.

The content-level question is, “What is happening?”

The situation-level question is, “What does this mean to me?”

0062 A researcher may try to be a tabula rasa, but cannot be, because he (or she) has already been raised in a civilization where ethnography is a profession.  Every community senses this, and regards the ethnographer as an emissary from a particular (and different) civilizational sphere.  To me, this is a remarkable feature of the ethnographic enterprise.  Plus, it is one of the phenomena of the noumenon of humans in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. 

0108 In section five, the author moves towards an integrated conceptual framework of evolutionary biology and anthropology.

So far, this examination conjures a vision of two applications of that framework.

0109 One reflects the Lebenswelt that we evolved in and niche construction.

Here is a picture of the domestication of cows_2b as an adaptation.  Human sociality_2a constitutes the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a.

Here is a diagram of the entanglement of humans_2b as an adaptation.  Niche construction_1b produces increasingly domesticated cows_2a that yield more milk for the herding ethnos.  Adult lactose-tolerance is one of the adaptations_2b.

0110 Two goes with our current Lebenswelt and seems to manifest as a standard adaptation.

The academic community_3b compares to natural selection_3b.

0111 But, in regards to the domestication and entanglement example, are the academics like cows or like humans?

Perhaps that is not a fair question.  But, an anthropologist may admit that the kenosis that the ethnographer learnsmight be comparable to an adult regaining the childhood ability to drink milk.

0112 If that is the case, then the dyad, {ethnographer [records] cognitive map}_2b, touches base with adaptation_2b.

The possibility of ‘subject cognitive spaces’_1b reflects niche_1b.

The dyad, {persons as matter [substantiate] narod as form}_2a, mirrors the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a.

0113 But, the subject community is not merely the community that is the subject of anthropological inquiry.  It is a community that assumes that these novel humans offer the potential of ‘what’?… ‘protection and nurture’?.. or at least… ‘something other than predation’.  Maybe, the labels of ‘safety’ and ‘mutuality’ will do.

With that assumption, the subject community adapts by losing fear of the civilized humans that send an ethnographer to participate in their world.

0114 Here is a picture.

0115 Of course, nothing like the above argument appears in section five.

Instead, the author says that anthropologists (“we”) need to develop a framework of feedback loops that include behavioral, cognitive, material and ecological components, that addresses key issues of human evolution from at least the mid-Pleistocene (maybe 2Myr) to the present.

Surely, evolution-informed anthropologists should be interested in showing how kinship systems, economic, religious and political affiliations, and institutions construct and influence social and perceptual processes through… um… interpellation.

Niche construction is key because humans… and their hominin ancestors… somehow… alter the actuality independent of the adapting species… through social and perceptual processes.

Yes, it may be messy, but an integrated anthropology will be worth the effort.

0116 The last claim that the author wants to make is that ethnographers are like humans and their subject narods are like cows.

0117 Of course, humans are not like cows.  Nor are humans like who we think they are.  They are… um… the products of complicated evolutionary feedback loops.

0118 In section six, the author lists more than a dozen publications on the subject, setting the stage to propose his own heuristic framework.

0119 Fortunately, the author has the excuse of not being familiar with Razie Mah’s masterwork, The Human Niche,available at smashwords (and other e-book venues) in 2018.

Unfortunately, he already tried to reverse engineer Bourdieu’s concepts of “habitus” and “structure” into a framework reductive enough to fit the basic requirements of current evolutionary theorists.  Current evolutionary theorists?  These are the highly-credentialed academics who have yet to figure out that adaptation_2H is not the same as phenotype_2V even though both labels apply to the same entity₂.

0120 I mean, really, current evolutionary theorists make fun of the proponents of intelligent design while sitting on an intersection as mysterious as the improbability of life itself.  If a species_2b‘ niche_1b and its_2b genome_1b are made possible by an actuality independent of the adapting species_2a and DNA_2a, respectively, in the normal contexts of natural selection_3b and body development_3b, respectively, then exactly what rules out a Creator God from operating within the realms_2a underlying the situation-level possibilities_1b or within the situation-level possibilities_1b themselves?

It is something to gag over.

0121 Meanwhile, this examination has already fumbled upon domestication-entanglement co-evolution as a possible manifestation of what the author is talking about.

The author proposes three components, or “nodes”, that influence one another: individual, group and community.  With the manifestation at hand, “individual” labels both the ethnographer and the person as matter.  The “group” corresponds to the narod.  The “community” goes with civilization and the academies within it.

0122 Then, the author proposes that these mutual influences engage in feedback.  

Then, the author illustrates the feedback using the example of sexual partnering.

The author chooses the term, “sexual partnering”, because the terms “mating” or “sexual activity related to reproduction”, are too blatant and annoying.

Nevertheless, even with the bland label, the example should pique the curiosity of any undergraduate.

“Sexual partnering”, indeed.

0123 This examiner will stay the course with the current paradigm of domestication and entanglement, modified by ambiguity, because the role of the cow and the role of the human now play out as mirrors of one another.

Even though this paradigm is not as… sexy… as the author’s example.  It has the benefit of shedding light on the nature of the first singularity, where hand-speech practicing ethnos become speech-alone talking narods, thereby making the passage from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.

0154 Section nine offers some parting thoughts.

The author proposes an integrated anthropology.

Integrated with what?

An extended evolutionary synthesis.

0155 Recall that the full title of the article is “The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, Ethnography, and the Human Niche: Toward an Integrated Anthropology”.

The proposition of an integrated anthropology and the title associate to a category-based nested form.

0156 The problem?

Anthropology₂ does not constellate under the normal context of the human niche₃ and within the potential of ‘the niche-construction version of an extended evolutionary synthesis’₁.

Instead, ethnography₂ is anthropology’s adaptation to the normal context of community₃ operating on the potential of ‘communal cognitive spaces’₁.

0157 This makes sense, in terms of Aristotle’s causalities, which are cleverly re-imported from philosophy into scientific inquiry by the academic discipline of Anthropology.

0158 Yes, humans evolve.  So, it seems that contemporary anthropology₂ should be contextualized by a need for integration₃ with the potential of ‘evolutionary science’₁.

0159 This expectation brings in a second problem, corresponding to the Greimas square of Dugin’s typology in Comments on Alexander Dugin’s Book (2012) The Fourth Political Theory (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0160 This examination of Augustin Fuentes’s article adds value by elaborating the elements within this Greimas square.

0161 The people (A) are here represented by the ethnographer, operating within an institution (of “the people”), that manifests its organizational objectives in terms of contemporary political theories (including notions (B) on how the discipline of anthropology should train ethnographers capable of receiving (and mapping) the cognitive spaces within a narod (C)).

0162 In other words, the ethnographer as anthropologist (A) contrasts with the various theoretical apparatuses (B) that sustain the academic discipline.

Plus, these various theoretical social constructions (B) are what makes a people capable of practicing a level of social complexity that appears as wealth and power in the view of the limitations of any particular community or narod (C).

Finally, the narod (C) is a traditional society in our current Lebenswelt that cannot return to a corresponding ethnos (D) that would exist in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0507 So, where was I?

Where have I traveled?

I have walked through the first of two interviews with a prominent member of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics at its first ascendant.  Because my approach capitalizes (some would say, “exploits”) Peirce’s formulations, my examination adds value to the discussion.  Diagrams of purely relational structures, such as the interscope, permits a visualization of semiotic changes and developments through time.

0508 The second interview, starting on page 425, discusses thirteen questions.  Predefined questions offer an awkward format for an interview.  Given the hyperventilation that occurs during the interview on August 25, 2011, the hope is for a more structured encounter at Uspenskij’s villa in Rome on May 27, 2012.

The interview concerns Uspenskij’s 2007 book, Ego Loquens: Language and the communicative space.

0509 The Latin term, “ego loquens“, roughly transliterates into “I speak”.

Of course, the end of Descartes’ famous slogan immediately comes to mind, “therefore I am.”

I speak, therefore I am.

0510 But, what am I?

Perhaps, I am language_2b (that another person can read like a literary text_2b) as well as a communicative space (like the way that I, as a literary text_2a, entangle a communal cognitive space called “language_2a“).

0511 How confounding.

A communal cognitive… er… communicative space_2a is the language_2am that is entangled by the literary text_2af, not as a thing itself_2b, but as a model_2c of structural_3b and semiological_3a signification_3c.

0512 I hope that this statement justifies the use of the title of Uspenskij’s book to label the fundament and derivative interscopes, as shown below.

0513 Look closely at the above figure.

Can the reader see a triadic relation where a semiological_3a structuralist_3b model_2c (SV_i) stands for a literary text as form_2af (SO_i) potentiated by meaning_1a, presence_1b and message_1c in the normal context of a defining intellect (SI_i)?

0514 At this point, I would like to introduce the interventional sign-relation, first brought to visualization in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols” and then used as a tool in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal“. Both works are by Razie Mah.  The former may be purchased at smashwords and other e-book venues (while the time lasts!).  The latter appears as a series in Razie Mah’s blog during October, 2023).

0515 The interventional sign-relation?

How informative.

Please tell.

0516 In general, the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i) is a perspective-level actuality_2c.

The interventional sign-object (SO_i) is the represented content-level actuality_2a.

The interventional sign-interpretant (SI_i) consists in the content-level normal context_3a and potential_1a.

0517 An interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i) stands for its sign-object (SO_i) in regards to an interventional sign-interpretant (SI_i).

0518 Here is a general diagram.

0519 This rendition of Peirce’s sign-relation in terms of Peirce’s category-based nested forms is founded on the notion that both the SV and the SO belong to secondness, the realm of actuality, leaving the SI to include both thirdness and firstness.  Since nested forms occupy levels in an interscope, the SO occupies the actuality on the adjacent higher level than the SV.  The SI occupies the same level as the SO.

0520 This rendition implies that there are three signs contained within any three-level interscope.

Each sign connects the levels of two adjacent categories, except for the interventional sign, which goes from thirdness to firstness.  One dare not call that “prescission”.

0521 Unless, one imagines, not precission among levels, but among interscopes.

The interventional sign-relation constellates precission between two interscopes.

In this case, the “tiers” belong to firstness and secondness.

How informative.

0522 Tiers of interscopes is not new.

Precission among tiers of interscopes can be found in Razie Mah’s chapter on presence in How To Define The Word “Religion”.  Ten primers belong to the corresponding course, for those interested in a step-by-step exposition.

Precission among tiers is also intimated in the very structure of the article under examination.  The first interview, part one, deals with the possibility of exact methods_3c virtually bringing structuralism_3b into relation with the potential of semiology_2a.  The second interview, part two, deals with Uspenskij’s literary text_2af, Ego loquens, and considers the possibility of meaning_1a, presence_1b and message_1c.

0575 Page 437 introduces a question (#7) concerning translation.

Why is adequate translation between languages impossible?

There are two specifying sign-relations in the TMS regime.

0576 In the first specifying sign-relation, in the fundament interscope, the literary text_2bf is substantiated by the language_2bm (SO_s) that virtually situates spoken words_2a (SV_s) as langue_2am and parole_2af of a particular mother tongue.  Translating a literary text into another mother tongue risks misreading the content character of a literary text_2af, especially when the text is rich with word-play.

0577 Here is the specifying sign-relation for the loquens interscope, in general.

Parole_2af (SV_s) stands for language_2bm (SO_s) in regards to a structuralist paradigm_3b((1b)) (SI_s).

0578 If the word-play is not translated, the text does not make sense.

In other words, an alien reader may not be able generate an adequate semiological_3a structuralist_3b model_2c of the original text.

The text_2bf is not funny anymore.

0579 In the second specifying sign-relation, in the derivative interscope, social interaction_2bf is substantiated by a cognition_2bm (SO_s) that virtually situates the language of meaning_2am (SV_s) that has been entangled by the literary text_2af.  Can this operation be translated into the various languages of a positivist intellect?  What if the positivist language is too different?  Then, will it be virtually situated by a style of cultural inquiry_3b that makes no sense at all, such as computer operations_3b.

0580 Say what?

Here is the specifying sign-relation for the ego interscope, in general.

A positivist language_2am (SV_s) stands for cognition_2bm (SO_s) in regards to a cultural-studies paradigm_3b((1b)) (SI_s).

0581 What if the literary text_2af is a series of apparently irregular scratches_2af that the academic thinks are inscribed near the center of only one side of each of the before mentioned pieces of fossilized wood?

What could these scratches_2af mean_1b in terms of the language of anthropology_2am?

0582 Of course, after the excavation, the researchers take the artifacts to Professor Rabenmann, who still has an office at the old Institute of Archaeology. 

What will the old man have to say?

0583 They explain the find and give him the two flat pieces of fossilized wood.  The Professor notes cord markings are on the opposing side of the scratches and much closer to the end of the flat pieces, than the marks.

Are the marks intentional?

What do these artifacts translate into?

0584 Hmmm.  The professor is not sure.  He opens the drawer to his desk and takes out a ball of string.  He measures out a meter, then cuts the string with a scissors.  Then, with a degree of deliberation, he places the stones face to face and starts to wind the string around the two pieces, retracing the one sided cord markings.

0585 Professor, what are you doing?

Give me a moment. I want to see.

You are not going to break them, are you?

Oh no, no breakage, these are hard as stone.  Now, look I have tied them together.

Now what?

0586 Then, the professor takes a walnut that is on his desk, places it between the two pieces, right where the scratches are, and presses the stone slabs together.

0587 The novices almost pass out.

“There you go.  It is a nutcracker.”, the professor says, while picking the meat of the nut away from the shell.

0588 Yes, the word “translation” now applies to two literary texts.  The loquens_2bf text (the one everyone talks about) is substantiated by the language of the mother tongue_2bm.  The ego_2af text (the one that Uspenskij talks about) entangles the language_2am of the TMS positivist intellect_3a.

0589 Later, the students use interferometry to make three-dimensional images of each fossilized piece in order to demonstrate that, if the two cord-impressed ends are bound by a simulated structure, then enough force could be simultaneously applied to the opposing termini as to compromise the mechanical integrity of a Persian walnut.

Now, that is what I call, “translation”!

0590 I recall that at the very opening of the second interview, Part II, Uspenskij notes that the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics is primarily interested in culture.  It does not regard inanimate and animate processes as significant.

0591 With that recollection in mind, consider a literary_2af… er computerized input_2af that entangles a coding language_2am.

Here is a picture.

0592 Does a cybernetic intellect_3a turn computer input_2af into machine code_2am according to the potential that ‘each word of the input translates into a sequence of machine codes’_1a?

0593 Does the answer imply that entanglement is translation, broadly speaking?

Entanglement is translation.

Does this apply especially to the content-level actuality_2a of the “ego” interscope, in so far as it embodies the sign-object of an interventional sign-relation (SO_i) and the sign-vehicle of a specifying sign-relation (SV_s)?