12/21/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 3 of 20)

0017 Evolution is the path that leads the reader from the earliest form of life, bacteria, to one of the West’s best musical designers, Johann Sebastian Bach.

Is that what Dennett claims?

If so, then the preceding blog offers an interesting comparison.

I wonder, can the specifying sign serve as an analogy for Darwin’s paradigm?

What about the other way around?

0018 Here is picture of the two-level interscope for the Darwinian paradigm.

Here is a picture of the two-level interscope containing the specificative sign of a dog’s tail action.

0019 Darwin’s paradigm and the specifying sign have a similar category-based structure.

So, may they serve as analogies for one another?

0020 If Darwin’s paradigm serves as a metaphor for the specifying sign, then my dog’s tail action_2a is like an actuality independent of the adapting species_2a. My dog’s tail action_2a harbors a potential that may be exploited or avoided_1b. Of course, the word, “niche”, seems a little awkward in this instance. A clever fellow, named Gibson, comes up with a good substitute. Gibson labels the potential with the term, “affordance_1b“.

The dog’s tail_2a provides an advantage to the human, that is, an “affordance_1b“. The dog’s tail might also offer a disadvantage, which is also an “affordance”. Gibson’s term is ambiguous in this regard. Nevertheless, “affordance_1b” suggests that the adapting species exploits the opportunity or avoids the danger.

0021 So, what on earth is the adapting species in this example?

It must belong to me, since my situation-level normal context, what the dog’s tail means to me_3b, is like an episode of natural selection_3b.

Dennett raises a very interesting option. Maybe, evolution is going on in my head.

Maybe, the neural networks in my head are products of Darwin’s paradigm working on neural synapses.

According to Darwin, natural selection_3b is a mindless proclivity to survive (or not survive) in the face of an affordance. For neurons, “survival” concerns participation in a neural network that serves to exploit or avoid an affordance.

For example, neurons in the cerebellum coordinate signals for fine-tuned motions. They are in business as long as the appendage or musculature that they are involved with is present and working. Neurons in the neocortex tend to be more enterprising. These cells are busy creating new synapses with other neurons. They network, so to speak. They fish for business… er… affordances. The selection process is guided by… shall I say… the best of all possible affordances_1b: an answer_2b to the question of what the dog’s tail action_2a means to me_3b.

Yes, I want to be Candide, in this regard.

0022 This leaves the specifying sign-object_2b (SO_s) as analogous to an adaptation_2b.

Isn’t that curious?

If Darwin’s paradigm serves as a metaphor for the specifying sign, then the inquirer may visualize a hypothesis concerning how the brain operates. The actuality independent of the adapting species_2a is my dog’s tail action. The adaptation_2b is a circuit built from synapses (along with their entrepreneurial neurons) that somehow conveys the mental perception that my dog is either happy or upset_2b.

This particular instance of natural selection is a variation of Darwin’s paradigm, because synapses are entities that either survive or don’t survive and neocortical neurons are long-lived prospectors that make (or cut loose) synapses in order to stay in business. The synapses are selected for or against. The neurons breed synapses. The neurons select for synapses that participate in sign-processing networks.

0023 Here is a revised picture for a dog’s tail as a specifying sign.

0024 Perhaps, the analogy works, but the adapting species_3b is not so clear. Is it the synapse, the neuron or the local network? Or maybe, it is all three, with the synapse similar to a member of a species, the neuron similar to a breeder of the species, and local networks serving as a motivation for why a neuron breeds synapses.

Plus, what is the affordance_1b in this instance?

0025 On top of that, what about memes?

My dog’s tail action may be labeled a “meme“.

Dennett associates memes to affordances. And here, one affordance is clear. The meme survives because it satisfies a particular specifying sign. Perhaps, all that a researcher needs to do is look for specifying signs that have survived for a long time in order to formulate hypotheses on the ways that memes survive.

Does that sound like circular logic?

0026 To me, here is one affordance_1b. If a dog’s tail-action is an index of its attitude, then that is an advantage to me, because it makes my dog’s behavior comprehensible.

With this adaptation_2b at hand, er… in mind, Daisy, my dog, becomes reasonable, as long as she stays on her leash.

12/16/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 7 of 20)

0057 The preceding blog brings me to an unappreciated, almost subliminal, theme in Dennett’s book. Dennett strives to defend scientific rationalism as opposed to… well… my blather about specificative extrinsic formal causality. Phantasm_2band manifest images_2b are the stuff of opinions. They_2b merely situate content. Even though they_2b appear to concern reality, they_2b are really user-end illusions, like the meanings of spoken words or the interfaces of mobile-phone applications. They_2b are the products of both evolutionary paradigms and explicit abstraction. Evolutionary paradigms contribute to design in one way. Explicit abstraction contributes to design in another way.

0058 Here is a picture of terms that apply to actualities in a two-level interscope.

0059 It makes me wonder about that word, “design”.

Is “design” an attribute of the manifest image_2b that dwells in the user-end illusion that I call “my mind”?

Or does “design” apply to the neural networks_2b that result from neurons_3b naturally selecting for synapses_1b?

Is my user-end illusion best described as a little homunculus capable of planning and carrying out those plans orcompetence without comprehension?

0060 Or, do these questions pose a false dichotomy?

Are my neurons like selective breeders of synapses? Do synapses flourish when plugged into a neural network? Do neurons and synapses serve as the material and instrumental support for an immaterial phantasm? I suppose so. Neurons are long-lived compared to synapses. So, they may support selection through producing and sustaining synapses. Neurons are entrepreneurs who often outlive one particular business (neural network) and end up participating in another. The pattern of synapses established by a neuron_2b may be regarded as an adaptation_2b.

0061 For classical biological evolution, natural selection operates on individuals within a species. Each individual is on its own.

For the evolution that Dennett is interested in, synapses are not like individuals. They are like toolkits, designed for neurons to network with other neurons.

0062 Okay, then let me take that to the next level.

I wonder whether the relation between human culture and our species expressa_2b, have the same evolutionary configuration. So, human culture reproduces neuronal natural selection_3b and a meme_2a, a species impressa_2a,reproduces the role of the synapse. After all, humans are long-lived compared to memes. Memes are not individuals. They are like toolkits, designed for humans to network with other humans.

Instead of “neural evolution”, Dennett proposes the label “cultural evolution”.

0063 This brings me back to the manifest image, produced mechanically and instrumentally by neuron-driven evolution,and, perhaps, mechanically and instrumentally producing cultural evolution.

Am I like a neuron of cultural evolution?

Think about it.

0064 Thank God that Daisy has not figured out that option.

The logic of this exposition would have Daisy as a short-lived synapse-like being held on a leash by a long-lived neuron-like master.

0065 What an incredible manifest image! What portraits of neuronal and cultural Darwinian paradigms are on display in Dennett’s book. Metaphysics-laden manifest images accord with the author’s physics-laden scientific images… er… models of biological and social phenomena. Yet, Dennett does not clearly envision the accordance.

0066 Why?

Dennett’s work contains a subliminal, or maybe… a sublime, defense of the scientific worldview.

A versatile and productive diagram for the scientific enterprise is developed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

12/13/23

What Is A Meme? (B of G, Part 10 of 20)

0092 According to Dennett, a meme is a unit of information worth having. If a meme is worth having, then it is worth paying attention to. A meme is a unit of cultural information. “A meme” rhymes with “gene”, a unit of information coded by DNA.

Of course, I can also say that a “meme” sounds like “mean” and “gene” sounds like “jean”.

0093 That raises the question, “What is information?”

Well, “semantic information” is encoded and specifies its own interpretation.

0094 Surely, that sounds like the work of the specifying sign.

So, a meme behaves as if it contains semantic information because it activates (what the scholastics call) specificative extrinsic formal causality, otherwise known as a specifying sign. The specifying sign connects the content and situation levels of the scholastic manifest image.

0095 In terms of semiotics, an impression_2a (SV_s) stands for a perception (SO_s) in regards to the question, “What does it mean to me?”_3b contextualizing the possibility of situating content_1b (SI_s).

Dennett calls the coupling of a content-level sign-vehicle (SV_s) to a situation-level sign-object (SO_s), “semantic information”, because, often enough, the species impressa_2a merely decodes spoken words and grammar. The qualifier, “semantics”, associates to spoken language. Semantic information offers designs worth getting, differences that makes a difference, and opportunities that go with Gibson’s term, “affordance”.

0096 So, right at the start, I know that the species expressa_2b (SO_s) virtually situates content_2a in such a manner that the species impressa_2a (SV_s) is meaningful to me_3b (SI_s). But, that is not all. Species impressa_2a (SV_s) also offers clues to presence (who speaks to me?) and message (why speak to me?) (SI_s).

0097 To Daisy, the cat (er… the species impressa_2a of the neighbor’s cat_2a (SV_s) stands for a species expressa_2b, a little monster… or maybe, an animated morsel… equipped with paws with claws_2b (SO_s).

To me, the fact that Daisy’s tail tucks between her hind legs_2a (SV_s)) stands for her fear and loathing of the neighbor’s cat_2b (SO_s) in regards to our morning walk_3b (SI_s).

Neither Daisy nor the cat know why this drama plays out with regularity. The lady next door throws out her trash just before I take Daisy on her routine walk. Her open door serves as an opportunity for the neighbor’s obnoxious cat to scamper out of its indoor enclave.

0098 I cultivated an additional incentive. I planted catnip among the neighbor’s untrimmed verge, which the cat finds attractive. Now, as soon as the neighbor lady opens her door, the cat scampers out and beelines to this destination, a garden of intoxication, where she is always surprised by Daisy and puts up a wonderful display of threats and hissing.

Daisy is so perplexed by this stoned feline that she either wants to protect me or expects me to protect her. The leash pulls tight either forward or backward, depending on the suddenness of the realization of this dramatic species impressa_2a(SV_s).

0099 Clearly, the cat_2a is a meme.

Plus, it_2a is more than a meme.

Daisy’s tail going between her hind legs_2a is a meme.

Plus, it_2a is more than a meme.

0100 As the encounter achieves greater regularity (thanks to the catnip taking root, plus the morning routines), Daisy is slowly coming to a consistent species expressa_2a (SI_s).

Nevertheless, she is regularly confounded.

12/5/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 18 of 20)

0183 If human culture is to be modeled as the replicative success of memes, then what would empirio-schematic researchentail?

Well, if the term, “meme”, labels a cultural adaptation_2b, in the normal context of cultural selection_3b operating on various affordances_1b, then the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a must relate to the scholastic interscope of how humans think_2a.

Indeed, I may highlight one particular element in the scholastic interscope_2a, the species impressa_2a, as the premier feature of the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a.

0184 But, didn’t I offer the above content-level actuality_2a as a technical definition for the term, “meme”?

So, how can the term, “meme”, also stand for a situation_b-level actuality₂ in the normal context of cultural selection_3b?

If that is not confusing enough, consider that the content-level actuality_2a also belongs to the manifest image (which is described by all three actualities of the scholastic interscope).

Plus, we are conscious of a manifest image, not its scientific image.

0185 Consciousness is the user-illusion of competition among neurons for active synapses_3b. Synaptic networks form and are maintained in response to memes. The qualia that we feel are most likely memes, sign-objects of interventional signs substantiating sign-vehicles of specifying signs.

Consequently, another term for [substance] is [implicit abstraction]. The sign-objects of interventional signs (SO_i) are like matter. The sign-vehicles of specifying signs (SV_s) are like form.

So, a meme may be denoted as SO_i [implicit abstraction] SV_s.

0186 Another word for [substance] might be, “projection”.

In projection, the situation-level potential_1b projects continuity into the content-level contiguity.

For example, there is no motion in cinema. There is only a rapid sequence of images cast upon a screen. The user illusion projects (or implicitly abstracts) smooth motion in time. This is only possible if the situation allows it.

Similarly, there is no sweetness to the fact that the neighbor’s cat is dead. There is only a corpse in the refrigerator and Daisy’s querying gaze, asking, “When are you going to give the dead cat back to me?”

So, the term, “meme”, also labels a neural network_2b, in the normal context of neural selection_3b operating on the potential of creating and destroying synapses_1b, in the process of situating a species impressa_2a.

But, once again, didn’t I offer the above content-level actuality_2a as a technical definition for the term, “meme”?

Yes, but neural networks are clearly implicated, since they constitute the adaptation_2b, and the adaptation is um… what?… a meme?

0187 If that is not enough, the designs of the most intelligent human designer cannot be compared to the adaptivity that arises from a variation of Darwinian natural selection operating on units of culture, in all their varieties. Why? There is always a cultural… er… cognitive space that even the most neurotic and attentive-to-detail engineer cannot plan for.

Consequently, cultural selection_3b yields memes that survive and flourish on their own and some of these memes are so strange and resilient that they appear miraculous, even to the positivist intellect. Therefore, they must be ruled out as “not scientific”.

0188 Here is one confounded empirio-schematic judgment characterizing this discussion.

Here is another.

12/4/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 20 of 20)

0196 Razie Mah offers three masterworks on human evolution.

The Human Niche concerns the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

An Archaeology of the Fall dramatizes the first singularity, the transition from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.

How To Define The Word “Religion” concerns our current Lebenswelt.

These works sustain this examination of Dennett’s book.

0197 In these blogs, the term, “meme”, is technically defined using the scholastic interscope for how humans think. This interscope is also in play in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”. A “meme” corresponds to a species impressa_2a with a hylomorphic structure whereby the sign-object of an interventional sign substantiates a sign-vehicle for a specificative sign.

0198 According to Dennett, a spoken word is a good example of a meme.

Notably, our current Lebenswelt must face the question, asking, “What is the nature of spoken words?”

Why?

Spoken words facilitate explicit abstraction, while hand-talk words allow only implicit abstraction. We innately expect that spoken words image and point to their referents. But, they do not. Symbols are natural signs whose sign-objects are defined by convention, habit, law, tradition and so on. Yet, no hand-talk language has words that can picture or indicate these terms. “Convention”, “habit”, “law” and “tradition” label explicit abstractions that cannot be articulated using hand talk. They may exist, but cannot be named, while using hand talk.

0199 Recall that actualities₂ are encountered.

Such actualities₂ are understood by ascertaining an appropriate normal context₃ and potential₁.

0200 How To Define The Word “Religion” applies these lessons to a familiar and contentious term. This examination of Dennett’s book applies these lessons to the word, “meme”.

Here is a picture.

0201 The message? The meme exemplifies cultural evolution.

The presence? The meme embodies neural selection.

The meaning? A scientific image of the word, “meme”, should overlay what is going on in my mind, that is, the manifest image. My consciousness is an user-end illusion produced by the message and the presence of cultural and neural selection.

0202 My thanks to the author. This well-documented work conveys that impression that inquiry into memes may account for the evolution of the human mind. Whether this impression is productive or unproductive depends on how one defines the word, “meme”.

06/30/23

Looking at Ian Hodder’s Book (2018) “Where Are We Heading?” (Part 1 of 15)

0001 Consider the title of archaeologist Ian Hodder’s recent book.

What is the question really asking?

Are we heading somewhere?

0002 The problem?

Who would purchase a book with an honest title, such as, “Are We Heading Somewhere?: The Evolution of Humans and Things”?

Everyone knows where we are going.

We are going to hell.

0003 So, maybe my first question concerns what Hodder’s titular question is really asking.

For my second question, I consider Hodder’s subtitle and ask, “Is there directionality to human evolution?”

A consensus among general biologists tells us, “Evolution has no direction, because direction implies an overall teleology or purpose.”

But, this is not the case.

0004 Why is it not the case?

An answer can be found in a series by Razie Mah, titled, A Course on Evolution and Thomism, available at smashwords and other e-book venues. This course includes Speculations on Thomism and Evolution and Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome.

0005 Here is a quick summary.

The normal context of natural selection_3b brings the actuality of adaptations_2b into relation with a niche_1b.

Plus, a niche_1b is the potential of an actuality_2a independent of the adapting species.

In order to digest this statement, consult Razie Mah’s A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0006 Here is a picture of the quick summary.

0007 What is a niche_1b?

A situation-level niche_1b is the potential of a content-level actuality independent of the adapting species_2a.

0008 Does that mean that biological evolution has direction?

0009 On the one hand, biologists confuse everyone with their declaration that evolution has no direction. For living systems, natural selection_3b encourages adaptations_2b in response to a variety of proximate niches_1a, which are actualities, more or less independent of the adapting species_2a. There is no telling which proximate niche_1b will turn out to be decisive. Most likely, the proximate niche_1b is the potential of an actuality_2a that directly benefits or challenges the creature’s reproductive success_2b.

Plus, there are various surprises, like a huge meteor striking the planet Earth, which changes all proximate niches so dramatically that mass extinctions occur. So, biological evolution, on a grand scale, appears to play out as a contest to adapt to proximate niches, which are themselves contingent on planetary conditions.

0010 On the other hand, the above diagram shows that biological adaptations are directional. They are teleological. There is an actuality_2a, independent of the adapting species that either encourages or inhibits reproductive success_1b. Genetic recombinations will throw up a variations among a species’ phenotypes. Some of these phenotypic variations will prove more successful than others at exploiting the actuality_2a or avoiding the actuality_2a. Biologists label this eventuality, “differential reproductive success”.

0011 Adaptations_2b reveal that the niche_1b is… to use a theological term… teleological. The niche_1b is the potential that becomes manifest when a biologist reflects upon the adaptations of a particular species_2b in the normal context of natural selection_3b. The niche is like a boulder in a river than causes water to flow around it. The rock is an independent actuality. The river adapts.

0012 Does that mean that biological evolution has a direction?

In the same way that a river of water running to the sea has a direction?

0013 The difference between a river of water and the river of life concerns altitude. Water runs downhill. When it gets to the sea, its niche is exhausted. Life runs uphill. It converts a huge amount of energy (think of water running downhill) into a little amount of energy that the organism can use (think of a waterwheel grinding grains of wheat into flour). Consequently, life is precarious. Death is ubiquitous.

So, a niche_1b is all about staying alive.

0014 Actualities independent of the adapting species_2a pose opportunities and hazards. These have the potential to constitute niches_1b. A niche_1b is relevant enough to increase the reproductive success of some in the adapting species, as opposed to others, in the normal context of natural selection_3b. The successful ones adapt_2a to their niche_1b. Life is always climbing uphill. Death is tumbling down.

0015 So, where are we heading?

Ian Hodder suggests an answer.

Things can keep us alive. So, it behooves our ancestors, the hominins, as well as ourselves, the humans, to attend to the things that keep us alive.

He calls this adaptation: “entanglement”.

06/29/23

Looking at Ian Hodder’s Book (2018) “Where Are We Heading?” (Part 2 of 15)

0016 Hodder’s desires to extend entanglement theory to all of biological evolution.

Am I already there?

The concept of the niche_1b entangles the adapting species_2b with independent actualities_2a (that is, things_2a).

Hominins are only doing what biological evolution has been doing for a long time.

But there is a difference.

Unlike most other species, where the actuality independent of the adapting species is a thing or state of things, our species adapts into a purely relational niche. Such is the bold hypothesis of Razie Mah’s masterwork, The Human Niche,available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0017 Dr. Hodder’s theory of entanglement starts with a thing. A thing is a content-level actuality.

Here is a picture.

0018 Entanglement starts with an actuality that is independent of people. Only one slot is occupied in the initial configuration. The others remain either empty or nascent. “Nascent” means “yet to be manifested”.

0019 For an example, let me consider a detail about the archaeological excavation that Dr. Hodder supervised (and is, no doubt, still involved), Catal Hoyuk in Anatolia.

The detail_2a is riverbed clay. This clay_2a has the potential to be used as construction material for the walls of houses in the Neolithic settlement_1b. This potential_1b goes onto the situation-level, and awakens a corresponding normal context_3band actuality_2b.

0020 Here is a picture. The lighter colors denote “awakening” as well as emptiness.

0021 Awakening? Emptiness?

The situation-level normal context_3b is obvious to the archaeologist. Shelter is an adaptation_2b to a proximate human niche_1b. Humans need shelter to protect themselves from all sorts of dangers_2a, especially at night. As such, shelters are sensible constructions.

0022 Sensible construction?

For some background concerning this topic, consult Razie Mah’s A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0023 Dr. Hodder awakens to the sensible construction implicit in entanglement.

This is the entanglement that Hodder wants to convey. Things become useful. Then, humans end up entangled with useful things.

06/28/23

Looking at Ian Hodder’s Book (2018) “Where Are We Heading?” (Part 3 of 15)

0024 Here is a picture of Hodder’s general theory of entanglement.

0025 Here is a diagram of the relational structure of biological adaptation.

0026 Notice any similarities?

Does this summarize Hodder’s book?

Yes, it does, because Hodder, as a scientist, limits his vision to sensible construction.

No, it does not, because the two diagrams are different, even though they appear remarkably similar.

0027 There are two actualities.

Things_2a occupy the slot for actuality_2a in the content-level of both two-level interscopes.

The ways that people use things and take care of them_2b occupies the slot for actuality_2b on the situation-level, for the normal context of entanglement_3b.

Biological adaptations_2b occupies the slot for actuallity_2b on the situation level, for the normal context of natural selection_2b.

0028 What does that imply?

The logics of normal contexts₃ include exclusion, complementarity and alignment. I can rule out the first and the third options, leaving me with the second.

Entanglement_2b complements natural selection_2b.

Similarly, the potential ‘uses of things’_1b complements the biological concept of niche_1b.

0029 Where are we heading?

Are we heading to the realization that people’s use of things, as well as their care for things_2b, complements the biological notion of adaptation_2b?

Are we are heading to an awareness that what Hodder calls “entanglement”_3b may be an adaptation_2b into the human niche_1b?

If the answers are “yes”, then perhaps the concept of biological adaptation_2b relies on (and is therefore, formatted by) our innate capacity for using and caring for things_2b.

0030 Does Darwin pick up on that?

What do natural selection and selective breeding by humans have in common?

06/27/23

Looking at Ian Hodder’s Book (2018) “Where Are We Heading?” (Part 4 of 15)

0031 Let me return to the example.

What is the problem with the following figure?

0032 The Neolithic houses at Catal Hoyuk are more than shelters. They are more than sensible construction. They are also social constructions.

0033 What is a social construction?

Please note A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0034 Is there an obvious social construction that goes with the walls of a house?

Yes, the house_2b is a home_2c.

0035 A home_2c puts a house_2b into perspective.

One of the difficulties facing archaeologists at Catal Hoyuk involves the imagination.

The closely packed houses_2b are obviously homes_2c, because people live in them. The inhabitants decorate various rooms. They post the skulls of wild cows on their walls. Are they trophies? Or, are they symbols of divinity? The archaeologist does not know.

Even worse, archaeologists do not know whether the people of Catal Hoyuk ideated any distinction between a trophy or a divinity.

My guess is that they did not.

0036 How so?

Consult the simple The First Singularity and Its Fairy Tale Trace and the complex An Archaeology of the Fall, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0037 My suspicion is that the people of Catal Hoyuk practice hand-speech talk, rather than speech-alone talk. In hand speech talk, I cannot picture or point to the label, “home”_2c. If I picture or point to anything, it would be the house_2b.

Here is a thought experiment.

Imagine that I live in Catal Hoyuk.

Even though hand-speech talk cannot label the word, “home”, I can implicitly commit to the conviction that my house_2b is my home_2c. After all, I use riverbed clay_2a to repair the walls of my house_2b. I live there.

My house_2b is implicitly my home_2c, but I cannot explicitly articulate that conclusion, because hand-speech talk only can image and indicate “house”_2b.

0038 Hodder does not know this, because the professor has not encountered the hypothesis of the first singularity.

The perspective level can evolve as an adaptation, but it cannot be explicitly abstracted. Instead, it is implicitly abstracted.

See Razie Mah’s e-book, A Primer on Implicit and Explicit Abstraction.

0039 The following diagram places a fine mesh underneath the elements of the perspective level, indicating that this level can adapt to the realness of houses_2b, without explicit abstraction of the perspective-level elements. What we call belonging_3c, home_2c and settlement_1c are explicit abstractions that veil the fact that our capacity to “sense” these elements is innate.

0040 Today, with speech-alone talk, I say, “I am going home.”

At Catal Hoyuk, with hand-speech talk, I manual-brachial gesture, “I-GO (point in direction of) HOUSE.”

06/26/23

Looking at Ian Hodder’s Book (2018) “Where Are We Heading?” (Part 5 of 15)

0041 Clearly, Hodder’s theory of entanglement requires embellishment. Sensible construction alone will not do. Social construction is another facet of entanglement. In the houses of Catal Hoyuk, no one ever uses the terms, “belonging”_3c, “home”_2c or “reside”_1c. Instead, they know the meanings, the presences and the messages of these terms in their hearts. They are habits of being.

What is it like to dwell in a living world where gesture-words are defined by things and events that one can picture or point to?

0042 Here is another application of Hodder’s sensible theory of entanglement.

Most likely, each filled-in element has corresponding manual-brachial gesture-words.

During the epipaleolithic, humans sow an original wild wheat on newly exposed riverbeds on the edges of streams. Why? Well, they observe that the riverbeds are nice little plots of land, free of weeds, that can be used to grow a preferred brand of grass. Why sow grass? There are lots of practical uses for grass, including mixing with clay to make stucco for houses and tinder for lighting fires.

0043 That is just the start.

The grass responds with an adaptation honoring the seeds that the humans sow. Human habits increase the potential for robust rachis, rather than delicate rachis. Grass with delicate rachis drop their seeds when humans cut the stalk. Stalks with robust rachis retain their seeds for humans to thresh and use again. Plus, they are edible. Put some in a pot with milk and place the pot in the fire for a while and the result is a delicious and teeth-rotting mush.

0044 Today’s technical name for the new variety is “emmer wheat”. During the early Neolithic, emmer wheat becomes common throughout southwest Asia. Mush gets added to the menu. But, soon enough, new culinary adaptations arise, including bread and beer.

An Archaeology of the Fall

A Horror Story by Razie Mah

Category Archives: Biological & Cultural Evolution