0416 Here is another way of looking at it.

The agent₃ of semiotic agency₂ is no longer the agent₃ that was present originally.  The new agent₃ effectively games an established semiotic agency₂ by changing its underlying signficance₁.  But, it is not an intentional change.  It is more like a subtle change in landscape that eventually alters the course of a river.

0417 So, coded semiotic agency₂ finds itself within the domain of a new agent₃ and potential₁ and the new domain is going to “game” the semiotic agency₂.

0418 Options?

Well, the original code can go out of business, to be replaced by semiotic agency₂ from the new management_3,1.

The original code can continue to operate irrespective of the semiotic agency₂ that the new management_3,1 is actualizing.  In this case, the new management_3,1 may use the original code as a functional component within a more comprehensive semiotic agency₂.

The original code that manifests as a functional component within a more comprehensive semiotic agency₂ may start to change, in response to its new normal context₃ and potential₁, through empedoclements.

0419 In short, modularity and hierarchy among semiotic agencies₂ may also be regarded as modularity and hierarchy among agents₃ and their significance₁.

Thus, the title of Prinz’s chapter is accounted for.

0420 Section 11.4 lists topics in neural codes.

Section 11.5 raises the question as to whether meaning is in or from codes.

Section 11.6 wonders how interpretation delivers meaning.

These sections all flow from Barbieri’s insights into the all-encompassing nature of codes.

And, codes are all-encompassing because the Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay is all-encompassing.

0421 For neural codes, consider a human agent who sees an object on a sunny day.

Specular reflection of photons from a solid thing (SV_s) in the external world (A) stands for a thing with matter and form (SO_s) in regards to the functioning of pattern-recognizing specifiers in my occipital lobe (SI_s).

A thing with matter and form (SV_e) stands for an exemplar of ‘what it is’ (SO_e) in my world (B) according to specialized exemplar-recognizing modules outside of my occipital lobe (SI_e).

0422 I can ask, “How do I experience this?”

I can ask, “What is happening?”

A juxtaposition between the category-based nested form containing semiotic agency₂ and the content-level of the scholastic interscope for how humans think (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog for October, 2023, titled, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”) provides an interesting answer.

Does a comparison work?

0423 A human agent₃ asks, “What is happening?”

What is happening₃ is a content-level normal context_3a.

It_3a makes me wonder about the possibility that ‘something’ is happening_1a.

A neural code-based S&T noumenal overlay_2c presents an impression_2a of an exemplar sign-object_2c (SO_e).

The potential of vision_1a offers the possibility of identifying what it_2a (SV_s) is_1a.

So, maybe, in the above figure, the entire lower nested form fits into the actuality₂ of semiotic agency₂.

0424 Here is another example for neural codes.

0425 In the specifying sign-relation, formant frequencies uttered by a vocal tract (parole) (SV_s) in the external world (A) stands for a spoken word (langue, an item in a mental system of differences) (SO_s) in regards to rapid associations between parole and langue that occurs in specialized regions of the brain (SI_s).

In the exemplar sign-relation, a spoken word (langue) (SV_e) stands for an exemplar of ‘meaning, presence and message’ (“m.p.m.”; SO_e) in my world (B) according to definition (SI_e).

0426 Definition?

Is a definition₃ a normal context₃ like the content-level question, “What is happening?_3a“

Consider the following juxtaposition.

0427 The author provides one illustration, titled, “Box 1”, listing various definitions of words in classic dictionary style.  For the past few centuries, encyclopedists have labored to keep track of and pin down the meanings of spoken words.  The effort is crucial to constructing and maintaining scientific disciplinary languages.

0428 Consequently, I can imagine a similarity between the human agent₃ engaged in definition₃ and the stance of a human agent₃ asking the question, “What is happening?”_3a.

0429 But, there is a difference, as well.

The problem is that the former normal context may be called, “explicit abstraction”, and the latter may be called, “implicit abstraction”.

The difference between the potential of meaning, presence and message₁ and the possibility that ‘it is something’_1acannot be swept under the cognitive table.  One is counter-intuitive and the other is intuitive.

0430 I can take that lesson all the way to the core term in this chapter.

Barbieri’s signature book is titled, Code Biology: A New Science of Life (2015, Springer Dordecht).

0444 Still, the writing of Abir Igamberdiev stands before me.

So, let me run through how Aristotle’s four causes play out in the category-based nested form.

I start with material and efficient causalities.

0445 Material causes point to the contiguity between the two real elements.  If the elements are matter and form (as in Aristotle’s exemplar), then the material cause introduces some sort of contiguity between the two.  For example, molten bronze flows into a plaster hollow (created by covering a wax figure with plaster then melting the wax).  For Peirce, the contiguity expresses the character of scientific cause and effect.  An observable cause [produces] a measurable effect.  For chemistry, reagents [react and turn into] products.  Chemical notation is iconic in this regard.

0446 Efficient causes point to actuality₂ emerging from (and situating) possibility₁.

For example, in chemistry, spontaneous chemical reactions release free energy (heat and entropy).  A change in thermodynamic potential supports spontaneous chemical reactions.  With a special apparatus, one can measure the heat produced by a chemical reaction by recording the temperature increase of a water bath.  Efficient and instrumental causes support observations and measurements that contribute to scientific modeling of the contiguity between reagents and products.

0447 Material and instrumental causes are familiar to scientists.  They fall under the label, “physics”.  

The other two causes are ignored and disparaged by scientists.  They fall under the label, “metaphysics”.  Metaphysics introduces the normal context and potential as “causes”.

0448 Formal causes concern the ways that a normal context₃ contextualizes its actuality₂.  Typically, formal causes are confounded with material causes.  If material causes do not satisfy a formal requirement, then the actuality₂ may fail.  Indeed, when one thinks about it, the only material causes that are relevant tend to be those that are entangled with formal causes.

Final causes concern the potential underlying the coherence of the entire category-based nested form.  The firstness that supports efficient causes is instrumental.  Instrumental of what?  Oh, instrumental of efficacy.  Okay, there must be another potential, a more substantial potential, that explains why efficient causes are instrumental.  Thirdness brings secondness into relation with thirdness.  Firstness potentiates the operations of thirdness.  Final causes are often framed in terms of “intentionality” and “purpose”.

0449 Surely, all four of Aristotle’s causes are in play when one encounters a thing or event. 

Understanding teases out all four causes.

Scientific inquiry does not seek understanding.

Science seeks the truth to be found in models of observations and measurements of phenomena.

Scientific inquiry seeks utility and control.

Of what?

The noumenon or the model?

0450 Scientific inquiry starts with the inorganic world, where the normal context is not apparent.  Seventeenth century mechanical philosophers want to reduce inanimate things to mechanistic models.  This can only be done by using material causes shorn of formal causes and efficient causes shorn of final causes to build mathematical and mechanical models.

0451 Later, the biologically inclined heirs of the mechanical philosophers strive to reduce animate things to mechanistic models.

Later, the socially inclined heirs of the mechanical philosophers strain to reduce social and psychological things to mechanistic models.

Later, the psychometrically inclined heirs of the mechanical philosophers convert what people are willing to say into data, in order to build opportunities for empirio-normative domination.

0452 What does this imply?

Scientists have been elucidating the physical foreground of semiotic agency for four-hundred years, while at the same time remaining oblivious to its metaphysical background.  It’s funny in a horrifying sort of way.  Perhaps, we may be forgiven, for we know not what we do.  Without the causes associated to Aristotle’s metaphysics, we cannot even ascertain what an agent is.

Here is a picture, once again.

0453 An agent₃ brings semiotic agency₂ into relation with the potential of ‘final causality’₁.

Without the potential of teleology₁, the agent₃ cannot be recognized as the normal context for semiotic agency₂.

0454 In section 12.2, Igamberdiev introduces two distinctive terms.

To me, “ontolon” labels the coming together of a triadic relation.  A triadic relation is an ontological whole.  Ontology encompasses thirdness, secondness and firstness.  A single category-based nested form is an ontolon.

To me, “vortex” labels the swirling coming-to-fruition of a model, in conjunction with disciplinary language and the observations and measurements of phenomena.  In short, “vortex” labels an empirio-schematic judgment, as a triadic relation constellating in what ought to be (and secondness) in the Positivist’s judgment.

0455 In sum, Igamberdiev’s terms label the two sources of illumination in the Positivist’s judgment.

Uh-oh, where is the ontolon?

0456 Ontolons associate to noumena.

Vortexes associate to phenomena.

0457 Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay identifies what phenomena can objectify the noumenal overlay.

Remember, triumphal science places a successful model over the noumenon, in order to create the situation where a model (veiling the noumenon) [can be objectified as] its phenomena.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlayperforms the same catharsis.  Yet, the performance cannot be complete, because Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay is… um… noumenal.  Indeed, it contains what every biological system has in common: the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

0458 The phenomena that Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay identify may be observed and measured by biologists.

Why?

Humans recognize noumena.  That is one of the human adaptations into our niche of triadic relations.

So, sign-vehicles and sign-objects constitute phenomena that humans may observe (and on occasion, measure).  That data may then go into models (vortexes) that account for the contiguities in the S&T noumenal overlay.  These models do not overwrite the noumenon, they fill in the noumenon.  So, “vortex” is an excellent word that describes the way models fill in the elements of the noumenon that need to be explained.  Models enrich our appreciation of material and efficient causalities that are not divorced from formal and final causalities.

0459 What does this imply?

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay explains the character of what is for the biosemiotic version of the Positivist’s judgment.   S&T’s overlay [can be objectified by] its phenomena.

Yet, the nested form of agent₃ (an ontolon) cannot be fully objectified by the same phenomena.

Why?

Agent₃ is the normal context₃ and ‘final causalities’₁ is the potential₁ for all semiotic agencies₂.

Ah, now I see the ontolon and the vortex.

0486 Of course, I cannot ignore Aristotle when it comes to these phenomena.  The labels that I use as a biologist call to mind Aristotle’s metaphysical causes.

Surely, the phenomena of sensitivity, detection, assessment and archetypal behaviors are efficiently caused by subagents, whose operations are coordinated in concert with final causalities.

Also, the material aspects that I measure, what chemical (SV_s), what method of delivery and what concentration (SV_s), identifiable structural changes (SO_s and SV_e), followed by overt behavior of approaching or avoiding (SO_e), formally cohere to the normal context of the paramecium as agent₃.

0487 Yes, all four of Aristotle’s causes appear in the preceding paragraph.

However, for natural scientists, formal and final causation are not allowed, even in the observation and measurement of phenomena.  That is the rule of the positivist intellect, the relation within the Positivist’s judgment.

Okay, this rule must be… shall we say… enforced only theoretically, rather that practically, for biosemiotics.  After all, biosemiotics is the study of semiotic agency₂, an actuality₂ that cannot be comprehended without its normal context₃and potential₁.

0488 Formal cause links thirdness to secondness.  The agent₃ contextualizes semiotic agency₂.

Final cause bridges all three categories.  But, not in an obvious way.

Obviously, thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness.  The normal context of agent₃ brings the actuality of semiotic agency₂ into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘final causality’₁.  So, the formal cause is obvious, along with its sidekick, material causality.

Not so obviously, final causality₁ operates from the opposite station.  Final causes establish the potential₁ from which actuality₂ emerges within a particular normal context₃.  For the paramecium, the potential of ‘staying alive’₁ sustains the phenomena of sensitivity, detection, assessment and overt response₂ in the normal context of the paramecium as agent₃.

0489 What is the sidekick of final causality?

Efficient causality links secondness and firstness.

0490 Here is a picture of the metaphysical causalities in regards to phenomena for the paramecium as agent.

0491 What does this imply?

The human ability to recognize formal and final causalities allows the biosemiotician to attend to the phenomena associated to semiotic agency₂.  The biosemiotician is a scientist engaging in empirio-schematic inquiry under the auspices of a positivist intellect that accepts that metaphysics must be allowed in order for… well… the scientist to make observations and measurements of phenomena.

And yes, this applies to all the subagents within the paramecium as well.

0492 The reason why we (scientists) are able to establish the parameters for considering material and efficient causes(which a traditional positivist intellect only entertains) is because we (humans) intuitively know that the actuality₂ of concern is not recognizable without a normal context₃ and potential₁.

0493 How can I make this claim?

Well, for one, in chapter twelve of Pathways, covered earlier in points 0434 to 0470, Abir Igamberdiev says (according to this examiner) that the agent₃, as a normal context₃, arises from final causality, as potential₁.

0494 Does this imply that final causality₁, which cannot be directly observed and measured, is something that needs to be explained by biosemiotic models?

No, the agent₃ and the potential of ‘final causality’₁ are not explained by biosemiotic models, they are assumed by researchers in the course of empirio-schematic inquiry.  After all, semiotic agency₂ is incomprehensible without them.

0495 So, what is explained by biosemiotic models?

Ah, the contiguities, [SI_s] and [SI_e], corresponding to the sign-interpretants for the specifying and exemplar sign-relations, as well as [&], the contiguity between the specifying sign-object and the exemplar sign-vehicle.

Here is a picture.

0496 [&]?

[&] is the substance translating specified information_2b into exemplar relevance_2b (or more precisely, “relevant information_2b“).  {SO_s [&] SV_e}_2b occurs within information_2b.

[SI_s] consists of a situation-level normal context_3b and potential_1b.  In terms of biosemiotics, [SI_s] is self-governance_3boperating on potential courses of action_1b.

[SI_e] consists of a perspective-level normal context_3c and potential_1c.  In terms of biosemiotics, [SI_e] actualizes the goal_2c (SO_e) of the organism for this particular challenge (SV_e).

0497 The contiguities need to be explained by biosemiotic models.

But, there is another way to appreciate the specifying and exemplar sign-interpretants.

I can look at them in terms of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

[SI_s] corresponds to the normal context_3b and potential_1b for the situation level.

[SI_e] corresponds to the normal context_3c and potential_1c for the perspective level.

0498 Here is a picture.

0499 So, I can look at the paramecium in the petri dish, the subject of my biological inquiry, and wonder, “What would I do if I were that poor thing?”, before releasing a small drop of nicotinic acid in its vicinity.

0500 If I had a more powerful microscope, then I could gaze upon the creature portrayed in Figure 10.1 of the text, and wonder whether any of the organelles are agents, each “saying alive” in its own way.

Consider the star-shaped contractile vacuole, portrayed in the figure as a circle with legs extending out into the interior of the cell.  I suppose that the legs go far enough to contact cell membrane in the furthest reaches of the cell.  When this agent activates, the cell squishes and sloshes, moving the other internal agents around.  Maybe, that is the way the paramecium says, “What the hell is that?”

After all, not all paramecium get treated to a dose of nicotinic acid.

0501 Perhaps, the star-shaped contractile vacuole was once an agent.  But, now it is a subagent within the agency of the paramecium.  Indeed, it is a reactionary subagent.

0502 Section 10.1 wraps up with multicellular holobionts, insect colony holobionts, and human institutional holobionts.  The pattern repeats on larger scales.  On every scale, an agent₃ flourishes on its own unique final causality₁.

0503 For example, when I go to work at the big, bureaucratic, institution that employs me, I imagine that one of my duties is to operate as a reactionary subagent, like the contractile vacuole.

So, I notice things going on (SV_s) and then think of comments to agitate my colleagues (SO_e).

Sometimes, my colleagues think that I act like a micronucleus or an anal pore, but the contractile vacuole is the best analogy.  As experts in paramecium biology say, “The contractile vacuole stirs the pot.”

0504 This brings me to section 10.2, concerning interactions among subagents.

The self-governance_3b that arises from possible courses of action_1b may be modeled on the basis of interactions among subagents.  The interactions may be direct (for example, the spindly legs of the contractile vacuole pulling at various membranes) or indirect (for example, the macronucleus secreting a hormone that calms the contractile vacuole down, while inducing the anal pore to release its contents).

0505 Here is a picture of how the contractile vacuole (CV) gets going in the first place (at least, during the current experiment that I am conducting).  “C.s.” stands for “cell surface”.

0506 Now, I translate this example of semiotic agency into me, as a contractile-vacuole-like subagent with the paramecium that is my large bureaucratic organization.

At work, my subagent-area does not really physically work.  It mentally works, if I can call it that.

There are many different people in my sector of cubicles.  One loves cabbage.  I don’t know why.

One of the byproducts of cabbage digestion is the flatulatory release of methane with a slightly sulfurous odor.

0507 When one of my colleagues (the cell-surface subagent) notices the scent, she writes a little note and leaves it on my desk.  The note says, “Cabbage”.  Don’t say it with an English accent, as if it is a vegetable.  Say it with a French accent, as if it is like a drop of nicotinic acid falling into a petri dish.

At this juncture, I (the contractile vacuole) saunter from my desk to the water cooler and say, with a tone of resignation, to whoever is present, “My it smells like someone ate too much cabbage yesterday.”

0508 The author notes that the aim of the subagent is not merely an isolated task.  Rather, the goal links back to the goals of the entire organism (the holobiont).

0509 If asked why I stir the pot, my answer would be… um… that my activities further the interests of my corporation by taking the attentions of my fellow workers away from the misery of serving as cogs in a soulless machine and towards making fun of and gossiping about one another.  It’s not enough to be “productive”.  We ought to enjoy working together as a “team”.

In short, my activities, like those of the contractile vacuole of the paramecium, are osmotic in nature.

0510 Of course, my boss, a figurative macronucleus, has different ideas about the matter.

0511 The author has a label for the multiplicity of final causations among subagents.  The term is “heterarchy”.  In heterarchy, the semiotic agencies of subagents can be ranked by the degree in which they match (or support) the goals of the organism.

Of course, any ranking is highly contingent.  I mean, for the paramecium, what happens when the anal pore goes on strike?  Surely, its mission goes to number one.  Or is it two?

0512 The author offers a list of the benefits of modularity (or subagents) besides being productive and having fun.  This list includes efficiency, reusability, robustness and adaptability.  The list applies to the holobiont.  The list also applies to the contiguities within the 
S&T noumenal overlay.

Each experiment that I perform on my petri-dish paramecium adds further details.

0513 Suppose, instead of pure nicotinic acid, I release one drop of a very concentrated solution of potassium chloride.  The paramecium’s environment has too much salt.  Water seeps out of the paramecium.  (The opposite happens when the environment has too little salt.  Then, water seeps into the paramecium.  But, I do not have a dropper bottle labeled, “Depletion of Potassium Chloride”.  So, I cannot conduct the experiment.)

0514 Either way, the contractile vacuole serves to keep the cell from shrinking or expanding due to osmotic disequilibrium.  The contractile vacuole can also stir the pot, just like I do at the water fountain.

0515 Here is a list of benefits for subagents, including a cell-surface receptor and the contractile vacuole in paramecium.

0516 Surely, this list serves as criteria for models of the specificative and exemplar sign-interpretants (SI_s and SI_e).

0517 Section 10.4 discusses how subagents find ways to guide one another.  The configuration of a stimulus response comes to mind, where one sub-agent provides a signal_2a (a real-initiating event_2a) that provides information_2b for another subagent.

This is precisely what happens in the recent example.

0518 Indeed, I might imagine that a feedback loop might be established where the contractile vacuole, in its goal (SO_e), signals to the cell-surface agent (SV_s) to become less sensitive to nicotine.

0519 Is that how addiction works?

An ingested chemical that seems to meet a goal, for certain subagents, at first, later becomes less and less effective in meeting that goal, because of downregulation of sensitivity.

0520 Who knows?

The author spends a good deal of effort on discussing how viruses may trick subagents, just like one subagent may trick another, but not for long.  There are as many avenues to death as there are subagents.  The lesson is sobering.

0521 So, consider the following figure.

What is that dotted line?

The goal of the cell-surface sub-agent (SO_e) is to somehow send a message to the contractile vacuole (SV_s).

The dotted line is that inter-action.

0522 What is to prevent the cell-surface subagent from continually activating the contractile vacuole?

Well, death by exhaustion from continual spasms is one option.

The other option is that the contractile vacuole secretes something that alters the sensitivity of that particular cell-surface sub-agent.  If it so happens that the secretion also lowers the sensitivity of all cell-surface sub-agents, then that is a danger that the paramecium will have to… um… live with.

0523 That brings me back to the water fountain business.

One never quite knows whether signaling systems, once established, can morph into absolutely hilarious moments that appear to reduce productivity.

0524 So, my boss, the macronuclear type, waits for the right opportunity to establish a feedback system.

But, because everyone uses the water fountain, there only seems to be impediments.

0541 In section 4.2, the authors discuss the prokaryotes.  These single-celled organisms are independent and fierce.  For the most part, they operate exclusively.  But, they do have moments of compatibility, due to horizontal gene transfer.

I once got a bacterial infection after… you know… having fun in the foolish ways of a human contractile vacuole.  My body did all it could to exclude the damn things.  But, they won and… what is that?.. you call it “penicillin”?… then I was miraculously cured.  But, I learned a lesson.  No more having fun in ways that I can get bacterial infections.

0542 In section 4.3, the authors discuss the eukaryotic transition.  Here, the second column comes into play, because eukaryotes look like big bags of specialized prokaryotes.  The impediments to prokaryotic incorporation are enormous. So, empedoclements seem to be miraculous – not in the way that some people define “miracle” as “something that is not physically possible”, but in the way that a miracle is simultaneous foretold and unexpected.  The empedoclement is the inverse of an impediment.  It is as unlikely as an impediment is likely.

The eukaryotic cell is so complicated, compared to prokaryotes, that I find it hard to imagine how a transition from prokaryote to eukaryote could have happened.  Certain prokaryotes, at first independent and great at doing one metabolic trick or another, found that they are compatible.  Then, they incorporate and form an agent.  The agent reproduces.  Agents that are most capable of aligning of all the former prokaryotes, reproduce more successfully than others.

0543 Here is a picture that may look familiar.

0544 Even though the eukaryotic cell lives in the outside world, the cell as agent acts as though it is the outside world to all the organelles.  The organelles end up fully domesticated.  They all live in the big house… er… cell.  And, they cannot leave.

Sometimes, a eukaryote will “ingest” a prokaryote and not “digest” it.  The prokaryote turns out to perform a task that benefits the eukaryote.  Mitochondria and chloroplasts come to mind.  Once, ingested, the cell can exploit a compatibility, leading to incorporation, rather than digestion (which is a type of exclusion that um… when I think about it… is also an incorporation).

0545 In section 4.4, the authors discuss multicellularity within the eukaryotic tradition.  At the beginning, this looks like the second column at play, at least to the point that when the multicellular organism dies, its subagent cells die with it.

When you think about it, the whole proposition is madness.

When a multicellular agent dies, every cell dies with it.

That is so unfair, unless every cell in a multicellular organism is fully “domesticated”.

It makes me think that maybe it may not be so awesome to be fully domesticated.

0546 So, perhaps it is only to be expected that a specialized organ would be tasked with keeping the animal alive by interacting with both the environment and the body.  A nervous system allows the environment and ecology to um… “domesticate”… the animal as agent, in so far as an animal lives and reproduces in an environment (material world) and ecology (relational world).  Both offer “affordances”, that is, actualities_2a that can be exploited or need to be avoided_1b.

0547 Section 4.5 discusses the nature of the nervous system in animals.

Yes, the nervous system specializes.  Its goal is to keep the animal alive by interacting with environment, ecology and body.  Consequently, the nervous system must behave as if it is an agent.  But, it is really a subagent of the animal as an agent.  Up to around seven million years ago, this was not a problem.  Not even the chimpanzee really considers that there is a biological subsystem that behaves as if it is the whole system, even through it is not.

0548 It’s like my macronuclear boss, so keen on the inner workings of conflict and cooperation, strife and love, that he thinks that he is the institution… or is it?… the organization.  Hmmm, institution sounds like agent.  Organization sounds like a multitude of subagents, like myself.

0549 The authors do not dwell on the awkward position that the nervous system finds itself in.

The nervous system is like an institution.  The body is like its organization.  All the organs, tissues and cells are like individuals in community, who are not aware that… if the community goes… they go with it.

0550 Should the three logics of thirdness for the nervous system operate differently from earlier cases where an animal is the agent?

I suppose so, since the nervous system represents “the agent” within the environment and ecology.  Here the logics of exclusion, complementarity and alignment sound like ways to survive where natural selection is the normal context.  Exclusion goes with the fact that everyone is on the menu.  Specialization associates to various tricks that a species masters in order to exploit the environment or ecology and to avoid… back to the menu business.  Differentiation keys into a very funny innovation that the multicellular lineage discovers that gets around the problem of all the cells dying when the big house fails.

0551 Yes, I am talking about sexual differentiation.

Talk about empedoclements!

0552 But, I am talking about the nervous system, which has to take various urges into account, because it is also a subagent, even though it regards itself as “the agent”, and performs its duties reasonably well.

Exactly who (or what) is “the agent” in a multicellular organization?

0553 The nervous system represents the environment and the ecology to “the agent”.  The nervous system moves “the agent” within the environment and the ecology.  Plus, the nervous system represents all the subagents of the body to “the agent”.  And, the nervous system monitors the subunits of the body for “the agent”.  And, on top of all this, the nervous system is totally unaware that it is a subagent of “the agent” that it pretends to be.

0554 To me, it is hard to imagine that evolutionary processes would produce something so hilarious.

0555 So, riddle me this.

In section 4.5, the authors describe a simple reflex.  A finger touches a hot ember that has rolled out of a fire located on a platform of stones.  An innate reflex pulls the hand away from the hot thing.  How do the logics of thirdness play out in this little drama?

0556 Here is a figure.

0557 The nervous system acts like an agent.  For this simple reflex, the body is taken for granted as subagents (skin for touch and muscle for action).  Also, sensory and motor neurons act as subagents.

0558 Now, let me think about the logics of thirdness: exclusion, complement and alignment.

In terms of exclusion, the body tissues (skin and muscle) are excluded from the reflex loop, except for the fact that they are… um… riddled with the termini of nerve cells.  For the skin, the sensory nerve-cell termini are sensitive to all sorts of disturbances, such as pressure, temperature and all the features that go with touch.  For the muscle, the motor nerve-cell termini are prepared to impart an impulse that causes muscle cells to contract.

In terms of complement, the sensory and motor neurons directly complement one another.  One receives inputs.  The other produces results.  The skin and muscles complement one another indirectly.  In this case, they complement one another through the mediation of a simple reflex.

In terms of alignment, the skin-embedded pain receptors immediately trigger pulling back from contact with the hostile thing.

0559 Ah, is this riddle some sort of trick?

In alignment, I return to the question of how one subagent influences another.

0560 What is the nature of the dotted line connecting the exemplar sign-object (SO_e) for the sensory neural pathway to the specifying sign-vehicle (SV_s) of the motor neural pathway?

0561 What about learning, the topic of section 4.6?

A renown form of learning is the conditioned “reflex”.  It is not really a reflex.  But, the conditioning make it look like one.  Another label is “stimulus-response”.

0562 Figure 4.7 in the text has a picture of Pavlov’s famous experiment.  A dog is positioned within an sling in order to measure the amount of drool that it slobbers while waiting for dinner.

If the experimental apparatus and the captive dog are subagents of an empirio-schematic inquirer, the subagents are working in parallel, not in sequence.

Here is a picture.

0563 Is that correct?

The dog is not really captive.  Instead, the dog is so tame as to allow the pelvis to be put into a sling and the mouth attached to tubes that suck up saliva.  The bell_2a (SV_s) stands for dinner_2b (SO_s) according to the self-governance_3b of its neural system operating on possible courses of action_1b (SI_s).

According to the scientist, who is so clever as to devise a way to measure the volume that a dog drools using tubes to suck the drool as it spills between mouth and lips, the bell_2a (SV_s) stands for the expectation of food_2b (SO_s) in regards to scientific inquiry_3b into the potential of ‘a rigorous conceptualization of anticipation’_1b.

0564 Does Pavlov induce the dog to drool in anticipation?

Does the dog’s saliva fulfill Pavlov’s expectations?

What is it about dogs that allows them to go along with such foolishness?

0565 I think that dogs are adapted to believe that humans are their pack leaders.  There is a motive for this belief.  Humans are not as cruel as wolves.  An alpha wolf is downright mean and expects to be… um… top dog all the time.  A human pack-leader is wonderful in comparison.  Not only do humans not bite back, although they occasionally hit and are nasty, they tend to share their food as if the dog is part of their pack… er… family.

It’s a nice gig, if you can get it.

0566 So, by instinct, the dogs know that Pavlov is pack leader.  Pack leaders have expectations.  So, the dogs go along with what Pavlov wants because, well, they want to please their pack leader.

05670 What do Pavlov’s dogs learn?

First, Pavlov’s dogs learn how to let themselves be hooked up to that stupid sling, which obviates the use of their hind legs.  Totally awkward.  Then, the dogs learn that the drool measuring apparatus hooked to their heads is not going to hurt them.  Dogs that can not handle this lesson are cut from Pavlov’s pack.  Finally, the dogs find out what the apparatus is all about.  It is the way that master is going to feed me.

0568 So, Pavlov’s dogs learn far more than the business about conditioned response.

Indeed, the salivation is merely an exemplar sign-relation that is built into their subagency.  If food is around, prepare to eat.  

0569 Meanwhile, Pavlov achieves what he wants to achieve.  Anticipation is a model that is associated to conditioned responses.  The model soon replaces the noumenon of what those Pavlov-loving dogs endured.  Today, the noumenal overlay of “anticipation” is objectified by the phenomena of psychological experiments conducted under the labels of “operant and instrumental conditioning”.

Today’s state educators perform these experiments on young children, completely unaware that the noumenon that the children experience is not quite the same as the model that substitutes for the noumenon.

0569 Does that mean that Pavlov is an subagent for something bigger, such as science as an institution?

I wonder.  In the following figure, Pavlov’s semiotic agency touches base with all three elements of the empirio-schematic judgment.

0570 This raises a parallel between Pavlov, the scientist, and his dogs, the subjects of scientific inquiry.