Category Archives: Book Review

05/11/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 17 of 19)

0214 Whoa!  Who would have expected that?

0215 The being of reason is still the other element in the dyad of actuality in the content level2a.  As such, it accounts for ‘the original element in the dyad of actuality, the encountered being2a’.

The encountered being2a is a language-event that stimulates the efficient intellect2b to produce this particular type of account2a, in the process of constructing a content-level nested form.

The beingin_reason2a is composed of actualities that contradict.   It emerges within the efficient intellect2b from the potential of intrinsic unity1b.

0216 At this point, I return to Novotny’s summary of Caramuel (Chapter 8; Section B).

0217 What are the causes of ‘beings of reason’?

CC1: Language is the (efficient) cause of extrinsically united, self-contradictory objects (‘beings of reason’).

CC2: If anything, language is the (efficient) cause of the (intellect seeing ‘beings of reason’ as) intrinsic unification.

CC3: If anything, God (efficiently) causes the ‘essence’ of the intrinsic unity (exhibited by beings of reason within the intellect).

CC4: If anything, intrinsically united ‘beings of reason’ have no formal or material causes.  They may have exemplar or final causes.

0218 To me, the depicted model captures all these causes.  The efficient intellect2b decodes a linguistic statement2a, producing a being of reason2a that depicts contradicting actualities as a single (contradiction-filled) actuality2a.  This actuality is then situated by the potential for intrinsic unity1b.  This potential1b underlies the efficient intellect2b within the normal context of situational reason3b.

0219 Notably, Caramuel’s causes call to mind one of Hurtado’s causes:

H2C9: ‘Beings of reason’ can be made through the simple apprehension of unity between incompatible items.

This suggests that the entire process is experienced as simple apprehension.  In modern terms, ‘beings of reason’ are gestalt experiences.

0220 What does this imply?

To Novotny, Caramuel’s perspective tends towards elimination of the term ‘beings of reason’ from the disciplines of ontology (the study of being) and metaphysics (inquiry into being itself).  After all, the very term ‘being of reason’ contains a contradiction.  Therefore, it is not subject to the logic of non-contradiction.  Beings that are not subject to the logic of non-contradiction cannot be actual.

0221 Or can they?

Novotny goes on to say that Caramuel may as well have written this, “Does it make sense to insist that there are non-existing entities that we treat as if they existed?  One would also have to insist that the contrary is true.  Some entities exist that we treat as if they do not exist.”

0222 To me, that recalls the matrix that has appeared more than once in this work.

0223 What Suarez called ‘a being of reason’ fits both entries in the red dashed outline.  It fits hand talk as an unreal being (a being that cannot be pointed to).  It fits speech-alone talk as a real nonbeing (a nonbeing that can be thought of as existing).

0224 How does this work?  Or, how does this not work?

0225 In hand talk, a real encountered being2a stimulates the efficient intellect.  The efficient intellect produces a being of reason2a, a nonreal being.  This beingin_reason2a exists as a being in the person, manifesting itself through fleeting physiological expressions. These expressions can be pictured and pointed to.  But, my projected beingin_reason2a cannot be seen by others.  Thus, the beingin_reason2a is a being that cannot be pointed to.

0226 Then, the reckoning2b that produces the beingin_reason2a is judged2c.  This judgment2c is a nonbeing that can be pointed to2c.

0227 Why is the judgment2c a real nonbeing?

It2c yields a hand talk statement that conveys a contradiction2a.  Two actualities are unified within one actuality.  The single actuality is a contradiction that has no being (existence), but it can be imaged and indicated.  The efficient intellect2b situates the encountered statement2a as an expression of truth2a.  This truth2a is a nonbeing that can be thought of in the manner of being.

0228 This is the nature of implicit abstraction.

0229 In speech-alone talk, a real encountered being2a stimulates the efficient intellect.  The efficient intellect produces a being of reason2a, a real nonbeing.  According to Suarez, this beingin_reason2a is a nonbeing that is thought of in the manner of being (existence).  If it existed, it would exist in the intellect2b.

I can say this only because I can symbolize the intellect using speech-alone words.  Symbols are placeholders in a system of differences.  Therefore, they do not exist by themselves.  They are nonbeings that cannot be thought of in the manner of being.

0230 With that said, I march on.  ‘The reckoning that produces the beingin_reason2a’ is judged according to what ought to be defined2c.  According to Hurtado, the beingin_reason2a is a fiction1b.  This accords with the perspective of true versus false2c.  According to Caramuel, it2a is a gestalt1b uniting two contradicting actualities2a.  This accords with a perspective of unity versus incoherence2c.

0231 Judgment2c supports an unreal being, manifesting as a speech-alone statement, independent of the formal intellect.  That speech-alone statement is encountered as a real being2a, even though it never fully articulates the complete judgment.  I call the process of speaking a judgment: an explicit abstraction2c.

It2c becomes a speech-alone talk statement2a that forces the intellect2b to do this or that.  Is it fact or fiction?  Is it unity or chaos?  The efficient intellect2b situates the encountered statement2a according to a reigning perspective2c.

This is the nature of explicit abstraction.

0232 Implicit abstraction belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in (as well as our current Lebenswelt).  It is intuitively natural.  Explicit abstraction belongs to our current Lebenswelt.  It is often counterintuitive.

Students should read the concluding chapter of Novotny’s book.

05/9/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel” (Part 18 of 19)

0233 If it is baroque, then how does one fix it?

0234 Baroque scholasticism is difficult to access.

Why?

It is written in Latin.

Plus, the format of Aristotle’s inquiry can confuse the reader.  Novotny’s pithy summaries are marvelous aids for understanding.  Also, since Novotny has already surveyed various Baroque scholastics, his intuition serves as a guide.  My comments closely track his text.

0235 In his work, Novotny aimed to display the dramatic shift in opinion concerning beings of reason between 1600 and 1680 AD.  This shift of opinion now raises two postmodern issues.

0236 One concerns the implications of the first singularity.  The adoption of speech-alone talk (and loss of hand talk) opens the door to explicit abstraction.  The history of philosophy may tell the tale of the unfolding of explicit abstraction.  

0237 Two, there is another history.  It is the historical expression of implicit abstraction in our current Lebenswelt.

These are issues to reflect upon.

0238 Through Suarez, scholastic inquiry constructs a model of implicit abstraction.  Through Hurtado, Mastri and Belluto, scholastic inquiry explodes the model by placing explicit abstractions into the slot designated for encountered real beings2a.  Then, with Caramuel, scholastic inquiry changes the perspective, turning the being of reason into both a real nonbeing and an unreal being.  Here is a subject of inquiry that defies the logic of actuality.

0239 But Caramuel does not conclude what I state here:  Actuality is not everything.  Actuality is not all there is.

0240 I say this only because Charles S. Peirce opens a new age of understanding.  There are three categories to existence: firstness, secondness and thirdness.  Firstness is the monadic realm of possibility.  Secondness is the dyadic realm of actuality.  Thirdness is the triadic realm of normal context.

Models of intuitive and explicit abstraction display the trajectory of Novotny’s narrative.  They do so from a truly postmodern stance.  Consequently, they demonstrate the potential of scholasticism in the Age of Triadic Relations.

0241 What comes next begins where Caramuel left off.

0242 What is this gestalt that contains a contradiction?  Where does his alternate definition of the ‘being of reason’ lead?

0243 Caramuel answers the question originally posed by Suarez: What are the causes, natures and divisions of beings of reason?  He does this by altering the definition of a ‘being of reason’ into something that Suarez would not recognize:

A ‘being of reason’ is an extrinsic, linguistically formulated, self-contradiction that is thought of in the manner of an intrinsic unity.

0244 Here is a picture of Caramuel’s novel concepts, once again.

0245 Let me examine the components.

0246 First, what is encountered?

Caramuel’s redefinition applies to hand talk, hand-speech talk and speech-alone talk.  All that is required is a grammatically correct statement that contains a self-contradiction.

What is encountered2a is one element of a dyad in the realm of actuality.  Roughly, this element corresponds to the word ‘effect’ in the phrase ‘cause and effect’.  The senses come into play.  For hand talk and speech-alone talk, the encountered being2a is a statement.

0247 What happens next?

Following Suarez’s model, the efficient intellect then projects a ‘being of reason’ into the slot that would roughly correspond to ‘cause’.  The being of reason2a accounts for what is encountered2a.  It is an object within the subject of the intellect2b.  The efficient intellect2b is able to project ‘an intrinsically unified being of reason2a’ because it emerges from the possibility inherent in unity1b.

0248 This explains how ‘beings of reason’ arise from extrinsic (to the subject, the situated intellect) statements.  This also explains how ‘beings of reason’ are projections of the efficient intellect2b.

05/6/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) Izquierdo on Universals (Part 2 of 6)

0282 Judgment is the actuality of a perspective-level nested form.  Unlike the drama of Hamlet, the scholastic objective concept is a judgment within the normal context of reason, rather than paranoia and passion.

0283 The normal context of reason3c brings the actuality of a relation between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’2c into relation with the potential of intellectual understanding1c.

0284 The actuality2c goes with objective concept.  The normal context3c and potential1c compose objective precision.

0285 How do the four meanings figure into this model of the scholastic term “objective concept”.

0286 The first meaning (M1) goes like this: A universal may be with respect to causal operations.

0287 The following depicts the ongoing example.

0288 The other three meanings behave similarly.  Each occupies a slot for judgment.

0289 Now, back to universals.

0290 According to Izquierdo, Aristotle follows two definitions of universal.

D1. A universal can exist in the many.

D2. A universal can be predicated in the many.

0291 To me, D1 goes with what is and D2 goes with what ought to be.

0292 Here is how that fits the ongoing model of judgment2c.

0293 This diagram implies that a third universal exists within the (universal) triadic structure of judgment.  This universal (D0) coincides with the meaning that brings D1 and D2 into relation.

0294 What does this imply?

0295 Universals are important because they participate in judgment2c.  Judgment2c is a primal triadic relation occurring within the normal context of reason3c.  The potential of intellectual understanding1c underlies judgment2c.

0296 Judgment2c is the natural harbor for universals.  In fact, judgment itself is a universal, since all humans share the ability to form judgments that may be diagrammed as a triadic relation.

0297 Aristotle isolated two universals (D1 and D2) and potentiated the discovery of the third (D0).

The third corresponds to the four meanings that Izquierdo assigns to universals.

05/5/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) Izquierdo on Universals (Part 3 of 6)

0298 Now, let me return to the example of the dual-body of the king.

0299 Here is the diagram.

0300 The meaning of a universal (D0, a causal operator, imbues) brings one universal (D1, the mortal body) into relation with another universal (D2, the glorious body of the king). 

0301 The political theory of the dual body of the king, identified by Eric Santner as a precursor to the modern theory of capitalism, brings three universals into a primal triad.  Each king, just like anyone else, is really or physically bound to the universal of the mortal body.  Each king, unlike anyone else, is formally and logically bound to the universal of the royal glorious body.  The glorious body of the king is a universal with respect to political nation states.

0302 The king’s glorious body is unique to each realm.  As such, the appearance of the king’s ghost (glorious body) must be disturbing for whoever sits on the throne (a mortal body claiming to be imbued with the one unique glorious body).

0303 The relation between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’2c is primal.  There is no a priori assignment of each element to a category.  The law of non-contradiction (which applies to actuality) dictates that each element dwells in one and only one category.  There are only three elements.  There are only three categories.

0304 In order for the primal triad to unfold into a nested form, each element must be assigned one unique category.  Typically, relation is assigned the quality of thirdness, becoming the normal context of an unfolding nested form.  ‘What is’ is filled with the quality of secondness, turning into actuality in the subsequent form.  ‘What ought to be’ is endowed with firstness, ending up as the potential of the subsequent unfolding nested form.

0305 However, other permutations are allowed.

0306 The previous figure typically yields the following nested form:  The normal context of imbues3 brings the actuality of the mortal body of the king2 into relation with the potential of a royal glorious body1.

0307 In the case of Hamlet, the ghost of the king takes on the mantle of secondness and the king’s deceased body becomes an exclusive concern (rich in thirdness).  The resulting nested form looks like this: The normal context of the murder of the king (mortal body)3 brings the actuality of the king’s ghost (glorious body)2 into relation with the potential that the king is imbued with a mission calling for retribution1.  The political and theological relation, where the glorious body of the king imbues the mortal body of the king, has been violated.

(Indeed, Shakespeare (1564-1617) and Miguel de cervantes (1547-1616) dates to the time of the Baroque Scholastics (1600-1680)).

0308 Are universals found in reality, independent of the intellect?

0309 Izquierdo lists four positions.  He argues against three and agrees with the fourth.  Novotny provides the details.  The fourth position goes like this:

T4. By nature, a universal is common to individuals only in the intellect.  It has no other lesser than numerical unity (that is, it is indivisible).

0310 I wonder: Does the primal triad of judgment and its elements satisfy this position?

0311 Let me start with the primal triad.

0312 The primal triad is by nature common to all individuals in a community.  All communities are composed of individuals who reason3c, thus actualize judgment2c in the pursuit of understanding1c.

0313 Members within each civilized community share particular primal triads.  Indeed, this is required for members of a community.  Those who cannot formulate particular primal triads (as formal acts of the intellect) are excluded from working together within an organization.  In our current Lebenswelt, many communities are so specialized that those who have not mastered particular elements and operations are excluded.

0048 In civilization, the fourth position (T4) works in two ways.  Objective precision is universal by nature.  Particular objective concepts are common to individuals in community.  Also, particular objective concepts define individuals in community by establishing conditions for belonging.

0314 The primal triad is indivisible.  It cannot be reduced to any one of its components.  In this, it has no lesser than numeric unity.  The entire primal triad must be delineated in the pursuit of explicit intellectual comprehension.

0050 This delineation is possible only in purely symbolic languages, such as speech-alone talk.  This explains my caveat: “in civilization”.  Our current Lebenswelt is potentiated by the purely symbolic qualities of speech-alone talk.

0315 Theoretically, each element of a primal triad can be extracted and labeled.  Practically, such a process fails to capture the intuitive aspects of judgment.

Remember, each element of the primal triad is a universal, steeped in varying qualities of thirdness (context and exclusivity), secondness (actuality and non-contradiction) and firstness (potential and inclusivity).  Only when a judgment becomes a nested form are the categorical assignments fixed.

0316 This brings me to the elements.

Aristotle connects two elements to universals.  These two elements are what is (existents) and what ought to be(predicates).  Izquierdo has these two elements in mind.  At the same time, he searches for how they fit into a bigger picture.

0317 He asks: What is the nature of Aristotle’s universals?

He concludes that universals exist only in the intellect.  This means that universals only exist in an intellectual actuality (or structure).  The primal triad models the intellectual structure of judgment2c.  Only a universal may occupy each slot.

0318 This again poses the question: What is a universal (now, as an element within an intellectual structure, the primal triad)?

0319 In order to discern an answer, I must step back and see the interplay of intellect with other types of cognition in the individual in community.

05/4/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) Izquierdo on Universals (Part 4 of 6)

0320 Here is the general interscope for the individual in community.

The student should write out each nested form as the fourth statement.  See A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form, by Razie Mah.

0321 The working model of Izquierdo’s perspective replaces decide and weigh3c with reason3c.  The primal triad stands in the place of judgment2c.  The potential of intellectual understanding1c substitutes for the possibility of rightfulness1c.

0058 This interscope allows me to see that a relation between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’3c virtually contextualizes a phantasm2b situating an impression2a.

0322 In intrinsic abstraction, the elements of the triad cannot be articulated.  Since they are symbols, they cannot be imaged or pointed to using hand talk.  Pointing to something that could be interpreted as a universal suffices.

0323 For example, in hand talk, gesturing with the arm towards the back of the talker may indicate the distant past.  In speech-alone talk, fairy tales may begin with the impressionistic phrase, “Once upon a time.”

0324 These gestures1a are sensed and decoded3a into an impression2a based on the potentials of various habituated cultural mechanics1a.

0325 An impression2a underlies the possibility of what is happening and me1b.  More crucially, an impression2a may be interpreted as a universal occupying the slot for ‘what is’2c.

0326 Conjuring3b brings a phantasm2b into relation with the possibility of me and my impression1b.  In Latin, the phantasm is “species expressa”.  Taking in the world is “species impressa”.  Notably, the phantasm2b may be interpreted as a universal occupying the slot for ‘what ought to be’2c.

0327 In this example, the phantasm2b is interpreted to be a stage for fairy tales2c.  It is the stage where imaginary worlds play out.  It is a testing ground for the real world.

0328 Here is how that looks within the interscope (with the ongoing working model of judgment in the perspective level).

0329 Once upon a time2a is contextualized as remembering2c.  Remembering2c is a universal ‘what is’2c that allowsintellectual understanding1c.

0330 The distance and mystic past2b is contextualized as mythos2c.  Mythos2c is a universal ‘what ought to be’2c that may actualize intellectual understanding1c.

0331 Three actors are on the same page, the text of a child’s book (or the campfire of a Paleolithic band), the adult presenting the tale and the children who witness the telling.

Remembering2c and mythos2c are universals, not because they can be extrinsically symbolized (as in this discussion), but because they are intersubjectively actual in the intellects of all the actors in an organized activity.  These universalsexist as intersubjective intrinsically abstracted beings.

0332 Judgment2c is the intersubjective intrinsically abstracted actuality that potentiates organized activities.

0333 In civilization, organized activities among cooperators require that each participant holds similar universals, if not judgments.  Even if individuals may disagree (have different judgments), they work with the same universals.  They must hold, in common, the universals that go into ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’.  Otherwise, who knows what anyone else is thinking?

05/2/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) Izquierdo on Universals (Part 5 of 6)

0334 So, what is a universal?

0335 The intellect is capable of using reason3c to actualize a primal triad2c, judgment2c, within the possibilities inherent in intellectual understanding1a.  Thus, the intellect itself is a universal structure.

0336 Whatever goes into each slot of the primal triad is a universal in a different sense.  ‘What is’ goes with existence.  ‘What ought to be’ goes with predication.  Relation goes with meaning.

0336 Aristotle formulated the universal in terms of the many.  A universal is held in common by many existents or many predicates.

0337 The category-based nested form turns this around, since the many may also refer to those who hold universals within their intellects.  The sharing of a cognitive space among many potentiates organized activities.  Universals, as objective concepts, potentiate the sharing of a single cognitive space that opens avenues for organizing our human world.

0338 A universal is an opportunity to organize our world.

0339 What is the nature of the intellect-dependent universal?

Or: What kind of unity does this universal (generated by the intellect) have?

0340 As Novotny recounts, Izquierdo lists and critiques various approaches before detailing his own favored treatment, T4.

T4 goes like this: A universal, by nature, is common to individuals only in the intellect.  It is indivisible.

0341 From T4, Izquierdo offers four propositions.

P1. Confused acts of cognition do not constitute a universal.

P2. The objective unity of a universal is generated by a substitute phantom.

P3. The unity of reason supports the unity of a universal.  All other supports are fictions.

P4. Future philosophers may consider the disposition of the universal to existence-in-many and predicability-of-many.

0342 Novotny discusses each proposition in detail.

0343 My question is: How well does the diagram of the primal triad of judgment2c fit these propositions?

0344 Proposition P1 and P4 pertain to the primal triad2c.

0345 The first proposition (P1) runs against nominalism, which takes universals as whatever the name evokes.  Nominalism argues that a universal is merely an act of cognition, as if the act of cognition had no real constraints (hence the term “confused”).

0346 The primal triad provides a real constraint.  Each universal must be a whole (as either a whole quality of existence, a whole predicate, or a whole operation) within a congruent triadic relation.  The two elements identified by Aristotle as universals are thus constrained by their capacities to enter into relation with one another.

The resulting judgment is intersubjective.  Others can generate similar primal triads (that is, judgments). Why?  The constraints on the universals are real.  This holds even when each universal cannot be fully symbolized (in speech-alone talk).

0347 For example, let me say this, “I am king of Bohemia.”

When asked why, I reply, “I like Bohemian beer.”

0348 Surely, the subject (the existence of lovers of Bohemian beer) is a universal.  What the subject is supposed to be(the king of Bohemia) is also a universal.  If Bohemia is a monarchy, then it has a king or queen or both.  All monarchies are predicated on this.

That leaves the relation, to which I exclaim, “The king of Bohemia must love Bohemian beer!”

0349 Surely, this act of cognition cannot be reduced to a universal.  Why?  There are many existents (beer lovers) but only one predicate (king of Bohemia).  The operation of loving beer is not sufficient to serve as a universal relation between ‘the subject’ and ‘what the subject is supposed to be’.

04/30/26

Looking at John H. Walton’s Book (2025) “New Explorations in the Lost World of Genesis”  (Part 1 of 20)

0001 The book before me is published by Intervarsity Press.  The subtitle is “Advances in the Origins Debate”.  This work is the latest in the “Lost World Series” that delves into how Genesis should be regarded in light of the archaeological discoveries of the past three centuries.

Of course, “new explorations” implies “advances”.  Advances adjust previous positions.  The reader is advised to consult the conclusion immediately after the introduction, and before the section on methodology.

An examination of a prior work can be found in Looking at John Walton’s Book (2015) “The Lost World of Adam and Eve” appearing in Razie Mah’s blog in August 2022.  The review is updated and fashioned as the first and fifth chapters in Razie Mah’s 2024 e-book, Exercises In Artistic Concordism, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0002 The term, “literature of the ancient Near East” is somewhat awkward, because the writings of the ancient Near East were buried in the ruins of royal libraries throughout Egypt and the Levant.  The writings are in cuneiform, wedge impressions on clay tablets.  The clay fires into brick when the royal library burns, along with the rest of the royal city.  Then, the ruins get buried in vegetation, and later human settlements, and so on.  Then, the tells (or hills) are excavated by modern archaeologists.  Archaeologists discover thousands of cuneiform tablets and learn how to translate them.  These translations constitute “the literature of the ancient Near East”.

0003 Of course, this story sounds implausible.

However, God tends to manifest the implausible.

0004 In fact, if God only performs sensible… what is the correct term?… “interventions”, then no one would notice.  If anyone could turn water into wine, then the miracle at Cana would be ho-hum.

The Uruk culture invents writing by impressing tokens onto the surface of clay balls (which then contain the impressed tokens).  That seems sensible.  Centuries later, a Sumerians scribe uses a reed stylus to create impressions on a clay surface that is curved, like the surface of a ball.  That seems sensible, also.  Then, stylus impressions on a clay tablet become so routine that cuneiform is used for centuries to record transactions and inventories.  Eventually, the same writing is used to record the civilization’s origin myths.

0005 Okay, each of these steps is sensible, although unlikely.

How many unlikely, yet sensible, developments can be strung together before the results may be declared “miraculous”?

0006 So, what is miraculous with respect to Walton’s lost-world propositions?

God provides eighteen centuries of biblical interpretation by Christians before creating the conditions where a challenge to traditional reference and affirmation occurs.

The archaeology of the ancient Near East unearths literature that is (more or less) contemporaneous with the Old Testament.

That is the challenge.

0007 The Old and New Testaments are no longer subject to plain reading as the sole foundation of interpretation.

Why?

How can one conduct an honest reading of the Old and New Testaments and not accommodate the literature of the ancient Near East?

0008 Okay, replace the word, “honest”, with the word, “literal”.

It seems that figurative and allegorical readings are not challenged.

04/29/26

Looking at John H. Walton’s Book (2025) “New Explorations in the Lost World of Genesis”  (Part 2 of 20)

0009 Words refer to things.

When one talks about literal interpretations of a text, things are typically sensible.

This is where Walton’s terms, reference and affirmation apply.  Reference points out the presence the thing.  If there is no presence, then reference is not relevant.  Affirmation indicates the form of the thing.  If the thing is present, then it should have a form.

Aristotle comes to mind.  Literal interpretations of a text make sense when it comes to things.  Things contain two contiguous real elements, matter and form.

0010 Things belong to Peirce’s category of secondness, the realm of actuality.  Peirce proposes three categories: thirdness, secondness and firstness.  The name represents the number of elements in the category.  Thirdness includes an element that brings the other two categories into relation.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  For proper notation, I place the contiguity in brackets in the following figure.  Firstness contains one monadic element.

0011 Aristotle’s hylomorphe is an exemplar of Peirce’s category of secondness.

Plus, the contiguity between matter and form may be labeled with the much abused term, “substance”.

0012 How does this apply to a literal interpretation of the Bible?

Consider the following application.

0013 Now, if a literal interpretation regards the text as a thing, then matter must be presupposed, because the text is present.  For the Bible, matter is revealed.  Matter may include being (in Latin, ens, being itself).  Beings are relational.  So, revealed matter may be called “being substantiating”.  In Latin, this corresponds to the term, “esse”.  Esse_ce is the matter (or being) of what goes into a literal interpretation.  In other words, the text portrays something real that substantiates form.

If the text is a thing, then it must take a form.  For a literal interpretation of the Bible, scripture is a form that literally portrays forms.  This is the essence of the literal interpretation of scripture. 

0014 Here is a diagram.

In Walton’s terminology, “reference” corresponds to esse_ce (that is, matter or being substantiating).

“Affirmation” corresponds to essence, (that is, substantiated form).

0015 Literalism assumes that the esse_ce and the essence of what the Biblical text says is as real as the presence and the form of the Biblical text itself.

04/28/26

Looking at John H. Walton’s Book (2025) “New Explorations in the Lost World of Genesis”  (Part 3 of 20)

0016 Now, if I know a person and that person tells me something, then what that person tells me is a real as the person that I know.

This may seem to be an odd way to consider how literalism works.

Literalism presumes that what the Bible says is as reliable as the person writing the text.

According to the Old Testament, that person is Moses.

But, for the past two centuries, an academic movement called higher criticism strives to ascertain who wrote the Old Testament, by analyzing writing styles within the text itself.  Each writing style indicates a different person.

0017 Perhaps, there is an additional complication.

I suppose that I need to figure how the person that I know (the author) makes what the person says (the biblical text) real.

One answer is that the person that I know serves as a mediator that turns the matter of something into the form of an… um… text.

The triadic structure of mediation comes to mind.

A triadic relation is a relation that employs all three of Peirce’s categories.

0018 Here is a picture.

0019 The mediation3 itself belongs to thirdness.  Thirdness contains three elements, one from each category.  The subscript indicates the category.  Thirdness is the realm of triadic relations, including mediations, signs, judgments and category-based nested forms.

Peirce’s concept of precission is on display in the structure of mediation3.  Precission underscores the fact that each higher level emerges from the adjacent lower level.

Thirdness prescinds from secondness.

Note how there are two real elements that support the mediation3.

The first is efficient causality2.  Efficient causes2 are at work in turning matter1 into form2.

The second is called “formal requirements2“.  Every design1 has formal requirements1.

For example, a text (as form2) has a formal requirement of an author saying something1 (as matter).  If the author says nothing, then the text is blank.  So, a text2 (as form) implies that someone3 (the mediator) is saying something1 (as matter) according to the author’s design1.

Design1 belongs to the realm of possibility, so the author’s design1 can somehow manifest God’s design1.  For example, a warning of an impending event could also be God’s way of telling future generations that the author is prophetic,because the warning turns out to be applicable to an event far into the future.

0020 The form2 belongs to secondness.  Secondness is the realm of actuality.  Secondness prescinds from firstness.  In this case, the form2 prescinds from intention1.  Like formal design1, final causes1 belong to firstness, the realm of potential.

0021 Finally, matter1 belongs to firstness.  And that is quizzical, because in Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter belongs to secondness.

0022 Okay, mediation3 portrays that matter1 becomes form2 in a triadic relation.

Aristotle’s hylomorphe says that {matter2 [substantiates] form2} in a dyadic relation.

How am I to understand these two configurations?

0023 Oh, the term, “understanding”, calls to mind the category-based nested form.

We encounter things as actualities2.

We can understand the thing that we encountered2 by placing it2 in a normal context3 and potential1.

0024 Here is a picture.

0025 For further reading, consult A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other book venues.

If I put the above figure into words, I say, “A normal context3 brings an actuality2 into relation with the possibility of ‘something’1.”

0026 For a literal interpretation of the text, the text tells us things, corresponding to Aristotle’s hylomorphes.  A thing is present because of matter.  A thing is what it is because of form. 

04/27/26

Looking at John H. Walton’s Book (2025) “New Explorations in the Lost World of Genesis”  (Part 4 of 20)

0027 I know what you are thinking.

What about John H. Walton’s book?

Is it about literalism?

0028 If so, from the introduction, I gather that matter has something to do with what makes Genesis 1-11 present.  Or maybe, what does Genesis 1-11 make present?

I label Genesis 1-2.3, “the Creation Story”.  I label Genesis 2.4-11, “the Primeval History”.  Some authors differ on this nomenclature.

0029 Okay, Walton wants to narrow these explorations to Genesis 1-4, the Creation Story and the Story of the Fall.

0030 The form is the scriptural text itself.  In particular, the form is written in Hebrew, using particular words.  The form is substantiated by the cultural circumstances of authors living in ancient Near East civilizations.

Indeed, the canonized form reflects the circumstances of redactors living some time after the return to Jerusalem after the exile to Babylon.

0031 Here, I am getting ahead of myself.

Why? 

Literalism presumes that what the Bible says is as reliable as the person writing the text.

Walton asserts that what Genesis 1-4 says is as reliable as the redactors who composed the text.

0032 In order to understand this, we must look at the Creation Story and the Story of the Fall as a thing2 that enters a category-based nested form.

Plus, this nested form corresponds to a redaction3 as the mediation3.

0033 Here is the general picture.

This figure expresses a mediation as if it is a category-based nested form.

Mediation3 becomes the normal context3.  The formal design1 and final attributes1 go into potential1.  Matter1(?)substantiates form2.  The substance contains efficient causes2 and formal requirements2.

0034 Now, the redactor3 operates in the name of Moses.  So, it is my understanding that the mediation3 involves divine inspiration3 and the formal design1 concerns what the redactors are constructing1 (with God’s permission) and um… their intentions1 (again, with God in the picture1).

The normal context3 and potential1 are on display in the introduction in a section titled, “Synopsis of the Message of Genesis 1-3”.

0035 A mediator3 compiles Genesis.  That mediator is the redactor3.  The redactor3 operates on a design1 and with intentions1. 

0036 In the Creation Story, one intention is to show that God’s acts of creation bring order, where order grounds a stable and properly working world.  God’s design is for humans (His image bearers) to work alongside God as partners for bringing order.  God is sovereign, and His royal presence in His cosmion… er, temple… establishes a patronage relation with humans.

0037 In the Story of the Fall, the intention is to describe people’s inability to create meaning.  Genesis 2.4-4 portrays several attempts to establish order, like naming the animals, obtaining a side-splitting helper, going naked and not being ashamed, as well as obeying the command not to eat from that poisonous tree.  I don’t know whether these activities are designed to establish order.  To me, they sound like things to do in the royal gardens of a deity who will let one get away with anything but one thing.

0038 After doing that one thing, the humans get evicted from the royal gardens and have to figure out how to achieve order on their own.  Civilization follows.

Well, in Genesis 4-11 civilization does not offer an improvement.  A reader can argue that the revelation (matter) is designed to show how the usual ways for seeking order do not work.  Only a covenant with God will save the people of Israel.

0039 I hope that I report the author’s text correctly, because I know that literalism presumes that what my text says is as reliable as the person writing the text.

I call this, “authorial authority”.

0040 If I look at the above figure, I conclude that my own authorial authority may be questionable when it comes to laying out the mediation3 (by the “redactor” or “compiler”), the formal design1 (to orient the people returning after the exile) and the final causes1 or intentions (to communicate about the nature of order in the ancient Near East cultural milieu… er… river).