0046 The mental process may be explicitly labeled, “implicit abstraction”.

I can now sketch the relational drama.

0047 First, a human encounters a real being_2a.  This being^encountered_2a must be thought of in the manner of being.  It is real.  It is actual.

0048 But, since actuality is dyadic, there must be another actuality_2a, accounting for the actuality of the encountered being_2a.  The human experiences this as a gap.  During this content-level emptiness, the human is unaware of a normal context or its underlying possibilities.

Why does the human experience this in this way?

If the tendency to experience this gap is innate, then humans evolved into a very odd niche.  In that niche, a disposition to recognize the dyadic character of the category of secondness increased reproductive success.  How strange is that?

0049 Second, a situation-level intellect projects a being of reason_2a (a nonbeing regarded in the manner of being) into the empty slot of the content-level dyad.  When this is done, a content-level nested forms gels.  The normal context_3a is what is happening_3a.  The underlying potential_1a is something that could happen_1a.

What does this imply?

A feature of the intellect_2b is the efficient cause of the being of reason_2a.  I will call this the efficient intellect.

0050 As soon as the being^in_reason is in place, other causes become apparent.  A formal cause (referring to the normal context), a material cause (concerning the encountered being_2a) and a final cause (imagining the possibilities inherent in the appearance of the encountered being_1a) come into view.  These complete the content-level nested form.

0051 Third, another aspect of the intellect constructs a judgment_2c, contextualizing the operation of the efficient intellect.  If the encountered being_2a corresponds to ‘what it is’, and if the being^in_reason_2a corresponds to ‘what it ought to be’, and if the efficient intellect grasps a comparison between the two, then implicit abstraction ends up as a formal relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’.  This formal relation is a judgment that contextualizes the situation.

Thus, a perspective-level formal judgment_2c establishes the basis_1b on which the efficient intellect_2b operates.

0052 The barebones storyline for implicit abstraction looks like this:

0053 Next, I would like to consider Suarez’s claims about beings of reason, as ably discussed by Novotny (Chapter 4; Sections A and B).

0054 SC1: Beings^in_reason_2a have no formal_3a, material_{2a and 1a} and final_1a causes in the strict sense, but they have these causes in some sense.

These causes engage as soon as the being of reason_2a enters into the emptiness of the other element of the dyad of actuality.  Consequently, they operate when a being^in_reason is present.  Yet, they cannot account for a being^in_reasonbecause, technically, a being in reason is a nonbeing.  It simply does not exist.  Yet, apparent formal, material and final causes contribute to the impression that it does.

0055 SC2: Beings^in_reason_2a have no efficient cause in the strict sense.  However, they have an efficient cause in some sense.

SC3: The human intellect is the only efficient cause of ‘beings of reason’.

This fits the dynamic of an efficient intellect reaching into the empty space of the second element in the dyad of actuality and molding a being of reason.

0056 SC4: Extrinsic denominations are necessary but insufficient conditions for beings of reason.

What is an “extrinsic denomination”?  Is it an encountered being_2a?  An encountered being_2a is a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient condition for the formation of a being of reason_2a.

An extrinsic denomination_2a… er… encountered being_2a (?) plays a crucial role of creating an emptiness in the realm of actuality_2a.  It does this simply by occupying one of the elements of the content-level dyad.  The other element appears, almost magically, by an alignment of actualities₂ in the perspective_c and situation_b levels. The content-level emptiness of the other element of the dyad of actuality_2a is thus filled.

0057 Another way to say this is:

SC5: Beings of reason are caused by an act of the intellect that conceives of something that has no being in the manner of being.

0058 The being^in_reason_2a is a nonbeing.  It does not exist, even though it belongs to the realm of actuality.  The efficient intellect_2b is able to think of a being^in_reason_2a as if it exists because the formal intellect_2c provides a facilitating perspective.  A perspective-level judgment_2c virtually (across categories) brings a situation-level efficient intellect_2b into relation with a nonbeing that can be thought of in the manner of being_2a.  The being of reason_2a is a nonbeing that has the potential of being grasped (by the efficient intellect) as a being_2a.

0059 This corresponds to Suarez’s sixth and last thesis concerning the causes of beings of reason:

SC6: Beings of reason are caused by a reflexive act of the intellect.

0060 Today, the word “reflex” means “a stimulated act performed without awareness”.  Yet, to my mind, the word also suggests a bending, a re- (again) flex (turning), similar to a reflection.  The efficient intellect acts like a reflex.  But, it does so under the oversight of a reflection, a second turning.  A reflective second turning_2c virtually brings the reflex_2binto relation with the potential inherent in the being^in_reason_2a.

0061 Next, I would like to consider Suarez’s claims about the nature of beings of reason, as ably condensed by Novotny (Chapter 3; Sections B and C).  I will demonstrate that this model of implicit abstraction applies to Suarez’s claims.

0062 Before I continue, however, let me show the bare-bones schema once again.

0063 Novotny lists Suarez’s nine claims about the nature of beings of reason.

SN1: ‘A being of reason’ is what cannot be actualized in reality.

What does this mean?

A being^in_reason cannot exist by itself.

0064 SN2: Not every being of reason is self-contradictory.

Why does Suarez mention this?

Consider the question that Suarez thought he was addressing:  How do you explain negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations?

After all, they are nonexistent.  They cannot exist by themselves.  Yet, they can be real.  One can think of them in the manner of being.

0065 Indeed, the model shows that the question that Suarez was addressing was more extensive and twisted than he imagined.  Negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations are beings of reason_2a.  However, according to the model, they occur in conjunction with encountered beings_2a.

0066 Here is an example.  I dig with a shovel.  The soil that I move goes with being^encountered.  The hole_2a goes with nonbeing.  When I say, “Watch your step.  Don’t fall into the hole that I just dug.” I speak of the hole as if it were a being.  But, it is not a being^itself.  It is a privation of soil.

If you fall into the hole, the hole itself does you no harm.  It is the soil that you collide with that injures.  The soil that you would hit in a fall corresponds to an encountered being_2a.

0067 Anyone who has come across disturbed soil and has reflected on the types of injury produced by such encountershas a perspective on the danger of holes.  That person reflexively grasps the danger of this nonbeing.  It is as dangerous as any being that one might run into.

0068 A hole is a privation.  A configuration of soil generates this being of reason.  Privations are nonbeings that can be imagined as beings, but cannot exist in reality.  

The self-contradiction is also a being of reason.  A good example is a large human rat.

0069 If I encountered a large human rat, I would be surprised, since large human rats do not exist.  Yet, if I encountered something large, like a raccoon, scurrying inside a dumpster, I could mistake it as both a rat and a human.  In this way, self-contradictions may exist as beings of reason.

SN3: Every being is either a real being or being of reason, but no being is both.

0070 The raccoon (neither human nor rat, but easily mistaken for both) is a being^itself_2a.

The human rat is a being^in_reason_2a.

This suggests the following conclusion.  Since self-contradictions, negations and privations are always beings of reason, they can never exist as beings^themselves.

This lesson is plainly portrayed in the content-level actuality in the bare-bones schema for implicit abstraction.  The first element of the content-level of actuality is a real being.  A second element must be present, according to the nature of secondness.  This second element somehow accounts for the actuality of the encountered real being.

0071 At this point, I have a general idea of why schoolmen postulated beings of reason in their various inquiries.  After all, when looking at beings, there are all sorts of reversals, losses, confounding things and dependencies.  These are grasped as negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations.

What does it mean for one of these nonbeings to fill the emptiness of the second element of the content-level actuality?  It becomes a being^{in reason}.  It is taken to be real, even though it does not exist.

SN4: Beings of reason are – in the analogical sense of the word “are”.

SN7: A being of reason is regarded as a being, even though it has no being in itself.

0072 The efficient intellect_2b is a real being.  It ascribes being (existence) to the being^in_reason_2a.  “Object” is another word for being^in_reason.  The efficient intellect_2b grasps an object_2a.  It makes the object part of its subjective — reflexive — reckoning.

The object_2a goes with the content-level nested form.  The efficient intellect_2b belongs to the situation-level nested form.  The content-level normal context_3a is what is happening_3a.  The situation-level normal context_3b is situational reason_3b.

0073 SN6: A being^in_reason_2a has only objective being in the intellect_2b.

SN5: Three different relations to reason are indicated by the expression ‘being of reason’.  These are (1) effective, (2) subjective and (3) objective.

This is a minimum, since the bare-bones schema offers one more. (4) A perspective-level actuality_2c draws into relation the ‘what it is’ of the encountered being_2a and the ‘what it ought to be’ of the being^{in reason}_2a.  Since the intellect, the seat of reason, is involved, Suarez predicted that this relation would generate a comparison.

SN9:  Beings of reason and real beings are related by an analogy of proportionality.

0074 Finally, Suarez suggests why ‘beings of reason’ are necessary.

SN8a: ‘Beings of reason’ are necessary to know nonbeing.

Nonbeing is more than nothing.  According to the bare-bones schema, the being^{in reason}_2a is an actual object that the efficient intellect grasps.

0075 SN3b: ‘Beings of reason’ are needed to know things relatively in comparison to other things.

This reminds me of the perspective-level nested form.  The actuality that puts the efficient intellect into perspective_2c is a judgment that weighs ‘what it is’ against ‘what it ought to be’_2c.  This judgment_2c grounds reckoning_2b.  It addresses the question: On what basis would the efficient intellect_2b grasp a real nonbeing_2a in response to encountering a real being_2a?

0076 SN3c: ‘Beings of reason’ are required to explain the capacity of our intellect to think of self-contradictory beings (as well as negations, privations and relations).

0077 This matches the situation-level nested form.  The efficient intellect reckons_2b.  Once a real being is encountered, the efficient intellect reckons that there must be a second element to the dyad in the content-level actuality.  This must be an innate reckoning, because the efficient intellect does exactly what needs to be done.  It_2b projects an object_2a — a being^in_reason_2a — into the emptiness of the second element in the realm of actuality_2a.

The projected being^in_reason is thought of in the manner of being (existence).  This is why humans regard negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions as real, even though they cannot be seen, heard, touched, tasted or smelled.

0078 So far, so good.  The bare-bones schema coheres to Suarez’s nine claims about the nature of ‘beings of reason’.  The only drawback is:  Suarez actually made eleven claims.  There are two more to go.

0079 I did not mention these two because Novotny insightfully does not list them in chapter 3.  Why?  Novotny argues that they are not consistent with the other nine.  So, he lists them in chapter 4 — on the division of beings of reason.

0080 Before I go there, I want to shine the flashlight of the category-based nested form in another direction.

My thesis is that Suarez’s comprehensive treatment of beings of reason coheres to a model of implicit abstraction.  I also propose that implicit abstraction corresponds to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Implicit abstraction evolves in the milieu of hand talk.

In this section, I want to develop the latter claim.

0081 I intend to adapt this bare bones schema to hand talk.  The adaptation provides greater insight into the model and its application to Novotny’s story about ens rationis.

So here goes.

0082 When our hominin ancestors talked, they used linguistic manual-brachial word-gestures.  These word-gestures were referential.  They were natural signs.  They imaged and indicated their referents.

0083 What does this imply?

In hand talk, the words “real” and “being” cannot exist.  What is there to image?  What is there to point to?

The sensibility that goes with the word “real” changes.  From my standpoint, as a person who uses only speech-alone talk, I need to imagine what “real” would denote in the world of hand talk.

So, here is my compromise: “Real” labels that which may be imaged or pointed to instead of that which is regarded in the manner of being.  The term “being” goes with existence.

0084 In order to clarify, consider Suarez’s construction of ‘beings of reason’.  He uses Latin, a tongue in speech-alone talk.  His words belong to our current Lebenswelt.  He uses the word “real” in a particular manner.  It means to regard in the manner of being (existence).

The following matrix applies to speech-alone talk.  The two real elements stand out. The two unreal elements do not stand out.  Of the latter, one is not ruled out.  The ‘unreal being’ is an existent that must be regarded as if it does not exist.  The other is ruled out as impossible.  The ‘unreal nonbeing’ is a nothing.  It is like a whisper in an empty room.

0085 How should this matrix be adjusted for the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

There was no word for “real” in the world of hand talk (before Homo sapiens) and hand-speech talk (from the appearance of Homo sapiens to the first singularity).  Why?  How can anyone picture or point to “real”.  The term “real” is an explicit abstraction.

0086 So how do I apply the term to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

My suggestion goes like this: “Real” is what can be conveyed through word-gestures.  Since word-gestures image and indicate, what they picture and point to can be matched to our current term “real”.  The real is whatever can be imaged or indicated.  This results in the following matrix of real and being.

0087 Now, the two elements that stand out belong to being (existence).  The two elements that are hidden are nonbeing(nonexistent).  Of these, one is less hidden than the other.

To me, real nonbeing and unreal being have similar sensibilities.  As soon as I think that an ‘unreal being’ is possible, then I imagine that there must be a way to point to it.  The way to point to it may be nonsensical, but what is the alternative?  The way to point to a being that cannot be pointed to is by treating it as if it were a nonbeing that can be pointed to.

0088 In other words, in hand-speech talk, unreal being and real nonbeing may be two sides to a single coin.

During the Upper Paleolithic, people were not rich, but they did carry a few items of value with them.  Some of these were carvings of animals or people.  What were these images pointing to?  Obviously, the carvings imaged beings.  But, just as obviously, the imaged beings were no longer present.  Similarly, what is no longer present could be imaged and pointed to in hand and hand-speech talk.  Perhaps, the image was of a real being, that became a unreal being, but is now a real nonbeing.

0089 So maybe, the matrix should look like this:

0090 To me, this looks like a nested configuration, rather than two sides of the same coin.  The being that can be pointed to goes with content.  The being that cannot be pointed to goes with situation.  Then, the nonbeing that can be pointed to goes with perspective.

This produces the following variation of the bare-bones schema:

0091 The nonbeing that can be imaged and pointed to_2c may enter into the slot designated 2a (real being).  In doing so, an implicit abstraction becomes an encountered being_2a.

0092 How can this happen?

The nonbeing_2c can be pictured or indicated through hand talk.  The nonbeing could be a self-contradiction, negation, privation or relation.  It can be depicted through a grammatically correct but nonsensical proposition.  After all, the statement, “A hole is where the ground is no longer there.” does not make much sense.  Thus, the relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’ may become a gestural utterance that fills the slot designated for a real being_2a.

This conclusion parallels the ideas in A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction.  The student may want to take a look at this work.

0093 Shall I tell the fable of the big rat?

0094 Before the first singularity, our Paleolithic ancestors lived in bands that occasionally congregated into tribes.  A lot was accomplished in the apparent chaos of tribal song-fests.  It was during such a gathering that Running Goat was given new parents.  He was a strapping youth, but he needed guidance.  His father died during the winter.  His mother was given to his uncle.  But, Running Goat was not going to live under his uncle’s tent.  His uncle was not much of a hunter.  Dashing Bleeter was.

0095 The tribal elders made him the son of a renowned hunter in a different band.  The hunter and his wife gladly accepted this, not so much because it would increase their status, but because they had no children of their own. Running Goat was not the first child they adopted.

0096 In the band, a girl was coming of age.  Her name was Smiling Water.

One day, she was coming back to her tent with a gourd of water.  Running Goat was nearby, working on his bow and arrows.  He and his pal had just been out trying the tool.  It needed some adjustments.  When saw her, he elbowed his friend.  Watch this.

0097 “Wait!” he gestured to Smiling Water.  “Rat I See Into tent Run.”

Pool of Joy lowered her gourd and put it on the ground.  By tradition, she could not speak to a warrior.  So, even though he was not yet a warrior, she treated him as one, gesturing, “(Points to tent) Please Rat Chase.”

0098 Leaping Cloven Hoof rushed into the tent, as if chasing a rat.  Once in the tent, however, he stopped in his tracks.  What did he see?  The mother of Smiling Water crouched in a corner of the tent, fixing a pelt coat.  She looked up, unhappy at the interruption and knowing that Running Goat was up to no good.

She threw her boot at him.  His face flushed.  Oh, was he in trouble.  He ducked out of the tent.

But, Happy Liquid was outside the ten, ready to see a dead rat, killed by her newfound hero.

Running Goat gestured, “(Points to Smiling Water) (points to inside tent) Mother!”

0099 Then he took off.  His friend dropped the construction project and ran after him.

Waters of Smiles picked up the gourd and went into her tent.

0100 She asked her mom, “Rat Running Goat See?”

Her mother looked at her quizzically, then grinned, gesturing “Me Rat Big.”

Smiling Waters suddenly understood.  From then on, even after she was married to Running Goat, she called her mom: Big Rat.

0101 What is an implicit abstraction?

An implicit abstraction is a nonbeing that can be imaged or pointed to using hand or hand-speech talk.  The nonbeing is a relation between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’. It is imaged or pointed to through a grammatically correct nonsensical statement.

0102 Here is a diagram of the judgment in the fable.

Note how the entire judgment is captured in two word gestures: Big Rat.

0103 As far as triadic relations go, judgment is unusual.  Any of its three elements may be assigned to the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness.  In this case, the relation belongs to secondness (the realm of actuality), ‘what is’ goes with thirdness (the realm of normal context) and ‘what ought to be’ associates to firstness (the realm of possibility).

0104 The resulting nested form is constructed on the basis of the categories.  The example goes like this:

The normal context of the Big Rat (mom)₃ brings the actuality challenging RG’s attempts to impress SW₂ into relation with the possibilities inherent in RG’s desire to capture the love and attention of SW₁.

0105 This raises the question, “Is this category-based nested form indivisible?”

0106 Novotny lists Suarez’s last two claims about the nature of ‘beings of reason’ in the chapter on division.

The student should read Chapter 5 of Novotny’s book.

0107 Suarez struggled to show the relevance of the traditional formulation.  He arrived at two conclusions:

SD1: ‘Beings of reason’ have three exclusive and sufficient species: negation, privation and relation.

SD2: Self-contradictory ‘beings of reason’ may define a fourth category, or they may belong to negation.

Put another way, negations, privations and relations are always ‘beings of reason’.  Self-contradictions may or may not be inherent.

0108 In order to appreciate these divisions, consider the triad that constitutes judgment on the perspective level.  The four traditional items fit into the structure of judgment as ‘what ought to be’.

0109 The element, what it ought to be, typically goes with firstness.  The logic of firstness is inclusive.  It allows contradictions.  Traditional formulas for ‘beings of reason’ are full of contradictions.  After all, they are beings that cannot possibly exist by themselves.

How can a negation exist without the reversal of a real being?  Yet, these non-existents may be regarded in the manner of being.  They may take on a life of their own.

0110 How does this happen?

A relation (in thirdness) becomes the basis on which ‘what it ought to be’ takes on the character of secondness.  ‘What is’, the encountered being, takes on the character of firstness.  For example, negation_2a arises from a reversal of the potential of the encountered being_2a.  ‘The reversed encountered being’ goes with ‘effect’.  Negation is projected as a ‘cause’.

0111 Implicit abstraction expresses the whole judgment in the slot designated 2a (real being).  Hand and hand-speech talk image and point to an action that may be attributed to a judgment.  The result may be a grammatically correct, yet nonsensical, statement.  The action… um…the statement_2a is what_2a the judgment_2c stands for.  But, the judgment cannot be pictured or indicated in hand talk.

Explicit abstraction places an element of judgment in the slot designated 2a (real being).  Why is this so?  Spoken words are symbols.  Symbols are placeholders in a system of differences.  So the whole judgment becomes an order composed of particular elements.  Each element may (or may not) get a label.

0112 Suarez’s claims imbue the element of ‘what it ought to be’ with secondness (the realm of actuality).  Negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions may now be examined as if they were real beings.  At the same time, the real being falls into the background, without a label.  The real being becomes an element that is hidden by Suarez’s definition of a ‘being of reason’.

Suarez’s explicit abstraction may now enter the slot designated 2a (real being), without regard to the other elements.

0113 Consider the previous two figures along with the tenth statement on the nature of ‘beings of reason’.

SN10: Negations and privations may be in things (as real negations or privations) or in beings of reason (as negations or privations that are spoken about as if they are real).

0114 Surely, this statement re-enacts the above categorical flip between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’.  When a negation is regarded as a real privation in a thing, it goes with firstness, the realm of possibility.  Why?  The real being (secondness) has a potential for reversal (firstness).  When the negation is regarded in the manner of being, it goes with secondness, the realm of actuallity.  It becomes actual.  Meanwhile, the encountered being enters into the category of firstness. 

0115 Suarez’s statement on the nature of beings^in_reason explicitly abstracts one feature of the three elements of judgment.  The scholastics before Suarez noticed a pattern.  If negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions entered into someone’s discourse, then the schoolman ended up discussing nonbeings the manner of being.  No one was sure why this was the case.

0116 The observation itself goes into the record as the eleventh and last claim listed by Novotny.  Suarez claims:

SN11: Humans think in both the ‘manner of being’ and ‘the manner of nonbeing’.

After all, one could not define the ‘being of reason’ unless one imagined a being in the manner of a nonbeing.  Ironically, this is precisely what occurred when Suarez transubstantiated (changed Peircean categories) the encountered real being (what it is) from the category of secondness into firstness.

A being thought of in the manner of a nonbeing may manifest itself it many ways.  It may be an existent that one must declare cannot possibly exist.  It may be a being existing in pure potential.  It may be a being that somehow causes an action to happen.  Then, the action exists, and the being that causes it must be regarded in the manner of a nonbeing.

0117 Say what?

Technically, a being belonging to the category of firstness (possibility) within a particular thirdness (normal context)can also be a being that one assumes (as if it is a nonbeing, such as an idea) and then ignores (because one has to deal with secondness, the realm of actuality). 

Is that confusing, or what?

It is especially confusing since we evolved to confound the iconic and indexal linguistic act_2a with thinking in the manner of being (existence).  Hand talk is experienced as real being_2a.  By extension, so is speech-alone talk.  What Suarez calls a ‘being of reason’ is experienced_2b as a nonreal being_2a, a being that cannot be pictuerd and pointed to (and therefore cannot be regarded as existing by itself).

0118 This experience_2b is triggered by the presence of talk_2a.  The efficient intellect_2b asks the question: What accounts for a linguistic act_2a (in the slot designated for real encountered beings)?

Is a linguistic act_2a the same as an encountered being_2a?

Or is it an encounter_2a regarded_2b in the manner of being_2a?

If that is not confusing enough, consider this: What Suarez defines as ‘a being of reason’ (a nonbeing thought of in the manner of a being) corresponds to a judgment_2c.  Judgment_2c is a nonbeing that cannot be imaged or pointed to (hence, hand talked about).  But, the action produced by a judgment can be pictured and indicated.

Oh my.  An action that can be imaged and indicated may go into the slot for an encountered being_2a.

But, the being that cannot be pointed to_2a is not the judgment_2c that is somehow objectified by the action_2a, it_2a is um… a being^{of reason}_2a.

0119 The following matrix hybridizes hand talk and Suarez’s speech-alone talk concepts.

0120 No wonder Daniel Novotny starts to question Suarez’s approach in the chapter of the division of ‘beings of reason’.  The terms “being”, “existence”, “nonbeing”, “image” and “indication” are intertwined in the strangest fashion.  To me, Suarez has intuitively constructed a model of implicit abstraction in a philosophical tradition devoted to explicit abstraction.

On one hand, implicit abstraction belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  It also belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

On the other hand, explicit abstraction belongs only to our current Lebenswelt.

0121 Here is the bare-bones schema for implicit abstraction:

Here is the skeletal model for Suarez’ motivation to study ‘beings of reason’:

0122 Implicit abstraction operates when a judgment is imaged or pointed to in hand or hand-speech talk.  Icons and indexes are holistic.  They are indivisible.  Consequently, their referent is the entire judgment.

0123 The nested form model of Suarez’s motivations diagrams an explicit process.  The process starts with an encountered being_2a.  The efficient intellect reckons a being^in_reason_2a. The formal intellect arrives at ‘a judgment that the efficient intellect has generated something that cannot exist as a mind-independent being.  Oops, I meant to say: a nonbeing thought of in the manner of being.

Various scholastics (before Suarez) offered this explicit abstraction in order to explain observations.  Suarez aims to construct a comprehensive treatment of these ‘beings of reason’.  He formulates a thought experiment.  The thought experiment imbues beings^in_reason with secondness.  But, in doing so, the schoolman enters unknown territory.  Suarez is about to place this explicit abstraction into the slot designated for an encountered being_2a.

0124 Here is another example.

0125 Around the time that Suarez was working on his thought experiment, Galileo was tinkering with his less ambitious and more playful scientific experiments.  Some of these were driven by technology.  The ability to make glass lens and the ability to understand how lenses worked bootstrapped one another.  Galileo made a telescope, also called a spyglass, that proved valuable to merchants waiting for ships to arrive.

0126 Why?

The prices of goods changed as soon as a ship arrived.  There was an advantage to lock in a low price when the ship had not arrived and its arrival was uncertain.  After the ship arrived, ‘the certainty of delivery’ increased prices.

A spyglass and a high tower made for advantage.  They eliminated privation (lack of certainty).

0127 Here is the story in a nutshell:

0128 Before the spyglass, no one knew whether the Athena would arrive with its shipment of olive oil from Corinth.  This was a privation.  A person could pay now for a jug of olive oil later, once the ship came in.  Privation went with risk.  If I were confident, my privation would not deter me from making my bid (paying a low price).  If I were less confident, it would.

0129 In this regard, privation is like negation.  It is like blindness.  I cannot see the future.  I cannot make a confident reckoning_2b because the arrival of the ship exists as situational potential_2b.  I do not know_3b whether it is real_1b until the arrival itself_2a.  Until its arrival, I am full of contradictions.  Do I make a bid?  Or do I wait for expensive certainty?

0130 With these two situations in mind, consider the difference between the real and the unreal.  Which being^{in reason}_2awould be labeled “real” and which “unreal”?  I will answer my own question, “Of course, the delivery would be labeled real because I spied the Athena on the horizon.”

0131 Meanwhile, a different me walks through the downtown exchange.  I do not possess a spyglass or a high tower.  The owner of the Athena asks me whether I want to buy 5 amphora of olive oil on his ship.  He promises it will come in soon.  He offers a great price, but I am not sure.  I heard rumors… Surely, my privation is a nonbeing that I regard in the manner of being.  Why?  The risk is palpable.

0132 I could write out the advantages of buying now.  I could write out the disadvantages.  These would be explicit abstractions that I could use when I go home and tell my wife that I had been to the exchange.

She says, “I told you not to go there.  You always lose money.  How am I going to run this house with you losing money like that.  By the way, we are out of olive oil.”

0133 I sit on a stool as she storms out of the kitchen.

The maid, who was listening, quietly approaches, whispering “Sir, it is none of my business, but I have a friend with a spyglass, and he says the Athena is on the horizon.”

0134 Now, I go back to Suarez.

0135 The terms of “privation”, “negation”, “self-contradiction” and “relation” are explicit abstractions.  They are not like implicit abstractions.

The same goes for the term: beings^{in reason}. 

In hand talk and hand-speech talk, beings of reason_2a would be beings that one cannot image or point to (therefore, cannot talk about)_2a.

In speech-alone talk, ‘beings of reason_2a” are nonbeings thought of in the manner of being_2a.

My uncertainty in the example is a being of reason_2a in both senses.

0136 In hand talk, I could never put my being of reason into the slot designated for the encountered being_2a.  I could never dissociate my being of reason (what it ought to be) from its relation to an encountered being (it is).

In speech-alone talk, I can dissect my own judgment_2c.  In fact, this is precisely where Suarez’s thought experiment leads:  What happens when I place an explicit abstraction into the slot designated for the encountered being_2a?

0137 What happens when my uncertainty enters the slot for a real being_2a?

Students should read chapter 6 of Novotny’s book.

0138 Francisco Suarez, S.J., is born in 1548 AD and died in 1617.  He starts teaching at Salamanca College in 1570.  He moves on to other universities.  Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, S.J., is a young colleague of Suarez at Salamanca College.  He considers beings of reason in two efforts, once in 1615 and again in 1624.  The first version of Disputation 19 is five thousand words long.  The second version is thirteen thousand words long.

0139 Hurtado starts by confirming Suarez’s divisions:

H1D1: Beings of reason fall into privations, negations and relations.

0140 He then contends:

H1N4: There are beings of reason.

H1N2: A ‘being of reason’ is what has merely objective being in the intellect.

H1N1: Extrinsic denomination is necessary, but not sufficient, for something to be a being of reason.

0141 Hurtado steps right into Suarez’s thought experiment.  Or should I say, “madness”?  He places an explicit abstraction, the ‘being of reason’ defined as ‘a nonbeing thought of in the manner of being’, right into the slot designated for a real being_2a.  The technical term for this placement is “extrinsic denomination”.

0142 Then, before I can scream, “No!  This is a booby trap,” Hurtado’s efficient intellect_2b has grasped this apparently real being_2a and generated the second element in the dyad of actuality_2a:

H1N3: A ‘being of reason’ is a false proposition thought of in the manner of being true.

H1N5: ‘Beings of reason’ are completely dependent on actual mental acts.

0143 Here is a model for the actual mental act:

H1C1: ‘Beings of reason’ are constituted by false mental acts.

0144 So, this model must be situated by the possibility of falsehood.

0145 The situation must be put into perspective.

H1N6: Some beings of reason can be actualized in reality.

0146 A good example is the being^{in reason}_2a of my feeling that the Athena will arrive with its cargo intact.

H1C2: Beings^{in reason}_2a are made of false statements.  The false statements may be necessary or contingent.

0147 Hmmm.  The potential of falsehood_1b is taking a life of its own.

0148 Self-contradictions make certain the possibility of falsehood_1b.

H1N8: True judgments about self-contradictory beings must presuppose that they are composed of false statements.

H1N7 and 9: Self-contradictory beings are not ‘beings of reason’.  They are pure nothingness.  No, that is not it.  They are fictitious beings.

0149 This provides nuance to the previous interscope.

0150 Falsehood_1b is a way to deny realness_1b.  Another way to deny realness_1b is labeled “fiction”.  This logic implies that truth is a way to affirm realness_1b.  Another way to affirm realness_1b has a label, as well.  It is called “fact”.

0151 According to Hurtado, facts are not beings^in_reason. They are beings because they affirm the referent that they correspond to.  Fictions are a peculiar sort of real being, because they pretend to affirm the referent that they correspond to.  Thus, the whole discussion comes to a judgment.  This judgment values true over false.

0152 This judgment has some notable features.

Previously, whatever went into the slot for encountered being_2a became ‘what it is’.  Suarez did not mention this connection.  He assumed it.  Now, the explicitly abstracted term, “facts”, designates ‘what is’.  Thus, Hurtado concludes that facts are not ‘beings of reason’.

0153 The being^{in reason}_2a remains ‘what it ought to be’.  Since judgment presents it solely within the metric of true versus false, the ‘being of reason’ becomes false.

0154 The entire relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’ remains the occasion for an implicit abstraction.  However, this abstraction entails a valuation of the quality of a speech-alone statement.

For Hurtado’s first version of Disputation 19, the axis of true versus false brings the ‘what is’ of fact into relation withthe ‘what ought not to be’ of fiction.

0155 To me, that fits the word “definition”.  

0172 Novotny’s summaries of Suarez and Hurtado suggest a story.  The story goes like this:

Francisco Suarez S.J. figured that he could construct a comprehensive approach to ens rationis (being of reason).  During the previous centuries, ‘beings of reason’ had been used in scholastic discussions of various topics.  Three types of ‘being of reason’ stood out.  These were negation, privation and relation.  Self-contradiction went in there somewhere.

Suarez wrote about the natures, causes and divisions of beings of reason.  (As it turns out, these fit into a model constructed of category-based nested forms.  The model starts with encountered beings_2a and ends with judgment_2c.  The same model applies to implicit abstraction [a way of thinking] and hand and hand-speech language [ways of talking].  These features belong to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.)

Suarez proposed a thought experiment.  What happens when an act of speech-alone talk becomes the encountered real being_2a?  (This thought experiment becomes apparent with the model.  However, it entails a mind-boggling transition.  ‘An act of speech-alone talk’ is not the same as either a real encounter or hand talk.)

0173 Pedro Hurtado S.J. conducted the experiment.  The answer was unexpected.  The perspective-level actuality changed from judgment_2c to definition_2c.

In Suarez’s set up, judgment_2c virtually contextualizes a reckoning_2b based on the possibility inherent in realness_1b.  Realness exists in the realm of possibility.  It includes both true versus false and true versus deception.  Realness_1b is thinking about it_2a in the manner of being (existence).

In Hurtado’s execution, proper definition_2c virtually contextualizes a reckoning_2b based on the potential of fact versus fiction_1b.  Facts go with true.  Fiction goes with false.

0174 Novotny takes issue with Hurtado’s claim that he is merely following the steps of Suarez.  How can Hurtado come up with different conclusions?

The answer is plain.  Hurtado placed input that belongs to our current Lebenswelt into a model that coheres with the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Speech-alone talk does not image or point to its referent, as hand talk does.  Explicit abstraction can symbolize one aspect of judgment and place the other aspects under erasure.  Implicit abstraction is holistic.  Explicit abstraction is not.

0175 Tellingly, in this transition from implicit to explicit abstraction, a facet of realness falls into shadow.  The facet is the axis of true versus deception.  In this occultation, the Age of Ideas begins.

0176 Definitions only care about true versus false.  Modernism focuses only on facts.

0177 Daniel Novotny is a detective as well as a philosopher.  He traces the attempt to develop a comprehensive treatment of beings of reason.  There are many clues in the writings of various Baroque scholastics.  Novotny faces the dilemma: Who do I present?

Suarez and Hurtado are obvious selections.  Suarez was a Baroque scholastic of great renown.  Hurtado was his understudy.

0178 But then what?

My analysis relies on Novotny’s genius.  After Suarez (publishing around 1600) and Hurtado (around 1620), Novotny introduces a pair of Franciscans, Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto (between 1628 and 1646).

0179 The manner in which they discuss the status of the question (concerning beings of reason) shows that they, like Hurtado, are investigating explicit abstraction (within a thought experiment set up for implicit abstraction).  Novotny lists three claims:

MBN1: The term ‘being of reason’ is defined as ‘an object of the intellect and nothing else’.

MBN2: There are beings of reason.  Beings of reason are actual.

MBN3: Beings of reason require actual thought.  They are completely mind-dependent.

0180 These claims fit into the interscope for explicit abstraction.  ‘The being of reason_2a’ is a decoded statement_2a.  ‘Complete mind-dependence’ suggests that the being of reason_2a is fiction, not fact_1b.

Nevertheless, the fiction_1b, emerging from the decoded statement_2a, may be regarded as fact_1b.  Yet, through reflection, the formal intellect may discern that the being of reason_2a is fictional_1b.  In doing so, the formal intellect attains truth by properly defining ‘the being of reason’ as fiction. 

0180 Thus, the three claims go with the words colored red in the following figure.

0197 What next? 

Novotny considers a rather odd Cistercian who distanced himself from all the schools of the Baroque era.  Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz publishes an essay one year before his death in 1682 AD.  The work is titled Leptatotos, translating as “The Most Subtle”.  This essay contains a discussion on ‘beings of reason’.

The student should read chapter 8 of Novotny’s text.

0198 Caramuel starts with a list of meanings associated with the term.  Or rather, he begins with a pairing of apparent contradictions.

The first pair is active and passive.  Active goes with the efficient intellect_2b.  Passive goes with the next pair: real and intentional.  Real is a product of the intellect that pertains to mind-independent beings or states of being.  Intentional goes with the next pair: subjective and objective.  Subjective is a state of the subject, that is, the intellect, which is active and dwells on the real.  Objective goes with the next pair: impossible and possible.  Impossible goes with beings that cannot exist.  Possible goes with the next trio: logic, physics and psychics.

To me, this list weirdly echoes the contrast between fact and fiction.

0199 If I go backwards, I start by acknowledging that the possible is not all encompassing.  I set aside logic (the laws of non-contradiction), physics (the deterministic laws of cause and effect) and psychics (the pursuit of resolving mental contradictions).  I consider the impossible.  The impossible is a contradiction (a dyad) that cannot reduce to its monadic elements through logic, physics or mental gymnastics.

0200 The impossible and the possible then flow into the objective.  The term “objective” indicates an object within the intellect.  It does not reduce to the subjective.  The ‘subjective’ is whatever is going on in the subject.  For moderns, the subject may reduce to neurophysiological dynamics.  But, the object cannot be reduced.  The object belongs to a sign, a non-reducible triadic relation.

0201 The objective and the subjective then flow into the intentional.  The term, “intentional”, contrasts with the term, “real”.

To me, these terms point to the dyad of actuality in the content-level nested form.  “Real” describes the encountered being_2a.  A ‘real being’ is being thought of in the manner of being.  “Intentional” describes what is imputed to the real being_2a.  The efficient intellect_2b projects ‘a being of reason (or a decoded version of a speech-alone statement)_2a’ in order to grasp what is happening_3a and the potential underlying the encountered being_1a.

0202 The intentional and real then flow into the passive.  The term “passive” seems odd, because it corresponds to ‘the machinations of the active efficient intellect’.  Just as a dancer feels that the music moves her, not the other way around, the efficient intellect generates its content-level nested forms in response to an encounter that cannot easily be ignored.  Indeed, sometimes the efficient intellect does so mindlessly.

0203 So what is a ‘being of reason’?

CN1: In its proper sense, a being of reason is objective and impossible.

That means the flow is from passive, into intentional, into objective, then into impossible.  

This makes me consider what is impossible.  Impossible contrasts with possible.  The possible flows into logic, physics and psychics.  These fields apply the logic of non-contradiction to various topics.

So what is impossible defies all methods to resolve contradictions.  The impossible is a contradiction (a bound dyad) that cannot be reduced to its monadic elements through logic, physics or rationalizations.

0204 Caramuel loved to coin new words.  He fashioned the word “incompossible” to label this particular type of contradiction.  An incompossible actuality cannot be reduced to its underlying potentials.

So what does Caramuel say?

CN2: If anything, a being of reason is self-contradictory.  It is the extrinsic or intrinsic union of incompatible things.

0205 How can this happen?  What causes this union?

CC1: Language (talk) is the efficient cause of extrinsically united self-contradictory objects.

CN3: There are no intrinsically united self-contradictory beings of reason.

CN4: There are extrinsically united self-contradictory beings of reason.

CN5: Extrinsically united self-contradictions (beings of reason) are real beings.

0206 What is going on?

0207 Like Hurtado, Mastri and Belluto, Caramuel transforms Suarez’s original Baroque scholastic interscope by introducing a new perspective.  This perspective values unity over division.  This type of perspective could account for a chimera, an imaginary animal stitched together from parts of real animals.  For example, the Greek Chiron is half-man and half-horse.  Hold the pieces close enough together and they will attach to one another.

Caramuel’s perspective shifts the situation.  With Suarez, situational reason relies on the potential of realness.  For Hurtado, and later, Mastri and Belluto, situational reason works with the possibilities inherent in fact versus fiction.  For Caramuel, situational reason deals with the possibility that contradictions can co-exist in the realm of actuality.  This potential defines the impossible.

0208 Two contradicting actualities are linked — through linguistic expression — into a single actuality_2a.  The linguistic expression occupies the slot designated for a real encountered being_2a.  The linguistic expression is decoded into a living contradiction_2a.  The efficient intellect projects this living contradiction_2a — a being of reason_2a — as the remaining element in the content-level dyad of actuality.  The being of reason_2a accounts for the encountered linguistic statement_2a.

0209 The efficient intellect_2a can only employ this projection_2a within a formal intellect_2b that values unity over division or structure over chaos.  In modern terms, this formal intellect seeks gestalt.

0210 Here is Caramuel’s argument as an interscope:

0211 Three surprises come to the fore.

First, Caramuel’s model applies to any fully linguistic way of talking.  Two contradictory items may be united only through grammar.  Grammar consists of operations within a symbolic order.  This applies to hand talk, hand-speech talk and speech-alone talk.  Therefore, Caramuel’s model transcends the differences between the Lebenswelt that we evolved in and our current Lebenswelt.

Second, Caramuel’s model applies to modern theories of gestalt and cognitive association.  Humans can discern a white horse in a snowy field.  Humans can imagine a mythical creature that has the torso of a man and the body of the horse.

Third, Caramuel explicitly recovers the part of judgment_2c that Suarez ignores and Hurtado Mastri and Belluto do not include.  “It is” is a linguistic statement that expresses a self-contradiction.

0212 Caramuel answers the question originally posed by Suarez: What are the causes, natures and divisions of beings of reason?  He does this by altering the definition of a ‘being of reason’ into something that Suarez would not recognize:

0213 A ‘being of reason’ is an extrinsic, linguistically formulated, self-contradiction that is thought of in the manner of an intrinsic unity.

0214 Whoa!  Who would have expected that?

0215 The being of reason is still the other element in the dyad of actuality in the content level_2a.  As such, it accounts for ‘the original element in the dyad of actuality, the encountered being_2a’.

The encountered being_2a is a language-event that stimulates the efficient intellect_2b to produce this particular type of account_2a, in the process of constructing a content-level nested form.

The being^in_reason_2a is composed of actualities that contradict.   It emerges within the efficient intellect_2b from the potential of intrinsic unity_1b.

0216 At this point, I return to Novotny’s summary of Caramuel (Chapter 8; Section B).

0217 What are the causes of ‘beings of reason’?

CC1: Language is the (efficient) cause of extrinsically united, self-contradictory objects (‘beings of reason’).

CC2: If anything, language is the (efficient) cause of the (intellect seeing ‘beings of reason’ as) intrinsic unification.

CC3: If anything, God (efficiently) causes the ‘essence’ of the intrinsic unity (exhibited by beings of reason within the intellect).

CC4: If anything, intrinsically united ‘beings of reason’ have no formal or material causes.  They may have exemplar or final causes.

0218 To me, the depicted model captures all these causes.  The efficient intellect_2b decodes a linguistic statement_2a, producing a being of reason_2a that depicts contradicting actualities as a single (contradiction-filled) actuality_2a.  This actuality is then situated by the potential for intrinsic unity_1b.  This potential_1b underlies the efficient intellect_2b within the normal context of situational reason_3b.

0219 Notably, Caramuel’s causes call to mind one of Hurtado’s causes:

H2C9: ‘Beings of reason’ can be made through the simple apprehension of unity between incompatible items.

This suggests that the entire process is experienced as simple apprehension.  In modern terms, ‘beings of reason’ are gestalt experiences.

0220 What does this imply?

To Novotny, Caramuel’s perspective tends towards elimination of the term ‘beings of reason’ from the disciplines of ontology (the study of being) and metaphysics (inquiry into being itself).  After all, the very term ‘being of reason’ contains a contradiction.  Therefore, it is not subject to the logic of non-contradiction.  Beings that are not subject to the logic of non-contradiction cannot be actual.

0221 Or can they?

Novotny goes on to say that Caramuel may as well have written this, “Does it make sense to insist that there are non-existing entities that we treat as if they existed?  One would also have to insist that the contrary is true.  Some entities exist that we treat as if they do not exist.”

0222 To me, that recalls the matrix that has appeared more than once in this work.

0223 What Suarez called ‘a being of reason’ fits both entries in the red dashed outline.  It fits hand talk as an unreal being (a being that cannot be pointed to).  It fits speech-alone talk as a real nonbeing (a nonbeing that can be thought of as existing).

0224 How does this work?  Or, how does this not work?

0225 In hand talk, a real encountered being_2a stimulates the efficient intellect.  The efficient intellect produces a being of reason_2a, a nonreal being.  This being^in_reason_2a exists as a being in the person, manifesting itself through fleeting physiological expressions. These expressions can be pictured and pointed to.  But, my projected being^in_reason_2a cannot be seen by others.  Thus, the being^in_reason_2a is a being that cannot be pointed to.

0226 Then, the reckoning_2b that produces the being^in_reason_2a is judged_2c.  This judgment_2c is a nonbeing that can be pointed to_2c.

0227 Why is the judgment_2c a real nonbeing?

It_2c yields a hand talk statement that conveys a contradiction_2a.  Two actualities are unified within one actuality.  The single actuality is a contradiction that has no being (existence), but it can be imaged and indicated.  The efficient intellect_2b situates the encountered statement_2a as an expression of truth_2a.  This truth_2a is a nonbeing that can be thought of in the manner of being.

0228 This is the nature of implicit abstraction.

0229 In speech-alone talk, a real encountered being_2a stimulates the efficient intellect.  The efficient intellect produces a being of reason_2a, a real nonbeing.  According to Suarez, this being^in_reason_2a is a nonbeing that is thought of in the manner of being (existence).  If it existed, it would exist in the intellect_2b.

I can say this only because I can symbolize the intellect using speech-alone words.  Symbols are placeholders in a system of differences.  Therefore, they do not exist by themselves.  They are nonbeings that cannot be thought of in the manner of being.

0230 With that said, I march on.  ‘The reckoning that produces the being^in_reason_2a’ is judged according to what ought to be defined_2c.  According to Hurtado, the being^in_reason_2a is a fiction_1b.  This accords with the perspective of true versus false_2c.  According to Caramuel, it_2a is a gestalt_1b uniting two contradicting actualities_2a.  This accords with a perspective of unity versus incoherence_2c.

0231 Judgment_2c supports an unreal being, manifesting as a speech-alone statement, independent of the formal intellect.  That speech-alone statement is encountered as a real being_2a, even though it never fully articulates the complete judgment.  I call the process of speaking a judgment: an explicit abstraction_2c.

It_2c becomes a speech-alone talk statement_2a that forces the intellect_2b to do this or that.  Is it fact or fiction?  Is it unity or chaos?  The efficient intellect_2b situates the encountered statement_2a according to a reigning perspective_2c.

This is the nature of explicit abstraction.

0232 Implicit abstraction belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in (as well as our current Lebenswelt).  It is intuitively natural.  Explicit abstraction belongs to our current Lebenswelt.  It is often counterintuitive.

Students should read the concluding chapter of Novotny’s book.