Category Archives: Positivist’s judgment

03/25/25

Looking at Abir Igamberdiev’s Chapter (2024) “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings…” (Part 1 of 4)

0434 The text before me is chapter twelve in Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (2024, edited by Alexei Sharov and George E. Mikhailovsky, pages 265-278).  The full title is “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings in the Relational Universe of Intercommunicating Agents”.  The author is a biologist at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, at St. John’s.

0435 The introduction places the term, “agent”, on stage.

How does one know whether “an agent” is an agent?

Well, the agent should be obvious.  An agent is physical.  An agent is the repository of – what Aristotle calls – “final causality”.  Final causality associates to another metaphysics-laden term, “teleology”.

What is the meaning of this term, “repository”.

0436 I only ask this because the thing that we encounter in science associates to what is for the Positivist’s judgment.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay pertains to what is, and it describes semiotic agency.  Semiotic agency (as the noumenon) gives rise to phenomena that are observed and measured by biologists, then the resulting models are attributed, not to agency2 itself, but to the agent3 and the agent’s intentions1 (that is, final causalities).

0437 “Repository” plays out as a category-based nested form.

The normal context of an agent3 brings the actuality of semiotic agency2 into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘final causality’1.

The agent3 puts semiotic agency2 into context.  Semiotic agency2 emerges from (and situates) the potential of ‘teleology’1.

These basics are found in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0438 The image of “the agent” as “an obvious repository of final causality” treats the category-based nested form diagrammed above as a thing.

The author presents the image without hesitation, as if that is what human naturally do.  Humans not only treat a thing as a thing, but we also treat a corresponding category-based nested form as a thing.  Not the same “thing”, but still, a thing.

We observe semiotic agency2.  We visualize the agent3 as a physical repository of final causality1.

0439 What does this imply?

Consider the title of the chapter, Evolutionary Growth of Meanings in the Relational Universe of Intercommunicating Agents.

Where do I slip the category-based nested form into this title?

Do category-based nested forms slide into the author’s designation of “relational universe”?

If so, then the substitution brings this examiner face to face with where the author seems to be going, the recovery of Aristotle’s causalities within the milieu of biosemiotics.

0440 If that is the case, let me present a more hylomorphic version of the category-based nested form.

0441 Notice that actuality2 corresponds to Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  In the figure, the contiguity is placed in brackets for the purposes of notation.

For example, for Aristotle, when I encounter a thing, the two real elements that come to mind are matter and form.  Matter is necessary for presence.  Form is necessary for shape.  What is the contiguity between matter and form?  Here, I snatch a term that has been much abused, because it has been so difficult to grasp.  The term is “substance”.  I now assign a very specific, technical definition to the term in hand.  “Substance” is the contiguity between matter and form.

0442 Aristotle’s hylomorphe is an exemplar of Peirce’s category of secondness.

Thus, the recovery of Aristotle’s terminology in the biosemiotic milieu begins.

0443 Abir Igamberdiev is not the only one to imagine a recovery of Aristotle’s causality in light of the postmodern compromise of the positivist intellect.

Mariusz Tabaczek pursues a recovery in the field of emergence.  Emergence endeavors to account for the constellation of higher-order noumena that could not be predicted on the basis of lower-level noumena.  Like biosemiotics, the goal is understanding, rather than prediction and control.

See Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  Much of this commentary may be found in Razie Mah’s blog for March, April and May 2024.  Tabaczek’s work is discussed in this examination in points 0276 to 0300.

03/13/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Composite Agency” (Part 5 of 5)

0525 That brings me to empedoclements.

Recall, an empedoclement (a noun derived from the name of the Neoplatonic philosopher, Empedocles) is the inverse of an impediment (see points 0329 through 0341).  In this case, almost all institutional and personal interactions at the water fountain impede my boss (the macronucleus) from establishing a feedback to me (the contractile vacuole) that might mitigate my impulse to stir things up.

0526 For my reading of Empedocles, the SIs is strife.  The SIe is love.

In strife, form (SVs) attracts matter, {SOs [salience] SOe}.

Okay, technically, matter is really {(SOs [&] SVe)2b [salience3c((1c))] (SOe)2c}.

The form2a of what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a appeals to matter2b[]2c, and that matter2b[]2c itself is a thing, coupling the situation and perspective levels, as matter2b and form2c.

The appeal comes in [strife].  The coupling, the empedoclement as thing, comes with [love].

0527 Obviously, my boss (the macronucleus) has greater wisdom than me (the contractile vacuole).

He has to wait, for the moment when preparation meets opportunity, to establish a feedback loop where my humor, instead of causing trouble, can improve morale.

0528 Yes, evolution is all about empedoclements, which are impossible to predict in advance.

Only in hindsight, does an empedoclement become clear.

0529 In section 10.4, the authors discuss many examples.

In each step of the progression of evolution on Earth, the emergent holobiont is more stunning to behold.  At each step, the holobiont seems to have more and more of an identity.  At the same time, the holobiont appears more susceptible to subagent malfunctions.

0530 With this in mind, I assess my own self-affirmation and self-awareness as the human version of contractile vacuole.

On one hand, I like to have fun.

On the other hand, I better mind my boss.

03/12/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Agency In Non-Human Organisms” (Part 1 of 7)

531 The text before me is chapter four of Semiotic Agency (2021).  Details on the text may be found on point 0473.  Chapter four covers pages 95-122.

0532 This chapter is an overview of both hierarchy and the evolution of living systems composed of hierarchies of sub-agents.

0533 Section 4.1 concerns a gradation of competence in semiotic agency.  The gradation arises from the intuitively obvious structure of animals.

0534 The above picture suggests that each level of semiotic competence both encompasses and transforms the adjacent lower level.

0535 Does the adjacent lower level come under the control of the higher level?

It makes me wonder about the term, “control”.

Does “control” assume the functionality of adjacent lower-level subagents?

Does “control” indicate that the higher-level agent uses lower-level subagents in order to achieve its goal?

0536 Well, here is one way to diagram the relation between agent and subagent.

The agent relies on the subagent to behave like its supposed to behave.

Does that accord with the meaning, the presence and the message of the word, “control”?

Yes, the agent uses the subagent and assumes the functionality of the subagent.

But “control”?

0537 Is there any other term that applies to the metasystem transition implied by the above figure?

Take a look at the normal contexts.

The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment. 

How do these apply to the above figure?

Obviously, the relation between the agent and subagent is one of alignment.  This implies that the possibility of ‘final causality’1 for the agent3 is included in the possibility of ‘final causality’1 for the subagent3.  Otherwise, the subagent3would be excluded from the agent3.

0538 Well, what about the other two logics?

Surely, exclusion and complement must have roles to play.

They do, in an evolutionary schema.

Recall, biological evolution is a mystery, consisting of the intersection of adaptation and phenotype.  If evolution starts with an agent, and ends up as agent with subagents, then the subagents differentiate (exclusion), specialize (complement) and then align (alignment).  If evolution starts with an independent agent (exclusion), who ends up as a subagent within another agent, then maybe some sort of phenotypic change comes into play (compatibility), leading to incorporation (alignment).

0539 Here is a picture of both routes.

0540 Consider the domestication of the dog.

Can I imagine the logics of exclusion, complement and alignment in play?

The agent is like an Umwelt to the subagent.  The subagent participates in the Innerwelt of the agent.

03/5/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Agency In Non-Human Organisms” (Part 7 of 7)

0592 What is Pavlov up to?

He is a modern scientist, who has adopted the precepts of the Positivist’s judgment.

0593 At the end of this chapter on non-human agency, the authors warn against anthropomorphic theories.

Clearly, that is not the only danger facing biosemiotics.

The fact that a word in common use is used as the label for a class of psychological models attests to the way that (for triumphalist science) models may be used to overshadow and occlude their noumena.

Pavlov’s experiment is widely regarded as foundational in psychological empirical science.  Yet, this examination suggests that, even before designing his experiment, Pavlov might have imagined that “anticipation” is what the noumenon must be, when it came to animal behavior.

0593 If correct, Pavlov’s work demonstrates that phenomenology is practiced in the formation of social sciences long before Husserl develops an explicit methodology for arriving at what the noumenon must be.  This is discussed in points 0120 to 0129.

The word, “anticipation” papers over the noumenon for a wide variety of psychological phenomena.  But, some scientists treat the word as if it is only a technical term in the scientific discipline of psychology.

0594 This conclusion is far more difficult to grasp that any warning about anthropomorphic theories.

Why?

Today’s psychologists think that “anticipation” is the thing itself when it comes to operant and instrumental conditioning.

0596 On top of that, neither “anticipation as noumenon” nor models of conditioned responses are semiotic.  They do not face the reality that the thing itself can only be recognized within a purely relational structure.  The noumena for biology, psychology and sociology are not as obvious as the noumena of the empirical sciences.  They are not obvious because they are actualities2 that only manifest in their proper normal contexts3 and potentials1.

Indeed, at some level of awareness, both social scientists and phenomenologists have always known this.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay may be the first attempt to ground noumena in the biological and social sciences in the realness of triadic relations.

0597 This brings me back to agency in non-human organisms.  The interactions between agents and subagents, as well as between agents, has been a focus on dyadic research for the modern era.  These interactions will need to be reframed for the postmodern era of triadic relations.

0598 Indeed, take a look at the following figure, depicting the semiotic agency of Pavlov and his dogs as if they are subagents in a scientific institution.

Both the apparatus and the dog in the sling cohere to the relational structure of semiotic agency (as formulated by the S&T noumenal overlay).

0599 But, look at that dashed line arrow.

I wonder, “Is that arrow dyadic?  Or does it hide a triadic relation?”

So concludes this examination of chapter four of Semiotic Agency.

02/28/25

Can Biosemiotics Explain The Psychometric Sciences? (Part 1 of 4)

0227 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen.  The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics.  The editors of this series have Razie Mah’s permission for use of following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

The psychometric sciences have already been introduced in points 0159 through 0173 of this examination.

0228 The titular question is crucial, since biosemiotics culminates a century-long development, starting with Edmund Husserl developing a phenomenological method for intuitively articulating what the noumenon must be, for a wide variety of phenomena, where the noumenon is not absolutely obvious.  Biosemiotics stands within the tradition of science as a search for truth.

0229 Similarly, the psychometric sciences constitute a century-long development, starting with Sigmund Freud discovering a psychoanalytic method capable of bringing unconscious wishes to consciousness in order that they may influence choices.  The label, “psychometric sciences”, is coined by Joseph Farrell, and further fleshed out by Razie Mah in Looking at Joseph Farrell’s Book (2020) “The Tower of Babel Moment” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog at the end of December 2023). The psychometric sciences stands within the tradition of science as a will to know… or is it… power?

0230 Both of these traditions lay claim to the Positivist’s judgment.

Judgment?

A judgment is a triadic relation containing three elements: relation, what ought to be and what is.  When each of these elements is assigned to one of Peirce’s categories, the judgment becomes actionable.  Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.

Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment for the natural sciences.

0231 As for what is, a noumenon is the thing itself.  The thing itself cannot be fully objectified as its observable and measurable facets.  A noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.

As for what ought to be, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness).  This is called the “empirio-schematic judgment”.

0232 Triumphalist scientists advocate that a noumenon be replaced with its model.   When a successful model substitutes for the noumenon, then the model (overlaying the noumenon) can be objectified as its phenomena.  In short, the tension within Kant’s slogan is mitigated when a model substitutes for its noumenon.

0233 As for the relation, the positivist intellect has a rule.  Metaphysics is not allowed.

Of course, when investigating human behavior, metaphysics is necessary for models.  Metaphysics includes formal and final causalities.  Formal causes pertain to designs and their requirements.  Final causes pertain to intentions, aims, goals, and the like.

I suppose that metaphysics (in the sense of two of Aristotle’s four causes) may be allowed in biosemiotics and the psychometric sciences, if they are not “metaphysical terms” (in the sense that theologians are always talking about “metaphysical” or “religious” stuff).

So, both biosemiotics and the psychometric sciences play word games.  Metaphysics is okay as long as formal and final causes are regarded as material and efficient causes.  Metaphysics is okay as long as it is not “religious”.

0234 Biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen propose a noumenon that is derived from the specifying sign-relation.  The triadic sign-relation is simplified into a dyadic formula.  Dyads are characteristic of Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness is the realm of actuality.

If I look at what is for the Positivist’s judgment, I notice that a dyadic structure is assigned to the category of firstness.  Why is that so?  The noumenon and its phenomena may be considered real elements.  The issue is whether the two elements are really the same thing.  A noumenon and its phenomena are not like matter and form, where matter is not the same as form.  The thing itself and its observable and measurable facets are the same entity.

0235 This explains Kant’s slogan, reminding the scientist that the thing itself cannot be objectified as its observable and measurable facets, even though both labels apply to the same entity.

02/24/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Book (2021) “Semiotic Agency” (Part 23 of 24) 

0256 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen.  The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics.  Series editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the ongoing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

0257 At this juncture, I have covered Parts I and III of Semiotic Agency.

0258 These sections cover tremendous territory, in a sweeping fashion.  By far and away, the diagram of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay is the most striking accomplishment of this examination.  The S&T noumenal overlayframes biosemiotics as a historical branch of phenomenology.  The S&T noumenal overlay is what the noumenon should be if the biosemiotic noumenon is what all biological systems and processes have in common.  Finally, the S&T noumenal overlay embodies the specifying sign-relation.

0259 The task before me?

How am I to delineate a path forward?

0260 Plus, as always in such matters, a new development cannot be ignored.  Alexei Sharov publishes a new book in 2024.

0261 So, let me first attend to the remainder of Semiotic Agency.

0262 Part II consists in three chapters.  I list these chapters in reverse order.

Part IV consists in three chapters that complement the chapters in Part II.  I list these chapters in forward order.

0263 The last chapter anticipates the recent book, Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe,edited by Alexei Sharov and George Mikhailovsky, published in 2024 by Scrivener Publishing (Beverly, MA) as a contribution to Astrobiology Perspectives on Life in the Universe Series (under the auspices of Wiley Press).

Here is a list of the four parts of this substantial book.

02/22/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Book (2021) “Semiotic Agency” (Part 24 of 24) 

0264 What do I conclude?

By the time that the authors finish Parts II and IV of Semiotic Agency, the range of applications expands into Parts I-IV of Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings of the Universe.

0265 Is such an expansion warranted?

From my examination of Parts I and III of Semiotic Agency, I may say, “Yes.  Biosemiotics entails a re-articulation of biology and the social sciences.  Biosemiotics also reveals the nature of phenomenology, cybernetics and the psychometric sciences.”

0266 The re-articulation of biology and the social sciences in the light of biosemiotics is just beginning.  In looking at Part I and III of Semiotic Agency, I could sense the breadth of the project.

0267 The problem concerns the status of the noumenon.

Natural scientists never worry about the noumenon, because the noumenon should be obvious. Indeed, triumphalist scientists want to paper over each natural noumenon with a successful model.  Social scientists observe and measure social phenomena then pull the associated noumena from holes in the ground.  Phenomenologists promote intuitive methods for guessing what a noumenon must be.  Sharov and Tonnessen re-format the triadic specifying sign-relationinto a dyadic structure amenable to empirio-schematic inquiry.  I call their discovery, “the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay”.

0268 The authors call it “semiotic agency”.

0269 Semiotic agency, depicted as a dyad (agency) within a dyad (semiotic agency), forces scientists to re-examine all that has gone before.

And, that is quite an accomplishment.

0270 The task before me remains.  A sea of biosemiosis lies before me.  The question is how to traverse the waters. How to set sail?

In order to examine Parts II and IV of Semiotic Agency (2021) and Parts I, II, III and IV of Pathways (2024) I plan to take certain steps, listed in the following script.

This script allows me to examine here and there, like a bumbling bee in a spring field, not certain about a proper path, and inadvertently pollinating along the way.

I begin by looking at the chapters on the origins of life.

02/21/25

Biosemiotics and the Origins of Life on Earth (Part 1 of 8)

0271 What does biosemiotics have to say about abiogenesis, the origin of life from non-living matter?

0272 Two texts are before me.

0273 Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism is written by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen.  Semiotic Agency is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics.  Series editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

The text is open to chapter five, titled, “Origins of Life”, and is found on pages 123-149.  This chapter closes Part II of Semiotic Agency.  The title of Part II is “Agency in Organisms and Beyond.”

0274 Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meaning in the Universe is edited by Alexei Sharov and George Mikhailovsky (2024, Scrivener Press, Beverly MA).

The text is open to chapter nine, titled “Chemical Origins of Life, Agency and Meaning” (pages 189-210).  This chapter opens Part II, titled “Meanings in the Evolution of Life”.  The chapter’s author is Alexei Sharov.

0275 First and foremost, chemistry-based scenarios for the origins of life have proven futile.  Why?  For one, it is difficult to imagine a chemical system constituting a semiotic agent.  Sure, a biological agent can be reduced to a chemical soup, but a chemical soup cannot unreduced to a biological being.

Is this the reason why proposals of life emerging from a primordial soup consistently fail?

0276 The key word in the above paragraph is “emerging”.

0277 So why not turn to Mariusz Tabaczek, who writes two books, titled Emergence (2019) and Divine Action and Emergence (2021) that are reviewed in Razie Mah’s blog for April and May, 2024?  These and other examinations go into Razie Mah’s two-part e-book, Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024), available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0278 Tabaczek criticizes Terrence Deacon, even as he translates Deacon’s conceptual apparatus into a classical Aristotelian framework.  Why?  If Deacon borrows ideas from Aristotle and re-tools them for his own approach to emergent systems, then why not articulate Deacon’s approach using Aristotle’s terms?

0279 The answer turns out to be more than academic.

Recall the Positivist’s judgment for the natural sciences?

The noumenon (the thing itself) and the model (what ought to be for the empirio-schematic judgment) are two contending sources of illumination.  Deacon stands with the model, then uses modified versions of Aristotle’s vocabulary in order to project his model onto the noumenon.  In contrast, Tabaczek stands with the noumenon, where Aristotle’s terminology is at home.  He sees Deacon’s projection from the model back onto the noumenon and does not think too highly of the imposition.

02/13/25

Biosemiotics and the Origins of Life on Earth (Part 8 of 8)

0316 Oxygen gas is a byproduct of photosynthesis.  Over billions of years, the continual release of oxygen transforms the atmosphere of the Earth.

The ubiquity of oxygen gas in today’s atmosphere makes experimental research into the chemistry of the early Earthdifficult.  Today, the reaction that Sharov suggests, the oxidation of an alkane to a fatty acid, would require elaborate precautions.  Why?  Even a trace amount of oxygen would directly react with the light-absorbing pigment.

0317  So, what am I saying?

Well, research is difficult.

0318 Also, as soon as one gets to the earliest forms of life on Earth, such as photosynthetic prokaryotes, the “genomic complexity” (nominally, the length of DNA that belongs to only functional genes) is already high.  If one plots the genomic complexity of (1) prokaryotes, such as bacteria, (2) single-celled eukaryotes, such as amoebas, (3) multicellular water animals, such as fish (4) invertebrate land animals, such as worms, and (5) vertebrate land animals, such as mammals, versus time for first fossil evidence, one gets the following graph.

 0319 On one hand, Sharov concludes that the genomic complexity doubles every 340 million years since the start of the Earth.

On the other hand, Sharov points out that, if one projects the line down to zero genomic complexity, the intersection occurs a little over 9 billion years ago.  But, the Earth is only 4.5Byr.

Fortunately, the universe is around 15 billion years old.

0320 If the early Earth is seeded, then biologists already have a label, “panspermia”.

All other planets and moons in the solar system should be similarly seeded.

So, future space exploration may provide an answer.

If it turns out that the early Earth is seeded through panspermia, then research into the origins of life (in general) becomes even more difficult.

0321 Now, I conclude.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay characterizes biosemiotics.

The Deacon-Tabaczek interscope characterizes emergence.

Both relational structures apply to inquiry into the origin of life on Earth.

This examination demonstrates how the two relational structures relate to one another and constitute complementary approaches for further inquiries into the origins of life.

0322 But, what I have learned concerns more than the topic of the origin of life.

This is significant.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay may “expand” to include the entire D-T interscope, which includes both the specifying and the exemplar sign-relations.

0322 By extension, the S&T noumenal overlay associates to any three-level interscope, containing two sign-relations,according to the comparison in the following figure.

0323 The topic of the origin of life on Earth turns into a valuable insight into biosemiotics, emergence, and two sign-relations.

02/12/25

Looking at Gustavo Caetano-Anolles’ Chapter (2024) “Evolution of Biomolecular Communication” (Part 1 of 10)

0324 The text before me is chapter ten in Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (2024, edited by Alexei Sharov and George E. Mikhailovsky, pages 217-243).  The author hails from the Evolutionary Bioinformatics Laboratory at the Department of Crop Sciences and Carl R. Woese Institute for Genomic Biology, at the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, USA.  The author and editors have permission to use and reprint this commentary.

From prior examinations, I propose that Alexei Sharov’s and Morten Tonnessen’s 2021 book, Semiotic Agency, formulates a noumenal overlay for the diverse field of biosemiotics.  All manifestations of semiotic agency are unique.  Each is a subject of inquiry on its own.  Yet, they have one relational structure in common.  Here is a picture of that dyadic actuality.

0325 Biosemiotics is not divorced from science.  Scientists observe and measure phenomena, then build models based on those observations and measurements.  The real elements in the above figure support phenomena.  The contiguities (in brackets) call for models.

0326 So, what about communication mediated by biomolecules?

0327 In the introduction (section 10.1), the author reminds the reader of two premodern views of biological behaviorsand how they change over time.  One is the force of life (in French, le pouvoir de vie), which tends to increase complexity.  The other is the influence of circumstances (in French, l’influence des circonstances), which tends to select for… um… survivors.

These premodern views fit nicely into the contiguities in the above relational structure.  Each dyad can be compared to Aristotle’s hylomorphe of matter [substance] form, allowing the following comparison.

0328 The force of life tends towards the many.

The influence of circumstances tends toward the few.. or rather… one goal.

Surely, my assignments are confusing, because the force of life is singular and circumstances tend to vary.  Also, real initiating events can vary.  But, goals tend to rule out alternatives.

0329 The author then draws upon a recently translated papyrus scroll, attributed to Empedocles.  Empedocles speaks of two opposing forces, one capable of growing things together from the many and one capable of growing things apart.  The former is labeled, “love”, the latter, “strife”.

0330 I wonder, “How does this ancient distinction fit into the schema pictured above?”

Here is my suggestion.

I have a 50:50 chance of being correct.

0331 Strife goes with the force of life, tending towards the many.  Love goes with the influence of circumstances and tends towards a singular goal.

Both are substances and reflect (however distantly) Aristotle’s exemplar: matter [substance] form.

In the above figure, the real initiating event is like an form that conjures matter (information). At the same time, that matter (information) substantiates another form (goal).  This conjured matter (information [love]goal) encompasses the presence that accounts for semiotic agency as a thing.  

0332 What does that imply?

As [strife] acquires information, [love] moves closer to its goal.