01/4/25

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 2 of 4)

0209 It’s funny how academics can turn disappointments around.

0210 Triumphalist science establishes a pattern.  If one considers a model to be the noumenon, then one can look for phenomena that objectify that model.  This is how the social sciences are born.  Since their inception in the late 1700s, social scientists have argued that the mechanical philosophies that gave birth to the natural sciences also apply to the study of people and society.

How do social scientists identify social and psychological noumena?

Social sciences pull noumena out of holes in the ground.  In other words, if a social scientist observes and measures activities that must correspond to a noumenon, then all the investigator needs to do is to dig a little and find the thing that their phenomena must be objectifying.

0211 This process gets formalized by phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).  Husserl develops a method by which common opinions about a thing are bracketed out, because they cannot reveal what the noumenon must be.  The models of natural science must also be bracketed out, because triumphalist scientists will insist that, if their models replace the noumenon, then everything becomes a controlled experiment, like in a college laboratory.

Phenomenology is precisely the formal process that self-identifying social scientists are informally practicing with the construction of the social sciences in the 1800s and 1900s.

0212 Yes, phenomenologists formalize the process by which noumena are formulated by the social sciences.

What do they get for their labors?

Established social scientists say that phenomenologists are pulling noumena out of their asses.

0213 How rude!

Okay, a lot of money is on the line.  How so?  Both social scientists (on their own) and phenomenologists (by way of a well-characterized method) ascertain what the noumenon must be, by considering associated phenomena.  The intent is to activate the Positivist’s judgment.  As soon as what is of the Positivist’s judgment constellates, it stands as a robust possibility worthy of empirio-schematic inquiry.

Empirio-schematic inquiry takes time and effort.

Is that the same as money?

Of course, social-science research requires so much money as to attract intellectuals who cannot tell their asses from holes in the ground.

In that regard, they are not so different from the laboratory sciences.

0214 Oh, on second thought, social scientists pull ideas out of holes in the ground.

Phenomenologists should not compete with that.

So, phenomenology takes a cultural turn.  Husserl is hired to sit in the same professorial chair as Kant at the University of Freiberg.  In 1916, Husserl is 56 years old.  The (soon to be Catholic) philosophy student, Edith Stein, works as his personal assistant.  In 1926, one of his students, Martin Heidegger, takes modern Western philosophy to the next level with the publication of Being and Time.

0215 All I can say is, “Look at what phenomenologists pulled out of their asses.”

01/3/25

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 3 of 4)

0216 In Part III of their book, the authors dance through a philosophical critique without Peircean tools to depict triadic relations.

Uh oh.  Without figures, is this critique philosophical or scientific or phenomenological?

0217 Here is the bottom line.

There is a method to the madness of the phenomenologists.

This is why Catholic philosophers long to engage in discourse with phenomenologists, even as phenomenologists reject discourse, on the um… grounds… that phenomenology follows the mandate of the positivist intellect.  Metaphysics is not allowed.

0218 Catholic philosophers see that there is a method to phenomenology that can be articulated (somehow) by scholastic tradition (following Aquinas, not Poinsot).  But, they do not appreciate how phenomenology is historically embedded in the modern Age of Ideas.  Also, they do not appreciate what the scholastic tradition has achieved.  John Poinsot writes in the 1600s and Thomas Aquinas writes in the 1200s.  Poinsot figures out that signs are triadic relations.  Aquinas mentions signs as things that signify other other things.

Razie Mah opens the lid to this can of worms in the series, Phenomenology and the Positivist Intellect (articles available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0219 Yes, there is a method to the madness of the phenomenologists.

Phenomenologists intuitively generate (through their prescribed methods) noumenal overlays that coincide with semiotic agency, as articulated by Sharov and Tonnessen.

0220 What does this imply?

Sharov and Tonnessen’s formulation of semiotic agency, as a noumenal overlay, allows the inquirer to consider the prescribed methods of phenomenology as ways for examining natural and social phenomena arising from… the noumenal overlay of semiotic agency.

0221 Am I saying that phenomenological determinations of what the noumenon must be are really models that phenomenologists triumphantly overlay upon S&T’s noumenon?

I suppose… if what I say is correct… then biosemiotics is a science that belongs to a new age of understanding.

What age is that?

John Deely (1942-2017) thought long and hard about the proper label.

How about The Age of Triadic Relations?

01/2/25

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 4 of 4)

0222 With that said, here is a quick wrap-up of the four chapters in Part III.

For chapter six, Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay conceptualizes semiotic agency.

For chapter seven, semiotic agency is considered an actuality2.  In order to understand an actuality2, the actuality2 must have a normal context3 and potential1.

0223 Here is the nested form for semiotic agency2.

Semiotic agency2 presents a sign-relation as a dyadic actuality.  This is shown in Part I.

Semiosis2 does not occur without an agent3 and the possibility of ‘significance’1.

0224 For chapter eight, the evolution of agents3 and the possibility of ‘significance’1 proceeds in tandem with the evolution of semiotic agency2.

0225 For chapter nine, phenomenology serves as a precursor to biosemiotics, just as the social sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries serve as intimations of phenomenology.

0226 Without a doubt, Sharov and Tonnessen build upon the insights of philosophers writing a century earlier, as seen in two of Razie Mah’s e-books: Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy and Comments on Nicholas Berdyaev’s Book (1939) Spirit and Reality.  Both Maritain and Berdyaev are interested in understanding the nature of scientific inquiry.  And now, their works inform biosemioticians.