0027 Test three.

What does phenomenology_3b do?

0028 In section three, the authors propose that Husserl’s phenomenology_3b approaches reality_1a by transcending the explanatory intentionality_2a of the exact sciences_3a.  Reality_1a is a noumenon_1a and its phenomena_1a.  The explanatory intentionality_2a of the exact sciences is the empirio-schematic judgment_2a.   Phenomenology_3b approaches reality_1athrough phenomenological reduction_2b.

In sum, phenomenology virtually situates hands-on first-order science.

0029 The authors continue, saying (more or less), “Consciousness (trained in the methods of phenomenological reduction_2b) unveils the face of subjectivity (the noumenon_1a) that has been eclipsed by positive objectivism (the positivist intellect_3a).”

This quote fits the picture of Husserl’s project_3b virtually situating hands-on natural science_3a.

This quote fits the idea that phenomenological reduction_2b elucidates what the noumenon_1a must be_1b.

0030 Notably, a return to the noumenon_1b renders a subjectivity that can be shared by others in the same situation.  Phenomenological reduction_2b elucidates an intersubjective being_1b in the category of firstness, the realm of possibility.

According to the authors, Husserl’s project_3b has been criticized for reducing intersubjectivity to the field of consciousness.  However, consciousness has already been narrowed by hands-on science to a cogito (the essence of the positivist intellect_3a, including the rule of no metaphysics).  

So, the terminus of phenomenological reduction_2b, what the noumenon_1a must be_1b (that is, a noumenon_1b), is a mind-dependent being, capable of being treated as a mind independent being.  I would go as far as to conjecture that this capacity directly correlates to the intersubjectivity of the noumenon_1b.