0022 Do the Greimas squares for Derrida and Heidegger equate to topolitologies?

Topolitologies?

“Topos” is Greek for place.  “Polito” sounds like politics.  “Logos” is Greek for “the study of” or “the word”.

0023 Well, I suppose the term, “topolitologies”, may have value.  But, how do the knowable word-places of politics, the topolitologies, express themselves?

They express themselves in two fashions, as explicit and implicit abstractions.

0024 To me, Derrida’s topolitology for the word, “secret”, describes a knowable-landscape of explicit abstraction.

According to the first way of being for the spoken word, a secret₂, the following nested form applies.

0025 Deconstruction relies on concepts.  One concept is a secret₂, that manifests as the actuality of utterance_2m [carries] information_2f.

Now, I want to move to the second way of being for the spoken word.  Elements in the category of secondness associate to and modify Derrida’s Greimas square, as follows.

0026 Derrida explores the topolitology of explicit abstraction, characteristic of our current Lebenswelt.  The concept (C) stands as form to the utterance (B) as matter.  Also, the concept (C) stands as langue (C) against the utterance (B) as parole (B).   Finally, the contiguity between utterance (B) and information (C) contrasts with information (C), speaks against the secret (A) and implicates the utterance (B).  However, “carries” (D) is mechanical, turning on the operations of a conceptual apparatus (D).

0027 To me, Heidegger’s topolitology for the word, “secret”, describes a knowable-landscape of implicit abstraction.

According to the first way of being for the spoken word, “secret”, the following nested form applies to apophatic mysticism, as well as to Heidegger’s project.

0028 For the second way of being for the spoken word, elements in the category of secondness associate to and modify Heidegger’s Greimas square, as follows.

Heidegger explores the topolitology of implicit abstraction, characteristic of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  The incept (C) stands as form to the matter of a pact between the one who signifies and the one open to signification (B). Because implicit abstractions cannot be discussed using hand and hand-speech talk, the presence of an incept (C) is recognized by others who witness behavior that suggests a pact (B).  The realness of the pact (B) is validated by actions corresponding to openness and reception (D).  Reception (D) is like the contiguity between what is known only to us_2mand the person as a vessel recognizing something_2f.  Openness (D) is like the contiguity between —-_2m (the preparation for a pact (B)) and a human vessel_2f (who strives to achieve a union with God (C)).

Yes, openness (D) and reception (D) are two sides to one coin.  Plus, this is very hard do describe because the pact (B) is also —- (B) and the human striving to serve as a vessel by emptying “himself” (C) is also the incept (C).

0029 Now that I have confused even myself, I want discuss a very awkward point.

Whereas Derrida’s formulation applies to our current Lebenswelt, Heidegger’s formulation does not quite apply to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

How so?

Heidegger writes in our current Lebenswelt and our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

Here is another way to say it.

Heidegger’s formulation is riddled with explicit abstractions because that is that nature of speech-alone talk.  Heidegger figures out that the arc of Western philosophy, starting with the ancient Greek schools (around 800 BC) and continuing to Nietzsche (around 1900 AD), has failed because it followed a particular path of explicit abstraction.  So, Heidegger wants to leap forward… or maybe, backward… to a world less differentiated, so that we may… um… receive secrets from God.

Meanwhile, his German national socialist bosses strive to obtain secrets from the ancient gods of old.

0030 Yes, this sounds like the American superhero movies of the early 7800s, where the evil Nazis pursue the secrets of ancient demiurges, in order to obtain magical tokens conveying supernatural powers.

After watching a number of these visual and auditory spectacles, Heidegger’s conclusion becomes obvious.

Our conceptual apparatus is dead.  May we be filled with inceptual beings.