0013 The normal context of evolution₃ brings the actuality of genetics [and] archaeological evidence₂ into relation with the potential of ‘a story about us (humans)’₁.

What is going on with the “and” in brackets?

Actuality is the realm.  Secondness is the category.  Secondness contains two contiguous real elements.  These two elements are subject to the logics of contradiction and non-contradiction.  This is the logic that we typically think about when we hear the word, “logic”.  If an actuality is logical, the two real elements should agree, or at least, not disagree, and if they do disagree, we should be able to figure out the precise manner in which the disagreement occurs.

Here, the two real elements are genetics and archaeological evidence.  I place the contiguity in brackets.  Here, the contiguity is [and].  [And] is not exactly an evocative contiguity.  But, in earlier days, Richerson frames another term for [and].  The term is “co-evolves”.  Genes and culture coevolve.

0014 The result is two similar hylomorphic structures.  

0015 Both belong to the realm of actuality₂ in the normal context of evolution₃.  Both arise from the potential of ‘stories about us (humans)’₁.

0016 In order to drive home where the evolution₃ of our genus has brought us, the authors relate the story of Jemmy Button, a native of Tierra de Fuego in South America, who was captured (as a child) and brought to England, then grew up in England before returning to his native land (as an adult).  What a tale!  Jemmy grew accustomed to both cultures, implying that each one of us has a tremendous potential for cultural plasticity.

0017 It makes me wonder about the contiguity, [co-evolve].

Clearly, human DNA codes for brains of great plasticity, in addition to function, and this allows culture to inform our brains.  Jemmy Button could function as an Englishman and a native of Tierra de Fuego.  But, he has only one brain.

0018 This implies that I can expand on the previous category-based nested form in the following manner.

Instead of the normal context of evolution₃, I can think in terms of the phenotype of brains (on a content level) that is situated by the adaptability of the same brains (on a situation level).  I imagine two normal contexts.  Body development_3ais the normal context₃ of the content_a level.  Sociality_2b is the normal context₃ for the situation_b level.  So, sociality_3avirtually situates body development_3a.

For actuality, originally culture [co-evolves with] genes.  Now, [co-evolves] corresponds to a relation between the situation and content levels.  On the content level, genes become the dyad: DNA [codes for] brains_2a.  On the situation level, culture becomes a dyad: culture [informs] brains_2b.  Notably, in chapter one, Newson and Richerson describe culture as “shared information”.

For potential, originally the potential is ‘something relevant’₁, which becomes ‘stories about us’₁.  Now, ‘stories about us’₁becomes a content-level ‘function or plasticity’_1a and a situation-level ‘situating content’_1b.  

0019 Here is a two-level interscope.  Interscopes are introduced in A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0020 Now I can ask, “What exactly goes into the slot for potential₁ on the situation_b level?  What is ‘situating content’_1b?”

Towards the end of chapter one, the authors are clear.  Their book intends to tell how our ancestors managed to harness culture_2b.

I wonder, “Aren’t they putting the cart (of culture_2b) in front of the horse (of ‘situating content’_1b)?”