0107 Yes, Tomasello’s term, “shared intentionality”, is more than about food.  Any dog will tell you this.  Domestication has a multitude of rewards.

Now, I examine the role of the bipedal ape near the snake.

0108 Yes, the affordance of my friend’s warning is valuable for me (and my reproductive success).

According to Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), this two level interscope harbors a sign.  The scholastics call this sign, “specificative extrinsic formal causality”.  I call it “a specifying sign”.

0109 According to Peirce, a sign-relation consists of three elements: a sign-interpretant (SI), a sign-object (SO) and a sign-vehicle (SV).  Unlike the category-based nested form, there is no simple assignment of categories to each element.  The reason is obvious.  Both the sign-object and the sign-vehicle belong to secondness, the realm of actuality.  That leaves the sign-interpretant as… um… belonging to both thirdness, the realm of normal context, and firstness, the realm of potential.

The above two-level interscope offers a frame for these odd assignments.

The following figure includes the three elements of a sign-relation.

The subscript, “s”, denotes specifying sign.

0110 In terms of the specifying sign-relation, my friend’s hand talk, “[SNAKE] [THERE]_2a” (SV_s) stands for an immediate need to avoid danger_2b (SO_s) in regards to what it means to me_3a operating on the potential of encountering a snake_1b (SI_s).

0111 This only works when both me (the one near the snake) and my teammate (the one pointing out the danger) share the same content-level category-based nested form.

How do we know what is happening_3a and the potential of ‘something’ happening_1a without a method to arrive at a common ground?

This is a very good question.