0120 In chapter three, Tomasello shows that human newborns and infants innately sense that intention_2c underlies specifying signs.

To explain this fact, Tomasello proposes his cooperation model.  Shared intentionality presupposes a background sense of the other as a candidate for cooperative agency.  This requires (1) cognitive skills for creating joint attention and intentions and (2) social motivations for helping and sharing with others.  Tomasello labels these formal requirements, (1) “common conceptual ground” and (2) “mutual expectations”.

0121 Do the interventional and specifying signs for the chimpanzee arm raise meet these requirements.

Here is a picture of the sequence, in the scholastic three-level interscope. 

0122 In the (apparently inside out) interventional sign-relation, I intend to play_2c (SV_i) stands for a raised arm_2a (SO_i) with respect to what is happening_3a operating on the potential of ‘something happening’_1a (SI_i).

In the (more familiarly structured) specifying sign-relation, a raised arm_2a (SV_s) stands for let us play_2b (SO_s) in regards to what it means to me_3b operating on the potential meaning of ‘raised arm’_1b (SI_s).

0123 For all practical purposes, this model works just fine for great apes and perhaps, bipedal australopithecines.  One youngster does not inform the other youngster about content as much as provide a signal to initiate a desired situation.

As soon as the other example is presented in the same manner, then one australopithecine informs another about content and that content initiates the desired situation.  How else is one friend going to warn another?

0124 Some of the hallmarks of human communication are apparent in this diagram, when compared to the prior diagram.

There is the sense that one hominin is the communicator and the other hominin receives a communication.

The intent is to inform.

Just as in youthful chimpanzee play, both hominins share a common conceptual ground. Both know the pantomime-word “snake”.  Both know that the pointing finger means “there”.  There is a mutual expectation that [SNAKE][THERE]_2aspecifies something real_1a in the normal context of what is happening_3a.  So, mutual expectation initiates a situation common to both, just like chimpanzee play.

0125 But, doesn’t there seem to be a missing sign?

In the first example, the missing sign is not so obvious.

In the second example, it is.

The missing sign is called the exemplar sign.  The exemplar sign is first discussed in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings.  A more recent discussion is found in Razie Mah’s blog for November 2023, titled Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) Semiotic Animal. 

0126 Here is a diagram.

0127 Note the substitutions in the perspective-level of the scholastic three-level interscope for how humans think.

The normal context_3c is not, “Does this make sense?_3c“.  It_3c is a common conceptual ground_3c.  If the common conceptual ground_3c does not make sense, then how can it be held in common?  This provides a high standard for hominin thinking, doesn’t it?

Also, the potential_1c is not, “the possibility of contextualizing the situation_1c“.  It_1c is the possibilities inherent in mutual expectations_1c.

0128 The above figure captures the message of chapter three, titled “Hominin Cooperative Communication”.