0082 Section three of Duma’s article wrestles with the views of thinkers within the scholastic tradition.
0083 Right after Aquinas, scholars want to classify relationes secundum dici (relations according to talk) as ens rationis(mind-dependent beings). They are like opinions, which are also ens rationis. So, maybe they may be safely ignored.
They cannot be ignored.
0084 Four hundred years after Aquinas, John of St. Thomas (or John Poinsot) says that relationes secundum dici (speech-alone talk) matter. They are real beings.
Indeed, relationes are the ens reale (mind-independent beings) that brings ens reale (mind-independent being) into relation with ens rationis (mind-dependent being).
Here, relationes are mind-independent even though they are immaterial beings. So, they are not like matter. But, they are like form, because they entangle mind-independent material things.
So, there are two styles of ens reale (mind-independent being), one is purely relational (where the relation can be depicted as a figure with empty slots) and the other is material (which is what comes to mind immediately with the term, ens reale).
Surely, Poinsot’s realization is significant.
0085 Yet, difficulties are apparent, expecially when four hundred years later, this examiner notes that there are two styles of dici, hand-talk and speech-alone talk.
0086 Overall, I can imagine two buckets for relationes secundum X, as shown below.
0087 Yes, the two buckets have appropriate labels.
I’m talking about relationes secundum X.
With X=”esse“, the foundational contiguity is [secundum] or [according to].
Relation associates to form. Relation is like essence. Esse_ce associates to matter. So, essence accords to esse_ce. Form accords to matter.
With X=dici (hand talk), the foundational contiguity includes a qualifier, either “categorical” or “transcendental”, as discussed earlier. In both cases, dici (hand talk) is like matter because the referent is like esse_ce. Once again, the essence (the relation) accords to esse_ce (the images and indicators of hand talk). Form accords to matter.
0088 With X=dici (speech-alone talk words), humans expect the same type of performance as dici (hand talk). Take the words, “chair” and “raven”. These terms seem to be located in the esse bucket, because the accordance is categorical.
However, the spoken words “chairperson” and “ravenous” are not so categorical. They are more transcendental. The bucket turns dicey, especially as a spoken term becomes more and more like a statement, as in the adjective-noun combination, “ravenous chairperson”.
To wit, I always make it a point to bring a dozen fresh donuts to faculty meetings.
0089 With X=dici (speech-alone statement), one cannot expect the same type of linguistic performance as with hand-talk. The relation becomes like matter and the spoken statement slips into the slot for form.
The switch is awkward, in so far as the relation enters the slot previously held by esse and dici (hand talk) and the spoken statement enters the slot previously held by the relation. It is as if the term, “ravenous chairperson” is a form (a dici (speech-alone talk)) that brings the appearance of donuts at each faculty meeting (a relationes) into um… accordance, as if saying, “Donuts [in accordance with the] ‘ravenous chairperson'”.
That is not all.
The relation can shift from “donuts” to “an invitation to co-author a publication that the chairperson has made no contribution, outside of mere administration”.
Yes, relationes secundum dici (speech-alone talk) can be dicey.
0090 The dyad can be shifty.
I ask, “What is a thing?”
And the listener hears, “What is your thing?”
Dici (speech-alone talk) goes into the slot for form and offers the aroma of essence.
Relation goes into the slot for matter and makes me wonder and ask, “Who nose?”
I hope that makes scents.
0091 For the scholar working in Peirce’s tradition, the relatives that Aquinas mentions belong to Peirce’s category of secondness. Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements. Here, one real element is relationes (for Aquinas) and the category of secondness (for Peirce). The other real element is dici (speech-alone talk) (for Aquinas, dici is speech) and Aristotle’s fundamental hylomorphe, matter [substance] form (for Peirce).
In both cases, the realness that associates to matter substantiates the realness that associates to form.
For matter, relationes, expressed as dyadic structures, exemplify Peirce’s category of secondness.
For form, matter [substance] form is an example of dici (speech-alone talk).