0227 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen.  The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics.  The editors of this series have Razie Mah’s permission for use of following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

The psychometric sciences have already been introduced in points 0159 through 0173 of this examination.

0228 The titular question is crucial, since biosemiotics culminates a century-long development, starting with Edmund Husserl developing a phenomenological method for intuitively articulating what the noumenon must be, for a wide variety of phenomena, where the noumenon is not absolutely obvious.  Biosemiotics stands within the tradition of science as a search for truth.

0229 Similarly, the psychometric sciences constitute a century-long development, starting with Sigmund Freud discovering a psychoanalytic method capable of bringing unconscious wishes to consciousness in order that they may influence choices.  The label, “psychometric sciences”, is coined by Joseph Farrell, and further fleshed out by Razie Mah in Looking at Joseph Farrell’s Book (2020) “The Tower of Babel Moment” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog at the end of December 2023). The psychometric sciences stands within the tradition of science as a will to know… or is it… power?

0230 Both of these traditions lay claim to the Positivist’s judgment.

Judgment?

A judgment is a triadic relation containing three elements: relation, what ought to be and what is.  When each of these elements is assigned to one of Peirce’s categories, the judgment becomes actionable.  Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.

Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment for the natural sciences.

0231 As for what is, a noumenon is the thing itself.  The thing itself cannot be fully objectified as its observable and measurable facets.  A noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.

As for what ought to be, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness).  This is called the “empirio-schematic judgment”.

0232 Triumphalist scientists advocate that a noumenon be replaced with its model.   When a successful model substitutes for the noumenon, then the model (overlaying the noumenon) can be objectified as its phenomena.  In short, the tension within Kant’s slogan is mitigated when a model substitutes for its noumenon.

0233 As for the relation, the positivist intellect has a rule.  Metaphysics is not allowed.

Of course, when investigating human behavior, metaphysics is necessary for models.  Metaphysics includes formal and final causalities.  Formal causes pertain to designs and their requirements.  Final causes pertain to intentions, aims, goals, and the like.

I suppose that metaphysics (in the sense of two of Aristotle’s four causes) may be allowed in biosemiotics and the psychometric sciences, if they are not “metaphysical terms” (in the sense that theologians are always talking about “metaphysical” or “religious” stuff).

So, both biosemiotics and the psychometric sciences play word games.  Metaphysics is okay as long as formal and final causes are regarded as material and efficient causes.  Metaphysics is okay as long as it is not “religious”.

0234 Biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen propose a noumenon that is derived from the specifying sign-relation.  The triadic sign-relation is simplified into a dyadic formula.  Dyads are characteristic of Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness is the realm of actuality.

If I look at what is for the Positivist’s judgment, I notice that a dyadic structure is assigned to the category of firstness.  Why is that so?  The noumenon and its phenomena may be considered real elements.  The issue is whether the two elements are really the same thing.  A noumenon and its phenomena are not like matter and form, where matter is not the same as form.  The thing itself and its observable and measurable facets are the same entity.

0235 This explains Kant’s slogan, reminding the scientist that the thing itself cannot be objectified as its observable and measurable facets, even though both labels apply to the same entity.