0624 Here is a picture of what a sentient cell is “conscious” of, as it appears in a three-level interscope.

0625 Yes, this interscope is both a category-based and a semiotic arrangement.  The interscope is not suitable for empirio-schematic inquiry because science investigates actualities.  In Semiotic Agency, Sharov and Tonnessen fashion a way to express this interscope in terms of Peirce’s secondness.  The S&T noumenal overlay supports empirio-schematic research.

0626 Now, I want to take my examination in a different direction.

In section 13.2.5, the authors claim that non-biological entities cannot become sentient agents.  This claim reminds me of the problem faced by biologists, in contrast to physicists and chemists.  Semiotic agency₂ is composed of both being (relationality) and matter (physicality).  Consequently, in order to understand the actuality of semiotic agency₂, it₂ must be placed in a normal context₃ with potential₁.

0627 Ironically, the same goes with the spoken word.

Here is a picture.

0628 The juxtaposition is suggestive.

0629 An agent₃ and a definition₃ both follow the logics of thirdness.  The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.  Here, one agent₃ excludes other agents₃.  The cell membrane₂ plays a role in that exclusion.  Similarly, the definition₃ of one spoken word₂ must exclude the definitions₃ of other spoken words₂ .

Notably, definition₃ does has not have anything like a cell membrane₂.  Rather, spoken words (parole) constitute a system of differences₃.  The Greimas square proves useful for teasing out how one spoken word is distinct from other spoken words.  (See points 0586 through 0591.)

0630 Semiotic agency₂ and a spoken term₂ follow the logics of secondness.  These logics include the laws contradiction and noncontradiction.  If a contradiction exists, then there must be a way to either resolve or formalize the contradiction.

For semiotic agency₂, one source of contradiction comes from the hierarchy of agent and subagents, as well as cooperation (and competition) among subagents.  If the agent and the subagents have difficulty coordinating₂, then the agent₃ may fail in regards to its intentions₁.

0631 But, what are those intentions₁?

Are those intentions₁ what the living cell₃ is sentient of₂?

If so, then I suppose that semiotic agency₂ involves being conscious of ‘something’₁ and this ‘something’₁ could be labeled with spoken words₂, as if a living sentient cell could speak.

0632 ‘Final causality’₁ and ‘meaning, presence and message’₁ follow the logics of firstness.  Firstness is inclusive and allows contradictions.  So, the intentions₁ of an agent₃ cohere to the meaning, presence and message₁ of a… hmmm… spoken word₂?

Uh oh.

The comparison starts to break up.  It is as if definition₃ is what an agent₃ does.  An agent₃ actualizes something₂ that may compare to definition₂₍₃₎ in order to bring semiotic agency₂ into relation with the possibility of ‘final causality’₁.

What does this imply?

Is definition₂₍₃₎ is built into semiotic agency₂?

Can spoken words₂₍₂₎ label what the agent₃ is conscious of?

0633 To me, this suggests that final causality₁ undergirds the actualities of semiotic agency₂ through a passage into meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎, as if meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎ (now incorporated into semiotic agency₂) reify final causality₁ for the agent₃.

0634 In other words, the agent₃ defines₂₍₃₎ through its life and sentience (SI_s and SI_e) actualities that it is conscious of₂₍₂₎ (SV_s, SO_s, SV_e and SO_e) by embodying meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎ as manifesting the potential of ‘final causality’₁.

Here is a picture.

0635 Does this make sense?

The entire nested form that we (humans in our current Lebenswelt) associate with definition₃ becomes a characteristic of semiotic agency₂.  Therefore, all the elements of how to define a spoken word enter into the realm of actuality₂. Definition₃ gets transubstantiated (a change of category) down to actuality₂.  Meaning, presence and message₁ gets transubstantiated up to actuality₂.  And, the spoken word₂ becomes what the living entity would be conscious of, if it were conscious₂.