Secularists do not deny the triune God for nothing.  Or do they?

Can Nothing be worshipped (44-46)?

Does not “the positive form of Nothing” act as both necessity (the point of transcendence, the “object that brings everyone into relation through mimesis^constrained”, so that everyone imagines that “they want to sacrifice themselves for Nothing”, because they sense that everyone else holds the same desire) and impossibility (after all, their sacrifice will be for Nothing)?

That is to say: Does the positive form of Nothing act as both transcendence and inevitability?

Any reasonable expert will retort:

Why sacrifice if your sacrifice will be redeemed by Nothing?

The question even applies to manners (47):

Why have good manners when good manners are redeemed by Nothing?

The answer has to be:

Nothing is not nothing.  Or rather, “the positive form of Nothing” is “Everything”

By “everything”, I point to “some thing capable of stimulating mimesis^constrained”.

“The object that brings us all into relation” is both transcendent and inevitable.

The divide between the “secular” and the “sacred” is not a divide between “no religion” and “religion”.  It is a divide between two symbolic orders, that is, two “religions”.  This is confusing, since God appears to have been forgotten in secular writing.  Perhaps, another word for “forgotten” might be “under erasure”.

Beneath the surface of Rousseau’s ploy lurks a vital lesson:

“The object that brings the group into relation” both defines and is defined by a symbolic order, that is, an apparently closed set of symbols (that excludes other symbolic orders).

Alberg convincingly demonstrated that Rousseau’s symbolic order derived its authority from the exclusion of the Christian symbolic order.  Without the Christian symbolic order, Rousseau’s symbolic order would rattle apart.

Even if the secular experts disagree on what the object should be, they all agree on this: “The ‘Son of Man’ should not show his face in any bureaucratic office and disturb their expert delineations of the multitudinous objects that bring us all into … relation?  … no … ‘organization’ is a better word”.

As long as that possibility remains, Rousseau’s admirers will not have to ask for forgiveness, despite the consequences.  Oh, I meant to say, the corpses.

Of course, when people reacted negatively to Rousseau’s pontifications (44), they (not him) were the idiots, because they could not see how the symbolic order that Rousseau created not only eliminated the need to regard that “scoundrel who pretended to ‘sacrifice for us all’ by dying on the rack” as some “hero”, but provided civilization with the opportunity for individuals like himself – “experts”, so called – to rationally determine “the objects that bring everyone into relation”.

OK.  Perhaps, Nietzsche’s self-promotion was a little over the top.

How about the fall back position, where I know that I should sacrifice for some object, but step back, and weigh the consequences?

Meet Jacques Rousseau.

Who wants to sacrifice when one does not get the rewards or the credit for the sacrifice?

Well, at least my innate “knowing that I should sacrifice” means that I must be naturally good.  But heavens, one should not over-do it, like that nut-job fellow who got himself crucified (page 43).  Someone else – someone reasonable – should be in charge of the “object that brings everyone into relation”.

If so … ?

An ironic turn in mimesis occurred with the potentiation of civilization.

Mimesis^constrained was adaptive in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. However, our current Lebenswelt is not the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Mimesis^{unconstrained} is so maladaptive that it produces the scapegoat mechanism.

A parallel ironic turn occurred with respect to referentiality in the passage from hand-speech to speech alone talk.  It is described in An Archaeology of the Fall.

Where does the vital lesson lead?  What question does It raise?

Nietzsche’s placement of himself as ‘object that brings all into relation’ by posing as both Dionysius and Socrates; that is, as both insane and reasonable; could only occur if Nietzsche hammered out a new specialization, a new language of theoretically aesthetic tragic drama.  Such an effort could only happen due to the purely symbolic qualities of speech alone talk.

To me, that means that Girard’s theory of mimetic rivalry applies primarily to the era of unconstrained complexity.

Consequently, I shall label it mimesis^{unconstrained}.

Now I can re-present the question that I started with:

Could there have been a different mimetic rivalry in the era of constrained complexity, that is, in the era that we evolved in (and that began to lose its mooring starting 7800 years ago)?

If so, I may label it mimesis^constrained?

Beneath the surface of Nietzsche’s ploy swims a vital lesson:

“The most important object in the group” is the “object that brings the group into relation”.

Nietzsche imagined that this “object” could be Dionysius.  The alternative, the theoretical man of Socrates, could only keep the divine passions at bay.

Nietzsche constructed a symbolic order where Dionysian madness would be “the object that brings the group – that is, the entire civilization (willing or not) – into relation”.  Social constructions emanated from that symbolic order, giving organizational imperative to his vision.  “Dionynsian madness” became “the object that brought all subjects into organization”.

It seems to me that Nietzche was not far off some mark.  Look how many corpses resulted from the theoretically aesthetic tragic dramas of the 20^th century.

Does the last blog not sound like a parody of modern politics, where politicians and professors regard themselves as “golden calves” (icons of the most important objects in the group) who demand sacrifice from the “scapegoats” (icons of the ones who somehow failed to live up to the expectation that they should sacrifice everything for the most important object in the group)?

It sounds so to me.

It also sounds like Nietzsche’s manifesto, where he placed himself into the roles of both Socrates (by writing in the genre of theoretical aesthetics) and Dionysius (by writing in the genre of tragic drama (pages 22, 35)).

Nietzsche thus midwifed his own Birth, that is Of Total Tragedy, encompassing both Apollonarian and Dionysian poles (29).

Nietzsche sought to take credit for the sacrifices of both man (Socrates) and god (Dionysius).

Hmmm, the previous blog points to a type of mimetic rivalry that would yield reproductive advantage under the selection pressures of intergroup competition.

But of course, such a ‘thing’ …

…was not meant to last, at least as far as human evolution goes.

In the milieu of unconstrained complexity, inaugurated 7800 years ago, the desire “to sacrifice oneself for the most important object in the group, in mimesis of the desire held by all the others in the group” became a fool’s errand.

Someone, by manipulating the symbolic order, could accrue the rewards and the credit for your sacrifice.

Plus, in a strange variant of the predator-prey relation, someone could demand your sacrifice because “you should feel that you should sacrifice yourself for the most important object in the group”.

And, for that special someone, it is that Special Someone: ‘me’.