07/7/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5T

Summary of text [comment] page 33 and 34

[Allow me to summarize.

Knowledge and will are categorical but cross the boundaries of the intersecting nested form.

Knowledge3 encompasses both thinkgroup_or_divine3and lawessential3.

Will1 covers both consciencespecified1 and dispositions1.

Knowledge3 may train the will­1 through sinful or virtuous actions2.

Knowledge3 contextualizes action2.  Action2 situates the will1.

“Knowledge3 brings “action2” into relation with “the possibilities inherent in the will1”.  Action2 emerges from will1.

Knowledge of what is proper to partial goods comes from “thinkdivine and lawsee_the_consequences” or “thinkgroup and lawexplain_away_the_consequences”.

The will that aids the training of the dispositions answers to a consciencespecified.

Training requires human action.]

Schoonenberg wrote that during this life, we grow interiorly and live deeper within the direction of our decisions, whether toward “love unto life” or “sin unto death”.  Yet, the influences of circumstances and the body cannot be dismissed, even in old age, even in dying.

07/3/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5S4

Summary of text [comment] page 33 and 34

Schoonenberg emphasized that both knowledge and will are involved in the grade from venial sin, to mortal sin, and to final impenitence.

[Knowledge is not limited to thinkgroup_or_divine, because, it may also be found on the natural philosophical axis.  Knowledge includes lawessential.

However, the gradation is important.

The interpellation of thinkdivine is still heard when the person commits venial sins.

The interpellation of thinkdivine becomes either a shout or a whisper when the person commits mortal sins.

The interpellation of thinkdivine is either soul-crushing thunder or a tiny gnawing whisper at the final impenitence. ]

07/2/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5S3

Summary of text [comment] page 33 and 34

[Let me repeat that: Even though actuality has constrained possibility to the point where a disinterested observer may objectively label the person’s subjective patterns of behavior, the subject’s will cannot be completely determined.

By the way, this is the fatal flaw of Modern Identity Politics.

Identity politicians label a person’s conscience according to certain criteria (the expectation of objective patterns of subjective behavior).  They believe that identifying the “specified” in consciencespecified is all they have to do.  Once they know what thinkgroup the person belongs to, that is all there is.

But that does not define the person, because there is always another think that interpellates the person.  Maybe, it is another thinkgroup.  Maybe, it is thinkdivine.   The person is always divided until, of course, the final impenitence or the moment of total self giving.]

07/1/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5S2

[Without a doubt, Schoonenberg wrestled with something that he could not fully explain. He did not have the categorical tools that I have 50 years later.

What was that something?

It was the way that parallel nested forms of the vertical axis of the intersecting nested forms address one another.

The nested forms of thinkdivine and thinkgroup exclude the other.  At the same time, each nested form interpellates – calls – the person habituated to the excluded nested form.  Even though actuality has constrained possibility to the point where a disinterested observer may objectively label the person’s subjective patterns of behavior, the subject’s will cannot be completely determined.]

06/30/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5S1

Summary of text [comment] page 33 and 34

[Eventually, a person habitually coheres to either thinkgroup(sin(consciencelacking)) or thinkdivine(virtue(consciencefree)).

At this point, we encounter an objective aspect in Schoonenberg’s argument.

Actuality (sin or virtuous acts) has constrained possibility (conscience) to a particular specification.  Technically, consciencespecified is possibilityconstrained_by_actuality.

Consciencespecified is subjectiveobjective.]

06/27/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5R

Summary of text [comment] page 33

[Schoonenberg addressed two facets of sin and virtue.

The “subjective” facet concerns the habituation of the will. This calls to mind conscience and disposition in the intersecting nested forms.

Consciencefree and consciencelacking associates to the “will” in the moral and religious sense of the term.

Dispositions also appear “willful” in the natural philosophical sense.

The human “will” then, broadly describes both aspects of possibility in the intersecting nested forms.

Actions emerge from the will.  Human actions situate the will (consciencespecified and dispositions).

Habitual actions change the will by increasing the likelihood of a particular configuration of consciencespecified and dispositions.  We become accustomed to certain environmental triggers.  We may seek out those circumstances because they tell us what we want to hear (for sin) or challenge us to overcome our selfish habits (for virtue).

In time, we may adopt a thinkgroup or thinkdivine that consistently puts our actions into context and further habituates the will.]

06/26/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5Q

Summary of text [comment] page 33

Let us look at those spontaneous appetites [dispositions] more closely.  They may be sensual (material) or spiritual (immaterial).  They substantiate the person as a mediating creature.

Mediation changes both the outside world and the creature.  So human action, as sin or virtue, changes both our world and our own persons.

How does human action change the world?

Every action is an event on its own, that is, an objective actuality independent of the mediator.  Every action occurs in circumstances and changes circumstances.  These changes may be labeled “objective”.

How does human action change the actor?

The person is distinct from circumstances, even as the person operates in circumstances.  The change in the person during human action is correspondingly “subjective”.

The terms “objective” and “subjective” thus become difficult to comprehend.  They depend on where one stands.]

06/25/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5P

Summary of text [comment] pages 32 and 33

Schoonenberg then wrote about will and an ascending series of venial sins, mortal sins, and final impenitence.

The will has to do with an intuition in this life about a future life.  The will makes choices in this life … and there comes a moment … a moment in dying … when the will and the choice become one  …

Free will works with the sensual appetites. The appetites spontaneously tend to partial goods.  They are able, like the sense knowledge to which they correspond, to push deeper decisions into the background.

[In terms of the intersecting nested forms, consciencespecified corresponds to free will and dispositions corresponds to appetite.

The dispositions focus the attention of the conscience onto partial goods (subjective knowledge) while pushing the deeper decisions (objective knowledge; thinkgroup_or_divine) into the background.]

06/24/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5O

Summary of text [comment] page 31

[So let me add the concept of “free will” to both examples.

In the first, the surgeon knows that something is wrong, but avoids corrective actions.

In the second, the medical professional knew that it was the wrong patient and still performed the operation.

Are both cases equivalent to mortal sin?

Here, we must confront the notion of “freedom”.  Freedom reflects the professional’s relation to thinkdivine (noting, here, that for medical practitioners, thinkgroup was formulated explicitly to complement and reinforce thinkdivine).

A surgeon may avoid corrective action in order to solve an even more critical issue.  Similarly, the “wrong patient” may need the operation but not have insurance.

In both cases, the surgeon breaks the rules in order to achieve a goal.  So these are not sins at all.  Are they?

Thus, the will must be added to knowledge of circumstances in the consideration of venial and mortal sins.

To me, it seems that free will and knowledge, not the objective results, constitute “gravity”.]

06/23/14

Man and Sin by Piet Schoonenberg (1964) 1.5N

Summary of text [comment] page 31

First, let us consider an example of the Dutch logic tree of sin.

Here is my analogy.

Professionals, people trained to perform within a certain discipline, perform tasks.  Here are two examples where tasks go awry:

First, on the subjective pole, a routine action may suddenly not feel right.  The reason becomes apparent.  Corrections follow.

Second, on the objective pole, a routine action may go completely smoothly then, later, the professional finds something horribly wrong.  This is the nightmare of every medical professional.  Guess who operated on the wrong patient.

[This example resonates with the scholastic view that a venial sin is a disorder concerning the means and a mortal sin is a disorder concerning the end.

Now let us apply this to the Dutch logic tree.

Both types mirror “transgression of God’s law”.

Both types relate to “important matters”.

Neither was committed with “full knowledge”.

Consequently, neither type was “committed freely”.

But clearly, one type is objectively worse than the other.]