This is one lesson found in Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenology Reductions” (available for purchase at smashwords).
0015 Givenness puts phenomenology into perspective.
This statement stands at the heart of Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean Luc Marion and … First Philosophy” (also available at smashwords).
0016 Yet, neither Spencer nor Trabbic mention science.
0017 Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean Luc Marion and … First Philosophy” adds value to the original.
How much value?
Maybe two Euros worth.
0018 What is the value of a Euro?
That is a very good question.
0019 Can a one Euro coin be reduced to its matter and form?
Can a Euro be reduced to instrumental and material causalities?
Surely, according to the empirio-schematic judgment, a one Euro coin can be accounted for by its constituent metals and circular shape. There is a science to coining money. Isn’t there?
0020 Or, does the givenness of the Euro allow us to imagine that a Euro is more than metal and shape?
Does the givenness of the Euro say that what the thing itself must be may be treated as athing itself, supporting novel, “social”, sciences, where the noumenon can be objectified as its phenomena?
0021 If this is so, then phenomenological reduction precedes Husserl by over a century.
Is that possible?
Can what the thing must be become a thing itself?
There is something eye-catching and nonsensical about givenness.
Trabbic graciously accepts that Marion must make sense and leads the reader to that glittering impossible possibility.
Phenomenology belongs to (what John Deely calls) the Age of Ideas, starting with the Western civilization’s turn from scholasticism towards mechanical philosophy.
0002 Mechanical philosophers, such as Rene Descartes (1596-1650 AD) say, “Forget final and formal causation. Think in terms of material and instrumental causalities. Attend to phenomena, the observable and measurable features of our world. Then, build mathematical and mechanical models using well defined terms.”
0003 Later, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) codifies a reaction against this fixation, arguing that we must not forget the thing itself (the noumenon). Sure, phenomena are crucial to scientific observations and measurements. But, the noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.
0004 Then, Edmund Husserl (1856-1939) declares, “I have developed another way to situate phenomena. By consciously focusing on phenomena, while bracketing out all this measurement business, along with other distractions, I can identify the noumenon, what the thing itself must be.”
0005 Now, there are two ways to situate phenomena.
First, scientists directly situate phenomena through observations and measurements. They build models. They are not interested in the thing itself.
Second, phenomenologists virtually situate phenomena through a method of bracketing assumptions, such as the empirio-schematic judgment, to end up with a noumenon, what the thing itself must be.
0006 The scenario depicted in the prior blog appears in Comments on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”, available for purchase at smashwords.
Search for Razie Mah, Mark Spencer, and phenomenological reductions. The electronic article in smashwords, or some other electronic literature venue, should appear.
0007 The engagement between phenomenology and science is delicate. Phenomenologists attend to the same phenomena as scientists. But, they do not compete with scientists.
Scientists directly situate phenomena using the empirio-schematic judgment (which is first diagrammed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy), in the normal context of a positivist intellect. The positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
Phenomenologists sidestep science, by contemplating phenomena, while reducing their field of consciousness to exclude the machinations of science, among other distractions. The goal is to identify what the thing itself must be, without any metaphysical baggage… er… I mean… terminology. Anything that sounds like metaphysics will raise the ire of scientists.
0008 It is like tiptoeing around a sleeping dog. The metaphorical dog protects science against metaphysics. It has been known to gnaw on the bones of its victims, especially the ones who uttered the word, “hylomorphism”. That word sounds totally metaphysical. “Hyle” is Greek for “matter”. “Morphe” is Greek for “form”.
To the sleeping dog of science, physics is the master of the house.
Does that mean that humans cannot be effected by inaudible sounds?
Can humans be impacted by inaudible sounds?
0010 These questions have proper grammatical form, but they do not speak to the heart of the matter.
Phenomenologists speak in a specialized language that scientists do not hear. The scientist’s ears are tuned to hear about measurements, models and precisely defined terms. Phenomenology does not speak of phenomena in scientific terminology.
The guard dog of science is on the prowl for another language that scientists do not want to hear, the language of metaphysics. So, phenomenologists also do not speak of phenomena using metaphysical terms.
0011 In short, phenomenologists strive to be impactful while being inaudible.
0012 Mark Spencer does not reflect on the tentative engagement between phenomenology and science.
He innocently explores an accommodation between Christian realism and phenomenology.
After all, both indirectly situate science.
0013 Well, forget the “after all”.
Spencer does not mention science at all.
As such, he threatens to wake the sleeping dog of the positivist intellect.
His proposals make phenomenologists jittery.
Talk of metaphysics will upset a delicate arrangement.
0014 Despite the hazards involved, there are opportunities.
The Christian realist cannot speak in terms of metaphysics, because those words are not allowed in polite scientific society.
Perhaps, the Christian realist can convey the same meaning, presence and message with phenomenological terms, which are designed to sidestep the dictates of the positivist intellect. The language of phenomenology is adapted to not wake the sleeping dog of science.
0015 Spencer ends the article in an impasse.
The impasse is theatrical.
Spencer declares, “Phenomenology longs to speak the language of metaphysics. Metaphysics longs to speak from the platform of phenomenology. Why can’t we find an accommodation?”
The phenomenologist cannot answer by saying, “An accommodation will destroy us both.”
0016 For Christians and phenomenologists alike, there is something to be learned from Mark Spencer’s 2021 essay, “The Many Phenomenological Reductions and Catholic Metaphysical Anti-Reductionism”, appearing in the summer issue of the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, and Razie Mah’s commentary, available at the smashwords website.
0001 Daniel Turbon, hailing from the University of Barcelona, publishes an article in the journal, Scientia et Fides(8(2)/2020, pages 65-94). The essay is available online. The full title is “The Distinctive Character of the Human Being in Evolution”. I place only the second focus in the header of my comments, while noting that the first character cannot be ignored.
0002 When I look at this essay, what do I see?
Does the title translate into a category-based nested form?
Here is a diagram, following the script in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form.
Figure 1
0003 Each of the above terms constitute an empty slot.
So, I ask, “How would words in the entire title correspond to the above empty slots?”
My answer is necessarily both speculative and synthetic.
The normal context3 is evolution3.
The actuality2 is (the origin of) human beings2.
The potential1 is a distinctive character1.
0004 The resulting application looks like this.
Figure 2
0005 The category-based nested form contains four statements. The fourth is paradigmatic: The normal context of evolution3 brings the actuality of the origin of the human being2 into relation with the potential of a distinctive character1.
When I read the title of Daniel Turbon’s article, this is what I see.
0006 From the prior blog, I know that evolution3 is the normal context for Turbon’s article. The logics of the normal context include exclusion, complement and alignment. One normal context will tend to exclude, complement or align with another.
Turbon’s abstract ends with a plea that is not re-iterated in the body of the article. As scientists labor to “cook up” human natural history, they must strive to ensure that the essence of human evolution does not become “indigestible”.
0007 What on earth does this mean?
Do humans evolve to grasp metaphors?
Or, do humans adapt into the niche of grasping essentials?
0008 Does scientific inquiry into our natural history3 exclude human intuition3?
Of course it3 does.
A simple substitution shows as much, as shown below.
Figure 3
0008 To me, the crux of Daniel Turbon’s entire article is captured by the last sentence of the abstract.The normal context of human intuition3 (guided by philosophy) ought to be able to digest what the normal context of evolution3 (guided by science) provides.
0009 The last sentence of Turbon’s abstract presents the crux, the point and the inspiration for the entire article. Two category-based nested forms stand side by side. The question now becomes, “Do these normal contexts exclude, complement or align?”
0010 Here they are.
Figure 4
0011 They look like the same cards of different suites, say clubs and hearts.
Can clubs exclude hearts?
0012 Clearly, Turbon does not publish an essay in the journal, Scientia et Fides, in order to support exclusion. Exclusion is already in the cards. The deck is stacked. Science excludes human intuition.
Why is this so?
0013 One reason is formulated in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy. Scientific judgment relies on the positivist intellect. The positivist intellect rules out metaphysics. What is the advantage? The rule assists in distinguishing a noumenon from its phenomena. Phenomena are subject to empirio-schematic judgments. Their noumenon is not.
0014 Science measures, models and discusses phenomena, the observable facets of a thing.
Philosophy guides inquiry into the thing itself, the noumenon.
Consequently, a noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.
Yet, a noumenon is necessary for phenomena to exist.
0015 So, exclusion is not in the cards. What about complement?
Clubs and hearts are suites with similar cards. They complement one another. They exist in the same deck. But, if clubs are like science and hearts are like philosophy, and if science focuses on phenomena and philosophy explores their noumenon, then what about the contiguity?
The contiguity between a noumenon and its phenomena is “cannot be objectified as”.
Clubs cannot be objectified as hearts.
Philosophy cannot be objectified as science.
Is this what Turbon aims to tell the reader?
I don’t think so.
0016 Intuition3 and evolution3 cannot exclude or complement one another. So, they must align.
0017 In alignment, two category-based nested forms generate a two-level interscope.
Before rushing headlong into that fact, I want to pause to appreciate another aspect of Peirce’s philosophy: the category of secondness.
Peirce’s secondness is the realm of actuality. Actuality consists in two contiguous real elements. It2 may be written: one real element [contiguity] other real element.
0018 Cause and effect is one expression of this contiguity. “Causality” is what most envision as the contiguity between any two real elements. The dyad, cause [contiguity] effect, exhibits the logic of noncontradiction. If nothing else, real causes do not contradict their real effects.
However, even though we (humans) typically (an perhaps, innately) anticipate causality to present itself as a dyadic actuality, one wonders what happens when two elements are juxtaposed in a speculative fashion. This is an old philosophical problem. Nothing demonstrates it as well as the contiguity between a noumenon and its phenomena.
Figure 5
0019 A noumenon is a thing itself.
Phenomena are observable and measurable facets of the thing.
Actuality2 is dyadic. So is the contiguity between a noumenon and its phenomena. But, obviously the word “not” presents a problem, casting the dyad into the realm of possibility, which exhibits the logics of inclusion and befuddlement. Phenomena cannot exist without a noumenon. Yet, they cannot objectify that noumenon.
Many of the causalities in evolutionary science are dyads in the style of actuality, because the contiguity is speculative.
0020 For example, Turbon states that human genes form the basis of extra-somatic culture and extra-somatic culture is an effective method for adapting to the environment. Here is a picture of these two speculations.
Figure 6
0021 Does this observation, that Turbon’s causal chains follow the style of secondness, assist in figuring out the alignment between philosophy and science?
Surely, the observation suggests that philosophy situates science.So, if the two nested forms combine into a two-level interscope, following the script of A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, then noumenon-oriented philosophy should situate phenomena-oriented science.
