0054 Allow me to cut to the chase.  The reason why Millerman writes this chapter is simple.  He wants to defend the serious study of Dugin before admirers of the political philosopher Leo Strauss.

Why would Millerman want to do that?

When Millerman declares the topic of his doctoral thesis at the University of Toronto, four members of his dissertation committee resign.  Two are Straussians.  The actions of these two are particularly poignant, since Millerman self-identifies as a maven of Strauss.

0055 Maven?

Yes, the term fits.  This chapter, number six in the collection of essays under one title, Inside Putin’s Brain: The Political Philosophy of Alexander Dugin, (available at Amazon and other hardcover book venues) plays Straussian themes.  The essay is exoteric.  The essay is esoteric.  There is a message in the middle.  Plus, that message comes from Dugin himself.

Of course, I do not say this lightly.  I have my own philosophical axe to grind, so to speak.  Yet, the clever Millerman has already prepared his text, so to speak.  The essay cleaves into three parts.  The introduction discusses two philosophical dances, one between Heidegger and Strauss and the other between Heidegger and Dugin.  The middle translates an excerpt from Alexander Dugin’s Book (2011) Martin Heidegger and the Possibility of Russian Philosophy.  The end recapitulates the introduction.

I cannot axe for more.

0056 Millerman’s text is an example of the semitic (as opposed to the greek) textual style (as discussed in An Instructor’s Guide to An Archaeology of the Fall).  The pattern is A:B:A’.

The semitic textual style asks the reader to recognize a possibility.

0057 What is the possibility that Millerman wants us to recognize?

Dugin and Strauss have a lot in common.  Both dance with the one Heidegger.  Both address a key question, articulated by ancient Greek philosophers, that defines classical political philosophy.

What is the best political order?

0058 What is best political order?

Leo Strauss ends up asking the question that moderns evade.  According to the political philosophers in our current Age of Ideas, the political order institutes organizational objectives in the names of the righteousness of the individual, the class member, the citizen and the unrighteousness of the one who cannot be a citizen.  The ancient questions are ignored.  The political order is a means to an end.  Plus, modern experts define that end in the name of an objectified subject.  We are who the experts say that we are.

And that is not good.

0059 To oversimplify Millerman’s account, Strauss’s story starts with Spengler’s cultural relativism and ends with the eternal, natural philosophy of Plato.  Spengler conceives of a comprehensive theoretical project, where (as Strauss frames it) the task of philosophy is to understand various cultures as the expression of souls.

To me, that sounds like a huge complicated project.

So, of course Martin Heidegger, who sits in the same academic chair once occupied by Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, says, “Let me give this a try.”

0060 Now, projection is a huge temptation in trying Spengler’s project.  As soon as one projects one’s own terminology into the past, then the past will conform to present academic expectations.  Here is a clue that Heidegger avoids this temptation.  Heidegger claims that modern philosophers do not understand Aristotle or Plato, at least, not in the ancient Greeks’ own terms.

The admission pleases Leo Strauss, who happens to agree.

Out, out, damned projection!

0061 Historical studies are welcome.  Historicism, the ideology that philosophy is a symptom of the culture and the age, be damned.

0062 What about Dugin?

Alexander Dugin wants to know whether there can be such a project as Russian political philosophy.  To me, this is a great question, because if there is a Russian political philosophy, then is should be as entertaining as an American political philosophy, starting from… say… the mound builders at Poverty Point, Louisiana.  I suspect that there is.  Let me take a look at the Book of Mormon.

0063 Dugin, the Russian, is drawn to Heidegger, the German, because the wizard has found two philosophical golden tablets.  One tablet offers to develop a philosophically adequate account of cultures as expressions of souls(corresponding to Dasein).  The other tablet promises a return to a study of the ancients as they are, rather than what we project upon them.  Not unlike the intrepid American, Joseph Smith, Dugin must translate these tablets into his native language.  Joseph Smith translates angelic script.  Alexander Dugin translates Heidegger’s German.

0064 To me, English (for Smith) and Russian (for Dugin) are only networks within a larger web of consciousness.  They allow us to envision a star, in the constellation of virtues, that is some sort of Omega Point.  Over time, our mundane earth rises towards the celestial earth, which itself moves towards a stellar Omega Point, as Teilhard de Chardin envisions.  See A Primer on Classical Political Philosophy, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0065 Well, Millerman does not mention any of this.

My flight of fancy soars into the joint between the end of the introduction and a translation of Alexander Dugin’s plans, as they appear in the 2011 Russian edition of Martin Heidegger and the Possibility of Russian Philosophy (Moscow: Academic Project).

Sort of like an axe hitting a soft spot.

0066 Dugin’s masterplan contains three tasks, (1) dismantling archeomodernity, (2) correctly comprehending the West and (3) elaborating a philosophy of chaos.

0067 On one hand, I think, “Whoa.  Dugin’s tasks are more ambitious than John Deely’s project to describe the arc of philosophical history in terms of the development of the causality inherent in signs.”

Deely’s book, Four Ages of Understanding (2001) runs over a thousand pages.  It is published by the… um… University of Toronto.

0068 On the other hand, I think, “Well, maybe, Dugin’s tasks are not as ambitious as the tasks proposed on October 1, 2022, of Razie Mah’s blog, under the title, A Fantasia in G-Minor: A Speech Written for Gunnar Beck MEP.”

MEP is an acronym for “Member of the European Parliament”.

0069 In the following blogs, I will present a stream of consciousness for each of Dugin’s heroic tasks.

0070 Task one seeks to dismantle archeomodernity.

What is archeomodernity?

Why does Dugin want to dismantle it?

0071 Well, given Dugin’s concrete directions, ably translated by Millerman, archeomodernity seems to be a cognitive space that is trapping contemporary Russians.  Liberation from archeomodernity opens the possibility of Russian philosophy.

0072 So, archeomodernity must be a trap.

How can I explain the purely relational nature of this trap?

I have found an example of such a trap in my intellectual wanderings through the vast goofiness of the internet.  I will not say where.  But, I will say that if you, the intrepid truly postmodern intellectual, post or publish a paper using the category-based nested form (or other triadic relations), please e-mail a notification to raziemah@reagan.com.

Perhaps, a new journal is called for.

0073 The story of the trap goes like this:

At the start of the middle ages in the West, Anselm coins a slogan that is repeated to this day.  Faith seeks understanding.

At the start of the modern era, Descartes coins another slogan.  I think, therefore, I am.

I associate Anselm’s premodern slogan to “archeo-“.

I associate Descartes’ slogan to “-modernity”.

0074 So, how does archeomodernity constitute a trap?

How can I portray this trap?

First, I render each slogan as a nested form.

0075 For archeo- Anselm, the normal context is faith₃.  The actuality is seeks₂.  The potential is understanding₁.

Here is a picture.

0076 For -modern Descartes, the normal context is I think₃.  The actuality is therefore₂.  The potential is I am₁.

Here is a picture.

0077 Now I ask, “Does Descartes’ slogan situate Anselm’s slogan or visa versa?”

The answer is no.

Do these two nested forms constitute a single, mysterious intersection, as described in the chapter on message in Razie Mah’s e-book, How To Define the Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues)?

The answer is no.

0078 Are there any other options?

Here, Dugin’s impression that archeomodernity is a trap comes into play. Biological (especially, cellular) systems are full of traps.  They are called “receptors”.  Receptors typically consist in proteins that are folded in such a fashion that a substrate is attracted and held in place.

So, I picture the archeo- side of a matrix and the -modern side of a matrix as forming a groove.

0079 What goes into the groove?

Nested forms, of course.Nested forms may be attracted to the normal context₃ and the potential₁ elements on each side of the groove.  The stronger the attraction to both sides, the stronger the binding and the better the fit.  Archeomodernity traps ideas that fit its groove.

0080 How about an example?

Consider a claim by Spengler, mentioned earlier.  According to Strauss, Spengler states that the task of philosophy is to understand various cultures as expressions of the soul.

0081 Does this go into a nested form?

The actuality is various cultures₂.  The normal context is expressions of the soul₃.  The potential is understanding₁.

Here is Spengler’s suggestion.  It fits well into the archeomodern groove.

0082 Now, let me try a variant.  Historicism explains expressions of the soul (including philosophy) in terms of the cultural dynamics of the time.

The normal context is explains₃.  The actuality is expressions of the soul₂.  The potential comes from cultural dynamcs₁. 

0083 Does this bind very well?

I don’t think so.

Spengler’s idea binds well to archeomodernity.

Historicism does not.

0084 Archeomodernity is a trap, in the same way that a receptor is a trap for its substrate.  Spengler’s claim is a suitable substrate.  Historicism is not, unless the substrate alters the binding site through irreversible degradation.

What do I mean by that?

0085 Compare the way that each nested form binds in the realm of thirdness.

Surely, Spencer’s claim intuitively binds to both sides of the groove, while historicism does not.  Expressions of the soul₃appeal to faith₃ as well as to human thought₃.  Determining an explanation₃ does not.  Faith₃ does not want empirio-schematic “explanations”₃.  Plus, scientific explanations terminate inquiry₃, and therefore, human thought₃.

0086 What do modern experts desire?

They desire to terminate inquiry with scientific models (explanations) that account for observations and measurements of phenomena.

0087 What about a comparison in the realm of firstness?

Take a look

0037 Understanding₁ from Spengler’s claim, does not match understanding₁ from Anselm’s slogan.  However, since Spengler’s understanding₁ is philosophical, rather than scientific, its potential coheres with Anselm’s use of the term.  

At the same time, understanding₁ from Spengler’s claim may not satisfy Descartes’ desire for individual realness₁.  But, it₁does not terminate the presence, inherent to I am₁.  

0088 In contrast, the naming of cultural dynamics₁ makes understanding₁ irrelevant.  Cultural dynamics is a term belonging to a specialized disciplinary language.  The term gives the impression that viable mathematical and mechanical models account for observations and measurements of cultural phenomena.

Of course, mathematical and mechanical models focus on actuality₂ and ignore normal context₃ and potential₁.  Anselm’s understanding₁ requires all three categories.  So, cultural dynamics₁ is not compatible with Anselm’s understanding₁.

Even worse, the impression that models of cultural dynamics₁ increases understanding₁ (in Anslem’s sense of the term) degrades the archeo- side of the groove.

0089 Similarly, if the term, “cultural dynamics”, belongs to a specialized disciplinary language, not known to average blokes, then the potential of I am₁ extols the expert, in contrast to the plebian.  Theoretically, the expert is Cartesian, with an unlimited will (I am₁) to know (I think₃)   In short, expertise₃ emerges from the potential of the expert’s will₁.

But, since normal contexts follow the logic of exclusion, most modern experts are satisfied to be the only person in the room with a model that no one else can argue with.  So, it makes me wonder whether the potential of cultural dynamics₁serves to disengage the purity of will implied by Descartes’ slogan, thereby degrading the -modern side of the groove.  Experts do not have an unlimited will to know, because… well… they are satisfied with what they know.

0090 The Western version of archeomodernity is a receptor.  That is why moderns (and especially, so-called “postmoderns”) despise it.  Indeed, the social sciences tend to degrade it.  Social science explanations do not bind well to the groove.  Consequently, the social sciences are inexplicably dissatisfying.

0091 If archeomodernity serves as a receptor for a productive matrix in the West, then why does Dugin want to get rid of it as his first task.

Remember that his task is to envision the possibility of a Russian philosophy.

So, Russia is not the same as western Europe.

0092 Consequently, the archeomodern groove must be different.  In the west, Anselm’s slogan pairs with Descartes’ slogan to form the sides of a receptor.  In Russian, a slogan from the premodern past pairs with, perhaps, a Marxist slogan, to form two sides of a trap.

In western Europe, the archeomodern groove tends to bind to nested forms that are not purely empirio-schematic judgments, which pisses off the scientific experts to no end (and explains the persistence of phenomenology and similar research programs).

In Russia, the archeomodern groove may bind to bad ideas, giving them an authority that they would otherwise not enjoy.

0093 Well, what would this Russian archeomodern groove look like?

Since I am not Russian, I cannot say.  But, I can make suggestions based on what little I know about Russia, with the expectation that Russian philosophers will surpass my suggestions without looking back.

Here goes a fool’s attempt at the Russian archeomodern groove.

0094 Slogans are wonderful sources for nested forms.  They are pithy.  They readily separate out into normal context, actuality and potential.  

0095 So, what about the archeo- side of the groove?

In the west, there is a slogan that calls to mind the world of Saint Basil and the Love of Sophia.  It is an appeal to an archangel, Saint Michael, who fights Lucifer and casts him out of God’s realm.  Yes, this is the stuff of Paradise Lost. 

The slogan says, “Saint Michael, the archangel, defend us!”

The normal context is angels₃.  The potential is being defended (or defense)₁.  The actuality is us₂ (in an unnerving situation). 

Here is a picture.

0096 What about the -modern side of the groove?

To me, one of the Marx’s most famous phrases is “the specter of communism”.  The specter of communism haunts the mercantile society of Marx’s time.  So, I will add a few words to turn the phrase into a slogan.  The specter of communism haunts us.

Here is the corresponding nested form.

0097 Now, I combine these two nested forms into the structure of an archeomodern groove.

0098 What nested form fits into this groove?

The example that I choose belongs to the famous Stalin-era scientist, Lysenko.  According to western sources, Lysenko ruined Soviet biology by promoting Lamarkianism, the idea that acquired traits may be inherited.

In particular, in agriculture, Lysenko wanted to plant wheat seed that had been frozen, because exposure to cold for the seed should produce the acquired trait for the plant.  Of course, this does not work, since frozen grain will not germinate.  Nevertheless, Lysenko did not fail for lack of trying.

0099 This example turns into a nested form through the following associations.  The normal context is survival₃, in the evolutionary sense of the term.  The actuality is frozen wheat₂.  The potential is the acquired trait of cold resistance₁.

0100 Now, I place Lysenko story’s nested form into the groove and ask, “Can I envision how the nested form might fit (or bind to) each side of the groove?”

For the archeo- side, surely survival₃ and angels₃ attract one another. Otherwise, why would we ask Saint Michael to defend us?

For the -modern side, survival₃ coheres with the soul of wheat seeds₃.  All wheat seeds should have the capacity to perpetuate acquired traits (even though, really, they do not).  Once the seed is frozen, it is dead, and its soul becomes a specter.  Perhaps, I can say, the seed becomes the specter of Lamarkianism.

Similarly, the acquired trait of cold tolerance₁ should haunt₁ the plant that grows from a frozen seed₂.  Plus, the anticipated acquired trait₁ serves as a defense against cold weather₁.

0101 Ah, Lysenko’s intuition binds well to the archeomodern groove for the Russian matrix.

The problem?

The fact that Lysenko’s Lamarkian proposition binds to the archeomodern groove for the Russian matrix does not make it correct.  Indeed, the binding is so strong that experiments are conducted over and over again, with slight variations, but always with the same results.  But, how can the experimental results turn out negative, when the proposition obviously fits our archeomodern groove?

Ah, now I can see how the archeomodern groove may be a trap.

0102 The concept of an archeomodern groove adds value to Dugin’s first task because it allows a way to envision how western European and Russian philosophies differ.

The Western archeomodern groove, composed of slogans by Anselm and Descartes, produces bindings that are so productive that western scientists want to dismiss the Western archeomodern groove.  Why?  People read popularized science in order to understand.  Yes, people want to understand.  People have faith, in God and in science.  Why don’t common folk only care about drab scientific results?  Why do they want to see how scientific models fit into a bigger picture?

Dugin wants to map the Russian archeomodern groove because it attracts and binds ideas that are satisfying, but scientifically impossible.  The Russian archeomodern groove is a trap.

0104 What about the second task?

Task two aims for a correct comprehension of the West.

I add, “Especially, the modern West.”

0105 Remember Descartes’ slogan, “I think, therefore I am.”

Modern scientists promise to satisfy an unlimited will to know₁ in the normal context of expertise₃.

Remember Anselm’s slogan, “Faith seeks understanding.”?

Modern scientists also imagine that they deliver the understanding₁ that people seek₂ in the normal context of faith₃.  Otherwise, why write books popularizing scientific knowledge?

People are not interested in materials and methods.

0106 As the western archeomodern groove breaks down, I ask.  Is there understanding₁ without faith₃?  Does the invocation of the term, “cultural dynamics₁“, satisfy the Cartesian will to know₁?  Or, are modern and postmodern institutions producing narratives… I mean… nested forms that do not bind well to the otherwise productive archeomodern groove?

The corrupt bureaucrats say, “Trust the science.”

The people reply, “This makes no sense.  I do not understand.”

0107 Perhaps, a correct comprehension of the West starts with science.

Christian philosophers struggle to formulate science in terms of Aristotle (or, for Catholics, Thomas Aquinas).  Their struggle has been going on for centuries.

Last century, Jacques Maritain comes close to hitting the target.  In Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, Razie Mah distills Maritain’s argument into two intertwined judgments: the Positivist’s and the empirio-schematic judgments.

0108 A judgment has a triadic structure.  It has three elements: relation, what is and what ought to be.  Each of these elements may be assigned to one category: firstness, secondness or thirdness.  Only one category per element is allowed.  Categories define the associated nested form.

Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment.

0109 A positivist intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the dyad, a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena(what is, firstness) into relation with an empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness).

The positivist intellect has a rule.  Metaphysics is not allowed.

0110 Note that what ought to be is also a judgment.

A disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness) into relation with mechanical and mathematical models (what ought to be, secondness).

0111 Questioning the Positivist’s judgment never works as anticipated.  If one criticizes the lack of metaphysics, one ends up trapped in a discussion couched in the disciplinary languages of the empirio-schematic judgment.  If one criticizes an empirio-schematic judgment , one gets accused of denying phenomena, the observable and measurable facets of their noumenon.  Or worse, one is dismissed as a metaphysician.

0112 Does a correct interpretation of the West entail an alternate vision of science?

There are many ways to describe science.  Who would describe science as two intertwined actionable judgments, that unfold into nested forms on the basis of their categorical assignments?

Razie Mah would.

0113 Even stranger, Razie Mah presents a series of commentaries, titled Phenomenology and the Positivist Intellect.  Several works appear in that series, including Comments on Jack Reynold’s Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”, A Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”, Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean-Luc Marion and… First Philosophy” and Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenological Reduction”.  These are promoted in blogs at www.raziemah.com during September and October, 2021, as well as during March and April, 2022.

0114 What is there in the Positivist’s judgment that a phenomenologist might fixate on?

Here is a picture.

Well, with a discipline called “phenomenology”, I imagine that the phenomenologist would fixate on what is.

But which side?  The noumenon?  Or its phenomena?

0115 A noumenon, the thing itself, cannot be fully objectified as its phenomena, its observable and measurable facets. Indeed, in the natural sciences (relation, thirdness), disciplinary languages model observations and measurements (what ought to be, secondness) of phenomena (what is, firstness), while ignoring their noumenon (what is, firstness).  In the 1920s and 1930s, the Vienna Circle proposes that noumena are completely irrelevant to our modern scientific world.

0116 There is a problem with this proposal.

Decades earlier, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938 AD) anticipates the issue and proposes an oddly named school, called, “Phenomenology”.  How is it oddly named?  Husserl strives to identify, in an intuitive way, what the noumenon must be.  Phenomenological reduction starts with the same phenomena as the empirio-schematic judgment, then brackets out all sorts of notions, such as traditional formulations, as well as the empirio-schematic judgment, in order to arrive at a declaration of what the noumenon must be.

Here is a picture.

0117 On what basis is the declaration made?

To me, the basis may correspond to what Heidegger calls “Da-Sein”.

If Da-Sein is the basis of discovering what the noumenon must be, then the noumenon must correspond to Sein, Being Itself.  

0118 Needless to say, Martin Heidegger (1899-1976) occupies the same Chair in Philosophy at the University of Freiberg that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) retires from.

Coincidence?

0119 Dugin knows the link between Heidegger and Husserl.  Dugin says that understanding Heidegger’s philosophy is crucial to articulating a Russian philosophy.  Yet, I wonder whether Dugin is aware that Heidegger’s Sein may be the noumenon, the thing itself, which cannot be objectified as its phenomena.

If that speculative “may” proves fruitful, then Dugin is something of a prophet.  A correct comprehension of the modern West involves a correct comprehension of science. Heidegger says that the key to a correct interpretation of our scientific world starts with Dasein.  Dugin points to Heidegger and says, “Listen to this philosopher.”  What Heidegger says fulfills the second task.

0120 At this point, I add a purely speculative note.  I have a guess.  I have a curious feeling that Heidegger offers a big label to what the noumenon must be.  It is “Sein” (German for “being”).  Plus, “Dasein” (German for “there” and “being”) labels the human encounter with Sein.  Once these substitutions are made, then the remainder of the Positivist’s judgmentis eclipsed, or “bracketed out”.  Heidegger brands the noumenon, the thing itself, in a most philosophically encompassing manner.  There is a difference between Dasein and the lived experience and the consciousness in our modern age.

Here is a picture of the new beginning.  The Positivist’s judgment fades as Heidegger rides the noumenon into a promised land.  Promised to the people of Germany.

Well, that sounds dramatic.  Plus, it sounds somewhat theological.  It is enough to make me wonder, “Is there a phenomenology of the spirit?”

With that in mind, consider the blog, posted October 1, 2022, at www.raziemah.com, appealing to a German politician.  The title of the blog is “Fantasia in G-minor: A Speech Written for Gunnar Beck MEP”.

MEP stands for Member of the European Parliament.

Perhaps, there is an alternative for Germany.

0121 The third task elaborates a philosophy of chaos.

Why?

The narod, the ethnos born into our current Lebenswelt, confronts chaos.

How so?

0122 Here is a narrative that addresses mythos.

0123 The ethnos corresponds to us in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  In terms of culture, the ethnos consists of social circles within social circles (friends, intimates, family, teams, band, community, mega-band and tribe), as described in Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big.  These social circles adapt to one another and promote human flourishing.  These social circles operate in harmony.  These social circles are the foundations of the human sense of belonging.

0124 Then, the first singularity casts all that away.  Humans abandon the hand-talk component of their hand-speech talkin their efforts to mimic wealthier and more powerful cultures, who practice speech-alone talk.

The narod corresponds to us in our current Lebenswelt.  Because speech-alone talk potentiates unconstrained labor and social complexity, our social circles no longer work in harmony.  Indeed, new “social circles” are formulated, using specialized languages that come into being explicitly to exploit some advantage, like turning blue rock into copper metal or rotting milk into delicious cheese.

0125 The narod cannot return to the ethnos, even though the ethnos characterizes what we evolved to be.  Yet, somehow, we intuitively recall the harmony of the social circles, the pleasures of constrained complexity and the sense of belonging.  Plus, we acknowledge that we are cast out of that world and our new world is ruled by a demiurge, a fantastic and cruel leviathan that draws people into organization.  This monster is visualized in chapter 6A in An Archaeology of the Fall.

0126 Out of a narod comes a people.

People long for order.  A people establishes an order.  Or, does an order establish a people? 

There are two ways to establish order.  Often, order spontaneously occurs.  Sometimes, order is imposed.  To the latter, the former appears as chaos.  How so?  Spontaneous order cannot be imposed.  Indeed, imposed order is threatened by chaos from without.  Imposed order is threatened by chaos from within.  And worse, the purveyors of an imposed ordermay feed off the fruits produced by a spontaneous order.

Some people call these purveyors, “Parasites.”

Parasites are agents of chaos, insofar as they prefer a fragile imposed order to a robust spontaneous order.

0127 Yes, there is a logos that walks with this mythos.

Dugin’s third task asks, “What is the philosophy of chaos?”