04/25/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 1 of 4)

0648 The text before me is chapter fourteen in Pathways (see point 0474 for book details).  The chapter covers pages 299 to 324.  The authors are Vic Norris at the University of Rouen, France, and Alexei Sharov at Elixirgen Scientific in Baltimore, Maryland.

The full title is “Hypothesis about How Bacterial Cells Sustain and Change Their Lives in Response to Various Signals”.  The fullness of the title is significant.  Elements may be associated to the S&T noumenal overlay.

0650 Here are my associations.

The only term not in the association is “hypothesis”.

0651 Looking back to chapter 13, concerning the sentient cell, the model of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBB), illuminates what the authors are constructing.  They project sentience from human consciousness onto the behavior of living bacteria.  Life and sentience are coterminous.

I suppose the authors’ hypothesis proposes that such a project is scientifically legitimate.

I already know the answer from the S&T noumenal overlay.  Semiotic agency2 is a reification of a three-level interscope, a purely relational structure which contains the specifying and exemplar sign relations.  This allows the designation of features that are crucial for empirio-schematic inquiry: phenomena and what needs to be modeled.

0652 Message, presence and meaning associate to phenomena.

The contiguities of [life] and [sentience] are what need to be modeled.

0653 Unfortunately, the authors do not have tools to visualize Peirce’s philosophy, which opens a window to two realms that cannot be observed and measured by humans: normal context3 and potential1.  Indeed, these two realms constitute the sign-interpretants of level-crossing sign-relations.  Which explains why [life] and [sentience] are precisely what models need to explain.

0654 So, how to the authors proceed?

The abstract and the first two sections (14.1 and 14.2) inform the reader as to the character of the project.

The proposed model for [self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b (SIs)] describes bacteria as hierarchically structured.  Functional roles are performed by hyperstructures, assemblies of molecules and macromolecules operating in multiple-level coordination as subagents. “Hyperstructures” are functionally competent states (coordinating as “temporal phenotypes”).

This model envisions subagents scrambling to support the ongoing hyperstructure or to change to a more appropriate hyperstructure.  The authors label this scramble, “competitive coherence”. 

The proposed model for [salience3c((1c)) (SIe)] is “plasticity”.  The resulting coordinated order among subagentsmaintains or changes cellular integrity… er… “identity”, as conditions either remain the same or alter.  Plasticity addresses the question, “What is the bacteria going to do?”  In effect, competitive coherence establishes a stage for a phenotypic expression of the holobiont.

0655 Does this argument flow into the structure of the S&T noumenal overlay?

Here are my associations.

0656 For the specifying sign-relation, various cues and signals2a (SVs) stand for competitive coherence2b (SOs) in regards to bacteria cells responding3b by potentially sustaining or changing their hyperstructure (or “temporal phenotype”)1b (SIs).

For the exemplar sign-relation, competitive coherence2b (SVe) stands for maintaining the cell’s identity2c (SOe) through plasticity3c((1c)) (SIe), where plasticity is the ability to hold or shift from one temporal phenotype to another.

0657 Now, an expert in bacteria should be able to observe and (in experiments) measure phenomena related to cues and signals2a (which the researcher can control), competitive coherence2b (patterns of behavior among bacterial subagents) and the maintenance or change of cell identity2c (observed as what actions the holobiont takes).

0658 These noumena may be objectified as phenomena that the researcher observes and measures.

04/24/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 2 of 4)

0659 In section 14.3, the authors report evidence that supports the hypothesis.

0660 What do bacterial researchers observe?

The authors provide examples “hyperstructures” in Table 14.1.  These include cytoskeletal filaments, structures made from enzymes, microcomponents, membrane-associated structures, external appendages, DNA-containing structures, phase separation condensates and more.

0661 What do the hyperstructures tell the researcher?

Hyperstructures vary depending on how much energy is available… oh, I meant to say… nutrients are available.

So, the authors propose two temporal phenotypes, corresponding to the appearance of hyperstructures that use lots of energy (NE, non-equilibrium conditions) and ones that conserve current integrity (E, equilibrium conditions).

0662 Here is a picture.

0663 As one might suspect, the two models of hyperstructure maintenance (SIs) and plasticity (SIe) work in tandem.  Some transitions from one temporal phenotype to another are easy.  Some are not so easy.

As one might have anticipated, a tremendous amount of scientific research has gone into almost all aspects of the hyperstructures, especially in regards to genomic regulation of bacterial DNA.  Empirio-schematic research abounds.  The problem is that research discoveries appear to have little in common.  It’s the problem of inquiry into each leaf occludes the reality of the tree.

0664 The authors provide an example, in section1 4.3.2, for the case when lactose is among the nutrients.

The lac operon, when expressed, contributes to NE hyperstructures.  Lactose… transformed into one isomer, allolactose… induces synthesis of the lac operon by binding to a LacI protein that clings to bacterial DNA and represses genomic expression.  Allolactose binds to LacI protein and changes it conformation.  The allolactose-bound LacI protein lets go of the strands of DNA that it is holding on to, providing the opportunity for formerly suppressed genes to be converted into mRNA.

In sum, for bacteria, lactose is both a nutrient and a cue (SVs) that ultimately says, “Fatten up and divide (SOe).”

0665 Section 14.3.4 describes cell-cycle hyperstructures and signaling.  That is to say, “The NE route.”  The density of scientific detail stuns the reader.  By my estimate, every two sentences summarizes a doctoral thesis.  In some paragraphs, every sentence boils down years of research by a doctoral student.  The section reads like a biochemical textbook.

After this tour de force of supporting evidence, the authors propose (in section 14.4) that semiotics can be used to explain cues and signals (SVs) in bacteria.

0666 This is where the authors stand today, in 2024, at the threshold of appreciating the um… message, presence and meaning… that biosemioticians observe and measure, in order to construct models of [being alive] and [sentience].

0667 As noted earlier, message (SVs), presence (SOs [&] SVe) and meaning (SOe) go with phenomena.

[Being alive (SIs)] and [sentience (SIe)] are what need to be modeled.

0668 What does this suggest?

The authors do not need to call for semiotics to explain cues and signals in bacteria.

Cues and signals are already specifying sign-vehicles (SVs) in the specifying sign-relation.

0669 Phenomena do not need to be explained.

Phenomena need to be observed and measured by humans who innately recognize sign-elements.  Plus, in our current Lebenswelt, we can label those sign-elements through explicit abstraction.

Biosemiotic observations and measurements (what is, firstness) are used to build models (what ought to be, secondness) within the purview of a scientific disciplinary language (relation, thirdness).  Such is the empirio-schematic judgment.

0669 Biologist Jakob von Uexkull intuitively senses this.  He does not have the advantage of Peircean diagrams of judgment or interscopes.  He cannot formulate the category-based nested form, where the normal context of definition3brings the actuality of a spoken word2 into relation with the potential of ‘meaning, presence and message’1.  But, he intuitively senses that definition3, spoken words2 and the potential of explicit abstraction1 fit into the conceptualization of semiotic agency.  That is why he frames his research in terms of theoretical biology and theories of meaning.

0670 Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen, in their 2021 book, Semiotic Agency, also intuitively grasp this.  Unlike von Uexkull, they have loads of scientific research into biological systems, from the micro to the macro, at their disposal.  However, like von Uexkull, they do not have the disciplinary language to articulate… um… diagram… their noumenal overlay.

The only way to get to the point of picturing a noumenal overlay is to use diagrams of triadic relations.  One value of this examination comes precisely in the act of diagramming the authors’ arguments using triadic relations. Another value of this examination comes in the act of framing the history of biosemiotics as a historical response to the Positivist’s judgment.

0671 Yes, we stand on the shoulders of giants.

Charles Peirce (1839-1914), Edmund Husserl (1859-1939), Jakob von Uexkull (1864-1944), Thomas Sebeok (1920-2001) and John Deely (1942-2017) are giants upon whose shoulders both the authors (and Razie Mah) stand.

Nonetheless, diagrams can really be useful.

04/23/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 3 of 4)

0672 In section 14.4, the authors announce that they intend to use semiotics to explain cues and signals in bacteria.

On one hand, this is a fool’s errand, since cues and signals are specifying sign-vehicles (SVs) in the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay for semiotic agency.  They are real initiating (semiotic) events.

On the other hand, the very fact that the authors see a need to explain cues and signals in bacteria suggests that biosemiotics encompasses more than semiotic agency.  But what is that “something more”?

0673 Section 14.4.1 is titled, “Types of Semiosis, Signs and Effectors”.  The authors enter into a curious discussion concerning the appearance of greater and greater complexity on Earth.  Does semiotics play a role?  Does a change in semiosis accompany each major transition in evolutionary history, such as the transition from prokaryotic to eukaryotic life?

This debate winds its way into a ranking of semiosis into proto- or primitive semiosis and eu- or more advanced semiosis.  “Protosemiosis” applies to prokaryotes and “eusemiosis” to eukaryotes. 

0674 With that in said, there arises a question of definition.

In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, language evolves in the milieu of hand talk.

The spoken word, “definition”, does not appear in the lexicon of any hand-talk language.

What is there to picture or point to?

So, where does the potential of meaning, presence and message come from?

Hand-talk words picture and point to their referents.  Meaning, presence and message are built into the natural-sign qualities of icons and indexes.  Icons and indexes promote implicit abstraction.

Speech-alone words cannot picture or point to their referents.  So, they must be defined.  That is where the nested form for definition turns out to be handy, as noted in Razie Mah’s e-book How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

Speech-alone words label anything.  Purely symbolic labels permit explicit abstraction.

0675 Now, putting the evolution of complexity and the histories of particular labels aside, I return to the title of section 14.4., “Using Semiotics to Explain Cues and Signals in Bacteria”.  How do these keywords figure into the category-based nested form for definition?

Here is my guess, concentrating on the word, “explanation”.

0676 The author’s normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of a spoken explanation2 into relation with the possibility of ‘the meaning and semiotics (presence) of bacterial cues and signals (message)’1.

0677 Maybe I am too cautious in my associations.  The authors’ discussion seems to imply that the spoken word2should be “complexity” and the meaning should be “explanation”.

0678 If that is the case, then I may associate the author’s potential1 in definition3 to the bacteria’s potential1 of defining3 its own semiotic agency2 within its Umwelt3.

Explanation associates to meaning and to a bacterium maintaining its identity (SOe).

Semiotics associates to presence and to competitive competition maintaining one or another “temporal phenotype” (SOs[and] SVe).

Cues and signals associates to message and to what a bacterium encounters in its Umwelt (SVs).  At this juncture, a word coined by Jakob von Uexkull floats into view.  The Umwelt consists of all the sign-vehicles (SVs) that an organism can specify (SIs).

0679 What does this imply?

Well, let me display my more daring guess.

I ask, “Is the author’s focus on ‘complexity’, rather than ‘explanation’?  Does ‘complexity2‘ emerge from (and situate) the potential of explanations (meaning), using semiotics (presence), of cues and signals (message)1 in the normal context of definition3?  And, is it any coincidence that this label2 might apply to the S&T noumenal overlay?”

Does an increase in “complexity” entail an increase in “semiotic agency”?

04/22/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 4 of 4)

0680 Now I can draw another association between category-based nested forms.

0681 If biosemiotics is what all biological processes have in common, and if the authors are biologists who both study and participate in biological processes, then a technical discussion concerning how bacterial regulate their functions in response to various signals should contain a certain irony.

0682 So, it is no surprise that these biosemiotic researchers define3 “complexity”2 as situating the potential of ‘biological explanations of bacterial cues and signals using semiotics’1.

0683 The normal context of definition3 compares to how any biological organism defines itself within its Umwelt3.

0684 The actuality of the spoken word, “complexity”2, compares to what any biological organism is figuratively “conscious of”2 (especially in regards to a model of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness).  Or maybe, “complexity” describes what we are conscious of when we regard the semiotic interplay within any biological organism.

Plus, in the discussion section (14.5), “complexity” touches base with the “subjective experience” of an organism, from the point of view of a disinterested observer (the biosemiotician) looking in.  Perhaps, the organism is “conscious” of its “phenotype”.

0685 The potential of ‘explanations (meaning) of cues & signals (message) using semiotics (presence)’1 compares to the potential of ‘identity (meaning), competitive coherence (presence) and events within the Umwelt (message)’1 for any biological organism.

0686 Surely, this implies that Norris and Sharov’s hypothesis applies to any biological organism, not just bacteria.

How so?

In points 0634 and 0635, the category-based nested form for definition meshes with the actuality2 of semiotic agency.

Here is the same diagram applied to the bacterium.

Does it seem that speech-alone talk infiltrates semiotic agency?

It is as if a bacterium3 speaks2 its identity1.

0687 At the same time, I must keep in mind that biosemiotics dwells in the house of science.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, that is semiotic agency2, is objectified by biological phenomena in regards to meaning, presence and message1.  Or, should I say, “…in regards to SOe, SOs [&] SVe, and SVs.”?

These phenomena (what is for the Positivist’s judgment) are observed and measured in order to produce models using the disciplinary languages (including diagrams) of biosemiotics (what ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment).

All this occurs under the auspices of a positivist intellect (relation for the Positivist’s judgment) who would rather do without metaphysics  But hey, semiotic agency2 is an actuality2 within a triadic relation.  Without a normal context3and potential1 for semiotic agency2, biosemiotics simply does not register.

0688 Perhaps, “the temporal phenotype that the agent seems to be conscious of”2(2) corresponds to what needs to be explained in the S&T noumenal overlay.  If so, then the agent is “conscious” by way of its specifying and exemplar sign-interpretants (SIs and SIe).

That is to say, two sign-interpretants constitute an organism’s figurative “consciousness”.

Surely, these sign-interpretants3((1)) cannot be reduced to actuality2 because they reside outside of Peirce’s category of secondness.  However, because the entire nested form in the above figure meshes with the actuality of semiotic actuality2, these sign-interpretants3((1)) are incorporated into the realm of secondness2 by an agent3 (say, a bacterium) on the basis of the potential of ‘a final causality’1.

So, what does a scientist do?

The scientist reaches for the label, “complexity”.

It is sort like asking a familiar civilized term to execute a tricky cognitive manipulation.

0689 Who would anticipate that?

Surely, Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov propose a worthy hypothesis on on how bacterial cells sustain and change their lives in response to various signals.  The phenomenon of competitive coherence is worth elevating, along with the phenomena of identity and cues within the Umwelt. These phenomena are observable and measurable sign-elements ofthe S&T noumenal overlay.

0690 At the end, I am left with the ambiguity of “definition”.

What compares to definition?

In general, the normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of a spoken word (or term)2 into relation with the potential of meaning, presence and message1.

For this chapter, the normal context of the agent defining itself with its Umwelt2(3) brings the actuality that the agent is “conscious” of its “phenotype”2(2) into relation with the potentials of ‘identity (meaning), competitive coherence (presence) and signals and cues (message)’2(1).

For the unfolded empirio-schematic judgment, the normal context of disciplinary language3 brings the actuality of (complex) models for “the phenotype”2 into relation with the potential of ‘observations and measurements of biological phenomena’1.

0691 Here is a picture of the last two category-based nested forms in the previous point.

Clearly, a comparison between a definition that meshes with semiotic agency and the empirio-schematic judgment is provocative.

Yet, that provocation is in tune with the author’s proposal.

0692 That proposal is constructed with spoken words.

Speech-alone talk can label anything.  And, now we can label the meanings, presences and messages within biological organisms as if they are phenomena.  We can also model our observations and measurements of these phenomena using spoken words that describe what needs to be explained, the sign-interpretants themselves.

0693 Here is one implication.

Biosemiotics is the field of inquiry3 that brings definitions that mesh with semiotic agency2 into relation with the potential of empirio-schematic inquiry1.

Perhaps, this is why the field of biosemiotics seems to be older than science as configured by modern Positivists (beginning with the mechanical philosophers of the 1600s).

And younger.

0694 For the modern Positivists, empirio-schematic inquiry (what ought to be, secondness) belongs to the realm of actuality and the noumenon [and] its phenomena (what is, firstness) belongs to the realm of possibility.

For the postmodern biosemiotician, empirio-schematic inquiry opens up to the categories of thirdness and firstness,which are the same categories encountered in Aristotle’s formal and final causalities.

The implications are difficult to fathom.

0695 I thank the authors for this chapter and hope this examination adds value to their inquiries.

04/21/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 1 of 5

0696 The text before me is chapter fifteen in Pathways.  Details on the book are found in point 0474.  Chapter fifteen covers pages 325 through 344.  This is the third chapter in Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”, which is a long way of saying, “Non-human Agency”. The chapter’s full title is “Self-Reinforcing Cycles and Mistakes: The Emergence of Subjective Meaning”.

0697 Hmmm, I wonder, “Does the structure of the chapter’s title offer an example of a self-reinforcing cycle and a mistake?”

After all, the topic is the emergence of subjective meaning.

The proposed mechanism for the emergence is self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes.

0698 Putting the mechanism before the subject is like putting a cart before the donkey.  The cart contains the mechanism.  The donkey represents the emergent being.

This reminds me of the way that modern scientists are all about mechanistic and mathematical models (the cart).  They disregard the noumenon (the donkey).  They go so far as to say that the cart should take the place of the donkey.  But, who ever heard of a cart that pulls itself? 

0699 As far as the category-based nested form pictured below goes.  The donkey goes with agent3.  The cart associates to semiotic agency2.  The donkey3 contextualizes the cart2.  The donkey3 brings the cart2 into relation with the potential of ‘final causality’1, which does not appear in the title.  Or does it?

0700 The chapter’s title contains the terms “self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes”.  These go with actuality, just like the cart.

The chapter’s title contains the term “subjective meaning”.  I suppose that this goes with the normal context3, just like the donkey.  

0701 Okay, what about the word, “emergence”, where does that fit in?

Uh-oh.

0702 Let me step back and ask myself, “How could a cart reveal the donkey as a normal context, rather than an actuality?”

How could self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes reveal subjective meaning as a normal context, rather than an actuality?”

0703 Hmmm.  I suppose some adjustments are in order.

Emergence3 must be the normal context that brings the actuality of the dyad, donkey [pulls] cart2, into relation with well… the potentials that historically puts the donkey and the cart together1.  Now, there’s an empedoclement.

Also, emergence3 must be the normal context that brings the actuality of the dyad, subject [experiences] meaning2, into relation with the potentials of ‘self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes’1.  Ah, that suggests opportunities for empedoclements to happen.

0704 Usually, mistakes are impediments.

Occasionally, a mistake will be an empedoclement, which is the inverse of an impediment.

On top of that, some empedoclements seem (after the fact) to be inevitable.  During the Uruk period of southern Mesopotamia, the donkey is domesticated for long-distance trade.  The wheel is invented to make pottery.  In retrospect, the actuality of donkey [pulls] cart2 seems destined.

0704 Now, all that I need to do is to realize that subjective meaning2 is an actuality.  Actuality2 is dyadic.  So, subjective meaning2 can be rendered as a dyad, consisting of two contiguous real elements.  The two real elements?  I suppose they must be the subject and the experience.  After all, both are real.  That leaves [meaning] as the contiguity.

In the following figure, the lower category-based nested form parallels the upper.

0705 Okay, by analogy, the title of “Self-Reinforcing Cycles and Mistakes: The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” reminds me of an anthropological story about the invention of the donkey pulled cart during the Uruk archaeological period of southern Mesopotamia.

0706 Having concluded my examination of the author’s prowess is synthesizing titles, I proceed directly to the conclusion (section 15.8), where the author makes three points (and maybe, one more) by way of summary (S, T U and maybe, V).

0707 First (S), NeoDarwinism may be a factor in evolution.  But, it is not the only one.

On one hand, tell that to a modern biologist and watch the listener’s body-language say, “Oh no, am I talking to one of those intelligent design advocates?”

On the other hand, if I say, “Neodarwinism does not take triadic relations in account.  If it did, then biological evolution would have to be called ‘mysterious’.”

Then, the modern biologist might think, “Oh worse! It’s a postmodern semiotician!”

But, it is not my mission to point out that biosemiotics performs what Christian intelligent design enthusiasts want to do, but cannot.  Biosemiotics brings all of biology into the gambit of triadic relations, including Neodarwinism.

0708 How so?

In Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome, (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), Razie Mah shows that the living being (individual, species or genus) is the intersection of adaptation and phenotype.  Then, in How To Define The Word “Religion”, Razie Mah shows that intersections are mysterious, fulfilling the expectation that the word, “mystery”, accounts for the message underlying the word, “religion”.

0709 Here is a picture of where I am going with this.

One category-based nested form is horizontal.  The other is vertical.

Several steps are required to get there.

But, once I am there, the author’s claim that neodarwinism is insufficient will make sense in terms of semiotic agency.

04/11/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 2 of 5)

0710 The intersection is a mystery because two actualities constitute one actuality.  Two category-based nested forms come together because their actualities apply to the same entity.

That is sort of confusing, especially when the single actuality2 has yet to be framed with a normal context3 and potential1.

0711 Let me consider each actuality2 on it own.

The first actuality is adaptation2.  Adaptation2 corresponds to the “darwinism” of “neodarwinism”.   The normal context of natural selection3b brings the actuality of an adaptation2b into relation with an organism’s niche1b.  The subscript, “b”, denotes the situation level.  So, there must be a content-level actuality2a (at a minimum).  The niche1b serves as the potential of that content-level actuality2a.

0712 Here is a picture.

0713 Yes, a niche1b is the potential1b of an actuality independent of the adapting species2a.

This formula applies to all sorts of “niches” fashioned within the boutiques of academic biology.

For example, “niche construction” fits the formula.  Beavers build a dam on a fast moving stream and the stream becomes a glen that provides plenty of food for the beavers.  The dam serves as a home.  Surely, when one dams a fast moving stream, the result is a glen that beavers can flourish in.  So, the term “niche construction” points to the fact that the actuality independent of the adapting species2a may be a process.  Plus, “niche construction” does not not stop there.  “Niche construction” indicates that the actuality independent of the adapting species2a may be purely relational structures, such as… um… triadic relations.

0714 I shudder to think what type of genus would adapt into a niche containing the potential of triadic relations.

0715 The second actuality is phenotype2.  Phenotype2 corresponds to the “neo” of “neodarwinism”.  The normal context of body development3b brings the actuality of a phenotype2b into relation with the organism’s genotype1b.  Or maybe, I should use the word, “genome1b“.  I guess the words are both different and the same.  The subscript, “b”, denotes the situation level.  DNA2a is the content-level actuality.

0716 Ah, the genotype1b is the potential1b of DNA2a.

0717 What else is curious about the two-level interscope for phenotype2b?

0718 The situation and content levels constellate a specifying sign-relation.  DNA2a (SVs) stands for the phenotype2b(SOs) in regards to body development3b operating on the variety of ways that DNA can be translated into proteins (the genotype1b) (SIs).

If this is the case, then I wonder, “Does this specifying sign-relation fit into Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay?”

The answer is, “Yes, here is a picture.”

0719 Isn’t that curious?

The specifying sign-object (SOs) of phenotype2b does not take the inquirer to the biosemiotic fullness of semiotic agency. The exemplar sign-relation remains occluded.  Remember that the exemplar sign-relation associates with emergence (points 0280 through 0292).  It also associates with a goal2c that a biosemiotician recognizes as meaning2c.

0720 What does the biosemiotician recognize with respect to the “neo” component of neodarwinism?

The biosemiotician recognizes DNA2a (SVs) as message and phenotype2b (SOs) as presence.

0718 What about the “-darwinism” of “neodarwinism”?

The same principle applies.  The situation and content levels constellate a specifying sign relation.  The exemplar sign remains occluded.  An actuality independent of the adapting species2a (SVs) stands for an adaptation2b (SOs) in regards to natural selection3b operating on an organism’s niche1b (SIs).

04/10/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 3 of 5)

0719 The first point (S) is stated in points 706 and 707.  NeoDarwinism may be a factor in evolution.  But, it is not the only one.

Maybe I went down the wrong rabbit-hole by raising the fact that neodarwinism is an intersection, because the lesson is not that intersections are mysterious (even though this lesson is true).  The lesson turns out to be that the two-level interscopes of natural selection3b and body development3b recapitulate the specifying sign-relation in independent ways.

0720 Why is that lesson important?

Consider the second point in the conclusion (T): The single actuality, the living being, operates on the basis of self-reinforcing cycles.

What does that imply?

Ah, the author shifts the reader’s focus in an unexpected manner.

Living being2 is the intersection of two actualities.

For non-human agency, self-reinforcing cycles are both adaptive and phenotypically expressed.

0721 What is natural selection selecting for?  Self-reinforcing cycles exploit opportunities and avoid dangers in regards to real initiating (semiotic) events.  If I drop a 2% glucose solution in the center well of a petri-dish containing a maze, the slime mold on the periphery of the dish will start making its way through the maze.  Glucose signals opportunity.

What is body development selecting for?  Self-reinforcing cycles allow the slime mold to move.  Also, receptors allows the slime mold sense a glucose gradient.  Plus, when the slime mold hits a wall and has to backtrack, a slime mold can deposit a chemical agent that says, “I’ve been here before.”  Yes, the slime mold is using its tools to solve the maze.

0722 So, how does this change of focus manifest when I return to the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlays?

To me, self-reinforcing cycles replaces natural selection3b because the operations of these cycles3b pursue objective opportunities1b.

The adaptive presence2b is slime mold moving towards the source of glucose2a.  Glucose2a (SVs) sends a message, meaning food2c (SOe).  

0723 Here is a picture.

0724 Yes, the slime mold tries to find a way to the source of glucose (SOs) because glucose (SVs) objectively means food (SOe).

Why do I say, “Objectively.”?

In the introduction, section 15.1, the author distinguishes between objectivity and subjectivity.  Here, the presence of glucose is objective (SVs).  So is the reality that glucose means food (SOe).

Indeed, the biosemiotician considers these (SVs, SOs [&] SVe, SOe) to be the bases of phenomena.  Observations related to these phenomena go into modeling [the self-reinforcing cycles], as well as [objective salience], that is [SIs] and [SIe], respectively.

The author’s shift of focus, along with the example, transfers the concept of adaptation2b, within the normal context of natural selection3b and arising from a niche1b, into the milieu of semiotic agency.  The shift may be rhetorical, but it is effective nonetheless.  Adaptations go with the objective world, that is, the Umwelt as the world of signs.

0725 Well, then, what about “subjectivity”?

Well, maybe “subjectivity” can be called “relative objectivity”.

Relative to what?

The slime mold in the petri-dish.

0726 Here is a picture.

0727 “Subjective” is the right word in so far as, from a modern point of view, “subjective” means “self”.  The scholastics offer a different view, “subjective” means “the subject that has the attention of the self”.  Indeed, the latter view associates to the real initiating (semiotic) event (SVs).

As before, capturing attention of a slime mold in a petri dish2a (SVs) stands for its sensing, moving and marking2b(SOs) in regards to self-reinforcing cycles3b manifesting the slime mold’s subjective capabilities1b (SIs).  Plus, the exemplar sign-relation is now relevant.  The goal2c is to solve the maze (SOe) that the researcher has imposed.

0728 And, that raises the question, “If the slime mold were to be conscious, what would it be thinking?”

I suspect that the answer would be the objective opportunity and its salience.

04/9/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 4 of 5)

0729 In section 15.2, the author dwells on the distinction between subjectivity and relative objectivity.

So, I guess I got it wrong.  Subjective is not “relatively objective”.  Objective is.

0730 I attribute the error to my own incoherent self-reinforcing cycles.

Maybe, my confusion may be lifted, if I make a distinction between my Umwelt-oriented self-reinforcing cycles and Innerwelt-oriented self-reinforcing cycles.

The former can be objective (or “relatively objective”) and the latter can be subjective.

0731 This works as long as I remember that they both contribute to semiotic agency2 for a single individual (or species or genus).

Here is a picture of semiotic agency that tells me what Neodarwinism cannot convey (see S and point 707).

0732 Yes, semiotic agency is a bit of a mystery.

That brings me to (U) the third point.

Point (S) says that Neodarwinism is not all there is.

Point (T) says that the living entity lives by way of self-reinforcing cycles.

Point (U) says that subjectivity and objectivity should be regarded as “equivalent”.

Yes, they are two actualities that constitute the single actuality that is semiotic agency2.

Is that the same as equal (“equi-“) in combination (“-valence”)?

0733 That brings me to the sad reality that the author has never had the opportunity to cast eyes upon the diagram of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay.

Point (V) says that the “equivalence” uses Peirce’s natural signs, that is, icons, indexes and symbols.

0734 The author elaborates this point in sections 15.2, 15.3, 15.4 and 15.5 and arrives at the conclusion that directionality and originality are indispensable concepts in evolutionary science.  Indeed, they are.  Directionalityassociates to the objective presence of message2H.  Originality associates to the subjective presence of message2V.

Yes, directionality and originality constitute semiotic agency as a singular actuality.

The inquirer does not have to explain the mechanisms of self-reinforcing cycles that are crucial for sign-processing.  Instead, the inquirer may appreciate what biosemiotics really accomplishes.

Biosemiotics offers an account of the one thing that all living processes and organisms have in common.

In doing so, it makes biology comprehensible.

04/8/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 5 of 5)

0735 How is biology… er… NeoDarwinism… incomprehensible?

0736 First of all, neodarwinism is an intersection.  An intersection contains contradictions that cannot be resolved.  That is why intersections are mysteries.  Philosophers can elucidate the contradictions, but they can never resolve them without cognitively reconfiguring the single actuality.

0737 For example, there are two major branches of evolutionary science.  For the most part, natural historians ignore the vertical axis and geneticists ignore the horizontal axis.  Everyone else ends up confusing niche1H and genotype1V as if these potentials1b situate “equivalent” actualities2a.

0738 The mystery within neodarwinism may be of interest to those concerned about mysteries.

After all, the Positivist’s judgment does not anticipate anything like this.  How can terms for two radically different models for the origins of species simply be clapped together?  I suppose that speech-alone talk can label anything, even mysteries… even, “neodarwinism”.

Well, “neo” is not exactly “genetic”.

Genodarwinism?

Perhaps, “neodarwinism” should be called out for what it is.

0739 Another reason why neodarwinism is incomprehensible is because the (hidden) content-level actualities2a do not have normal contexts3a and potentials1a.  They are the foundations2a of situation-level potentials1b that support situation-level normal contexts3b (natural selection3b and body development3b).  Does ecology and environment (as actualities independent of the adapting species)2a have anything to do with DNA2a (as the template for reproduction and cellular organization)?

I think not.

0740 So, how does one make biology… er, the evolution of subjective meaning on Earth… comprehensible?

This is the question that the author wrestles with.

The answer is in the title.  It must have something to do with the operations of self-reinforcing cycles.  How does biological meaning evolve?

Occasionally, mistakes do not act as impediments, but serve as empedoclements.

0741 Plus, the answer may have something to do with Peirce’s natural signs and how brainless creatures behave according to what we expect in terms of these natural signs.  When the behavior of brainless creatures is regarded through the lens of Peirce’s natural-sign typology, directionality and originality are obvious.  These obvious concepts must be indispensable for an explanation of the evolution of subjective meaning within biological entities.

0742 Neodarwinism will not do (S, T, U).

That much is for sure.

The role of Peirce’s natural signs (V) is a guess.

Or, should I say, “an intelligent guess”?

0751 For me, one of the pleasures of examining these chapters comes from the fact that the authors do not have a diagram of the S&T noumenal overlay before them, but they write like they are fishing around for the diagram.

In this case, the author does not catch, but almost hooks, a much bigger fish than neodarwinism.  Indeed, directionality (the horizontal axis) and originality (the vertical axis) are built into the diagram of the semiotic agent as a mystery, in the style of neodarwinism.

0752 Remember, the author discusses non-human, or rather, brainless organisms and ends up with an alluring line for appreciating the evolution of meaning in the universe.

My thanks to the author for the fishing expedition.  What a wonderful cast.

04/7/25

Looking at Hongbing Yu’s Chapter (2024) “…Danger Modeling…” (Part 1 of 7)

0753 The text before me is chapter seventeen of Pathways (2024, see point 0474 for details. pages 363-375).  This chapter concludes Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.  The related title in Semiotic Agency (2021, see point 0473) is “Nonhuman Agency”.  The author works at Toronto Metropolitan University, in the Department of Languages, Literatures and Cultures.

The full title of chapter seventeen is “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning Generation in Three Dimensions”.

0754 Of course, danger offers great examples for semiotics.  The abstract says as much.  In 2022, Marcel Danesi publishes a book on the topic, titled Warning Signs: The Semiotics of Danger.

For example, when a dog growls at me2a, that serves as a sign-vehicle (SVs) that is interpreted by my self-governance3bcontextualizing the potentials of various courses of action1b (SIs) in order to construct information2b (SOs).

0755 Here is a picture, using the S&T noumenal overlay.

0756 Yes, semiotic agency looks like a noumenon that exhibits observable and measurable facets (phenomena) that may be used to construct models of [self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b (SIs)] and[sentience3c((1c)) (SIe)].

Does the reader notice my sleight of hand in the preceding statement?

I substitute “sentience” for “salience” in SIe.

0757 The substitution is justified because information2b (SOs [&] SVe) says, “Danger is present.”

The “danger” goes with SOs.  Its “presence” is what I am sentient of (SVe).

The exemplar sign-relation goes like this.  The danger2b (SVe) that I am sentient of3c,1c (SIe) stands for something that I can avoid or safely ignore2c (SOe).

0758 So, what is the problem?

The author does not have the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay, which is foundational for the Positivist’s judgment, when it comes to biosemiotics.

Consequently, the author proposes that Thomas Sebeok’s concept of modeling may be used as a productive approach.  After all, modeling offers a highly integrative framework for meaning generation.

0759 Shall we see?

If highly integrative frameworks for meaning (that is, Sebeok’s models) are um… “natural”… for humans, then they should support implicit abstractions, characteristic of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Implicit abstractions are holistic.

0760 But, there is a problem.

We no longer live in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices hand- and hand-speech talk, which is holistic and relies on Peirce’s natural sign-relations of icon and index.  Of course, symbols operate in the background, allowing hand talk to become linguistic.

0761 Our current Lebenswelt practices speech-alone talk.

0762 How is this relevant to the current discussion?

With speech-alone talk, different aspects of a holistic implicit abstraction can be explicitly labeled.

The author identifies three dimensions to Sebeok’s models (as highly integrative frameworks of meaning): existential, representational and interpretational.

0763 These three dimensions are explicit abstractions.  They label “dimensions” of a model that frames message{SVs}2a and integrates presence {SOs [&] SVe}2b into meaning {SOe}2c.

In short, these dimensions bring this examiner right back to semiotic agency.

0764 Say what?

These dimensions bring this examiner right back to specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

So, the direction that this examiner will take, with plenty of creativity (hence, mistakes), calls to mind the S&T noumenal overlay, as the purely relational structure that all biological entities and processes have in common, including the case of me, surprising an unfamiliar dog, who is snarfing something already dead, found in a pile of autumn leaves.  The incident occurs on my morning walk with Daisy (who is taken by surprise herself, along with me).