Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 14 of 23)
0127 Unless, of course, one uses computer simulations (8).
That is the topic is chapter eight.
Computer simulations assume that spoken words are like tokens. A token is a type. Here, a spoken word would be a token of a symbol.
Is it easy to see the assumption?
Displacement has already occurred.
0128 This brings me to the metaphor that organizes this book. Why does Mithen choose the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle?
Well, obviously, the author wants to review various areas of research pertaining to the origins of language as pieces of a problem, so that fitting the pieces together will offer a solution.
0129 I ask, “Isn’t there a another reason that um… does not qualify as a ‘reason’?”
0130 What is the definition of “reason”?
In Original Sin and the Post Truth-Condition (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), “reason” serves as the normal context3a and potential1a of the dyadic actuality2a, {what people think [cannot be objectified as] what people say}2a. For the postmodern, reason3a,1a is the normal context of the intellect3a operating on the potential of the will1a.
In contrast, “pre-modern reason” is not “post-modern reason”.
For the premodern, reason3a1a is the intellect3a operating on the potential of the truth1a.
0131 So, what am I asking for?
Consider the postmodern answer for why Mithen chooses the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle.
Obviously, the answer comports with reason3a1a as the author’s intellect3a operating on the potential of the will1a.
So, I am asking for an answer that is not obvious, where reason3a,1a is the author’s intellect3a operating on the potential of truth1a.
Why does Mithen choose the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle?
Am I registering two different mentalities operating within Mithen’s text?
0132 Why do I take the author’s metaphor of the jigsaw puzzle literally?
From his prior work, The Prehistory Of The Mind, I know that Mithen thinks intuitively and holistically. His use of the metaphor of the history of the architecture of European cathedrals allows an implicit appreciation of explicit theories on the evolution of cognition in hominins.
The work under examination is different, because a coherent illumination gets veiled by disparate agendas of current research. The diversity of the so-called pieces of the puzzle speaks to an incoherence, where pieces do not necessarily lock together.
0133 In my view, a coherent illumination may be revealed by biosemiotics.
See Biosemiotics As Noumenon, Parts 1-3, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
0134 Without a coherent illumination to objectively organize his subjective intuition, Mithen blindly reaches for a metaphor that can accomplish the task.
By definition, jigsaw pieces must fit together.
Correct?
Yes, but there is another avenue to appreciate Mithen’s intuition.
If I take the metaphor literally, I can intuitively portray the two crucial adaptations involved in explaining why language evolves in the milieu of hand-talk.
Here is a picture.

0135 A biosemiotic view of signs shows how language evolves by assigning the iconic and the indexal character of natural signs to displacement and the symbolic character of natural signs to grammar. This view unfolds while examining Mithen’s text, which explicitly rejects the idea of gestural origins to language (in chapter four).
It is as if Mithen inadvertently conveys what current research into the evolution of language is not illuminating, and in doing so, provides this examiner with a weird sort of challenge. How do the biosemiotic truths embedded within Mithen’s own text betray what he willingly expresses?
What a challenge!
I suppose, at this juncture, the reader may say, “Hey, you said that chapters eight (8) and nine (9) stand between the chapters on stone tools (7) and fire (10). What happened to chapter nine (9)?”