03/6/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2020) “Derrida” (Part 5 of 5)

0031 What about the second incident (point 0003)?

The next essay that Millerman reviews is titled, “Heidegger’s Ear”.

Here, Derrida waxes on a snippet in Heidegger’s book, Being and Time, that mentions the voice of a friend whom every Dasein carries with it.

0032 To me, if Heidegger’s leap really opens a vista into the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, then Heidegger would have used the word, “gesture”, rather than “voice”.

Or, maybe, the word, “voice” is okay, since, before the first singularity, humans practice hand-speech talk. Two modes of talking co-exist. Cultural tradition determines which mode is more appropriate for any particular social situation.

0033 Derrida reads German. So, he has an ear for Heidegger. German (B), like all spoken languages, carries a conceptual apparatus (D). So, Heidegger must allow Derrida into his pact (B), concerning openness to an inception (C), that is like a concept, but is not a concept, because it complements a secret (A) that makes us present (Da-) to being itself (-Sein) (D).

Because Derrida speaks German, he must be a “friend”. But, Derrida finds that naive, because he can also be an enemy. Derrida figures out that, if you speak the same language, then you can share secrets. Heidegger says “friend” in the most naive way, as if the word reflects a state before the duality of friends and enemies. It seems to me that Derrida could be a real enemy who infiltrated behind the defenses of an opposing camp. And, he knows it.

Derrida is a dangerous philosopher. Everyone respects Derrida. Everyone fears deconstruction. Derrida approaches Heidegger as a “friend”, who speaks the same language. Derrida knows that the fraternal order of philosophy has splintered. First, everyone is a companion (or a compatriot). Then, everyone is either a friend or an enemy. Heidegger marks this transition with a German word: Geschlect.

0034 According to Derrida, Geschlect is a “mark”, a sign of division, a yellow patch for some and no patch for others. Well, maybe the patch can be sex, race, species, genus, status, genealogy or community. The yellow/no patch dualityrelies on concepts (that is, explicit abstractions). Yet, certain phenotypic and physical tags are inceptual (that is, implicit abstractions). But, explicit abstractions end up justifying these implicit abstractions.

0035 Here, I can see the threat of Derrida’s genius. Concepts, as utterances_2m [carrying] information_2f, are manifestations of Saussure’s definition of spoken language, parole_2m [arbitrary relation] langue_2f. This implies that the apparent mechanical substance corresponding to [carry] is really grounded in the slippery substance of [arbitrary relation]. This is the nature of sensible construction in speech-alone talk.

Here is how Derrida’s Greimas square manifests as sensible construction.

0036 What does Geschlect do?

Geschlect traverses the topolitology of secrets. In the city of Geschlect, there is a factory, turning pre-political feelingsinto conceptualized divisions among people. Today, that factory is called “modern politics”. It is run by, for and of the government. But, it claims to be by, for and of the People. Compatriots become friends and enemies.

0037 The voice of the compatriot, Heidegger’s “friend”, is embedded in the constitution of the human. Prior to the first singularity, hand-speech talk relies on manual-brachial gestures. Solidarity is guaranteed by one’s gaze. Someone who word-gestures a falsehood is immediately exposed as one’s enemy. How so? Manual-brachial gestures are defined by what they picture or point to. Word-gestures do not define their referents. They picture and point to them.

In contrast, spoken words do not picture or point to anything.

0038 After the first singularity, spoken language relies on our innate sensibilities until… labor and social specialization starts to spin explicit abstractions, like threads on a spool, and speech becomes something like a secret. You have to know the relation between the utterance and the information, in order to be a member of the club. So, the arbitrary relation between parole and langue slowly, irrevocably, weaves the threads into conceptual apparatuses.

Everyone who speaks the same language starts as a compatriot. But, two parties emerge, ones who are in tune with the conceptual apparatus and the ones who still imagine that our words picture and point to their referents.

0039 Derrida discovers a secret within the secret. The conceptual apparatus is mechanistic. And, like all machines, it can be constructed differently. So, deconstruction is a technique to shake the conceptual apparatus, in order to expose the arbitrariness of its relations. Concepts divide us. Deconstructed concepts unnerve us.

Heidegger discovers the foundation of the secret. The secret is a pact, where information is known only by us, and that pact cannot be articulated in speech-alone words. Instead of a concept, where the utterance is a conspiracy, Heidegger proposes an incept, where the pact manifests as inspiration. An incept draws us into one inspiration.

0040 Heidegger has a word that is translated as “both strife and accord”. I suppose that strife labels the struggle to keep the vessel empty. I suppose that accord is the happy moment when the vessel is full. The word is “Walten“.

Or perhaps, Walten is the originating unity of two real elements. Perhaps I can imagine that these elements are —_2m and vessel_2f. So the unity or the contiguity is [empty]. But also, imagine the unity of …known only to us_2m and vessel_2f. The contiguity is [fill].

Either way, the originating unity of two real elements is inceptual.

No one can open someone else to an inception. Inception is where the seed of conviction germinates. No political philosopher has a recipe for an inceptual institution of the theologico-political domain. No one, except for Jesus, has torn the veil woven by explicit abstraction. In contrast, many theologians and politicians have quested for a magical token that empowers the veil and strands us in the domain of conceptual apparatuses.

0041 In our cutthroat world of concepts, people cling to their worldviews, ridicule other worldviews, and fail to notice that their conceptual apparatuses have closed them off from their inceptual heritage. Concepts pose as things that bring us into organization. But, is organization all there is?

Of late, the United States of America has a humorous tradition in this regard. They name legislative decrees with the conceptual apparatus that they are going to replace. For example, in 2001, the so-called “Patriot Act” is legislated and signed into law. Twenty years later, a surveillance-oriented bureaucracy identifies members of the “make America great again” movement as “domestic terrorists”.

Yes, the utterance of “domestic terrorists” institutes a concept that identifies patriots as enemies of thier surveillance state.

0042 What does this imply?

Is Walten like a secret, that is, information known only to us?

Then, as fast as I can say, “Geschlect.”, there are two parties. One party focuses on information. One party focuses on the “known only by us” business.

How can companions come together after established nomenclature turns everyone into either friends or enemies? As politics invades all aspects of society, each person asks, “Which worldview do I belong to?” Cognitive machinations hustle propaganda and apologetics. Some people get carried away. The last thing they want is to be cut from the pact. No one wants to get cut. Plus, true believers are willing to sacrifice others to their cause.

How does a people become a people?

I suppose that theologico-political topolitologies are required.

Plus, it seems as if the secret allows me to visualize the topolitology of a Walten, an originating unity of two realities.

Here is one reality, corresponding to “information…”.

0043 Here is the other element, corresponding to “…known only by us”.

When does a Walten solidify its current theologico-political domain?

An accord, seeking to be filled with a conceptual apparatus (D), leads to calcification and total domination.

When does a Walten liquify its current theologico-political domain?

A struggle to be open to being filled by God’s meaning, presence and message (H) leads to revelation and new life.

0044 To the extent that Derrida reads German, Derrida is Heidegger’s companion.

What does Derrida see?

Heidegger’s “friend” can speak as either friend or enemy. Geschlect says, “You are either friend or enemy.” Walten says, “Please, remain a companion.”

0045 In one fashion, Derrida’s and Heidegger’s theologico-political constructions mirror one another.

I suspect that Derrida stays his desconstructive hand in recognition of this reality.

In another fashion, these two theological-political constructions derive from a single, undifferentiated, realness, to which we, in our current Lebenswelt, can never return.

We need deconstruction to combat our march towards death by a totalizing conceptual apparatus.

We need inception to seed the fields of our open minds.

In the chapter on Derrida, Millerman finds good reason to start with Heidegger.

Recognize the possibility.

03/3/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2020) “Rorty” (Part 1 of 3)

0001 This chapter appears in Michael Millerman’s Book (2020) Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (Arktos Press). The composition of the book sends a message. A forty-nine page introduction is labeled as a preface, complete with Roman numerals. The first chapter covers Heidegger and stands in the center of the book. Then, chapters two through five covers the responses of four political philosophers to Heidegger’s academic labors (as well as his political affiliation).

Richard Rorty is discussed in the third chapter. This chapter serves as a transition from the weighty chapters on Heidegger and Strauss to the surprising chapters on Derrida and Dugin.

0002 Rorty offers a change of style. Rorty is an American philosopher. This pleases me, since I write like an American, too. I roll, roll, roll down the river of literary endeavors. My paddles are purely relational structures, such as the category-based nested form and the Greimas square.

Consequently, Millerman refers to movies, rather than books. And, if books must be mentioned, then novels come first.

0003 Oh, I should add, the first novel comes from the pen of Cervantes. Don Quixote marks the start of the Age of Ideas. In seventeenth-century Spain, two movements coincide. On one hand, Baroque scholastics finally articulate the causality inherent in sign-relations. On the other hand, Cervantes creates a new literary genre.

Perhaps, these two hands belong to a single entity. The novelist represents the scholastic behind the mask of modernity. Like the heroic character in V for Vendetta, there is no removing the mask. The Spanish innovator spins away from truth (the scholastics were all about mind-independent being) and leaps towards happiness (the novelists are all about mind-dependent beings).

Is it any surprise that, in the next century, France produces a revolution with a similar attitude? Then, two centuries later, today’s social democratic politics perform the same routine.

0003 Richard Rorty wrestles with a strange duality. Politics is contextualized by two distinct masters, truth and reality. Politics emerges from the potential of good (which goes with truth) and the potential of what can be done (which goes with reality).

Here is a picture of two nested forms.

0004 Of course, Rorty wants to step away from truth₃ and find happiness in reality₃. But, one cannot take the mask without the face or the face without the mask. One cannot say, “Look at the mask without thinking about the face.”

Here is where Rorty flounders. His social democratic politics tell him that viable options are the only things that matter. But, as a philosopher, he must face the question as to which options are good.

0005 In short, politics is a single actuality that is composed of two distinct nested forms. Neither nested form can situate the other. So, the actualities for both nested forms fuse, creating one single contradiction-filled actuality, as described in the chapter on message in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.

I call the following diagram, “an intersection”.

0006 Right away, I spy that the single actuality of politics₂ veils two unspoken actualities that emerge from (and situate) the vertical and horizontal potentials. These two actualites are overshone by politics₂, in the same way that Mercury and Venus appear to disappear within the Sun in astrological conjunctions. The technical term is “combustion”.

Here is a Greek parody of politics₂.

0007 Yes, truth_3V and reality_3H exhibit different orbits around politics₂.

According to Millerman, Rorty is a social democrat advocating for truthlessness and hopefulness.

0008 How does that statement mesh with the above intersection? Rorty distains Heidegger’s romance with language and says that there is no such thing as a thing itself that can be put into language. So forget esse_ces (beings substantiating) and essences (substantiated forms). Indeed, forget righteousness. The question is whether the thing is useful. Or not.

At first, it seems that Rorty is only interested in the horizontal axis.

0009 But then, Rorty writes that there are three conceptions of the aim of philosophizing in the modern era. These three are Husserl’s scientism, Heidegger’s poetics and Dewey’s pragmatism. The latter two respond to the former. Husserl idealizes scientists. Heidegger extols poets. Pragmatists, like Rorty, Dewey and James, prefer engineers.

Now, if I associate these embodiments into the above mystery, then I replace Mercury with the engineer and Venus with the poet, resulting the the following intersection.

0010 Once I diagram this, the contradictions become more apparent. The Heideggerian venusian poet_2V and the pragmatist mercurial engineer_2H orbit an all encompassing solar politics₂. From the point of view of an astrologer, sometimes these inner planets run ahead of the solar presence, sometimes they lag behind the solar presence, and sometimes they are in conjunction with the solar presence. Combustion! The Sun’s transit through the constellations, plays this celestial drama over and over again, for those who watch the heavens. For those who watch politics, the Earth orbits the sun.

03/2/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2020) “Rorty” (Part 2 of 3)

0011 Now, I personalize the ongoing intersection.

0012 Rorty’s condundrum becomes all the more visible.

Rorty, a pragmatist mercurial engineer_2H, is trapped by the same gravitational field of politics₂ as Heidegger, a visionary venusian poet_2V.

0013 Rorty is a social democrat, concerned with implementation of policies that work. He has lots of options, but no philosophical heft when it comes to figuring out the truths of political matters, much less the question, “What is a political good?”

Heidegger is an anti-democratic phenomenologist, whose vision of the truth amazingly allows him to pursue the only political option available to a professor of philosophy at the University of Freiberg during the Third Reich. If Heidegger wants to keep the job, there not many options. The German people march, like Don Quixote on his quest, towards a political good that is a figment of their leader’s imagination.

0014 What does this add up to?

Well, I suspect that Rorty, having no sympathy for Heidegger, wants to replace the political philosophical poet with a nice automated coffee dispenser. First, the dispenser does not talk. Second, everyone agrees that coffee is needed in departments of philosophy. Its utility is guaranteed.

Of course, Millerman does not agree with this utopian solution.

Utopian solution?

Brew a cup of coffee and think about it.

0015 One problem lies in the nature of the intersection. One actuality overshines two. Intersections are filled with contradictions.

On top of that, an intersection may serve as actuality in a nested form.

Rorty sees no other options for political philosophy than social democracy. His vision serves as a clue that Rorty works within social democracy₃ as a normal context. Normal contexts tend to exclude other normal contexts. But, social democracy₃ cannot exclude the normal contexts of reality_3H and truth_3V.

Why?

Reality_3H and truth_3V belong to politics₂.

What about potential?

Well, not unlike Voltaire’s Candide, Rorty aims for the best of all possible worlds.

That means utopia is possible, today.

0016 Here is the nested form for Rorty’s politial philosophy.

0017 This nested form dovetails into Rorty’s views concerning the contingency of language_2V and the absence of foundation_1V. Rorty needs truth_3V. But, his utopia₁ comes on the wings of viable options_1H, not from claws sharpened by debates over the good_1V. So, the philosophical question boils down to figuring out options_1V, without being gouged by the claws of do-gooders_2V.

0018 Other philosophers hone in on Rorty’s dilemma. Obviously, Rorty evades the contradictions inherent in politics₂. How so? Rorty cannot offer a persuasive resolution to a mystery that is as old as Mercury and Venus and the Sun. Surely, the beauty of a mystery does not dwell in avoiding its contradictions. Theologians know this. Modern philosophers have forgotten this lesson. Astrologers remember.

0019 This nested form allows me to appreciate Millerman’s claim that Rorty does not respond to Heidegger philosophically. He responds politically.

To Rorty, the vertical axis of the intersection₂ corresponds to Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological reactionary politics of nostalgia₂, which is just another metaphorical language game. Indeed, such nostalgia arises from the potential of another no-where₁ (the transliteration of the Greek term, “utopia”). Rorty accuses Heidegger of trying to step onstage in a decisive event in the History of Being, when a new philosophy emerges from the ashes of the old, on the possibility of a new know-where₁. Know-where₁ does the truth_3V bring that coffee-making appliance₂ into relation with the good_1V than in the dispensation of Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological nostalgia₃.

0020 Here is a picture of Rorty’s view of Heidegger’s political philosophy.

Americans are so good at projection.

03/1/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2020) “Rorty” (Part 3 of 3)

0021 Of course, Heidegger would (if he could) return the insult, by calling Rorty a liberal propagandist.

After all, Rorty is not concerned with questions of truth_3V, preferring issues concerning social consequences_3H.

0022 Plus, Heidegger (if he could) would have regarded the imprisonment of Rorty and other social democratic philosophers as a matter of “petty details”.

Petty details?

In Heidegger’s view, the West has exhausted its options_1H. And, proof comes later in the title of Rorty’s book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Are these options? Or, are they signs of exhaustion? Compare that title to Being and Time.

0023 The squishiness of the former title is made worse when Rorty’s dichotomy of choice, private versus public, appears to align with the potentials of good_1V and options_1H, respectively. Is truth_3V private? Is reality_3V public? If so, then I ask, “Are these affirmations the poisonous fruits of the Treaty of Westphalia?” The Treaty of Westphalia marks the start of the modern era, almost four hundred years ago.

Perhaps, Rorty inadvertently testifies to Heidegger’s proposition. The West has exhausted its options_1H. Politics₂ is the intersection of the actualities of reality_3H and truth_3V, arising from the potential of viable options_1H and good_1V. Without a good_1V, there are no options_1H. So, politics₂ is dead. But, our love (philo-) of wisdom (-sophy) endures. So, it is only a matter of time before politics₂ rises again.

Shout it from the rooftops!

Politics₂ is dead. Long live politics₂.

0024 My thanks to Michael Millerman for his excellent chapter into how Rorty views Heidegger, chapter three in Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (2020, Arktos Press, London), pages 97-134.

02/28/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism” (Part 1 of 9)

0001 In late 2022, Americans loathe the Russian civilization because the Soviet Union was a existential enemy during the Third Battle Among the Enlightenment Gods: The Cold War Among Materialist Ideologies (1945-1989 AD).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, not much has been done to alter Americans’ fears, even though lots of water has passed beneath the bridge of history. Indeed, much has been done expressly to conceal those waters, full of greed, ambition, illusion and delusion. The modern intelligensia is guilty of sins of omission.

0002 Here is a brief remediation of that sin, which, unfortunately, may itself be a transgression.

When the Cold War ends in 1989, many difficult to comprehend events follow. Boris Yeltsin supervises a firesale of Russian state property. Maybe, “firesale” is not the right word. “A mind-bending transfer of ownership” may be better. Soon, oligarchs corral entire industries and markets. Russian GDP falls like no tomorrow.

Then, before the wholesale transfer of Russian commodity wealth is fully consummated, Vladimir Putin steps from under the wings of Yeltsin’s weakness and corruption. Following a series of explosive events, Putin manages to secure leadership of the listing ship of the Russian State. He rights the boat, sending many overboard (so to speak).

The predatory wolves of the American Empire do not forget. They lick their wounds. They plan their revenge.

0003 Oh, so that is the reason why nearly every mouthpiece of the American Regime denounces Russia, as if it is still the Soviet Union of old. When the Americans win, they want total surrender. So, the American citizen remains informed that the Cold War never really came to a conclusion.

Just as America once looked to the East and saw an “iron curtain”, Russia now looks West and experiences a “word curtain”.

0004 Of course, this brief transgression into history is required to introduce the tragic philosopher, Alexander Dugin. From 1989 on, Dugin formulates and proposes new ideas concerning the fact that Russia did not totally surrender to America’s empire religion. His struggles culminate in a book that finally breaks through the Western word-curtain about how bad Russia is. That book is titled, The Fourth Political Theory. First published in Russian, an English translation comes out in 2012.

Three years later, Razie Mah electronically publishes Comments On Alexander Dugin’s Book (2012) The Fourth Political Theory. This commentary is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0005 Simultaneously, as well as more amazingly, Michael Millerman decides to make the philosophical work of Alexander Dugin the topic of his doctorate in philosophy. Oh, that does not go well. How dare this young intellect challenge the current narrative. Dugin should go into a box. He is a fascist. Or rather, a communist. Or something similarly unsavory, like a Eurasianist. Yes, that box should never be opened.

0006 Michael Millerman, like Pandora, opens the box. And the last monstrosity to emerge is hope.

He actually graduates with his doctorate.

The subsequently blacklisted Millerman starts his own school. The cancelled Millerman publishes the book that I currently examine: Inside Putin’s Brain: The Political Philosophy of Alexander Dugin (2022: Millerman School). Yes, Millerman starts a school. Look and see.

0007 In these blogs, I comment on chapter two, titled, “The Ethnosociological and Existential Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism”. This chapter is originally published in Telos (Winter, 2020).

In order for the reader gain an acquaintance with the Greimas square, I recommend blogs appearing at www.raziemah.com for January 2023. These blogs include Looking atAlex Jones’s Book (2022) The Great Reset and Notes on Daniel Esterlin’s Book (2020) 2045 Global Projects At War.

02/27/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism” (Part 2 of 9)

0008 Okay, I am looking at chapter two of Inside Putin’s Brain, titled “The Enthosociological and Existential Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism”.

Does this title explain my blog’s title?

Obviously, there are two dimensions to Dugin’s view of people.

People?

Yeah, like “We, the People…”

The ethnosociological dimension addresses the question, “What is a people?”

The existential dimension addresses the question, “Why is there a people?”

Now, I move to a purely relational structure, the Greimas square.

Here is a picture.

A is the focal term, “people”.

B contrasts with the focal word, “people”. Here, I will put “person”.

C speaks against (the transliteration of “contradict”) B and complements A.

Right away, I see a technical term that Dugin uses. “Narod” is a Russian word that means “people”, in an us-versus-them sort of way. Narod is distinct from individual, class, state and race.

I ask, “What if narod goes into C?”

Once I put the word, “narod”, into C, the term, “person” in B, appears convoluted.

According, to Dugin, the narod contradicts individual, class, state and race. Plus, when I recall about how modern academics classify each person, they tend to do so according to easily observable and measurable features.

Plus, these classifications fit into a Greimas square.

Obviously, the most phenomenal feature of a person is that the person is an individual. Liberalism models the phenomena of the individual. The individual is the subject. The phenomena of individuals give rise observations and measurements, that end up in models that liberal experts use.

Class contrasts with the focal word, “individual”. Class terms include “bourgeois” and “proletariat”. Working personsself-identify as the latter. Owners of various means of production are accused of being the former. The pattern extends into culture, by associating “class” with a person’s chosen identity. Technically, class is a style of righteousness that calls persons into organizations. Communists model observations and measurements of social phenomena on the basis of distinctions among classes.

The state contradicts (or “speaks against”) class. To appreciate the contradiction, replace “class” with “state” in the above technical definition. The state is also a style of righteousness that calls persons into organization. The state is an institution that is in charge of keeping peace among institutions. Class is tied to a feedback loop between institutions and persons. When, the state replaces class, the state confounds righteousness and social order.

State-based fascists model observations and measurements of social phenomena according to the state as arbiter of order and righteousness. Fascists consider individuals to be citizens. The state (as subject) takes priority over the individual (as subject). Hence, fascisms are called “il-liberal”.

Finally, what happens when “race” substitutes for “class” as a style of righteousness that calls persons into organization?

Well, once the subject is regarded in terms of “race”, then the state decides who is free and who is a slave. That implies that there are two classes, “free” and “slave”. Certain races are free and the other races are slaves.

Oddly, the assignment of “free” or “slave” is not necessarily based on phenotypic variation among populations. But, it is often enough the case. Members of the free “race” are regarded as citizens. Members of the slave “race” are not. Thus, race-based fascism fixates on who is a citizen and who is not.

Race-based fascists model observations and measurements of social phenomena according to the state serving as arbiter of who is free and who is slave.

0009 What does this apparent digression have to do with “the person” in slot B?

If the narod, the Russian word for “people”, goes into slot C, then the person in slot B is the person as the subject of inquiry, according to a modern science-inspired ideology (B). The result may be depicted by a Greimas square for the three political theories preceding Dugin’s proposed fourth political theory.

Here is a picture.

02/24/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism” (Part 3 of 9)

0010 The previous discussion yields the following Greimas square.

0011 A is the subject of Dugin’s populism, the people.

B contains objectifications of the subject, according to modern political theories. These theories claim to be rooted in science. Yes, trust the science, even as each theory goes on to first order the people, then destroy the people on the altar of its own construction. Isn’t that what science does? It discovers the order of nature, a facet of God’s creation, then ambitious technologists use that discovery in order to create a weapon?

The pattern is ancient. But, premodern theories are not based on modern science. They are based on idolatries.

0012 This permits me to introduce a tangent not in Millerman’s text.

To me, the following strange association from the gospel of Matthew 16:13-20 mirrors Dugin’s approach, as rendered above.

0013 Here, the people (A) are those capable of ideating who Jesus is.

In Dugin’s approach, the people (A) are those capable of theorizing who they are. To me, this theorization requires speech-alone talk.

Speech-alone talk?

Consider Razie Mah’s short e-work, The First Singularity and Its Fairy Tale Trace, or the lengthy (and much more dramatic) An Archaeology of the Fall, available at smashwords and other e-work venues. Speech-alone talk defines our current Lebenswelt.

0014 Returning to the strange association, I ask, “How does B contrast with A?”

Here, B is how the people, who have no idea of what is really going on, regard Jesus in terms of contemporary political theologies. Who formulates these theories? Well, the Sadducees and Pharisees are self-anointed experts and they intend to remain that way. Indeed, they remain so until the second temple, and later, most everything else, is destroyed by the Romans, who are sorely pissed off by the rebelliousness of the province.

In Dugin’s approach, the people, who may or may not have any idea of what is really going on, embrace one or other political theory. These political theories exclude one another in the same way that sociology excludes biology and biology excludes chemistry and chemistry excludes physics. Even though the noumenon of the narod remains the same, the phenomena observed and measured by each political theory differs according to the way that the subject is objectified by each political discipline. Liberalism observes and models the individual. Communism observes and models the class. Fascism observes and models the state and race. Race is a special application of the state. “Race” is state imposition of the condition of “free” or “slave” on the basis of established criteria. How special is that?

0015 What about C in the strange association?

C contradicts B and complements A.

0016 Obviously, Jesus as an objectified subject of political theologies (B) is not who he is (A). Admission of that realitydefines (C).

So, Jesus asks a second question, where “you” (C) complements “people” (A), because “you” encompasses those living with Jesus. Indeed, it encompasses the Church as the Bride of Christ, the helper to the New Adam.

Also, the second question asks “you”, the disciples, to put the answer into spoken words.

0017 In Dugin’s approach, the narod is not the people as constituted in response to political theory, but the people as constituted by lived experience. The narod is personal. The narod is like a bride to her groom. Marriage is more than what spoken words can describe. The groom belongs to his bride.

0018 The narod (C) is the subject of the fourth political theory.

The narod cannot be understood by political science. Yet, political sciences have had their day. The people need a new political not-science. The people need a fourth political theory that is theoretical in the same way that the hermeneutical interpretation of the gospel according to to Matthew 16:13-20 is theoretical.

To this end, Dugin turns to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

02/23/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism” (Part 4 of 9)

0019 Dugin offers an entirely new discipline of political philosophy, based on the term, “narod”. He calls this discipline, “ethnosociology”. Ethnosociology is not a science. Indeed, ethnosociology stands as a noumenon in contrast with its phenomena. Phenomena are observable and measurable facets of a noumenon. The distinction between the noumenon and its phenomena is developed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

Ethnosociology (C) contradicts the first three political philosophies of the modern West (B). Ethnosociology (C) complements the people (A), the topic under consideration.

0020 The first three political philosophies of the West (B) objectify phenomena of the narod, that is, the person in community. Liberalism, communism and fascism operate as empirio-schematic judgments, where disciplinary languages bring mechanical and mathematical models into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena.

Dugin’s use of the term, “subject”, applies to the suite of phenomena that contribute to observations and measurements of one particular -ism. Substitute the word, “person” for “subject” and one gets the person as individual, class, citizen and role-bearer.

Role-bearer?

Yes, free or slave.

Or maybe, accepted or rejected.

Or maybe, pure or defiled.

Whatever the state decides.

0021 This brings me to the existential dimension, as related by Millerman.

First, the fact that the subjects and the -isms constitute a Greimas square serves as a nexus for existential concern.

Each -ism excludes the other. Liberalism excludes communism and fascism. Communism excludes fascism and liberalism. Fascism excludes liberalism and communism. Surely, the implications are existential.

Second, the fact that -isms constitute political scientific disciplines that engage sovereign power in order to exclude one another reinforces slot B as a nexus of existential concern.

Does that suggest that the fourth political theory will grasp for sovereign power in order to exclude the prior three political theories? No and yes. No, all three prior political scientific disciplines have already ruined themselves through incredible and mind-boggling failures. Yes, the fourth political theory must interpret the historic catastrophes of the prior scientific political theories in order to guide sovereigns in avoiding future cataclysms.

0022 Here is a diagram of how the two dimensions of Dugin’s populism radiate out of two slots of the Dugin’s Greimas square.

02/22/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism” (Part 5 of 9)

0023 Here are my associations, so far.

0024 The Greimas square for the term, “people”, slowly manifests.

A is the focal word, “people”.

B is the objectification of the subject (the person) by various -isms. Each -isms strives to exclude the other. In this regard, they are like normal contexts. -Isms are empirio-schematic. Social behaviors serve as phenomena. Observations and measurements of phenomena permit explicit abstractions. Explicit abstractions initiate sensible constructions of existential significance. The fourth political theory aims to interpret that existential significance.

C is the narod, encompassing both the person and the community. The narod is a noumenon. Only philosophy can address noumena, because a noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena. As such, the term, “narod”, reminds us that people in community cannot be understood as phenomena. The narod cannot be distilled into individuals, classes, citizens and so on. The narod is an actuality that philosophy struggles to articulate, but cannot, because spoken words fail. Nevertheless, the articulation must be made, because the question is posed. Who do we say that we are?

Every people faces an ethnosociological question.

D is what remains.

0025 What goes into D?

02/21/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism” (Part 6 of 9)

0026 What goes into D?

Once again, consider the strange association to Matthew 16:13-20.

Here is the complete Greimas square.

0027 D contrasts with C, contradicts A and complements B.

The contrast between D and C is clear. C is a question. D is an answer.

The contradiction between D and A is less obvious. What Peter says is not the same as who people say that Jesus is. Yet, it is the same. People intuitively feel Simon Peter’s answer, yet cannot say, because they fear the Pharisees and Sadducees. They fear those who frame the political theologies of the day. Their angst is existential.

The complement between D and B is difficult to fathom. Perhaps, the experts of Jerusalem may be able to formulate the theology of Christ as the Son of the living God (B). But, they cannot recognize Jesus as the person who fulfills theological expectations (D). The inability to recognize Jesus is existential.

0028 So, how does the complement between D and B work?

How does fulfillment (D) implicate contemporary models of the anticipated phenomena of the Christ, Son of the living God (B).

Jesus cannot be the Messiah because Jesus is not the one who fits our models.

0029 Christian theologians take note.

Dugin’s fourth political theory may be what you should be exploring.

Who defines who Jesus is?

The experts or the uncertified fisherman?

0030 To me, the complement between D and B parallels the way that a noumenon and its phenomena complement one another. The noumenon is the thing itself. Its phenomena are its observable and measurable facets. A noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.

This is one of the weird (and often not discussed) features of modern science. Every scientist works to observe and model and talk about phenomena. But, no scientist can address the noumenon, the thing itself.

But, the narod (C) is the noumenon. So, (D) must be some transit between the noumenon (C) and its phenomena (B).

Yes, Dugin’s Greimas square goes one step further.

Dugin introduces the term, “ethnos”, as that which is prior to the narod. Ethnos is where the narod comes from and where the narod cannot return to.

Here is a picture of the ethnos in its placement in Dugin’s Greimas square.

0031 Now I replace the term, “ethnos” with “cannot be objectified as” in order to elucidate a resonance.

“Cannot be objectified as” (D) is where the noumenon (C) comes from and where the noumenon (C) cannot return to. Plus, it (D) is a transit between a noumenon (C) and its phenomena (B). It (D) consists of a contradiction that exists in the realm of potential. What something is cannot be objectified as what scientists observe and measure.

“Cannot be objectified as” expresses an impossibility. Yet, here is the foundation of science.