08/5/24

Looking at Josef Pieper’s Book (1974) “Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power” (Part 4 of 8)

0791 Okay, spoken words are supposed to convey reality and facilitate common understanding.

Reality and understanding are two perfections of the spoken word.

And, these two perfections have been put on pause.

0792 One lesson is clear.

If what I say corresponds to what I think, then the perfection of spoken words point to the content level of the sophist’s interscope, as a location for reality and understanding.

0793 But, what about abusing these perfections through something that corresponds to perfectionism?

Ah, if the perfectionism of spoken words associates to sophisticated values2bthen that perfectionism is facilitated by the potential to ‘frame propositions’1b as well as the potential of ‘formalizing knowledge’1b.

0794 So, I wonder, how would rhetorical discourse3b virtually situate reason3a,1a in a fashion that accords to refined reason3c?

0795 I have a suggestion.

Let me start with how to define a spoken word.

Does this nested form provide the appearance of reality for rhetorical discourse?

0796 Note how the content-level of the interscope for the ancient Greek reasoning one1c is repackaged into the above nested form.

What I say2a is the spoken word2 and the very act of speaking associates to a message as an actuality2 and as a potential1.

What I think goes with definition3 and touches base with the potential of meaning1.

The intellect3a contextualizing the will1a goes with presence, which (in the above figure) only stands in the realm of possibility.

Ambiguities concerning whose intellect and whose will capture the attention of the inquirer.

There are many ways to resolve these ambiguities.

For example, a written English dictionary presumes that the presence (of an authority’s reason3a,1a) is substantial enough to inscribe the definition3 of a spoken word2 onto a page, in indelible ink1.

0797 Now, I can bring in the situation level.

If I associate the potentials1 underlying the definition3 of spoken words2 with elements of the nested form on the citizen level, then I can co-opt the elements that correspond to the citizen, but not the elements that correspond to a sophist’s participation on the citizen’s level.

For the citizen, meaning1 underlies a spoken word2.  Meaning is what I think2a.

For the sophist, what I propose (is the meaning)1 underlies a spoken word2.

For the citizen, message1 underlies a spoken word2.  Message is what I say2a.

For the sophist, what I proclaim (is the message)1 underlies a spoken word2.

For the citizen, presence1 underlies a spoken word2.  That presence1 is my intellect3a and my will1a.

For the sophist, the intellect3a characterizes whether one particular word2 is used or not.  The presence of one particular word as opposed to another particular word may be crucial to victory1a.  This selection corresponds to the machinations of the intellect3a, directly, and the victorious will1a... er… the will1a, indirectly.

0798 Now, I may reconfigure the category-based nested form for definition into a style where the “I” becomes more ambiguous.  The citizen may think that “I” is me”.  But, the sophist is confident that “I” is “we”, the ones who are participating in the forum.

Here is a diagram of the reconfigured definition.

0799 Technically, what I say2a no longer associates with the spoken word2, it2a only goes with the potential of message1.

Also, what I think2a no longer associates with definition3, it2a only goes with the potential of meaning1.

0800 So, theoretically, while the potential of meaning presence and message associates to the all three elements of the citizen-level nested form, this reconfigured definition no longer implies that what I say2a entails both actuality2 (of spoken words2) and potential1 (of message1) and that what I think2a entails both normal context3 (of definition3) and potential1(of meaning1).

Practically, the potential of framing propositions1b and formalizing knowledge1b packages the entire contenta-level of the citizen interscope.  It1b does so through definition3.  The normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of spoken words2 into relation with the possibilities of meaning, presence and message1.  Yes, that entire nested form goes into the situationb-level potential1.

0801 Here is a picture.

08/3/24

Looking at Josef Pieper’s Book (1974) “Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power” (Part 5 of 8)

0802 Once again, here is the interscope for the Sophist tradition.

0803 The purposes of spoken words are two fold.  The first is to convey the reality of rhetorical discourse.  The second is to package understanding.  Rhetorical discourse3b and properly packaged understanding1b sustain sophisticated values2b.  Sophisticated values2b virtual situate the content-level actuality2a where the citizen imagines that what I think [should correspond to] what I say2a.

A clever student may have noticed that the presence underlying the spoken word associates to both the intellect3a and the will1a.  So, what does it imply that an education in rhetoric involves intellectual exercises?  Lots of intellectual exercises!  Why else would someone take a course from Prodicus?  Everyone in Athens knows that the five-drachma lecture is a teaser for the fifty-drachma lecture. And, the fifty-drachma lecture delivers the intellectual goods on how to frame propositions1b.

0804 Oh, the power of intellectual success!

Pieper tells a story about Albert Einstein, who is both perplexed and amused when an American university offers him a million dollars in order to buy the twelve original handwritten pages of his theory of relativity.

0805 What is that university3c purchasing?

It3c is not purchasing the argument2a, that is already published.  Nor is it3c purchasing the way that Einstein reframed the propositions of physics, from the point of view where all things are in motion, consequently no location is fixed1b.

Instead, the university3c sees an opportunity1c for the ownership2c of the handwritten papers that document Einstein’s theoretical breakthrough2a.  These papers2a represent Einstein’s victorious will1a.  These papers2a are the content that is situated by Einstein’s monumental reframing of physics1b.  To purchase2c these papers2a is to acquire the reputation2bafforded to Einstein3a,1a, but at a much lower price2b.  The ancient Greeks have a word for this type of transaction.  English does not. English translators translate the Greek word into “flattery1c“.

See 1 Thessalonians 2.5.

0806  Here is how flattery enters into the picture.

08/2/24

Looking at Josef Pieper’s Book (1974) “Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power” (Part 6 of 8)

0807 After this rollout on the abuse of language, I return to the virtual nested form in the category of firstness.

0808 I summarize.

The will1a to speak my mind2a addresses the two-fold purpose to spoken words and language.

First, spoken words should picture or point to their referents.  In this, they do not.  But, they do the next best thing.  Spoken words convey reality.  Reality is one perfection of spoken words.

Second, spoken words intend to establish a common understanding.  What is understanding?  Understanding is a complete nested form, where a normal context3 brings an actuality2 into relation with its potential1.  Spoken words2 need to do that.  That need is satisfied for a spoken word when a definition3 brings that spoken word2 into relation with the potential of meaning, presence and message1.

0809 In the normal context of rhetorical discourse3b, sophists formally package understanding1b according to variations of the above formula.  Definition3 brings a spoken word2 into relation with the potentials of what I think (meaning)1what I say (message)1, and the intellect1as that which characterizes whether one particular word is used or not.

0810 What about the will1a?

Well, the only reason why the sophist3b situates the citizen3a,1a through rhetorical discourse3b is to be victorious1a.

Oops.  I should not have mentioned that.

0811 Instead, let me say that the sophist3b frames each proposition1b in order to articulate sophisticated values2b (the citizen3a,1a is obviously incapable of doing this, since he is merely saying what he thinks2a).  This requires that the understanding that the citizen expresses2a be repackaged into well-defined propositions1b in such a manner that the ongoing discourse3b reveals the reality that the sophist wants the citizen to endorse.

0812 Finally, the packaging of knowledge1b, the sophistication of the argument2b and the reality of the discourse itself3bflatter1c the one who pays the sophist3c and provides the opportunity1c for a decision2c that will provide well-deserved remuneration.

I suspect that the last sentence may be regarded as offensive by the one who pays3c.  No one is supposed to talk about the one who pays the sophist from the riches that he earns from political manipulation of public decisions.

Plus, sophists3b are not really redefining the meaning, message and presence underlying spoken words.  They are “adjusting” them to suite their needs.  Yes, particular situations call for particular adjustments.  Finally, the victorious will1a does not opportunistically say what is necessary to win1a.  The intellect3a with the he victorious will1a only stateswhat furthers a rhetorical position1a.

0813 Now, the reason why Plato despises the sophists becomes a little more transparent.

Their abuse of words leads to the corruption of language.

After all, the two functions of spoken words are to convey reality and to achieve understanding.

Neither is furthered by the virtual nested form pictured above.

0814 The sophist is not concerned about the truth.  The truth should resonate with my will1a, but it does not, because there are two wills in play on the content level, the will of the citizen1a and the will of the victory-oriented sophist1a.  The same can be said for the intellect3a.

0686 Here is a picture.

0815 Indeed, in regards to the content-level normal context, my intellect3a confronts a sophisticated intellect3a in the arena that serves as a forum for citizens making decisions3b.

0816 Is this an abusive relationship?

What chance does the citizen have?  When the citizen speaks, he says what is on his mind.  He speaks what he is thinking.  When his opponent speaks, he says what is necessary to achieve victory.

08/2/24

Looking at Josef Pieper’s Book (1974) “Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power” (Part 7 of 8)

0817 What about the abuse of power?

Here is a picture of the virtual nested form in the realm of normal contexts.

0818 As already noted, there are two nested forms contesting the content (or citizen) level.  One goes with the unsophisticated citizen.  The other associates with the “educated” sophist.

The normal context of rhetorical discourse3b does not respect the integrity of traditional spoken-word associations.  Tradition builds language.  Sophism3b manipulates what it did not create. Indeed, if the chances of victory1a were not enhanced by the clever use of spoken words, then the situation-level would not flourish and the perspective-level would not attain the fusion of money and persuasion that builds unimaginable fortunes.

0819 How so?

Why else would the one who pays3c, hiding behind the veil of refined reason3c, be willing to suffer the price commanded by the sophist who can get the job done2b?

For example, a trader who has cleared the roads to Thebes pays a sophist to advocate for a war between Athens and Syracuse, which will stop transport between Syracuse and Athens, but not stop transport between Syracuse and Thebes.  If a declaration of war2c between Athens and Syracuse is passed, even if it only means a cessation of direct trading, then the Thebes-connected trader can now be the sole importer into Athens from Syracuse through Thebes, with the additional benefit of higher prices due to rarity… er… supply-chain challenges.

After all, there is no substitute for the raisins of Syracuse.

0820 The sophist3b will offer convincing reasons for why Athens should declare war2b, which is different from actually conducting a war, because this declaration will merely decree that no ships that have ported in Syracuse may dock in Athens for certain period of time.  Yes, this is a “limited war”, an “economic war”, a “war sanctioning Syracuse” for its offensive behaviors, including undercutting raisin production around Athens by offering dried grapes of higher quality at lower price.

What reasonable citizen would not vote for such a “war”?

0821 What happens after the “war” is enacted?

The citizen’s wife later complains that the price of those delicious and affordable raisins from Syracuse has skyrocketed, and the slaves who are supposed to pick the dried grapes around Athens have been tasked with other labors.

Will the reasonable citizen now vote for a decree demanding that the Athenian slaves who once picked raisins must now return to their old jobs?

No, that would be crazy.

0823 Perhaps, the reasonable citizen will realize, too late, that he voted for a decision2c that makes no sense.

0824 So, he goes to the sophist to complain and finds that the sophist has changed.  His consort is not longer this plain-looking woman from a wealthy family.  His consort is incredibly beautiful and obviously trained in the arts of…

Well never mind that!

0825 Meanwhile, the trader, whose clandestine meeting with his sophist has been interrupted by this “reasonable citizen”, stands behind a curtain and overhears the conversation.  The trader silently feels the power inherent in what he has done.  He has brought Athens to its knees.  Over dried grapes, no less.  Such a little thing presages greater things.  Soon, Athens will be on its knees to this trader, who will then demand the war that he desires.  Yes, the trader angles for a real war, not with Syracuse, but with unsuspecting Thebes, whose trading business is ripe for takeover.

08/1/24

Looking at Josef Pieper’s Book (1974) “Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power” (Part 8 of 8)

0826 Needless to say, the trader with refined reason3c belongs to one of the finest families in Athens.

The ancients have a saying, “The best, corrupted, become the worst.”

Abuse of power goes hand in hand with abuse of language.

Abuse of language manifests in the realm of possibility1.

Abuse of power develops in the realm of normal contexts3.

0827 Here is a picture.

0828 The actualities2 of the sophist interscope are topics of gossip and conversation.

0829 Does the sophist really believe what he says?

Is the idea that Athens should economically sanction Syracuse not the same as “war”?

Well, it is and it isn’t.

What is the definition of the word, “war”?

And finally, what about the enforcement of the sanctions?

Of course, Athenian troops can stop ships from Syracuse from docking, but is that enough?

I hear rumors that ships are now simply bypassing Athens and going to Thebes.

0830 In the forum, the bought-off… er… well-paid sophist hears what people are saying.  He has a ready reply, “Thebes is causing a problem.  We should think about going to war with Thebes.  Not, this weak-kneed sanction business, but full-fledged conquest.”

0831 It’s like selling candy to a baby.

This is what Plato sees.

0832 What is there to stop the sophists3b and their behind-the-scenes sponsors3c?

If a reasonable person3a,1a adopts the sophist terminology, then the reasonable person3a,1a buys into the way that the sophist3b has framed the citizen’s reality and understanding.

Consequently, even the reasonable person’s thoughts are tainted, because what he says (using a word whose meaning, presence and message has been tweaked by the sophist) cannot correspond to what he thinks (because he thinks in terms of the traditional meaning, presence and message of the spoken word).

0833 A citizen may ask, “Would sending a delegation to Thebes asking what is going on be a way to avoid war?”

The sophist replies, “No, Athena forbid!  Sending a delegation would be an act of war.  Obviously, the traders in Thebesalready are trying to take advantage of our conflict with Syracuse.  We all know that ships from Syracuse are docking in Thebes.  Sending a delegation would only tip them off, so they would attack us, with the assistance of Syracuse, before we can attack them.”

0834 The sophist interscope supports ruinous political decisions. 

But, does the sweetness of refined reason3c turn to bitterness?

Or does the fish rot from the head, down?

0835 The one who pays to support refined reason3c no longer believes that refined reason3c is right reason.  Instead, it is a way to gain advantage1c by promoting political decisions2c that favor the elite, rather than all citizens.  Without a doubt, the most advantageous political decision2c is the one2c where public citizens bear the risks and costs and private elites gain the benefits. 

0836 Today, experts2b call these arrangements, “public-private partnerships”.  The arrangement sounds attractive, “the public” (that is, a government bureaucracy) works with “private” citizens (that is, very wealthy operators) in order to accomplish goals that neither can achieve alone, such as an active war with Thebes while engaging in sanctions with Syracuse.

Finally, the citizen becomes confused and starts saying what the sophist says as if it is his own thought.  Sanctions are war.  Diplomacy is war.  Thebes and Syracuse must be defeated.  No one quite knows why, because reason3a,1a itself has fallen into sophistry2b.

0837 Tyranny is near when reason3a,1a falls into sophistry2b, because a dictator and his allies may declare what one can say, as if that is the gateway to what one can think.  Citizens who have fallen into sophistry have no defense and end up blaming those who speak against sophistry.

0838 Weirdly, this is the topic is covered from a completely different approach, in the ninth and tenth primers of the series, How To Define the Word “Religion” and Related Primers, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  The titles are A Primer on Classical Political Philosophy and A Primer on Another Infrasovereign Religion.

0840 So, what was Plato’s problem?

We all know what happened to Socrates.

His admirers and compatriots, including Plato, were devastated.

Plato could only stop, and lay flat, and look into the empty sky.

And, an interventional sign-relation comes to be.

07/31/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 1 of 26)

0023 The full title of the book before me is A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition: The Name of the Game (Anthem Press: London and New York). The book seems brief, but it packs a lot of material in sixteen short chapters… well… technically, an introduction, fourteen chapters and a conclusion.

0024 Professor Steve Fuller introduces the topic with the headline, “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Post-Truth Condition”.  The headline is a tongue in cheek reference to Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 intellectually pleasing masterpiece, “Dr. Strangelove”.

Yet, one has only to trace Kubrick’s career trajectory to envision a conclusion beyond worry and love.  Kubrick dies in 1999 after wrapping up a homage to the will, titled “Eyes Wide Shut”.

0025 What matters is not whether something is true or false.

What matters is how something is decided.

The first statement concerns the intellect.  The second statement concerns the will.

0026 So, how is a matter to be decided?

Shall we call upon the experts?

Consider the issues of anxiety and affection.  An expert may reduce diverse and unsettling experiences to phenomena that can be observed and measured.  Then, the expert may build a model, using a specialized disciplinary language.  Next, with that model in hand, the expert will consider avenues to control the phenomena.

0027 For example, in a casual academic encounter at a university, I meet a needy and uncertain scholar who constantly nags her compatriot and (most likely) lover about the importance of managing her anxiety.  Of course, the university setting is full of people making odd demands, so I think nothing of it.  Later, I find out that her “husband” is a pharmaceutical salesman.

Indeed, she learned how to stop worrying about her field of inquiry and to love her husband with his briefcase full of Valium samples.

0028 So, is there a problem?

Fuller suggests that the “distance” between the layperson and the expert shrinks, because a layperson can become acquainted with the disciplinary language of any field of expertise well enough as to ask apparently intelligent questions. Yes, a question may be posed to the pharmaceutical salesman that goes like this, “I can see that your lover is addicted to Valium.  Could you tell me exactly the mechanism for how this drug operates on the love-centers of the brain?”

To which the expert in marketing scoffs, “The human brain has frontal, parietal and occipital lobes.  The human brain has a cerebellum.  These anatomical structures perform various specialized neurological functions.  Okay?  The human brain does not have a ‘love-center’.  What an ignorant question.”

0029 Indeed, the salesman goes on to testify before a legislative committee on the need to monitor and reduce the amount of medical disinformation on the internet.  When laypeople read books on the neurological underpinnings of sexual attraction and drug addiction, they think that they’ve learned something.  They think that they can ask revealing questions. So, they stupidly ask about “cerebral love centers”.

A law must be passed to deter this conduct.

0030 What does Fuller predict?

Just as during the Reformation, when Bibles printed in the layperson’s language opened the opportunity for any layperson to interpret sacred text, the current internet allows anyone who can read to become familiar with the language of any specialized discipline.  Then, that layperson may publish a podcast that asks… um… revealing questions about what experts are supposed to know best.

The cost of entry into the market is astonishing low. So, many experts argue that it is the responsibility of the state to increase that cost through regulation and censorship.

07/30/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 2 of 26)

0031 Fuller’s introduction continues to set the scene.

First, this player’s guide is a follow up to the foundational text, published in 2018, titled, Post-Truth: Knowledge as a Power Game.

0032 Second, the post-truth condition is not merely an exercise in relativism.  It is more.  Relativism makes the most sense when one (the holder of the relativist position) is outside of all relativized jurisdictions.  Imagine the advantages that the relativist one must have in order to make that presumption.  There is only one absolute and that is me, acting as a disinterested observer and declaring that all other opinions are relative… er… not absolute.

Well, if the post-truth condition is more than an exercise in relativism, and if the relativist one has the very attractive advantage of being able to account for all other stances as part of a relativist system, then what is the problem?

What about those who remain in the relativized jurisdictions?

I suppose that the scrappy player needs see things from the standpoint of his opponents, and if possible, turn that to an advantage.

And, that is not easy to do when one’s “opponent” does not dwell in one’s jurisdiction… or any relativized jurisdiction, for that matter.

So, I wonder, “Where does the expert appear in this exercise in more-than-relativism?”

Well, the expert must be located between the relativist one and the scrappy player.

0033 If I think in terms of category-based nested forms, then the following nested form applies.

I say, “The perspectivec of the relativist one virtually brings the situationb of expertise on a specific topic into relation with contenta produced by scrappy players exercising their reason.

Or, maybe, I can say, “The relativist one3c relativizes all jurisdictions… or ‘turfs’… of academic expertise3b.  Then, diverse fields of expertise3b virtually situate scrappy players3a.”

0034 This nested form is protean because each element immediately expands into its own nested form.  See A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

In brief, this protean nested form expands into a three-level interscope.

Is this how the relativist one socially constructs a post-truth world?

07/29/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 3 of 26)

0035 Educational institutions issue credentials.  Credentials associate to expertise.  Credentials are metaphorical keys (situation-level actualities2b) to metaphorical locks (perspective-level potentials1c).  Credentials2b are key for opportunities1c that lead to success2c.

Here is how these elements enter a post-truth interscope, where the perspectivec, situationb and contenta levels are denominated by the protean nested form.

0036 In chapter one, Fuller dwells upon the central term, “post-truth”.

Reason imposes chains on itself.  How so?  Well, knowledge gets formalized.  For example, what is worth knowing is divided from what is not worth knowing.  Well, then, what is worth knowing?  Formalized knowledge is so much worth knowing that it1b supports the awarding of credentials2b by an educational institution3c.

0037 Back in the introduction, Fuller recalls Willard Quine’s insight. A knowledge claim that requires a massive change to the overall “web of belief” will be considered dubious until academically domesticated.  In other words, a novel notion that is true will stand as just another opinion that is on offer on the content level until academics make it their own.

This implies that a “web of belief” constitutes the expert level.

 Plus, the expert level situates the scrappy (or is it “crappy”?) player level.

0038 These developments are entered into the following diagram.

0039 Well, if formalizing knowledge1b domesticates a knowledge claim2a that might call for a massive cognitive change,then the ‘something’1a that underlies opinions2a must be ‘something’ to be reckoned with.  ‘Something’1a may be too creative to process.  ‘Something’1a may be too destructive.  Or, ‘something’1a may change the status quo.

0040 Look at the content-level nested form.  There are two aspects.  One associates to the normal context3a.  The other associates to potential1a.  Both aspects concern reason.

Fuller offers a psychological formula.  Reason equals intellect plus will.

Are these the two aspects?

If so, then intellect3a is the normal context3a that chains the creative and destructive potential of the will1a.  The  actuality of facts and claims2a (that is, opinions2a) emerges from (and situates) the creative and destructive potential of the will1a, within the normal context of the intellect3a.

0041 Here a picture of the ongoing post-truth interscope.

0042 The question now arises, asking, “Who or what goes into the perspective-level normal context?”

If the perspective-level normal context is the relativist one3c, then this particular element becomes a safe-haven, outside of all traditional (credentialed) jurisdictions, yet holding all the metaphorical locks and keys to success.  All educational institutions3b, as well as all forums for discourse3b, are relative, according to the relativist one3c.

0043 Here is how the interscope may be spoken.

On the content (or scrappy player) level, the normal context of the intellect3a brings the actuality of diverse facts and claims (that is, opinions)2a into relation with the potential of the will1a.

On the situation (or expert) level, the normal context of an educational institution3b brings the actuality of credentials2binto relation with the potential of ‘formalizing knowledge’1b.

On the perspective (or relativist one) level, the normal context of one who stands above all relativized jurisdictions3cbrings the actuality of success2c into relation with the potential of opportunities1c.

Perspective brings situation into relation with content.

07/27/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 4 of 26)

0044 One implication of the complete three-level interscope for the post-truth condition takes the title of chapter two, “Post-Truth Is About Finding A Game One Can Win”.

The relativist one3c operates a justified “true” belief system.

The key term is not “true”.

The key term is “operates”.

0045 Yes, “operates” has the same first syllable as “opportunity”.

What is opportunity1c beyond the potential of putting credentials2b into perspective?

0046 According to Fuller, the operational game of “axiology” starts with a continuum, such as the continuum between what must be done and what cannot be done, then explicitly divides the continuum according to two labels: “necessity” and “impossibility”.

In terms of on-the-ground impact, such a division may be regarded as nonsense, even when applied to a single topic.

0047 Consider a nagging issue faced by ancient Athenians.  The Kingdom of Syracuse!  What do we do about it?  When hearing the diverse facts and claims around the market2a, one would conclude that war with Syracuse is both necessary and impossible.  But, once a sophist3b opportunistically formalizes the issue in terms of an either/or proposition1b, then one party gathers under the banner of “necessity” and one party gathers under the banner of “impossibility”2b

The result is a hylomorphic structure, where the party of impossibility standing against the party of necessity occupies the slot for credentials2b.  At this juncture, the solution to the contention between the two parties becomes obvious.  The party saying that war is not possible does not want to do anything.  But, doing nothing is not an option.  Doing nothing will only make war more necessary.

0048 Does that sound like an opportunity1c?

Here is a picture of this unfolding drama.

Go from left to right.

0049 Now, I wonder, “Does the relativist one3c care whether Athens decides to go to war with Syracuse?  Or, does the relativist one3c only care about arriving at… what may be called… the actions associated with a justified belief… that is… success2c?”

07/26/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 5 of 26)

0050 Here is the the post-truth interscope for the ongoing example.

Diverse claims about Syracuse2a are virtually situated by one party under the banner saying that war is necessary2b and another party under the banner saying that war is not possible2b in the normal context of a public forum3b operating on the potential of ‘situating rumors about what to do about Syracuse’1b.

Does the relativist one3c know what will happen after Athens gathers a fleet and sails to Syracuse?  Or, is the relativist one3c clever enough to cast a veil of ignorance1b over a cauldron of irreconcilable claims2a thus constituting a post-truth game2b that results in a particular organized endeavor2c?  See page 21 of Fuller’s text for that question.

0051 Remember, for the post-truth condition, what matters is not whether something is true or false.

What matters is how something is decided.

The first statement concerns the intellect.  The second statement concerns the will.

0052 This reminder suggests a flaw in a preceding figure.

The starting point for a virtual nested form in the realm of firstness (the column in the realm of possibility) is not the various opinions of the people in Athens2a, it is their will1a.

Here, the virtual normal context is on the left and the virtual potential is on the right.

0053 The normal context of a resolution of contradictions between the parties of impossibility and necessity1c virtually brings the actuality of the formalization of impossibility in contrast to necessity1b into relation with the possibility of the wills of the people of Athens in regards to Syracuse1a.

Success2c takes the form of a judgment that leads to action.