12/19/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 5 of 20)

0033 Where does this notion of specificative extrinsic formal causality come from?

Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings is a good place to start.

The specifying sign is embedded in a formula for sensible construction, arrived at by Latin schoolmen during the later Middle Ages.

Obviously, the scholastics did not know that.  The discovery of the triadic nature of the sign-relation comes towards the end of centuries of philosophical inquiry and debate (say nothing of political intrigue), during a period labeled, “Baroque scholasticism”.  Baroque scholars witness the end of the Latin Age at the same time that mechanical philosophers usher in the beginning of the Age of Ideas (that is, the modern period).  This terminology comes from John Deely (1942-2017 AD) and appears in his massive tome, The Four Ages (2001).  The four ages are the Greek Age, the Latin Age, the Age of Ideasand the forthcoming Age of Triadic Relations.

0034 The category-based nested form comes in handy when portraying sensible construction.  Here is a picture for how humans think.

0035 There are several items to note.

First, the actualities are Latin terms.  “Species” (say it with an Italian accent, with lots of cheese) means “type of”.  “Impressa” means impression or sensation or feeling.  “Expressa” means perception or phantasm or emotional reaction.

Second, the situation level emerges from (and virtually situates) the content level.  The vertical elements are nested.  Species expressa2b virtually situates species impressa1a.  The qualifier, “virtual”, means “in virtue”, for the mind, and “in simulation”, for the brain.

Third, Aristotle’s four causes allow me to appreciate normal context3 and potential1.  The four causes allow me to comprehend an actuality2.  Material, instrumental, final and formal causes elucidate a category-based form that incorporates the actuality at hand.

0036 Say what?

At the start of chapter three in Dennett’s book, titled “On the Origins of Reasons”, the author lists Aristotle’s four causes.  Two of the four causes are familiar to scientists.  These are the material and efficient (or instrumental) causes.  The other two causes are ruled out by the positivist intellect.  These are formal and final causes.  Today, formal and final causalities are not regarded as “scientific” at all.

0037 What does this imply?

Without all of Aristotle’s four causes, only actualities are relevant.  The normal contexts and potentials cannot be considered, much less appreciated.  A species impressa2a and a species expressa2b constitute a manifest image of sensible construction.  The following figure is the corresponding scientific image.

0038 Well, there goes the whole discussion on how Darwin’s paradigm and the specifying sign may be analogies of one another.

Indeed, there goes the specifying sign, along with comprehension.

0039 The scientific picture only allows for material and instrumental causation.

Yet, we cannot comprehend any actuality without final and formal causation.

What can we do if we cannot comprehend?

We can assess competence.

0040 We can measure phenomena of perceptions in response to particular sensations.

How does a human brain come to recognize that the dog is happy because it wags its tail?

Can I fashion a mechanical or mathematical model, using a disciplinary language, describing neurons selecting for synapses which either exploit or avoid an affordance?

How does one build a model on observations and measurements of species impressa1b and species expressa2b?

One scientific model would be like a giant betting parlor filled with neocortical neurons, where each successful bet raises the stakes.  A perception, a species expressa2b, is like a winner2b, in this regard.  A phantasm2b depends on the survival and demise of synapses, so the qualia of the species impressa2a (those impressions, sensations and feelings) constitute the “winnings’ that perception2b rakes in (and must use to bet again).

0041 In many respects, the survival and demise of synapses1b corresponds to what psychologists might call “priming” or “training”.  Neurons perform natural selection3b on synapses2b.  The result is not comprehension.  The result is competence.

My brain’s reading of my dog’s attitude2b, my species expressa2b, turns into an example of competence, stimulated by observations of my dog’s tail2a.  My brain is competent at conjuring a phantasm2b that seems, upon subsequent reflection, to be perfectly sensible.

0042 My brain’s competence even extends to Daisy’s reaction to the neighbor’s cat.

Here is a diagram.

0043 At this juncture, I feel that I am on the verge of slipping from my brain to my mind.

Oh, I meant to say, “the user-illusion of my brain”.

0044 The first aspect of the slippage goes with chapter eight, titled “Brains Made of Brains”, more or less applying the Darwinian paradigm as a metaphor for the specifying sign.  Neurons3b selectively breed synapses1b in order to participate in adaptive neural networks2b.

0046 The second part of the slippage starts with chapter three, titled “The Origin of Reason”, and concerns the fact that, on the occasion of my reactionary dog encountering the neighbor’s revolutionary cat, the process of natural selection3b of neural synapses3b, provides me with a phantasm2b, a manifest image2b, a species expressa2b, that avoids the affordance1bimplied by my dog’s tail action2a.  I pull Daisy back on her leash in order to prevent her from engaging in an impetuous action.

Yes, my brain provides its user with an illusion.  The phantasm2b that occupies my mind is a solution to a challenge similar to the Turing test.  The Turning test asks a question, “Can a human observer distinguish whether an action or behavior is in virtue or in simulation?”  If the answer is no, then the action passes the test.  My phantasm2b is a human thought that passes Turing’s test. It has the virtue of being human. But, that does not mean that I created my phantasm.

0047 No, a specific application of the Darwinian paradigm “designed” my phantasm2b.

I do not comprehend how I obtain the phantasm2b in my mind, because it has been designed without a designer.  It has been conjured by an evolutionary process.

Even more, the phantasm in my mind swarms with formal and final causalities, which cannot be recognized by a positivist intellect, er, I mean to say… a scientist.

The positivist intellect has a rule.

Metaphysics is not permitted.

12/18/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 6 of 20)

0048 In science, metaphysics is not allowed.

Yet, Aristotle’s four causes allow comprehension, because they step out of the physics of material and instrumental causalities, even as they include them.  Comprehension wraps actuality2 with a normal context3 and a potential1.  The resulting category-based nested form entangles actuality, even as it transcends actuality.

Are triadic relations real?

Are they real enough to provide the ultimate human niche?

0049 Surely, the similarity between the relational structure of Darwin’s paradigm and the specifying sign is unsettling. Dennett writes this similarity out of his many scenarios.  Why?  The similarity stinks of metaphysics.

0050 Say what?

The absence and the presence of metaphysics is on display when comparing the content-level of the Darwinian paradigmand the content level of the human mind, as depicted by those medieval Aristotelian scholastics. 

0051 For the Darwinian paradigm, metaphysics is not allowed.

There is no content-level normal context3a and potential1a.

Biologists do not worry about comprehending the actuality independent of the adapting species2a.  All they worry about is the potential of the actuality2a in defining a niche1b.

0052 For the scholastic picture of the way humans think, metaphysics is allowed.

Why?

Signs cannot be understood without metaphysics (that is, final and formal causation).

The species impressa2a is the sign-vehicle of the specifying sign (SVs), regardless of what is happening3a and the potential of ‘something happening’1a.  Yet, the specifying sign-vehicle2a becomes affordance-rich when the content-level normal context3a and potential1a are available.  The normal context3a associates to formal causation.  The potential1aassociates to final causation.  Without a content-level normal context3a and potential1a, situating an impression1b becomes difficult and prone to error.  The impression2a becomes less comprehensible.

0053 When I take my dog on a walk and the beast suddenly puts her tail between her legs (SVs) , I know that she is upset (SOs).  That is the specifying sign-relation in action.

When she does so when encountering the neighbor’s cat, I see the cat as well.  The cat triggers a species impressa2a.  She has prehensile paws that may claw my dog’s nose.

In this instance, what is going on in my brain is more like the selective breeding of synapses, because the actuality independent of the adapting synapses2a… er… the species impressa2a presents within a non-empty normal context3a and potential1a.

0054 On other occasions, I do not know what is happening3a nor what possibilities are raised1a when her tail goes between her hind legs2a.  

In these instances, what is going on in my brain is more like a wide-open exercise in synaptic selection.  No phantasm seems adaptive until an affordance becomes obvious.

0055 My conclusion?

A species impressa2a, an impression2a, a sensation2a or a feeling2a marks a human encounter with a thing or event.

If the content-level species impressa2a is embedded in the normal context of what is happening3a and the potential of ‘something’ happening1a, then the affordance1b is obvious and neuron-facilitated synapse selection3b produces a familiar species expressa2a through a Darwinian process similar to selective breeding1b.  Selective breeding of synapses1bcorresponds to rote learning.  That is, competence without comprehension.

If the content-level species impressa2a does not occur in the normal context of what is happening3a and if the potential of ‘something’ happening1a is not apparent, then affordance1b is not obvious and neuron-facilitated synapse selection3b will not produce a stable species expressa2b unless an affordance1b becomes obvious or another process (besides sensible construction) is initiated at a level higher than the situation level.

0056 I know what is happening3a when Daisy encounters the neighbor’s cat on our morning walk.  I worry that the cat’s fast moving paws may make mince-meat out of my dog’s precious snout.  So, I pull on the leash, in order to avoid confrontation.  That is my example of the selective-breeding of neural synapses.

At the same time, I wonder about other options.  Such wondering introduces an affordance that is not so obvious. Consequently, I have the user-experience of a phantasm2b that is odd and constantly in need of revision.  Do I call this option, “incompetence without comprehension”?  Or “temptation without a devil”?

12/16/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 7 of 20)

0057 The preceding blog brings me to an unappreciated, almost subliminal, theme in Dennett’s book.  Dennett strives to defend scientific rationalism as opposed to… well… my blather about specificative extrinsic formal causality.  Phantasm2band manifest images2b are the stuff of opinions.  They2b merely situate content.  Even though they2b appear to concern reality, they2b are really user-end illusions, like the meanings of spoken words or the interfaces of mobile-phone applications.  They2b are the products of both evolutionary paradigms and explicit abstraction.  Evolutionary paradigms contribute to design in one way.  Explicit abstraction contributes to design in another way.

0058 Here is a picture of terms that apply to actualities in a two-level interscope.

0059 It makes me wonder about that word, “design”.

Is “design” an attribute of the manifest image2b that dwells in the user-end illusion that I call “my mind”?

Or does “design” apply to the neural networks2b that result from neurons3b naturally selecting for synapses1b?

Is my user-end illusion best described as a little homunculus capable of planning and carrying out those plans orcompetence without comprehension?

0060 Or, do these questions pose a false dichotomy?

Are my neurons like selective breeders of synapses?  Do synapses flourish when plugged into a neural network?  Do neurons and synapses serve as the material and instrumental support for an immaterial phantasm?  I suppose so.  Neurons are long-lived compared to synapses.  So, they may support selection through producing and sustaining synapses. Neurons are entrepreneurs who often outlive one particular business (neural network) and end up participating in another.  The pattern of synapses established by a neuron2b may be regarded as an adaptation2b.

0061 For classical biological evolution, natural selection operates on individuals within a species.  Each individual is on its own.

For the evolution that Dennett is interested in, synapses are not like individuals.  They are like toolkits, designed for neurons to network with other neurons.

0062 Okay, then let me take that to the next level.

I wonder whether the relation between human culture and our species expressa2b, have the same evolutionary configuration.  So, human culture reproduces neuronal natural selection3b and a meme2a, a species impressa2a,reproduces the role of the synapse.  After all, humans are long-lived compared to memes.  Memes are not individuals.  They are like toolkits, designed for humans to network with other humans.

Instead of “neural evolution”, Dennett proposes the label “cultural evolution”.

0063 This brings me back to the manifest image, produced mechanically and instrumentally by neuron-driven evolution,and, perhaps, mechanically and instrumentally producing cultural evolution.

Am I like a neuron of cultural evolution?

Think about it.

0064 Thank God that Daisy has not figured out that option.

The logic of this exposition would have Daisy as a short-lived synapse-like being held on a leash by a long-lived neuron-like master.

0065 What an incredible manifest image!   What portraits of neuronal and cultural Darwinian paradigms are on display in Dennett’s book.  Metaphysics-laden manifest images accord with the author’s physics-laden scientific images… er… models of biological and social phenomena.  Yet, Dennett does not clearly envision the accordance.

0066 Why?

Dennett’s work contains a subliminal, or maybe… a sublime, defense of the scientific worldview.

A versatile and productive diagram for the scientific enterprise is developed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

12/15/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 8 of 20)

0067 The year, 1935 AD, stands in the interim between the “First World War” and the “Second World War”.

Remember, these terms are modern labels for two brief historical periods.

Jacques Maritain publishes his book in the interim.  He lives in France, where Christendom faces an apparently mortal enemy: Modernity.

0068 Modernity has modern science in its arsenal.  Christendom has… um… a newly revived Thomism, apparently ill-suited for the intellectual fashions coming from allegedly “scientific” movements, such as Darwinism, Marxism, Saussure’s linguistics, Husserl’s phenomenology, quantum physics, and so on.  Catholic intellectuals in Paris, a former epicenter of medieval scholasticism, ask, “What is the nature of science?”

Maritain’s answer may be diagrammed according to the triadic structure of judgment.  A judgment contains three interlocking elements: relation, what is and what ought to be.  A judgment is a relation between what is and what ought to be.  When each element is assigned one of Peirce’s categories, then the judgment becomes actionable.  Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.

0069 Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment.

0070 A positivist intellect (relation) brings a noumenon […and…] its phenomena (what is) into relation with an empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be).

0071 Note that two judgments are entangled.  The empirio-schematic judgment is embedded within the Positivist’s judgment.  The empirio-schematic judgment is what ought to be.  It is also imbued with the category of secondness, the realm of actuality.  To the scientist, a model is more real than its supporting observations and measurements.  How so?  One may make predictions about future observations and measurements based on the model.

0072 Also note that what is has a hylomorphic structure, even though it belongs to the category of firstness, the realm of possibility.  Aristotle presents an exemplary hylomorphe: matter [substantiates] form.  This hylomorphe fits Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists in two real contiguous elements.  For Aristotle’s hylomorphe, the real elements are matter and form.  The contiguity is labeled “substance”.  For clear nomenclature, I place the contiguity in brackets.

In the above figure, the substance labeled “…and…” is far more complicated than it appears.  The full hylomorphe is a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena.  […And…] is short for […cannot be objectified as…].

Perhaps, it will be no surprise that the noumenon associates to Dennett’s term, “manifest image”.

0073 Dennett’s scientific image is located in what ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment.  Here is a picture of the empirio-schematic judgment.

0074 How do diagrams of the Positivist’s and empirio-schematic judgment illuminate Dennett’s subliminal… or is it sublime?… defense of the Positivist’s judgment?

To start, I wonder, “What elements associate to the manifest image and to the scientific image?”

Well, obviously, the manifest image and the noumenon go together.

The scientific image matches mathematical and mechanical models.

0075 Here is a result of the substitutions.

0076 Ah, the manifest image is already proscribed by the rule of the positivist intellect.  The manifest image is not the thing itself.  It is a sensation2a, a phantasm2b or a judgment2c concerning the thing itself.  The manifest image calls to mind the actualities within the scholastic interscope about what is going on in an individual’s mind.

Plus, the scientific image is constructed from observations of phenomena that cannot fully objectify the manifest image… er… our mind’s response to a noumenon, a thing itself.

0077 Here is a comparison of what is for the standard version and for the adjusted version of the Positivist’s judgment.

0078 What does this imply?

Dennett’s defense of the Positivist’s judgment is neither subliminal nor sublime.  It is subtle, in precisely the way that philosophers employ subtlety.  The fact that the phenomena of neural synapses and (I will get to this later) cultural memessupport the manifest image as a multifaceted evolutionary adaptation (that may be modeled using neuronal and cultural Darwinian paradigms) implies that the manifest image may be dispensed with, because it is an user-illusion of the scientific image.

Does this tell me that the noumenon, the thing itself, is what humans are conscious of?

Or is the noumenon what humans adapt to according to neuronal and cultural Darwinian paradigms?

0079 My user-illusion is an adaptation, as substantial as a dog’s fierce jaws and a cat’s sharp claws.  It cannot be dispensed with, lest I die.

In the face of subtle distinctions between the noumenon and the manifest image and between the manifest image and the scientific image, the betting man would place his money on the manifest image, as that which will endure… er… survive, rather than the scientific image.  Dennett argues against this bet, but he cannot speak directly, because his scientific discussion supports the betting man’s conclusion.

0080 If our consciousness of species impressa2a and species expressa2b is an adaptation, then how is the proposed scientific accounting of our impressions2a and perceptions2b supposed to make them more adaptive?  And if Dennett’s argument succeeds, and a scientific image based on Darwin’s paradigm overlays our feelings2a and phantasms2b, then what about what humans think?

0081 The long-debated scholastic picture of the way humans think cannot be lightly discarded.

Only a subtle argument will suffice. 

12/14/23

What Is A Meme? (A of G, Part 9 of 20)

0082 So far, the structural coincidence between Darwin’s paradigm and the specifying sign covers Part I of Dennett’s book and a couple of chapters in Part II.  The title of Part I is “Turning Our World Upside Down”.  The title of Part II is “From Evolution to Intelligent Design”.  The chapters covered in Part II include seven (“Darwinian Spaces: An Interlude”) and eight (“Brains Made of Brains”).

From this coincidence (or is it from Dennett’s argument?), I learn that a lot of what goes on in my neocortex supports a user-end illusion, which I label “my mind”.  The method behind this neuromechanical marvel employs a Darwinian paradigm, where neurons act like selective breeders and their synapses are the creatures that they breed.  This method strikes me as a little weird, since short-lived synapses are extensions of long-lived neurons.

Maybe it is not as weird as me walking Daisy around on a leash.

0083 I also learn that scholastic inquiry into human knowing provides a nested picture of the actualities that participate in manifest images held by individual human minds.  A three-level interscope contains three virtually nested actualities.  The three-level interscope is delineated in A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

Here is a picture, highlighting the three actualities2 of the manifest image, and downplaying their respective normal contexts3 and potentials1.

0084 The content-level actuality, species impressa2a, goes with the terms “sensation”, “impression”, “feeling” and “qualia”.  In terms of ontology, this actuality2a may be portrayed as active body [substantiates] sensate soul.

The situation-level actuality, species expressa2b, goes with perceptions2b, phantasms2b, emotions2b, trained responses2b, along with other expressions.  In terms of ontology, this actuality2b may be portrayed as perceptive soul [informs] reactive body.

The perspective-level actuality, species intelligibilis2c, goes with judgments2c, explicitly, and convictions2c, implicitly.  A conviction is a judgment where the relational elements are not labeled.  So, the triadic structure operates holistically.  In terms of ontology, a judgment is a triadic structure consisting of three elements: relation, what is and what ought to be.  When we associate each of the elements with one of Peirce’s categories, the judgment becomes actionable.

0085 These three actualities are discussed in Razie Mah’s blogs for October 2023, titled Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) Semiotic Animal.  Of course, in order to understand these three actualities, I must divine their normal contexts and potentials.  This divination will proceed as I examine the sign-relations that are embedded in the scholastic manifest image.

0086 Let me start with the basics.

We (humans) encounter actuality2.

We understand that encounter when we have elucidated the appropriate normal context3 and potential1.

The elucidation may proceed using Aristotle’s four causes.

0087 But, what if two of Aristotle’s causes are outlawed by the positivist intellect?

Well, the positivist intellect cannot achieve understanding.

Instead, the positivist intellect (which is the relation in the Positivist’s judgment) uses disciplinary language to construct mathematical and mechanical models of observations and measurements of psychological and social phenomena (what ought to be in the Positivist’s judgment).

Then the Positivist sells these models under the label, “scientific conclusions”.

0088 Typically, when a clinical psychologist mentions the term, “manifest image”, the referent is a species expressa2b. Why?  People tend to seek the services of a clinical psychologist when they cannot control their emotions.  An emotion may be portrayed by the hylomorphe, perceptive soul [informs] reactive body.  Perceptions [trigger] emotions.

The client suffers the actuality of a phantasm2b.

The clinician suspects that the client will understand that actuality2b when a virtual normal context2c and potential2a are elucidated.

0089 The following figure portrays the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality for the scholastic’s manifest image.

0090 This nested form is virtual because it runs down a column in a three level interscope.  The qualifier, “virtual”, means “in virtue”, in regards to the mind, and “in simulation”, in regards to the brain.

The perspective-level normal context of judgment2c virtually brings the situation-level actuality of a perception2b into relation with the content-level potential of sensations2a, impressions2a and feelings2a.  Each of these actualities conveys its own sense of realness.  But, the phantasm2b seems to be the most real because it occupies the slot for secondness in both the situation-level nested form and the virtual nested for in the interscope. 

0091 Often, the species intelligibilis2c and the species impressa2a do not register.

Even less apparent are the normal contexts and the potentials for all three actualities.

No wonder the catholic schoolmen spend centuries debating the causalities involved in how humans think.

12/13/23

What Is A Meme? (B of G, Part 10 of 20)

0092 According to Dennett, a meme is a unit of information worth having.  If a meme is worth having, then it is worth paying attention to.  A meme is a unit of cultural information.  “A meme” rhymes with “gene”, a unit of information coded by DNA.

Of course, I can also say that a “meme” sounds like “mean” and “gene” sounds like “jean”.

0093 That raises the question, “What is information?”

Well, “semantic information” is encoded and specifies its own interpretation. 

0094 Surely, that sounds like the work of the specifying sign.

So, a meme behaves as if it contains semantic information because it activates (what the scholastics call) specificative extrinsic formal causality, otherwise known as a specifying sign.  The specifying sign connects the content and situation levels of the scholastic manifest image.

0095  In terms of semiotics, an impression2a (SVs) stands for a perception (SOs) in regards to the question, “What does it mean to me?”3b contextualizing the possibility of situating content1b (SIs).

Dennett calls the coupling of a content-level sign-vehicle (SVs) to a situation-level sign-object (SOs), “semantic information”, because, often enough, the species impressa2a merely decodes spoken words and grammar.  The qualifier, “semantics”, associates to spoken language.  Semantic information offers designs worth getting, differences that makes a difference, and opportunities that go with Gibson’s term, “affordance”.

0096 So, right at the start, I know that the species expressa2b (SOs) virtually situates content2a in such a manner that the species impressa2a (SVs) is meaningful to me3b (SIs).  But, that is not all.  Species impressa2a (SVs) also offers clues to presence (who speaks to me?) and message (why speak to me?) (SIs).

0097 To Daisy, the cat (er… the species impressa2a of the neighbor’s cat2a (SVs) stands for a species expressa2b, a little monster… or maybe, an animated morsel… equipped with paws with claws2b (SOs).

To me, the fact that Daisy’s tail tucks between her hind legs2a (SVs)) stands for her fear and loathing of the neighbor’s cat2b (SOs) in regards to our morning walk3b (SIs).

Neither Daisy nor the cat know why this drama plays out with regularity.  The lady next door throws out her trash just before I take Daisy on her routine walk.  Her open door serves as an opportunity for the neighbor’s obnoxious cat to scamper out of its indoor enclave.

0098 I cultivated an additional incentive.  I planted catnip among the neighbor’s untrimmed verge, which the cat finds attractive.  Now, as soon as the neighbor lady opens her door, the cat scampers out and beelines to this destination, a garden of intoxication, where she is always surprised by Daisy and puts up a wonderful display of threats and hissing.

Daisy is so perplexed by this stoned feline that she either wants to protect me or expects me to protect her.  The leash pulls tight either forward or backward, depending on the suddenness of the realization of this dramatic species impressa2a(SVs).

0099 Clearly, the cat2a is a meme.

Plus, it2a is more than a meme.

Daisy’s tail going between her hind legs2a is a meme.

Plus, it2a is more than a meme.

0100 As the encounter achieves greater regularity (thanks to the catnip taking root, plus the morning routines), Daisy is slowly coming to a consistent species expressa2a (SIs).

Nevertheless, she is regularly confounded.

12/12/23

What Is A Meme? (C of G, Part 11 of 20)

0101 With a single chomp of her mighty mouth, along with some head thrashing, Daisy can put an end to the neighbor’s cat.  I suppose that I restrain her from what her species expressa2b calls her to do, because I have her on a leash.  The leash puts Daisy’s species expressa2b into perspective.

0102 Does this imply that there is another sign?  Does this sign connect the situation and perspective levels?

Daisy’s fear and loathing of the cat2b (SVe) stands for her being restrained by the leash and thereby confounded2c (SOe) in regards to the question, “Does this makes sense?”3c, contextualizing the possibility of putting the situation into perspective1c (SIe).

The subscript, “e”, stands for “exemplar”.

Here is a picture.

0103 The exemplar sign-vehicle (SVe) coincides with the specifying sign-object (SOs).

Correspondingly, the exemplar sign-object (SOe) puts the specifying sign-object (SOs) into perspective.  This perspective includes both Daisy and myself, along with the catnip, the cat and my trash-toting neighbor.

0104 Plus, there is a question about nomenclature.

For scholastics, the specifying sign starts with subjective content and ends with objective situation.  The exemplar signstarts with an intersubjective situation and ends with a suprasubjective perspective.  So, the situation-level actuality is “objective” (SOs) for the former and “intersubjective” (SVe) for the latter.

For moderns, only two terms are employed, “subjective” and “objective””.  Scholastic terms shift when stepping from the specifying sign to the exemplar sign.  For moderns, “subjective” opinions often address the question, “What does it mean to me?”3b, while “objective” facts raise the question, “Does this make sense?”3c.

This terminological shift is discussed in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”.

0105 The exemplar sign object2c (SOe) makes sense3b because it may be true, or believable, or commonly accepted, or logical with respect to an affordance.  What is that affordance?  May I call it, “intelligibility”?  Oh, that could bring a smile to the face of a philosopher and a grimace to the face of a scientist.

0106 Let me return to the scholastic manifest image for the example of Daisy, my dog, who I knowingly place into proximity to the neighbor’s miserable feline, soon after the neighbor lady takes out her trash.  Is there a problem with planting catnip in the verge near where we regularly stroll?  Surely, the neighbor’s husband, who is rarely at home to tend the verge, does not mind.  Plus, the cat clearly loves the mint.

Here is a picture.

0107 The exemplar sign-object (SOe) contains a judgment.

Recall, a judgment is a relation between what is and what ought to be.

0108 In order to arrive at my judgment2c, I first look at the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality.

To me, Daisy’s confoundedness2c serves as a virtual normal context that brings the actuality of unnerved Daisy2b into relation with the possibilities inherent in her tail tucked between her legs2a.

I next transfer the virtual nested form into the triadic structure of judgment.

Daisy’s confoundedness (relation, thirdness) brings her tucked tail as an universal being (what is, secondness) into relation to Daisy’s fear and loathing as an intelligible being (what is, firstness).

0109 Yes, whatever is going on in Daisy’s mind2c contributes to my judgment2c, even though it (whatever “it” is) cannot be articulated.

0110 For Daisy, a relation that I am not privy to2c virtually brings fear and loathing2b into relation with that catnip-addled feline2a.

0111 The triadic structure of judgment fits neatly into the sign-object of the exemplar sign as well as the perspective-level actuality2c of the scholastic’s three-level interscope.

12/11/23

What Is A Meme? (D of G, Part 12 of 20)

0112 Here is a scholastic picture of the way humans think.

0113 What is the nature of the Latin term, “species intelligibilis“?

Typically, this actuality2c attempts to bring the ‘what is’ of a species impressa2a into relation with the ‘what ought to be’ of a species expressa2b.

There is another way to describe the perspective-level judgment.  A relation2c brings together the universal aspects of the species impressa2a (what is) and the intelligible aspects of the species expressa2b (what ought to be).  As such, the elements belonging to the perspective-level actuality2c are not exactly the same as the situationb and contenta level actualities2.  They must be qualified as elements of judgment.  The scholastics accomplish this task by adding the word, “intelligibilis”.

Here is a picture.

0114 Daisy cannot ask the question, “Does this makes sense?”3b.

Consequently, Daisy cannot contextualize the potential1c of her species expressa2b by formulating a species expressa intelligibilis2c.

Or, maybe she can.

I guess one does not have to speak the question3c in order to ask it.

0115 What is her conviction2c?

Is her phantasm2b effectively true, believable, commonly accepted, and logical with respect to an affordance1b?

What is that affordance1b?

I can only guess.

And then, there is the issue of the leash2c.

0116 Since I am able to put my species expressa2b into perspective2c, I can imagine what Daisy’s judgment might be2c.   I may not be correct.  But, I know that Daisy is fully capable of dispatching that cat, because, by my reckoning, she has already performed such duty on at least one other cat, a half-dozen squirrels, and a dozen rats.

On top of that, if Daisy suddenly throttles that indoor cat, whose only excursions into the wild lead directly to the catnip patch, then the cat’s owner would have to deal with me, her neighbor, whom she has studiously ignored for long enough.

0117 Hmmm.  I guess I should not have said that.

There is something about my species intelligibilis2c best be left unspoken.

How so?

My little addendum enters the reader’s slot for species impressa2a and, in the process, provides a clue to what is happening3a, as well as the potential of ‘something happening’1a.

0118 I know what you are thinking.

What sort of freak would create a situation where his dog kills the neighbor’s cat in order to gain her attention?

12/9/23

What Is A Meme? (E of G, Part 13 of 20)

0119 I have another label for what you are thinking.

You are thinking a meme.

According to Dennett, a meme is a unit of culture, bearing semantic information, offering ‘something’ that makes a difference and surviving through reproduction, such as gossip.

News of Daisy killing the neighbor’s cat is a meme.

0120 I snatch the cat’s corpse from Daisy’s mouth, after distracting her with one of her favorite treats.  I intend to bring the deceased to the neighbor lady.  I am sure that she will tell every person she knows about the incident, if she knows anyone.  She seems like a sailor’s widow, waiting for her husband to return.  But, she does not do what every woman whose man works the seas should be doing, going to church to pray for his safety.

I plan to carry the cat’s body in a bag and knock on her door.

When she answers, I aim to say, “I took the leash off Daisy this morning and she went right after your cat.  Your cat is dead.  I am sorry.  If you want, I will buy you a new cat.”

But first, I ought to address another question.

0121 How did Daisy manifest her judgment2c with such vigor?

I think that the leash says it all.

Removing the leash2c produced a species impressa2a in Daisy, which specified a species expressa2b, which inspired a canine species intelligibilis2c, which stood for an action, which took the cat completely by surprise and generated a new species impressa2a in me, as I came to realize the potential of ‘something’ happening1a underlying the normal context ofwhat is happening3a.

0122 What am I saying?

Am I saying that Daisy’s judgment2c produces a sign-relation that appears inside out, because the sign-vehicle is hidden within Daisy’s mind and the sign-object is what Daisy does, for me to witness?

0123 Yes, I call this inside-out sign-relation an “interventional sign”.

Here is a picture.

12/8/23

What Is A Meme? (F of G, Part 14 of 20)

0124 A meme involves an interventional sign-relation, whose sign-vehicle3c (SVi) fills in the slot for species impressa2a(SOi) while providing clues to a relevant content-level normal context3a and potential1a (SIi).

A meme also involves a specifying sign-relation, where a content-level species impressa2a (SVs) specifies a species expressa2b (SOs) within a situation-level normal context3b and potential1b (SIs).

0125 Here is a general picture of the specifying sign.

0126 Obviously, the interventional sign-object occupies the same content-level actuality2a as the specifying sign-vehicle.

The adaptiveness of the subsequent specifying sign weighs (takes into account) the initial bias (perhaps, affordance) provided by the interventional sign’s interpretant.

0127 In chapter nine, Dennett considers spoken words as paradigms of memes.

What about the gesture-words of hand talk… er… “sign language”?

Surely, these are even more paradigmatic because the gesture-word images and points to its referent.

0128 What if language evolves in the milieu of hand talk?

Here is a scenario to think about.

A warm rain falls all afternoon on my mixed forest location in eastern Africa, around a million years ago.  My Homo erectus comrades can’t do much, so they huddle under trees and nap.  The next day, the clouds have not given way, and I can smell something and I know what that something is.  Mushrooms are sprouting!

0129 How do I know this?

A mental module has evolved, over the course of generations, specifically devoted this opportunity, the smell and the taste and the weather conditions are all encoded, because those of my ancestors who responded to the mushroom-related opportunity reproduced more successfully that those who did not.

Plus, I don’t have a leash.

0130 However, I need to recruit others.  I need volunteers willing to work for food and share the riches with others.  In time, others will return the favor.  So, I initiate an interventional sign-relation.

0131 By Dennett’s account, my hand talk words constitute “a meme,” a unit of culture, containing semantic information, a difference that makes a difference, and a piece of know-what worth having.

0132 By a scholastic’s account, my hand talk words constitute the sign-object of an interventional sign-relation (SOi).

I don’t know whether medieval schoolmen successfully formalize the causality inherent in the interventional sign as a relational being.  According to Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, Latin-writing scholars formalize the specifying and the exemplar sign-causalities.  The discovery of the interventional sign, which has all the characteristics of Dennett’s notion of “an inversion of reason”, appears in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.  Both commentaries are available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0133 Whatever the accounting, my intervention sign initiates a specifying sign, leading to a wonderful mushroom harvest and contributing to our team (and our band’s) reproductive success.

0134  What is this “inversion of reason” business?

The interventional sign-relation inverts the commonplace notion that the sign-vehicle is visible (and thus, a subject) and the sign-object is mental (and thus, an object).

The specifying sign-relation reverts the inversion back into the commonplace notion.

0135 Both sign-relations intimate an affordance.

In this instance, the two affordances speak with one voice, saying, “Our team can gather many more mushrooms than a single individual.  We can gather enough to feed all the other potential (but not, at this weather moment, actualized) teams in the band.  Plus, we can dry and hide the rest.  Time is short.  Get to work!”

0136 Notably, this affordance cannot be articulated using hand talk.

How can one picture or point to “team”, “potential” or “affordance”?

Nonetheless, the affordance includes the potentials within the purely relational structure of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

Clearly, each member of the team conjures the same relational structure, even though each individual possesses a different brain.

Only one more step is required to answer the question, “What is a meme?”