04/1/23

Looking at Karatzogianni and Robinson’s Article (2017) “Schizorevolutions Versus Microfascisms” (Part 4 of 4)

0028 This article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory (2017, vol 13(3), 282-295). So far, my examination describes how the weird confounded diagram developed in the commentary on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” is relevant to Karatzogianni and Robinson’s argument. This blog retells the story.

The weird diagram confounds two independent paths of articulation. The path of Graeber and Wengrow is the way of definition (P). After all, they are academics. Academics are devoted to defining their terms. The path of Razie Mah is the way of differentiation (Q). The differentiation of a nested form into the society_C, organization_B and individual in community_A tiers takes place in the chapter on presence in the masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.

Here is a picture of the situation and content levels of definition (P) confounded with the same levels of the society_C tier (Q).

0029 The above diagram does not include the perspective_c level of the society_C tier (Q). Karatzogianni and Robinson open by describing the securitisation state as exploiting and promoting an atmosphere of fear. Fear is the object that brings everyone into relation_2cC.

Consequently, this confounding (P and Q) is put into perspective by a demiurge_2cC, an entity standing above sovereign power, and this demiurge_2cC defines the state_2b.

0030 This configuration produces a split in the content level of defined_3a institutions_2aC.

Some institutions_3b’ attempt to work with the state_2b. These conforming institutions_3b’ bring sanctioned organizational objects_2b’ into relation with the potential_1b’ of the three imperatives of domination_1c’ as well as the institution’s original righteousness_1b. This is useful for the state_2c’, which relies on conforming institutions_3b’ to situate institutions_3a’ that (for whatever reason) cannot or will not conform.

Conforming institutions_3b’ perform microfascist activities for the state_2c’, increasing the possibility of state control_1c’through forcing choices, limiting and misleading information, as well as protecting reputations. These activities are built into sanctioned organizational objectives_2b’ that presumably emerge from (and situate) the potential of the institution’s original righteousness_1b’. According to my reading this article, Karatzogianni and Robinson do not clearly ideate this side of the splitting.

Other institutions are downgraded (often, by state interference) into networks_3a’. Nonconforming networks_3a’ bring unsactioned organizational objectives_2a’ into relation with the potential of ‘unsupervised righteousness’_1a’. Conforming institutions_3b’ are ofted viewed by the anarchy level as state apparatuses_3b’ whose organizational objectives_2b’ are compromised by the fact they follow the rules, even when not necessary, lie and cover up_1b’.

0031 How do nonconforming networks_3a’ respond?

Not as the state_2c’ would like them do. The state_2c’ now occupies the perspective level of an interscope that expresses the path of definition. Remember, the perspective level typically comes into play on;y when there is a failure on the situation level. In other words, the perspective level is taken for granted, until something goes wrong.

Here is the interscope of securitisation_2cC.

0032 Once again, what about the response of noncomforming networks_3a’ on the anarchy level?

Unsupervised righteousness_1a’ inspires organization objectives_2a’ that appear schizophrenic (they are listening to the voices in thier heads instead of the state) or paranoid (they think that the state is the one to fear, rather than the demiurge that defines the state). Consequently, the two actors of importance in Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article belong to the state and the anarchy levels.

0033 So, what is lacking in this article?

Situation-level institutions_b’ end up being drained of their original righteousness_1b’ due to their compromise with the defining power_3c’. Conforming institutions_3b’ lose respectability by enforcing the three imperatives that underlie the word, “domination”_1b’. Conforming institutions_3b’ lose respectablity by sacrificing their original righteousness_1b’ in the process of enforcing the three imperatives_1b’. Yet, conforming institutions_3b’ maintain respectablility by being the only ones whose organizational objectives_2b’ are sanctioned by state decree_2c’ and therefore less likely to suffer capricious state action_2c’.

0034 It makes me wonder what the word, “respectable”, really means.

The sociological and psychological dynamics of the compliant level are ripe for exploration.

Coloration tells the story.

0035 So much for the political theory aspect of Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article, what about the “international” aspect?

After all, the article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory.

Well, in the introduction and the conclusion, the authors speculate that the security state may be a response to the anarchy generated by… or may be a strategy to control the wealth and innovations produced by… or may aim to wrest control from…

… global capitalism.

Which makes me wonder, “Could global capitalism be a demiurge, just like securitisation?”

If so, then Graeber and Wengrow’s weird confounding diagram is relevant.

And, the prior steps should apply to the following perspective-level nested form.

0036 The rest is left as an exercise for the intrepid inquirer.

03/31/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin” (Part 1 of 13)

0180 If David Graeber and David Wengrow’s recent book, subtitled, A New History of Humanity, is a breakthrough in postmodern anthropology, then it is so because it displays a semitic textual structure, instead of a greek textual structure.

These two styles are discussed in An Instructor’s Guide to An Archaeology of the Fall. Rather than eliminating possibilities in order to arrive at the most likely correct interpretation, these authors play literary tricks, coupling chapters one and twelve, A:A’, chapters two and eleven, B:B’, and chapters three through nine and chapter ten, C:C’.

0182 The semitic structure is A:B:C:C’:B’:A’. In Comments on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) The Dawn of Everything (by Razie Mah, available and smashwords and other e-book venues), the work is discussed in the pattern A:A’, B:B’ and C:C’. Notably, the bulk of the book covers the last layer, C:C’, and balances seven chapters (three through nine, C) against one chapter (ten, C’). Chapter ten is twice as long as any other chapter.

0183 Plus, chapter ten stands on its own, allowing me to place an examination in Razie Mah’s blog, with the title Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”. If the reader first encounters the blog, the commentary is available. If the reader first purchases the commentary, then the reader can call the blog to the attention of others.

03/30/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin” (Part 2 of 13)

0184 Chapter ten is the only chapter on theory in the entire book. The rest of the book concerns the inadequacy of current theory in archaeology and anthropology. The authors intuitively zero in on a problem. Neither science imagines that people have minds of their own. For example, modern histories do not admit that the so-called “Western Enlightenment” is influenced by reports coming from the Americas, including an indigenous critique of late-medieval and early-modern European civilization.

However, Graeber and Wengrow cannot pass into their promised land, because they have no models for appreciating or diagramming what is going on in people’s minds.

0185 Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913 U0′) has a model for speech-alone talk. Spoken language contains of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, consisting of parole (speech acts) and langue (mental acts). A model of langueshould provide a picture of what is going on in people’s minds. So, how can we model langue?

One answer is provided in Razie Mah’s first masterwork, The Human Niche, plus its companion work, Comments on Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky’s Book (2016) Why Only Us?. These are available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Langue may be modeled by diagrams of triadic relations.

In the ongoing commentary, two triadic relations are presented: the category-based nested form and judgment. If talk (parole) is related to a triadic relation (langue) then Saussure’s definition of language is satisfied. Plus, our innate sensibility that words are associated to the things that they refer to is satisfied.

0186 Our innate sensibility that words refer to things and states of things arises in the milieu of hand talk. Here, the relation between parole and langue is not arbitrary, because langue (mentally) reproduces the icons and indexes of parole(well-executed manual-brachial gestures). This is the nature of natural signs.

Curiously, the word, “semiotics”, does not appear at all in Graeber and Wengrow’s weighty volume. Yet, the term is crucial to their claim that people have minds of their own. People have minds of their own because they are adapted to sign-processing.

0187 Fast forward through human evolution to the first singularity, dramatically portrayed in Razie Mah’s second masterwork, An Archaeology of the Fall. The first singularity consists in a cultural change. Hand-speech talking cultureslose the hand-component of their hand-speech talk, leaving them with speech-alone talk. The Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia is the first culture to practice speech-alone talk. The Sumerian language is a speech-alone creole, originating from two hand-speech languages. Speech-alone talk spreads from the Ubaid to the far corners of the world.

0188 The first singularity is a complex transition. There is great uncertainty about how it happens.

But, we can set down two markers with great certainty.

Before the Ubaid, in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, all cultures practice hand-speech talk.

In the present, 2023 U0′, in our current Lebenswelt, all civilizations practice speech-alone talk.

0189 Speech-alone talk does not picture or point to its referents. Instead, speech-alone talk projects meaning, presence and message into a purely symbolic label. This label belongs to parole. Parole consists of a system of differences. Langue is arbitrarily related to parole.

So, if we are to display… or imagine… or depict what people think, we may be begin with the proposition that those thoughts have the structure of triadic relations, such as the category-based nested form.

This is the proposition underlying Razie Mah’s third masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”. The propositionconcerns the nature of definition. The category-based diagram offers ways to picture the meaning, presence and message underlying the spoken word, “religion”.

0190 Here is a picture.

The normal context of definition₃ brings the actuality of a spoken word₂ into relation with the possibilities inherent in meaning, presence and message₁.

0191 Such a diagram offers sites for explicit abstraction, without short-changing implicit abstraction. Standard dictionaries define spoken words with combinations of other spoken words, emphasizing the idea that words are placeholders in systems of differences (that is, “languages”). It does not evoke the idea that a spoken word (parole) is arbitrarily related to what people think (langue). In contrast, the category-based nested form for how to define a spoken word conveys what standard dictionaries cannot tell.

03/29/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”(Part 3 of 13)

0192 Graeber and Wengrow begin their wide-ranging discussions concerning everything anthropological with a question on the origins of social inequality. In chapter ten, they implicate the state. But, they face a problem. Can the stateaccount for the origins of social inequality if there are no origins to the state?

0193 The spoken word, “state”, is the topic of chapter ten of Graeber and Wengrow’s book.

So is the spoken word, “domination”.

Here is a diagram of what these authors may be thinking.

The “state” is a placeholder in a system of differences for speech. Since the spoken word cannot picture or point to anything, as would be expected for hand talk, then we project meaning, presence and message into the langue that is arbitrarily related to this speech act. Graeber and Wengrow explicitly abstract the term, “domination”, as a label for (what I suspect is) the presence or the message underlying the term. The state₂ emerges from (and situates) the potential of domination₁.

0194 The masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”, offers another option.

The option arises while trying to elucidate the presence₁ underlying the word, “religion”₂. Religion includes institutions. These institutions are different from sovereign power. How so? Righteousness_1a is the potential underlying institutions_3a. Order_1b is the potential underlying sovereign power_3b. Order_1b belongs to the situation-level of an interscope. Righteousness_1a belongs to the content-level.

On the situation level, sovereign power_3b is the normal context where sovereign acts and decrees_2b emerge from (and situate) the possibilities inherent in order_1b. Sovereign power_3b virtually situates institutions_3a.

What we call the “state”_2b should correspond to the actuality_2b of sovereign power_3b contextualizing the potential for order_1b.

0195 According to Graeber and Wengrow, the term, “state”, appears in the French lexicon in the late 1500s, about a century after Christopher Columbus’s voyage of 1492 U0′. In the late 1800s, a German philosopher defines the “state” as an institution, within a given territory, claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force.

This implies that the term, “state”, labels something more than the actuality of sovereign acts and decrees_2b.

0196 Why does the state_2b require a monopoly on coercive force?

How else can it enforce order_1b?

0197 Does the above figure offer a definition of state_2b that is familiar to modern social scientists?

No and yes.

No, this diagram of the “state” as an actuality₂ located within a normal context₃ and situating a potential₁ is innovative. It belongs to the first comprehensive picture in anthropology composed of triadic relations. The diagram relies on the differentiation of nested forms. The first differentiation yields a nested form composed of three terms: society₃, organization₂ and individual in community₁. Second, each of these terms differentiates into a nested form. Third, each element in each nested form differentiates, resulting in a three-level interscope. The result is three tiers of interscopes, corresponding to society_C, organization_B and individual in community_A.

0198 The first two levels of the society_C tier correspond to content-level institutions_3a and situation-level sovereign power_3b.

Graeber and Wengrow do not know this diagram. Yet, they write as if they do. Social complexity_C arises as diverse institutions_3aC pursue their organizational objectives_2aC, based on a righteousness_1aC that interpellates individuals in community_A. In our current Lebenswelt, righteousness_1aC calls individuals in community_A into organization_B.

The need for order_1bC may arise when institutions compete with one another and come into conflict.

I suppose that may occur when institutions find something to fight over.

03/28/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”(Part 4 of 13)

0199 In order to lay out their theory of state, Graeber and Wengrow recall their three foundational expressions of freedom: (1) the freedom to move, (2) the freedom to disobey orders and (3) the freedom to organize (and adjust) social relations.

The authors ask (more or less), “Can we speak similarly about elementary forms of domination?”

0200 Recall the equilibrium exchange between freedom and property rights. The concept of property rights seems to be the inverse of the concept of freedom, as seen in the following figure, which appears earlier in the commentary.

0201 The fact that these two are located in the category of firstness, the realm of possibility, means that they are a monad. They are like two faces in one photo. I do not think that I can name the foundational monad, but it must be as sacramental as a marriage. Two faces are in one photo because they are married. What God has joined, let no man tear apart.

0202 This union becomes more palpable when I ask, “How can property rights be violated?”

Well, the answer is the same as the question, “How can freedom be violated?”

The obvious answer is through force. I can steal your property. I can stop you from leaving. I can force you into a social configuration.

The next obvious answer is through the mitigation of one’s ability to make a claim. I can control your property through fraud and misrepresentation. I can force obedience by denying your freedom to disobey commands. I can change the meaning of the word, “ownership”.

The least obvious answer is through charisma. I can seduce you into slavery. I can destroy order through mob action. I can demand your admiration.

0203 Who am I?

“I” am the state. Did someone else say that? Louis XIV of France?

Yes, “my” three principles are sovereignty (the control of violence), bureaucracy (the administration of information) and charisma (the appropriation of honor).

0204 According to Graeber and Wengrow, each of these principles has served as a basis for state formation. Access to violence, information and charisma define the very possibility of social domination. The modern nation state is configured as a combination of sovereignty, bureaucracy and competitive politics. Each elementary form of dominationhas its own historical origins.

03/27/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”(Part 5 of 13)

0205 When historians speculate about the origin of states for ancient Mesopotamia, India, China and Peru, they project these three principles backwards, in time and location. They presume that each path culminates in a state_2b, emerging from the potential of order_1b. “Order_1b” is confounded with policing power, administration and competitive politics.

0206 Or, should I say, that “order_1b” is confounded with domination₂, according to the following definition.

0207 Graeber and Wengrow explore the concept that a state could arise from one or two of the potentials₁ underlying the term, “domination”₂ in the normal context of defintion₃.

0208 Well, the Olmec and the Maya may have started with competitive politics. They play “ball games” where the “ball” is a human skull (or something like that). No wonder everyone wanted to follow the winner.

0209 What about the early large-scale societies that appear in the Peruvian Andes and adjacent coastal drainages, long before the Inca?

Monumental architecture appears in the Rio Supe region between 3000 and 2500 B.C. Then, between 1000 to 200 B.C., a single center, Chavin de Huantar, is founded in the northern highlands of Peru.

To me, this suggests exposure to speech-alone talk before 3000 B.C., with full adoption by say, 2800 B.C. I wonder, “Could some speech-alone talking person have made it to the coast of Peru two thousand years before the official start of the Lapita horizon in the eastern Pacific, around 1600 B.C.?”

Hmmm, the establishment of large settlements in China’s Shandong province, on the lower reaches of the Yellow River, date to no later than 3500 B.C.

0210 Graeber and Wengrow dwell on the Chavin horizon. Its art appears across a wide region. Some of the pottery figures are monsters. Do the monsters have a purpose? Perhaps, they offer visual clues for remembering complicated mythologies, such as genealogies or shamanic journeys. Some carved figures hold plants known for their hallucinogenic properties. Can a “state” come together on the administration of psychoactive substances? I suppose so. What about today’s psychoactive propaganda? Do our televisions offer the same appeal as the representatives of the Chavin horizon? Come experience the illusion. Watch and enter the delusion.

0211 Graeber and Wengrow label the early civilizations of the Americas, “first order regimes”, because they seem to be organized around only one of the three elementary forms of domination.

0212 This implies that the term, “state”_2b, directly emerges from and situates the potential of “domination”_1b. Plus, the potential of the term, “domination” arises from three independent sources, which look increasingly like meaning (exclusive control of violence), presence (various ministries trafficking in information) and message (honor our heroic deeds).

0213 Here is a picture.

03/24/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”(Part 6 of 13)

0214 Can there be sovereignty without the state?

0215 Graeber and Wengrow turn their attention back to North America.

A French Jesuit, Father Maturin Le Petit, gives an account of the Natchez in the early 1800s. He draws parallels to the reign of King Louis XIV, the self-fashioned “Sun King”. The story that the missionary tells is both strange and familiar.

Like the Sun King, the Natchez ruler has total authority. Unlike the Sun King, the Natchez ruler cannot delegate his power. If any Natchez “citizen” does not live close to the Great Village, then there is no reason to obey the one who embodies the total authority of the state.

0216 What does this imply?

Sovereign power_3b is a normal context₃, not an actuality₂ or or a potential₁. The Natchez ruler_2b is sovereign_3b, but only for those within the Great Village at any moment in time_1b. The sovereign_3b stands above all other institutions_3a, because sovereign power_3b arises from the potential of one type of righteousness_1a: order_1b. On one hand, order_1b is not the same as violence, knowledge or charisma. On the other hand, it_1b may be.

0217 Graeber and Wengrow go over examples of apparent anomalies, where the normal context of sovereign power_3b is operational, yet the actuality_2b does not meet the definition of a state₂, emerging from the potentials of exclusive control over force₁, knowledge₁ and charisma₁. Besides the Natchez, the authors mention the Suillah, along the White Nile, as well as the Chavin and Olmec, already mentioned.

0218 Then, the authors turn their attention to one apparently reliable indicator of state formation: mass killings at royal burials. Such mass killings are familiar to students of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and China.

For example, mass killing marks the beginning of Egypt’s first dynasty, starting in 3100 B.C.

Yet, sovereignty is clearly evident during the predynastic periods, starting around 4000 B.C. Modern archaeologists speculate about the material conditions behind the transition. However, these matter-oriented speculations distract from the main point of Graeber and Wengrow’s insights in layers A:A’ and B:B’. What goes on in people’s minds matters.

0219 What is going on in people’s minds at these mass killings?

Well, let me speculate. The king is dead and I serve the king so, let me get in line to serve the king on his journey to the source.

Or, let’s get rid of these throwbacks to a bygone era.

0220 Clearly, the state_2b, as the actuality of sovereign power_3b, differentiates from all other organizational objectives_2aand institutions_3a. Yet, the state_2b remains like an organizational objective_2a in regards to three principles₁ that may be endowed with righteousness_1a (control of violence₁, adminstration₁ and charismatic status₁).

0221 Of course, these principles associate to domination_2a, but so does the word, “outlaw”. The state_2b is like an outlaw_2b that works for the good of its institutions. In contrast, the outlaw_2b, is defined solely by self-interest.

Here is a picture of the definition of the term “outlaw”_2b, as opposed to the “state”_2b.

Just something to think about.

03/23/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”(Part 7 of 13)

0222 Starting around 3500 B.C., during the proto-dynastic period of Egypt, petty monarchs are afforded fine burials all along the Nile Valley. These petty kings give every indication of maintaining military and administrative control in their respective territories. Graeber and Wengrow ask (more or less), “How do we get from these monarchs to the massive agrarian bureaucracy of First Dynastic Egypt?”

0223 Could it be about death?

The authors imagine debates about the responsibilities of the living to the dead.

Here is an institutional diagram for each little kingdom along the Nile.

0224 The dyadic actuality_2a consists in two contiguous real elements, the living (people) and the dead (ruler). The contiguity is placed in brackets. The brackets contain a modern term, “responsibility”.

However, I must keep in mind that the term, “responsibility”, is an explicit abstraction. The ancient substance in the brackets is not an explicit abstraction. The ancient substance arises in various questions. Does the dead hunger? Does the dead thirst? The answer is apparent. Grave goods include bread and pots of fermented wheat beer.

0225 Two innovations, one agricultural and one ceremonial, reinforce one another. Agricultural improvements include ploughs and oxen, introduced around 3000 B.C. Ceremonial innovations include networks of obligations and debts, centered around the provisioning of the dead. Facilities dedicated to baking and brewing appear, first, alongside cemeteries, then later, near palaces and grand tombs. By the start of the First Dynastic (around 2500 B.C.), bread and beer are manufactured on an industrial scale, enough to supply seasonal armies of corvee laborers working on royal constructions.

0226 The transition from proto-dynastic to First Dynastic differentiates the above institution into the Egyptian state_2bCand the people’s “religious” obligation to the afterlife_2aC. The conundrum about the local ruler_3aC blossoms into separate social levels for the Pharoah_3bC and the people_3aC. Order_1bC arises from righteousness_1aC.

0227 Needless to say, the Pharaoh’s order_1b does not reduce to the actuality of the term, “domination”_2a.

03/22/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”(Part 8 of 13)

0228 Why does each early ancient civilization exhibit a unique historical trajectory?

Mesopotamia differs from the Mayan lowlands.

China differs from the Olmec, Chavin and Natchez.

The Inca empire differs from ancient Egypt.

0229 Yet, there are commonalities, which Graeber and Wengrow attribute to the three elementary forms of domination. Each ancient civilization passes through its own sequences of first-order, second-order and third-order regimes.

The Olmec, Chavin and Natchez develop first-order regimes, displaying primarily one elementary form of domination.

Egypt’s predynastic rulers develop two: sovereignty and administration. Mesopotamian kings start with administration and heroic status. Classic Maya elevates sovereignty and competitive politics.

Eventually, each civilizational state manifests all three elementary forms of domination.

03/21/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”(Part 9 of 13)

0230 However, unbeknownst to Graeber and Wengrow, there is another definition that arises from a historical differentiation of category-based nested forms due to the explicit abstraction afforded by speech-alone talk. Society₃, organization₂ and individual in community₁ are the first to differentiate after the first singularity. The differentiation continues until situation-level sovereign power_3b differentiates from content-level institutions_3a in the society_C tier.

0231 Here is a picture comparing the two situation-level category based nested forms.

0232 The first nested form is from the chapter on presence in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.

The second nested form is from chapter ten in David Graeber and David Wengrow’s masterwork, The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity.

0233 From this comparison, I conclude that Graeber and Wengrow’s definition of the “state”_2b coincides with sovereign acts and decrees_2b. The potential for order_1b parallels the possibility of domination_1b. The potentials underlying the term, “domination”_1a by extension, associates to the possibilities inherent in righteousness_1a. Or even worse, the potentials underlying the term, “domination”_1a, defines righteousness_1a.