0031 Let me return to the example.

What is the problem with the following figure?

0032 The Neolithic houses at Catal Hoyuk are more than shelters.  They are more than sensible construction.  They are also social constructions.

0033 What is a social construction?

Please note A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0034 Is there an obvious social construction that goes with the walls of a house?

Yes, the house_2b is a home_2c.

0035  A home_2c puts a house_2b into perspective.

One of the difficulties facing archaeologists at Catal Hoyuk involves the imagination.

The closely packed houses_2b are obviously homes_2c, because people live in them.  The inhabitants decorate various rooms.  They post the skulls of wild cows on their walls.  Are they trophies?  Or, are they symbols of divinity?  The archaeologist does not know.

Even worse, archaeologists do not know whether the people of Catal Hoyuk ideated any distinction between a trophy or a divinity.

My guess is that they did not.

0036 How so?

Consult the simple The First Singularity and Its Fairy Tale Trace and the complex An Archaeology of the Fall, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0037 My suspicion is that the people of Catal Hoyuk practice hand-speech talk, rather than speech-alone talk.  In hand speech talk, I cannot picture or point to the label, “home”_2c.  If I picture or point to anything, it would be the house_2b.

Here is a thought experiment.

Imagine that I live in Catal Hoyuk.

Even though hand-speech talk cannot label the word, “home”, I can implicitly commit to the conviction that my house_2b is my home_2c.  After all, I use riverbed clay_2a to repair the walls of my house_2b.  I live there.

My house_2b is implicitly my home_2c, but I cannot explicitly articulate that conclusion, because hand-speech talk only can image and indicate “house”_2b.

0038 Hodder does not know this, because the professor has not encountered the hypothesis of the first singularity.

The perspective level can evolve as an adaptation, but it cannot be explicitly abstracted.  Instead, it is implicitly abstracted.

See Razie Mah’s e-book, A Primer on Implicit and Explicit Abstraction.

0039 The following diagram places a fine mesh underneath the elements of the perspective level, indicating that this level can adapt to the realness of houses_2b, without explicit abstraction of the perspective-level elements.  What we call belonging_3c, home_2c and settlement_1c are explicit abstractions that veil the fact that our capacity to “sense” these elements is innate. 

0040 Today, with speech-alone talk, I say, “I am going home.”

At Catal Hoyuk, with hand-speech talk, I manual-brachial gesture, “I-GO (point in direction of) HOUSE.”

0041 Clearly, Hodder’s theory of entanglement requires embellishment.  Sensible construction alone will not do.  Social construction is another facet of entanglement.  In the houses of Catal Hoyuk, no one ever uses the terms, “belonging”_3c, “home”_2c or “reside”_1c.  Instead, they know the meanings, the presences and the messages of these terms in their hearts.  They are habits of being.

What is it like to dwell in a living world where gesture-words are defined by things and events that one can picture or point to?

0042 Here is another application of Hodder’s sensible theory of entanglement.

Most likely, each filled-in element has corresponding manual-brachial gesture-words.

During the epipaleolithic, humans sow an original wild wheat on newly exposed riverbeds on the edges of streams.  Why?  Well, they observe that the riverbeds are nice little plots of land, free of weeds, that can be used to grow a preferred brand of grass.  Why sow grass?  There are lots of practical uses for grass, including mixing with clay to make stucco for houses and tinder for lighting fires.

0043 That is just the start.

The grass responds with an adaptation honoring the seeds that the humans sow.  Human habits increase the potential for robust rachis, rather than delicate rachis.  Grass with delicate rachis drop their seeds when humans cut the stalk.  Stalks with robust rachis retain their seeds for humans to thresh and use again.  Plus, they are edible.  Put some in a pot with milk and place the pot in the fire for a while and the result is a delicious and teeth-rotting mush.

0044 Today’s technical name for the new variety is “emmer wheat”.  During the early Neolithic, emmer wheat becomes common throughout southwest Asia.  Mush gets added to the menu.  But, soon enough, new culinary adaptations arise, including bread and beer.

0052 The first three dependencies, H_2b-T_2a, T_2a-H_2b and T_2b-T_2a are fully expressed within the two-level interscope of Hodder’s sensible theory of entanglement.

My next question brings in the hypothesis of the first singularity, mentioned in points 0029 and 0030.

Do these dependencies require explicit abstraction?

Or, do these dependencies roll out holistically, as if entanglement_2b proceeds in the same fashion as natural selection_2b?

If so, these dependences are guided by implicit abstraction.

0053 Plus, parallels between human evolution_3b and Hodder’s entanglement_3b, already noted in the third day of this blog (points 0017 to 0022) offer intriguing insights. 

0054 Here is a picture of the ultimate human niche.

0055 Note that triadic relations_2a compose the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a.  Triadic relations_2a are immaterial (technically, purely relational) beings… er… things_2a.  Yet, they are real enough to support the ultimate human niche.  The beauty of this proposal is demonstrated in Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) The Prehistory of The Mind, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0056 Compare the above figure to triadic relations_2a as things_2a in the normal context of entanglement_3b.   Triadic relations include humans as one terminus and things as another terminus.  For example, a particular type of cloud may serve as a sign of coming inclement weather.  At the same time, humans may serve as one terminus and humans as another.  For example, a gesture pointing to a cloud of a particular type may signal that certain precautions should be taken, such as moving to higher ground or building a shelter.

Here is a picture of Hodder’s sensible entanglement theory with triadic relations as things_2a.

0057 Of all the potential ‘uses of triadic relations’_1b, one stands out: the use of manual-brachial gestures to sign to one another during team activities.  This connection is explored in Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0058 Team cooperation_3b brings manual-brachial gestures_2b into relation with the potential of ‘sensibly picturing or pointing to salient things and events’_1b.

I call the spectrum from pantomime to fully grammatical manual-brachial gestures, “hand talk”.

0059 On top of that, a juxtaposition of the situation-level category-based nested form for the human niche and for Hodder’s sensible entanglement theory suggests that the entire situation-level nested form for entanglement constitutes the actuality of human adaptation_2b.

0060 Here is the comparison.

0061 Does the nested form at the top neatly fit into the situation-level actuality at the bottom?

It appears so.

0062 But, I add an important note.

Look at the situation-level potential_1b.  It_1b changes from the potential of triadic relations to implicit abstraction.

In human evolution, cooperative_3b activities_2b locate uses of triadic relations_1b without an explicit awareness of the nature of triadic relations_2a.  Indeed, an explicit awareness of triadic relations only appears on the stage of civilizationduring the past four-hundred years, first, with the Baroque Scholastic John Poinsot and second, with the American Postmodern Philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.

Instead, our awareness of triadic relations is implicit.  Implicit awareness_1b coincides with potential ‘uses of triadic relations’_1b. Implicit abstraction is innate and explains why the neocortex size of hominin brains has systematically expanded during the past two million years.  See Comments on Derek Bickerton’s Book (2014) More Than Nature Needs,by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

In other words, entanglement theory applies to the evolution (and history) of the situation-level nested form of cooperation_3b, where the potential for cooperation_1b may be labeled with the term, “implicit abstractions_1b“.

0063 Where am I?

Okay, here is where I left off.

0064 I ask, “Why do hominins engage in cooperative activities_3b?”

0065 Hodder’s book serves as a concrete example.

Hodder labors to share his knowledge and insights.

Hodder anticipates remuneration or acclamation for his efforts.

Hodder competes (labors) to cooperate (share knowledge), because the fruits of cooperation (remuneration and acclamation) increase his chances of reproductive success.

0066 Okay, that may sound reductionist.  It is.  But, anyone who reads books by social scientists is familiar with this type of nonsense.

0067 As an archaeologist, Hodder is honestly trying to puzzle out a difficulty.  How does one explicitly discuss implicit abstraction_1b, the potential hiding within entanglement theory_3b?

Oh, I know how.

Rely on implicit abstraction to convey the impression that entanglement theory coincides with a human adaptation.

Well, now, the message is explicit.

0068 From the prior blog, I know that Hodder’s entanglement theory indirectly describes a human adaptation_2b.  This adaptation_2b exploits a niche_1b in the normal context of natural selection_3b.  The human niche_1b is the potential of triadic relations_1b.

Triadic relations_2a are purely relational beings.  They rely on material beings.  But, they are not material beings.  They are like things, in the sense that they exist in the environment of evolutionary adaptation.  They are not mere things, like boulders resting on a valley floor.  They are like boulders changing the way that water flows in a river.  They are relational beings.

0069 Hodder writes as if things entangle us.  He wants to extend the idea to biological evolution.  Things create potentials_1b that may be exploited by adaptations_2b in the normal context of natural selection_3b.

But the inverse is also true.  Life searches for opportunities to stay alive.  Life seeks ways to avoid death.  Sometimes, things provide those opportunities.  Sometimes, things provide dangers.  We know this in our bones.  Potential may be opportunity.  Potential may be dangerous.

Consequently, entanglement theory should fall into our mind’s lap, like manna from heaven.

0070 These comments add value to Hodder’s work.  Here is a way to articulate Hodder’s entanglement theory.

0071 Hodder refines his theory by isolating various dependencies.  Human-thing dependence is H_2b-T_2a.  Thing-human dependency, T_2a-H_2b, is an instance when the content-level normal context_3a and potential_1a come into play as a projection of implicit awareness_1b.  Thing_2a-thing_1b dependency describes the nature of tools.

These dependencies are salient in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0072 Oh, I almost neglected to mention one more dependency.  Human-human dependency.

Now, this dependency is like all the other dependencies.  At the same time, H-H dependency is not the same as all the other dependencies.  How so?  One of the elements of H-H must be a thing.  One element changes from a human to a thing. This transformation characterizes explicit abstraction.  In this regard, all the other dependencies may be re-enacted with specialized humans as things.

H-H dependency is salient in our current Lebenswelt.

0073 Plus, our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0074 A terminological shift is appropriate when considering human-human dependency in our current Lebenswelt.  Instead of a “thing”, the person becomes an “object”.

Of course, in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, one can never objectify a person within one’s own social circles.  What does one image or point to?  Hand-speech talk does not allow objectification, that is, explicit abstraction.

0075 Can I wrap my head around this idea?

In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, linguistic hand-speech talk always referred to things and states of things that could be imaged or pointed to with manual-brachial word gestures.  In our current Lebenswelt, almost every spoken word that I know involves an explicit abstraction, where meaning, presence and message are projected into a formant-frequency placeholder (a parole) in a system of differences.  How mind boggling.

0076 When we project meaning, presence and message into a spoken word, the intended referent becomes an “object”.  A “baker” is someone who makes the dough to make bread.  A “ovener” is someone who makes sure that the fire heating an oven is constantly and correctly maintained.

Well, that is the nomenclature that I am going to use.

0077 Now, I can return to the diagrams of H_2b-T_2a, T_2a-H_2b and T_2b-T_2a presented earlier (points 0036-0041).

Emmer wheat is used to make bread.  This is an example of human-thing dependency, H_2b-T_2a, in our current Lebenswelt.

0078 Bread is a product of organized human activities.  Because spoken words may be used to label specialized features of the organization_2b, explicit abstraction allows various tasks to become specialties, such as baker and ovener_2a.  This follows the pattern of thing-human dependency, T_2a-H_2b.

Here is a picture.

0079 The specialties of “baker” and “ovener”, once defined, promulgate feelings of implicit abstraction.  These people-things become artifacts that validate our projections of meaning, presence and message into the spoken words.  These specialties_2a are part of the toolset for producing product_1a in the normal context of managing a bakery_3a.  

Humans are now tools.  The question arises, “What makes a good ‘baker’ or ‘ovener’?”

Of course, these human-tools require training_2a.

0080 Plus, these specialists_2b better do their jobs well_1b in the normal context of running a bakery business_3b.  This criteria fits the style of thing-thing dependence.  However, now the things are objectified humans.

0081  Needless to say, Hodder proves a variety of examples in his excellent work.

Some of the examples carry moral overtones.

0082 For example, the making of thread starts during the Neolithic with spinning whorls.  These distinctly shaped cylinders twist strands of wool or flax fiber together.  They take some skill to use.  One must turn the whorl in a particular way in order to produce thread.  The thread may not be fine.  It is thread nonetheless.

By the medieval period of Europe, “spinsters” use fairly sophisticated pedal-powered spinning wheels, where the rotary motion is powered by a foot pedal and the cylinder-aspect of the whorl is performed by a spinning wheel.  Obviously, explicit abstraction plays a role in the technical separation of the spin from the fiber holding aspects of the old-fashioned whorl.  Now, finer threads are made.

So, the whorl to spinning-wheel transition belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

0083 What about fire?

The domestication of fire, accomplished hundreds of thousands of years ago, occurs in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in,when hand talk favors implicit abstraction.  Note that there are no “fire specialists” apparent in the fossil record for the ensuing millennia.  Making fire involves tacit knowledge.  Making fire is procedural.  Making fire is an embodied experience.  Do we have a spoken word to label the making of fire as a cooperative effort?

0084 In contrast, the specialty of running a kiln occurs in our current Lebenswelt.  Kilns are used to cook things, such a pottery, at particularly high temperatures.  Indeed, in this instance, two specialties are apparent: the one who makes pots out of clay and the one who fires the pottery using a kiln.  Expertise is required for both specialties.  Explicit abstraction is required for expertise.

0085 Perhaps, the fact that humans can be objectified as things in our current Lebenswelt accounts for Hodder’s moral intonations.

Or, perhaps a feeling of moral indignation arises from his examples, include opium, which starts as a thing, a poppy plant.

0086 In our current Lebenswelt, explicit abstraction allows humans to be objectified.

Objects can be treated as things in Hodder’s H-T, T-H and T-T dependencies.

The result?

H-H dependencies include H-O, O-H and O-O dependencies.

0087 Plus, H-H dependency carries moral implications.

Why?

Dependencies on things is intuitively natural for humans.  We adapted into a niche filled with these dependencies.

Dependencies on objects requires explicit abstraction.  Once implemented, these dependencies start to feel intuitively natural.  Once established, they feel intuitively natural.

But, they are not.

0088 Perhaps, I am starting to appreciate the implications of Hodder’s title: Where are we heading?

Imagine what happens when I replace the term, “things”, with “objects” (that includes humans).

0089 Here is a diagram.