01/10/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Book (2021) “Semiotic Agency” (Part 19 of 24)

0161 Today, in 2025, the psychometric Positivist’s judgment looks something like this.

0162 Yeah, the figure looks busy.

But, it still reads like a judgment.

The psychometric intellect (relation, thirdness) brings disciplinary languages honed to produce capitalist and socialist models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with a noumenal overlay of what people think, that can be objectified as what people say (what is, firstness).

0163 But, I thought that what people think cannot be fully objectified as what people say.

Ah, capitalist and socialist models substituting in for what people think can be objectified as what people say.

No wonder the judgment associates to the term, “the post-truth condition”.

0164 Remember, experts in the psychometric sciences make a lot more money than the practitioners of biosemiotics, even though the psychometric sciences are, like cybernetics, closely related to biosemiotics.

0165 Allow me to discuss the entire judgment starting with the relation (thirdness).

The psychometric intellect employs two normal contexts, a positivist one3c and expertise3b.  Note the subscripts.  The subscripts apply to a three-level interscope developed in Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2021) “A Player’s Guide To The Post-Truth Condition” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog in July 2024).  Subscripts 1, 2 and 3 correspond to potential1, actuality2 and normal context3. Subscripts a, b and c correspond to contenta, situationb and perspectiveclevels.

The psychometric intellect has a rule.  That rule is not quite the same as the mandate of the positivist intellect.  The positivist intellect says, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”  This constitutes a ban on Aristotle’s formal and final causes.  But, what of the psychometric sciences?  What do they permit?

0166 Allow me to elaborate.

Natural sciences depend on “truncated” material and efficient causes, because they are necessary for mathematical and mechanical models.

The social sciences fudge, as one sees with the phenomenologist’s Positivist judgment.  Social scientists ignore metaphysics.  As a result, novel “mechanistic” models reduce observations and measurements of social phenomena to material and efficient causes that slyly incorporate formal and final causation.  Metaphysics slips into social science models through an open backdoor.

The cybernetic sciences admit that metaphysics is allowed (and is not ignored).  Formal and final causes may appear in mechanistic models of habit.  At the same time, “metaphysics” changes its definition to “religious”.  So, cybernetic models are “not metaphysical”, because they are “not religious”.

The psychometric sciences apply the cybernetic approach to the political sciences.

0167 The psychometric sciences constitute the situation-level of a three-level interscope.  Rather than ignoring metaphysics (like social sciences) or grudgingly accepting them (like cybernetics), the psychometric sciences play a language game.  Metaphysical mechanisms are not “metaphysical”, therefore the label cannot apply.

Ah, that makes sense.

This is about politics.

0168 Take a look at what ought to be (secondness) and what is (firstness) for the psychometric Positivist’s judgment.

Expertise involved in the psychometric sciences is geared to explaining observations and measurements of what people say in response to an interventionalist “sign”.  Whenever the “system” takes an action, that action impacts people who are not involved in… um… “the decision2c” to take action.  Nevertheless, people3a are effected1a.  People3a will talk about those impacts1a.  Those statements2a become the phenomena2a that experts2b observe and measure1b.  Then, the experts3b produce capitalist and socialist models2b, couched in the language of science3c.  These models2b offer opportunities1c for “the system”3c to make another “decision”2c.

0169 A cyberneticist may portray the above paragraph as a functional… er… dysfunctional circle.

What does this suggest?

Is there more to the functional circle than meets the eye?

0170 Take a moment and examine the first item in point 0152 and the figure in 0153.

I ask, “What is a metaphor for the receptor?”

The answer is, “What people are saying.”

Note that phenomena2a for the psychometric sciences2b are strictly conditioned by a noumenon (what is, firstness) consisting of content-level personal experiences3a,1a of an interventional sign-relation.  In other words, phenomena are what people say about an interventional sign-relation.

0171 Where does this interventional sign-relation come from?

Some deciding body (technically, the relativist one3c) makes a decision2c based on an opportunity1c justified by capitalist and socialist models2b, constructed by experts3b, on the basis of psychometric data1b.

0172 What about this “strictly conditioned” business?

Well, people say a lot of things.  The expert is only interested in statements that (1) concern the person’s experiences2ain regards to an interventional sign-vehicle2c and (2) are capable of becoming data1b for capitalist and socialist models2b.  So, the psychometric expert3b dismisses almost everything that anyone says and only record statements relevant to their models2b.

0173 Now, look at the title of the above figure.

The cyberneticist does the same conditioning for observations and measurements.

The cyberneticist triggers the receptor that initiates the functional circle.

01/9/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Book (2021) “Semiotic Agency” (Part 20 of 24)

0174 Do you know where I am going with this?

Do I know where I am going with this?

Ah, the question!

Does Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay satisfy the three principles listed in point 0152?

I examine the first item.

First (P), limit agents to things that are accessible to observation and measurements.

In other words, for biosemiotics, limit phenomena to the noumenal items portrayed in green.

0175 What about the second admonition (Q) in point 0152?

Do not explain agency by any hypothesized substances or forces other than those already known to modern natural science, social sciences and humanities.

This suggestion is pictured in blue in the above figure.

0176 Of course, the term, “substances”, needs clarification.

According to Razie Mah, the term, “substance”, may be used to label the contiguity between the real elements of matter and form.  By extension, Aristotle’s hylomorphe is an exemplar for Peirce’s category of secondness.

The problem is that the word, “substance”, can be applied to all sorts of crazy notions. 

So, biosemioticians take note.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay suggests that substances need to be explained by biosemiotic models.  Substances are not explanations.  They are contiguities that need to be explained.

0177 The third please-do in point 0152 (R) says, “Do not link agency with unproven, speculative physical effects such as subatomic quantum factors, extra dimensions in space, and so on.”

Both authors work as editors in the fledgling field of biosemiotics.  Imagine the manuscripts that they have received.  How does one explain triadic sign-relations in terms of dyadic cause and effect?

Here, I wonder.  Are these diagrams equivalent to subatomic quantum factors, extra dimensions in space, and so on? 

Obviously not, physical factors do not cause purely relational beings.  Physical factors may be drawn into a triadic relation.  And, that makes it difficult to tell which is more real.

Physics or metaphysics?What is the nature of reality?

01/8/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Book (2021) “Semiotic Agency” (Part 21 of 24)

0178 Let me review points 0152 to 0177, examining section 6.1 of Sharov and Tonnessen book.

Here is a picture of the biosemiotic Positivist’s judgment.

A biosemiotic intellect (relation, thirdness) brings an empirio-schematic judgment that models sign-interpretants (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the dyad, semiotic agency [can be objectified as] phenomena related to sign-vehicles and sign-objects (what is, firstness).

0179 Section 6.2 discusses autonomy.

Autonomy associates with self-governance.  If an agent has self-governance, then it must have autonomy.  Autonomy needs to be accounted for by a mechanistic model for each biosemiotic topic of inquiry.

0180 Autonomy entails several implications.

The first is maintenance (section 6.2.1). The technical term for self-repair is “auto-poesis”.

Here is a picture of phenomena related to auto-poesis.

0181 Auto-poesis is obvious in all living organisms.  Auto-poesis is not obvious in dead ones.

So, phenomena related to auto-poesis touch back to the idea of wholeness as an attribute for semiotic agency.

With auto-poesis, wholeness requires the functioning of lower-level autonomous systems.  These lower-level systems are not whole.  They are autonomous systems within a whole system.  They are not fully autonomous.  But, they can be close to autonomous.  For example, I heard of a surgeon who transplanted a heart of a pig into a human and the human lived a couple of weeks.

0182 Well, what about transplanting organs from one human to another?

Yes, that works better, especially if one has a large number of political prisoners who are willing to “donate” their organs.

0183 What am I saying?

I meant to say, “criminals”.

0184 So, what needs to be modeled in regards to auto-poesis?

Here is a picture.

0185 Note how the term, “self-governing” (the topic of section 6.2.2) becomes explicit in models for auto-poesis.

Now, if one is talking about organs as “self-governing”, then the term becomes a tad more difficult to explicitly model, outside of a conditional phenomenal qualifier, such as “staying alive”.  For example, after removing the cornea from a criminal, and implanting it in a patient in need of a new cornea, the cornea typically does just fine.  If one does that with one of the lobes of the liver, the recipient’s immune system must be suppressed, because the patient’s body may recognize the criminal’s liver as a foreign agent.  Otherwise, the liver does just fine.

0186 All the organs in an animal body evolve to be interdependent, in so far as they all belong to a single body.  And, for humans, they are remarkably resilient when it comes to transplantation. As for removal, I suppose that as long as one organ for every system remains intact, then the entire organism retains its autonomy.

0187 But, what about its “freedom”?

That term associates to potential courses of action.

For example, some criminals may gain their “freedom” after the removal of one cornea, one lung, one lobe of liver, one gonad and one kidney.  This liberated criminal remains autonomous without the luxury of organ redundancy.

Other criminals gain their “freedom” after removal of their hearts, along with all those organs that are redundant, because redundancy is no longer necessary once the heart is removed for transplant.

0188 So I wonder, “Is an autonomous agent exhibiting ‘semiotic freedom’ really ‘free’?”

The authors provide the example of egg-laying by monarch butterflies.  These butterflies prefer to lay eggs on certain species of milkweed.  The milkweed serves as food for caterpillars. Plus, one suspects that the bold-coloration of the butterfly advertises that it once fed on a poisonous plant.  If you don’t want to taste milkweed, don’t eat me.

0189 “Semiotic freedom” implies a capacity to sense and perceive.  Sensation acts like a sign-vehicle for perception. Medieval scholastics recognize this. Sensation belongs to the content-level for how humans think.  Perception belongs to the situation level.

Indeed, models for semiotic agency should account for sensation and perception.

0190 Yes, the term, “semiotic freedom”, captures an irony in biosemiotics as science beyond mechanism.  The most robust “models” for semiotic agency are pre-scientific and are couched in (what big government (il)liberals would call) “religious” terminology.

0191 What does this imply?

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay works well because it is (as a phenomenologist might say) what the noumenon must be.

Plus, humans are adapted to recognizing noumenon.

That much is obvious.

0192 However, as this examiner has already pointed out, the noumenon is precisely the element in the Positivist’s judgment for the natural sciences that the positivist intellect must ignore.  In the 1920s, the so-called “Vienna Circle” advocated for the dismissal of the noumenon.  Scientific inquiry does not require the thing itself.

Why?

Models constitute the illumination that the Positivist’s judgment actualizes as what ought to be.

01/7/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Book (2021) “Semiotic Agency” (Part 22 of 24)

0193 Examine the following figure closely.  Note how what ought to be associates to the category of secondness, the realm of actuality, even though it obviously belongs to the category of thirdness, the realm of mediations, normal contexts, signs, judgments and so on.

Also, what is associates to the category of firstness, even though it looks like it should belong to secondness, the dyadic realm of actuality.

0194 What do the awkward categorical assignments among the elements in the Positivist’s judgment imply?

Are models more real than their respective noumena?

Then, why can’t the noumenon be ignored?

Is the noumenon more than the sum of all its observable and measurable facets?

Can all of our observations and measurements of phenomena objectify the thing that we recognize as the noumenon?

Not directly, that would violate Kant’s slogan.

Instead, a roundabout way is fashioned by triumphalist scientists.

Models are built upon observations and measurements of phenomena, because phenomena have the potential to be observed and measured.

But, can a model substitute for its noumenon, so that the model (in the slot for the noumenon) [can be objectified as] its phenomena?

Yes, but Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay is different.

Do Sharov and Tonnessen identify a noumenal overlay that shares a disturbing (and defining) feature of all um.. noumena, while, at the same time, expressing the cathartic character of model substitution?

0195 If so, then triumphalist scientists may feel uncomfortable as diverse models of empirio-schematic inquiry (think of the leaves on a tree analogy) produce specific models that complement, but do not replace, the one noumenon that they all have in common (think of the tree in the tree analogy).

This discomfort is exacerbated because Sharov and Tonnessen mimic the trick that triumphalist scientists use in order to resolve the tension engendered by the noumenon.  Unlike a noumenon, a model (overlaying the noumenon) can be objectified as its phenomena.  This what is accounts for academic laboratory science.  Academic laboratory science relieves the tension intrinsic to Kant’s slogan.

0196 So, what am I suggesting?

Sharov and Tonnessen do not offer a model that overlays the noumenon of biosemiotics (as one expects for triumphalist scientists).  But, that is what they appear to do, as shown in the previous figure.

The problem is that for each application of their schema to a biosemiotic question, their noumenal overlay does not get fully objectified as its phenomena.  At the same time, their noumenal overlay can be objectified as its phenomena, just as in the laboratory sciences.

0197 So, what is going on?

Sharov and Tonnessen philosophically identify a common feature of many biological things (that is, the use of specifying sign-relations) and construct a noumenal overlay capable of being read by scientists who are interested in biosemiotic phenomena and models.  Consequently, the S&T noumenal overlay shares a foundational awareness with the natural sciences while, at the same time, exhibiting the character of academic laboratory science, where phenomena [objectify] the model (overlaying the noumenon).

This becomes obvious in chapter six, concerning conceptualizing agency.

0198 The S&T noumenal overlay seems to work for every application of biology.

Consequently, their noumenal overlay looks more and more like a thing itself.

0199 Section 6.6, on the typology of agents, is no exception.

All semiotic agents exhibit self-governance and follow courses of action.  Each does so in its own way.  All semiotic agents have this in common.

Table 6.2 lists different types of agents.  Criteria varies, including hierarchy, production, activity, resources, movement, semiosis, origin of components and individuation.  Each of these criteria have at least two types.  For example, production has two types (primary and secondary).  Activity has three types (active, dormant, potential).

0200 Why do typologies offer an advantage?

All semiotic agents have two traits in common.  These traits are precisely what needs to be modeled by biosemiotic inquiry.

01/6/25

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 1 of 4)

0201 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen.  The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics.  The editors of this series have Razie Mah’s permission for use of following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

Part III concerns theoretical considerations, addressing the headliner question.

Here is a list of the chapters, along with their titles.

Each title labels a labor of biosemioticians.

0202 So far, from Part I, Sharov and Tonnessen propose a philosophical dyad that serves as an overlay for the noumenon of biosemiotics.  The authors’ proposed noumenon constitutes what is for the Positivist’s judgment and contains what all biosemiotic phenomena have in common.

This is significant.

0203 The Positivist’s judgment is constructed, starting in the 1600s, by mechanical philosophers.  Mechanical philosophers aim to bracket out metaphysics, in favor of models based on observations and measurements.

So, what is science?

0204 Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) “Natural Philosophy” shows that the scholastic ideation of three styles of abstraction comes close to a satisfying answer.  But, no one can capitalize on that answer until a hidden knot is unraveled.  A knot?  Two judgments are entangled.  This becomes clear when the abstractions are pictured as elements of judgment.

0205 The following diagram of the Positivist’s judgment is a satisfying way to portray what the mechanical philosophers created in the 1600s and what Kant corrected in the late 1700s.

In 2025, no definition of science compares to this diagram.

0206 In the Positivist’s judgment, the positive intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the dyad, a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena (what is, firstness).

In the empirio-schematic judgment, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is,firstness).

0207 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) forces natural scientists to concede that they investigate the observable and measurable facets of the thing itself.   Plus, their observations and measurements cannot fully objectify the subject of inquiry.

0208 Over the next two centuries (1800s and 1900s),  scientists promote their successful models, saying, “Our models are more illuminating than the thing itself.  Indeed, our models can take the place of the noumenon.  Once that happens, then our models can be objectified by their phenomena.  Observations and measurements validate the successful model.”

The academic laboratory sciences are born.  For example, a chemistry laboratory and its accompanying lecture belong to the laboratory science of chemistry.  In contrast, the science of chemistry is the study of natural processes, that is, things themselves.  The key to science is to make an observation and then explain it.  The model is an explanation, rather than the thing itself.

01/4/25

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 2 of 4)

0209 It’s funny how academics can turn disappointments around.

0210 Triumphalist science establishes a pattern.  If one considers a model to be the noumenon, then one can look for phenomena that objectify that model.  This is how the social sciences are born.  Since their inception in the late 1700s, social scientists have argued that the mechanical philosophies that gave birth to the natural sciences also apply to the study of people and society.

How do social scientists identify social and psychological noumena?

Social sciences pull noumena out of holes in the ground.  In other words, if a social scientist observes and measures activities that must correspond to a noumenon, then all the investigator needs to do is to dig a little and find the thing that their phenomena must be objectifying.

0211 This process gets formalized by phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).  Husserl develops a method by which common opinions about a thing are bracketed out, because they cannot reveal what the noumenon must be.  The models of natural science must also be bracketed out, because triumphalist scientists will insist that, if their models replace the noumenon, then everything becomes a controlled experiment, like in a college laboratory.

Phenomenology is precisely the formal process that self-identifying social scientists are informally practicing with the construction of the social sciences in the 1800s and 1900s.

0212 Yes, phenomenologists formalize the process by which noumena are formulated by the social sciences.

What do they get for their labors?

Established social scientists say that phenomenologists are pulling noumena out of their asses.

0213 How rude!

Okay, a lot of money is on the line.  How so?  Both social scientists (on their own) and phenomenologists (by way of a well-characterized method) ascertain what the noumenon must be, by considering associated phenomena.  The intent is to activate the Positivist’s judgment.  As soon as what is of the Positivist’s judgment constellates, it stands as a robust possibility worthy of empirio-schematic inquiry.

Empirio-schematic inquiry takes time and effort.

Is that the same as money?

Of course, social-science research requires so much money as to attract intellectuals who cannot tell their asses from holes in the ground.

In that regard, they are not so different from the laboratory sciences.

0214 Oh, on second thought, social scientists pull ideas out of holes in the ground.

Phenomenologists should not compete with that.

So, phenomenology takes a cultural turn.  Husserl is hired to sit in the same professorial chair as Kant at the University of Freiberg.  In 1916, Husserl is 56 years old.  The (soon to be Catholic) philosophy student, Edith Stein, works as his personal assistant.  In 1926, one of his students, Martin Heidegger, takes modern Western philosophy to the next level with the publication of Being and Time.

0215 All I can say is, “Look at what phenomenologists pulled out of their asses.”

01/3/25

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 3 of 4)

0216 In Part III of their book, the authors dance through a philosophical critique without Peircean tools to depict triadic relations.

Uh oh.  Without figures, is this critique philosophical or scientific or phenomenological?

0217 Here is the bottom line.

There is a method to the madness of the phenomenologists.

This is why Catholic philosophers long to engage in discourse with phenomenologists, even as phenomenologists reject discourse, on the um… grounds… that phenomenology follows the mandate of the positivist intellect.  Metaphysics is not allowed.

0218 Catholic philosophers see that there is a method to phenomenology that can be articulated (somehow) by scholastic tradition (following Aquinas, not Poinsot).  But, they do not appreciate how phenomenology is historically embedded in the modern Age of Ideas.  Also, they do not appreciate what the scholastic tradition has achieved.  John Poinsot writes in the 1600s and Thomas Aquinas writes in the 1200s.  Poinsot figures out that signs are triadic relations.  Aquinas mentions signs as things that signify other other things.

Razie Mah opens the lid to this can of worms in the series, Phenomenology and the Positivist Intellect (articles available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0219 Yes, there is a method to the madness of the phenomenologists.

Phenomenologists intuitively generate (through their prescribed methods) noumenal overlays that coincide with semiotic agency, as articulated by Sharov and Tonnessen.

0220 What does this imply?

Sharov and Tonnessen’s formulation of semiotic agency, as a noumenal overlay, allows the inquirer to consider the prescribed methods of phenomenology as ways for examining natural and social phenomena arising from… the noumenal overlay of semiotic agency.

0221 Am I saying that phenomenological determinations of what the noumenon must be are really models that phenomenologists triumphantly overlay upon S&T’s noumenon?

I suppose… if what I say is correct… then biosemiotics is a science that belongs to a new age of understanding.

What age is that?

John Deely (1942-2017) thought long and hard about the proper label.

How about The Age of Triadic Relations?

01/2/25

Is Biosemiotics Scientific? (Part 4 of 4)

0222 With that said, here is a quick wrap-up of the four chapters in Part III.

For chapter six, Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay conceptualizes semiotic agency.

For chapter seven, semiotic agency is considered an actuality2.  In order to understand an actuality2, the actuality2 must have a normal context3 and potential1.

0223 Here is the nested form for semiotic agency2.

Semiotic agency2 presents a sign-relation as a dyadic actuality.  This is shown in Part I.

Semiosis2 does not occur without an agent3 and the possibility of ‘significance’1.

0224 For chapter eight, the evolution of agents3 and the possibility of ‘significance’1 proceeds in tandem with the evolution of semiotic agency2.

0225 For chapter nine, phenomenology serves as a precursor to biosemiotics, just as the social sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries serve as intimations of phenomenology.

0226 Without a doubt, Sharov and Tonnessen build upon the insights of philosophers writing a century earlier, as seen in two of Razie Mah’s e-books: Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy and Comments on Nicholas Berdyaev’s Book (1939) Spirit and Reality.  Both Maritain and Berdyaev are interested in understanding the nature of scientific inquiry.  And now, their works inform biosemioticians.

12/31/24

Looking at Bill Arnold’s Article (2020) “Genesis and the Challenges of the 21st Century” (Part 1 of 5)

0001 This article records a presentation at a symposium on Adam, the Fall, and the goodness of God.  The text is published in the journal, Pro Ecclesia (2020), volume 29(4), pages 387-406.  I request that the journal to unlock this issue.  After all, this lecture is not the only gem, covering a topic that is seldom broached.

0002 The author steps to the podium and posits two axioms.  One addresses the evolutionary sciences, in a minimalistic sort of way.  The other addresses biblical hermeneutics in the modern age.  Ironically, another science hides in the shadow of the second axiom.  That science is archaeology.

0003 Here is a picture of the two axioms.

0004 The science axiom poses a double difficulty.

Currently, the biological sciences present all evolution as continuous developments in time, although there are moments of radical… um… “re-organization”, hence the theory of punctuated equilibrium.  When the evolutionary sciences cast their models of human evolution into the mirror of theology, the theologian sees a picture that does not quite sync with the wild change of… um… “genre” that occurs the moment after God wraps up the Creation Story, by telling humans that they should give food to the animals (Genesis 1:30).

Speaking of that, here is an application of the two axioms in action.

0005 Mirror of theology?

See Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2014), available at smashwords and other e-book venues, as well as Razie Mah’s blog for the months of April, May and June, 2024.

On the one hand, the mirror of theology embraces the noumenon.

On the other hand, the mirror of theology reflects models proposed by science.  Science is not interested in the noumenon, the thing itself.  Scientists are only interested in a noumenon’s phenomena.  Phenomena are the observable and measurable facets of a noumenon.  Scientists build models based on observations and measurements of phenomena.  If the model “works”, then scientismists want to say that the model is more real than the thing itself.  At this point, natural philosophers and theologians object and say, “No, the scientific model is not more real than the thing itself.”

0006 After an awkward pause, triumphalist scientists reply, “Well, then, how are you going to know anything about the noumenon without our models?”

“Well,” the natural philosophers say, “What about matter and form?  I can know these about the noumenon through experience of it.”

“So how are you going to do that when the noumenon is evolutionary history?  How can you grasp that though determining its matter and form?”

To which the theologian sighs and says, “Listen, whatever the noumenon is, it cannot be reduced scientific models of its phenomena.  So, I will set up a mirror that will reflect your scientific model, so you can be assured that your models are not ignored when I contemplate the metaphysical structures intrinsic to the thing itself, while keeping my mind open to revelation (including the the Bible). I will call it ‘the mirror of theology’.”

0007 To which the scientist counters, “And, we will correspondingly set up a mirror in our domain, a mirror of science.  We will look at the theological statements concerning the character of the noumenon, which really should just be replaced by our mathematical and mechanical models.  Then, we will laugh at and ridicule them.”

0008 Now, I once again present the odd coincidence pictured before as an application of the two axioms.

Do I have that correctly?

Does the scientist project his model into the mirror of theology?

Does the theologian project his metaphysical analysis into the mirror of science?

How confusing is that?

0008 It seems to me, a mere semiotician, that these two images actually reflect a single real being.  The theologian looks into the mirror of theology and sees what evolutionary scientists project, then looks at revelation and locates an appropriate correspondence.  Then, when the theologian’s correspondence is viewed by the scientist in their mirror of science, it says, “That is superstitious nonsense!”

“It”?

I thought male and female he created them.

“It” must be a first approximation.

0009 Of course, to the semiotician, the whole situation is sort of funny, because it implies that there is a body of wisdom that is independent of science, but not subject to science, because it concerns the noumenon, the thing itself.

12/30/24

Looking at Bill Arnold’s Article (2020) “Genesis and the Challenges of the 21st Century” (Part 2 of 5)

0010 Okay, so there is a off-chance that there is wisdom… or… superstitious nonsense… that is independent of science, comes from the realm of theology, appears in the mirror of science and provides a weirdly compelling impression.  After all, the start of the Developed Neolithic (projected into the mirror of theology) enhances the impressiveness of Genesis 1:30 (projected into the mirror of science).  How can it be superstitious nonsense, when the Genesis verse sounds like a sign of the corresponding evolutionary period?

0011 With this impressiveness in mind, I reiterate the following.

Currently, the biological sciences present all evolution as continuous developments in time, although there are moments of radical… um… “re-organization”, hence the theory of punctuated equilibrium.  When the evolutionary sciences cast their image of human evolution into the mirror, the theologian sees a picture that does not quite sync with the wild change of… um… “genre” that occurs the moment after God wraps up the Creation Story, by telling humans that they should give food to the animals (Genesis 1:30).

So, the question arises, “Is there a scientific proposal that would be in sync with this change in genre?

Yes, there is.  It is called the hypothesis of the first singularity.

0012 Both human evolution and chapters one through three of Genesis portray two phases.

0013 Razie Mah offers three scientific masterworks that project well in the mirror of theology.

The first work is titled, The Human Niche.  The human niche is the potential of triadic relations.  This e-book covers the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

The second work is titled, An Archaeology of the Fall.  It dramatizes the scientific discovery of the first singularity.  But, for those who prefer not to dally in fiction, there is The First Singularity and Its Fairy Tale Trace.  In the series, “Crystallizations of the Fall”, this essay is paired with Original Sin and Original Death: Romans 5:12-19.  

The third work is titled, How To Define the Word “Religion”.  The accompanying course includes ten primers, starting with A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form.  This course concerns our current Lebenswelt.  It introduces the category-based nested form, which encompasses three logics, corresponding to firstness, secondness and thirdness.  Thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness.

Yes, these terms come from the philosophy of Charles Peirce.  The logic of firstness is inclusive and allows contradictions.  The logic of secondness is where the logics of contradiction and non-contradiction apply.  The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.

0014 In sum, human evolution comes with a twist.

That twist is mirrored in the sudden shift of genres in the first two chapter of Genesis.