0116 This reader can barely imagine the heaps of intellectual garbage that this earnest and prayerful graduate studentstruggles through in constructing chapters one and two.
Then, at the start of chapter three, Tabaczek introduces the philosopher scientist, the guru at the top of the academic mountain (the story takes place in Berkeley, after all), the much-ballyhooed, well-published and honorably appointed, Professor Terrence Deacon.
Deacon works on the model side of Tabaczek’s mirror. He converses with the ghost of the positivist intellect. He fashions novel versions of Aristotle’s four causes in order to accomplish, on the science side, what any dullard would do on the philosophical side of Tabaczek’s mirror.
By “dullard”, I mean “a nerd who believes in the risen Christ”.
0117 With that in mind, I have a few caveats.
First, when I mention “Deacon”, I mean what Tabaczek says about the work of Professor Deacon. After all, Tabaczek writes the book under examination.
Second, on both sides of Tabaczek’s mirror, spoken words mean whatever the viewing agent thinks they mean, because each viewing agent projects his own image into the mirror.
I hope that makes sense.
0118 Fortunate for me, I am already using Deacon’s terminology. Deacon’s terms label the levels for the interscope of the hydrogen-oxygen fuel-cell. “Thermodynamic” labels orthograde processes on the content level. “Homeodynamic” covers the contragrade processes on the situation level. “Morphodynamic” covers the perspective level, where the energy captured by an emergent phenomenon2b is dissipated.
Needless, to say, there is one key term that I neglect. “Teleodynamic” applies to the entire interscope, especially the integration of the perspective-level actuality2c into other emergent processes.
So, my example of a fuel-cell driven motor is not complete, because the motor gets integrated into another emergent-bearing interscope.
0119 My manner of expressing the thermodynamic (content) level differs from Deacon’s manner.
I prefer to express the unconstrained orthograde reaction.
Deacon prefers to show how the situation-level potential1b constrains the orthograde reaction in order to exploit reagent properties.
0120 Of course, since Deacon is much more clever than this examiner, Deacon’s preference allows a generalization of the adjusted thermodynamic level.
Here is a picture of the generalization, along with the hydrogen-oxygen fuel-cell example.
0121 Almost all emergent phenomena are unique, each in its own way.
0122 Does a general description work?
0123 To me, the normal context3a of the general description (tendency towards equilibrium) fits the normal context3a of the example (adjusted orthograde reaction). Without the adjustment, the thermodynamic example is a chemical reaction that releases lots of free energy. Boom!
In Deacon’s schema, the “downward causation” of situation-level potential1b is apparent in the content-level adjusted category-based nested form. There is a certain pedagogic advantage to this. The method becomes obvious. The actuality is a contained circulation of ingredients2a. Specifically, this corresponds to the construction of the fuel cell itself. The fuel cell physically separates the oxidation of hydrogen from the reduction of oxygen.
0124 Oh, did I mention that the “contained circulation” and the “physical separation” correspond to Aristotle’s material causes, not divorced from formal cause?
Yes, the material causes are integrated with the formal cause. In general, the formal cause aims to maintain a tendency towards equilibrium3a for the circulating ingredients2a. For the specific application, this requires the physical separation of the reagents, molecular hydrogen and molecular oxygen, as well as the separation of the sites where electron loss and gain occur.
Tabaczek intuitively couples material and formal causes. He puts them into the same basket, so to speak, without explaining why.
0125 So, the tendency towards equilibrium3a is formalized by the way that ingredients are circulated and contained2abased on the potential of maintaining a displacement from equilibrium1a. One efficient cause is obvious in the specific case. The physical separation1a of the anode and cathode2a forces the hydrogen to give up its electrons at the anode and the oxygen to take up its electrons at the cathode. But, that is not the only efficient cause. The addition of a polysulfonate barrier, creating a forest of negative charges for positively charged hydrogen ions to enter, improves “the circulation of ingredients”.
0126 The couplings of actuality2a and potential1a in the efficient causes cannot be divorced from the final cause, which says, “There is more to the potential that what the scientist maintains.”
Yes, the normal context3a and potential1a simultaneously select for and give rise to the actuality2a. Darwinian natural selection for multicellular organisms offers an analogy. On one hand, natural selection selects. On the other hand, sexual reproduction offers variation. The logic of normal contexts is to exclude, align or complement. The logic of potential is to include, even to allow contradictions. So, in the scientific laboratory, a lot of failed experiments take place before the proper conditions, the proper “containment of circulating ingredients” is isolated within the constraints of the normal context3a (the scientific question at hand) and out of the ordered chaos of the laboratory1a (the instruments and equipment at hand).
“Final causes” label the manifestation of an actuality2a within its normal context3a and out of its potential1a. They also describe intentionality.
0127 The problem?
Final causes are metaphysical.
The ghost of the positivist intellect has a rule, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”
And, that rule spooks the agents on the science side of Tabaczek’s mirror.
0128 Here is the homeodynamic (or situation) level general and specific nested forms.
0129 The fuel cell3b is the normal context for the example.
Does the fuel cell amplify the non-equilibrium dynamics3b of the adjusted orthograde reaction3a?
Of course it does.
0130 Final causes come to the fore.
The normal context of a fuel cell3b operates on the potential of ‘a contragrade arrangement for the orthograde chemical reaction of molecular hydrogen and molecular oxygen’1b in order to produce an electric current2b.
A normal context that amplifies a nonequilibrium dynamic3b brings an emergent being2b into relation with the potential of ‘constraints and biases imposed on an orthograde process’1b.
If I, as a scientist, say, “The contragrade arrangement1b of the adjusted orthograde reaction3a explains the emergent phenomenon2b, the electric current2b, in terms of instrumental and efficient causality.”, I really am saying, “I have imported the shadow of final causality into my declaration of modern instrumental and efficient causes.”
0131 The emergent phenomena2b, the electric current2b, has “a life” of its own, in the sense that it represents the capture of some of the free energy of an orthograde process. It is a “non-self” self, within the “self” of the entire interscope,the fuel-cell driven motor for sale by corporation A. The motor dissipates the energy represented by the current and translates it into movement. So, the power2c of the emergent being2b that virtually situates (and emerges from) the fuel cell2a is dissipated as mechanical movement2c. The dissipated power2c persists as movement2c.
0132 Here is a picture of the virtual nested form for all three levels in the realm of actuality.
0133 Now, I can look at the emergent phenomenon2b, as a thing in itself, an actuality that needs to be understood in material terms. Here, Aristotle’s hylomorphe is a good place to start: matter [substantiates] form.
On one hand, the electrical current2b is directly contextualized in the normal context of a fuel cell3b arising from the potential of a contragrade arrangement of hydrogen and oxygen gases1b. On the other hand, the emergent phenomenon2bis part of a grander scheme (or virtual normal context2c) that formalizes the phenomenon2b and orders its material2b(anode, wire, motor, wire, cathode) and efficient (design of fuel cell) causations2a.
The above nested form portrays the “on the other hand”.
0134 This virtual nested form is such a discovery that Deacon deserves a commendation that philosophers talking about “emergence” and “downward causation” may not deserve.
Deacon presents his discovery entirely within the science side of Tabaczek’s mirror.
Here is a picture.
0135 The “dullard” Tabaczek notices the subtle change and that gives him inspiration. Deacon clearly (and significantly) alters Aristotelian notions so that formal causes fall under the label of “material” and final causes sort into the title of “efficient”.
Or something like that.
Nevertheless, when looking into the mirror of natural philosophy, Deacon sees the ghost of the positivist intellect conjuring a smoky image of a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena.
0136 How so?
Well, Deacon (sort of) regards the constraints and biases imposed on the orthograde reaction1b and the simplifications demanded from the emergent phenomenon1c as “causes”.
Tabaczek wrestles with this apparent misapplication of the term, “causes”. Deacon’s “causes” do not seem, at first blush, to correspond to Aristotle’s four causes.
However, if I have learned anything from this examination, it is the following.
0137 First, in emergence, “downward causation” follows the nature of a passage from a lower-level category-based nested form to a higher-level and the subsequent ordering of the lower-level in response to the new situation or new perspective.
Second, in emergence, both the category-based nested forms that compose each horizontal level and the vertical virtual category-based nested forms that compose each vertical column in Tabaczek’s interscope exercise all of Aristotle’s causesin a holistic manner.
0138 With that in mind, I turn to the morphodynamic level.
The morphodynamic level puts the homeodynamic level into perspective, just as the homeodynamic level situates the adjusted thermodynamic level.
0139 Here is a comparison of the general formulation and the ongoing application.
0140 For the example, the dynamic form3c is the fuel-cell driven motor3c.
The power2c of the emergent phenomenon2b is intentionally dissipated as movement2c.
So, the example’s potential1c is ‘mechanical work’.
So, why does Deacon, the Professor Scientist-Educator, choose the label, ‘simpification’1c?
0141 Perhaps, ‘simplification’1c better evokes final causality hidden in the shadow of the image of ‘mechanical work’1c as an efficient cause.
Certainly, it evokes the virtual formal cause that says, “If this fuel cell is going to work for this motor, it had better be both reliable and small.”
0142 What does that call for?
Simplification.
Each feature of the fuel cell adapts to this formal requirement1c, commanding from its perch as the perspective-level potential1c.
0143 Indeed, some emergent phenomena2b, self-less “selves” operating within a even more emergent “self”, are stunning in their simplicity and beauty. They are amazing in the way that they arise from constraints1b imposed on processes2a that would otherwise occur without them. It is as if a designer sees an opportunity1b to take a little of that “otherwise” energy2a and fashion it to produce something that might otherwise not occur2b.
Emergent phenomena2b are what we think of when we think about creation.
0144 Part two of Tabaczek’s book builds a case for the noumenal side of the mirror.
Needless to say, I cover much of this territory during my account of the historical development of Tabaczek’s mirror.
0145 Chapter four presents six theories that associate to emergent phenomena in our world.
When a philosopher of science looks from the empirio-schematic side into Tabaczek’s mirror, the following describes what appears in the looking glass.
Yes, the focus is on emergent phenomena. The rest of the mirror is clouded by the ghost of the positivist intellect.
0146 Agents on the metaphysical side of the mirror are also not pleased.
In section 4.7, Tabaczek concludes that no current proposal recognizes that emergent phenomena are better described as dispositions [properties] powers, rather than the observable and measurable facets of… what? What is the thing itself in a world where one emergence is incorporated and taken for granted by another? When does the scientist realize that emergent phenomena coincide with the dispositions [properties] powers within a noumenon. Plus, the noumenon is an emergent being.
0147 In particular, inadequate models cannot substitute for the emergent being.
Disciplinary languages bound to truncated material and efficient causalities sneak in the characteristics of formal and final causation, under the table, so to speak. The contiguity between a noumenon and its dispositions [properties] powersincludes both whole and parts.
Dispositions [properties] powers of parts and whole are what give rise to emergent phenomena that can be observed and measured.
0149 In chapter five, Tabaczek starts to develop the noumenal side of his mirror, beginning with dispositions and powers. Tabaczek wants to use these terms interchangeably. Perhaps, it is better to regard them as two contiguous real elements, where the contiguity is [properties].
Disposition [property] power is a hylomorphe that is slightly different than Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter [substance] form. Even though they differ, they both belong to Peirce’s category of secondness.
To me, Peirce’s secondness opens the door to expressions of causality that reflect Aristotle’s hylomorphe in so far as they have the same relational structure.
Currently, no modern philosopher views Aristotle’s hylomorphe as a prime example of Peirce’s category of secondness.
How so?
As soon as a modern philosopher recognizes the point, then he or she becomes a postmodern philosopher.
Labels can be slippery.
0150 In chapter six of Emergence, Tabaczek introduces forms and teleology (that is, formal and final causes). The operation of these causes within the category-based nested form has already been presented.
0151 In chapter seven, Tabaczek labors to apply his dispositional metaphysics to Deacon’s formulation of dynamical depth. Perhaps, the results are not as coherent as the application found in this examination, but his efforts are sufficient to earn him his doctorate in philosophy.
Amen to that!
0152 Overall, Emergence is a testimonial to the resilience of a graduate student who completes his doctorate in philosophy of science without knowing that the model and the noumenon are two (apparently competing) illuminations within the Positivist’s judgment.
0153 Why doesn’t he know?
Well, no one knows, because philosophers of science are not paying attention the traditions of Charles Peirce or of Jacques Maritain. As noted in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, Maritain uses the scholastic tool of three different styles of abstraction to paint a picture of science displaying the structure of judgment. Peirce’s semiotics and categories clarify Maritain’s painting by resolving two integrated yet distinct judgments: the Positivist’s judgment and the empirio-schematic judgment.
Plus, another reason why no one knows is because philosophers of science still think that the positivist intellect is alive. All laboratory scientists obey the dictate of the positivist intellect. Metaphysics is not allowed. So, if well-funded scientists are correct, then philosophers of science must project what is for the Positivist’s judgment from science into their own image in Tabaczek’s mirror. They do not realize that Tabaczek inadvertently de-defines the positivist intellect by not getting the Positivist’s memo and regarding a noumenon as the thing itself and its phenomena as manifestations of dispositions [properties] power.
0154 Say what?
Tabaczek’s “dispositional metaphysics” disposes with the positivist intellect by vaporizing the relation of the Positivist’s judgment and condensing what ought to be (the empirio-schematic judgment) and what is (the noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena) as two distinct illuminations. Both enter secondness. Two hylomorphes stand juxtaposed. In Tabaczek’s mirror, each hylomorphe sees its own image in the other.
0389 The book before me published by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The question? What makes humans unique? The approach is scientific. Humans think differently than great apes, their closest biological kin. One way to understand that difference is to observe and measure the cognitive capacities of human newborns and infants, as well as the cognitive abilities of adult great apes.
This book belongs to a decades-long arc of inquiry by the author. During much of this time, Michael Tomasello serves as co-Director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany. I cover two decades in my examinations. Here is the fourth book in the list.
0390 What has this semiotician found so far?
First, from the very start of his journey, the content-level of Tomasello’s vision corresponds to the situation-level of Razie Mah’s hypothesis. The ultimate human niche consists of the potential of triadic relations.
Razie Mah’s hypothesis applies the two-level interscope for Darwin’s paradigm to human evolution.
0391 First, the general Darwinian paradigm looks like this.
0392 In The Human Niche (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), Razie Mah proposes that the ultimate human niche1b is the potential of triadic relations.
Tomasello’s hypothesis that joint attention2b and shared intentionality2b are behavioral and cognitive adaptations to the niche of sociogenesis1b reconfigures the situation-level of Darwin’s paradigm, resulting in what I call the “Tomasello-Mah synthesis”.
0393 Yes, fortune turns her wheel. Tomasello does not know Mah’s hypothesis. Tomasello’s arc of inquiry is underway in 1999. Mah’s hypothesis first appears online in 2018. So, Tomasello configures his insight, corresponding to the situation-level of the Darwinian paradigm, as the content-level of his vision.
Tomasello’s vision offers a way to bring a phenotype (of human ontogeny2c’) into relation with a foundational adaptation (of joint attention2a’). But, according to Mah, phenotype and adaptation are two independent fields of evolutionary inquiry. One does not situate or contextualize the other. Rather, the two intersect.
Consequently, Tomasello’s vision resolves the internal contradictions of the intersection of genetics and natural history,by assigning the phenotype to the category of thirdness and the adaptation to the category of firstness, while maintaining the actuality of both.
0394 Here is a picture of Tomasello’s vision.
0395 Of course, this examination appears precisely 25 years after Tomasello’s vision is cast in 1999 AD.
His vision is maintained throughout his arc of inquiry.
Consequently, his conclusions carry an awkward emptiness. The emptiness compares to the basement of a house. The basement is dark, cool, foundational and ignored, until of course, one must seek refuge in a storm.
0396 The previous examinations of Tomasello’s works demonstrate that the house, the abode of his vision, is furnished with morality.
Tomasello can ignore the basement, haunted by immaterial beings called, “triadic relations”. Yet, in that place, where a family might store potatoes, onions, smoked meat, along with luggage and Christmas ornaments, dwells something that Tomasello may safely ignore. I call that ghost, “religion”.
0397 Tomasello’s book opens with a hypothesis. Interpendence2 emerges from (and situates) cooperation1. In terms of Tomasello’s vision, interdependence2 replaces human culture2b and cooperation1b virtually situates joint-attention2a as an adaptation to sociogenesis1a. Cooperation1b may be defined as the potential of joint- and collective-attention2a.
0398 Of course, the other option is to consider cooperation2b as an actuality and interdependence1b as a possibility.
The option that I offer captures Tomasello’s claim that there are two forms to cooperation: mutualistic collaboration andaltruistic helping. Classical philosophers discuss these two forms in terms of motives. Mutualistic collaboration harbors a motive for justice (that is, the right, as in “righteous”). Altruistic helping carries a motive for beneficence (that is, the good). Yes, philosophers distinguish fairness from sympathy. Each exhibits is own style of morality, where morality associates with the possibility of what is righteous and good1b.
0399 So, why say that cooperation1b is the potential1b of joint attention2a?
Joint attention2a holds the potential of justice and beneficence, the motives for cooperations1b.
Plus, moral dilemmas reside in the way that interdependence2b, the actuality emerging from (and situating) cooperation1b,plays out.
0400 Remember, the sociogenesis1a of teams entails competition (each member of the team is selected by all others) for the honor of cooperating (that is, manifesting the potential of joint attention2a).
Hominins compete to cooperate.
Morality plays roles in both competition and cooperation.
Ah, that must mean that morality is embedded in cultural selection3b.
0400 Tomasello intends to provide an evolutionary account for the natural history of human morality3b, as the normal context for unique forms of social interaction and organization of the Homo genus2b(that is, interdependence2b), emerging from the cultivation of fairness and sympathy1b (that is, cooperation1b).
Here are two pictures of one situation-level nested form.
0401 Have Tomasello’s previous books laid the groundwork for an exploration into the natural history of human… or is it?… hominin morality?
So, remember to cross out the word, “human”, and write the word, “hominin”, where “hominin” is technically defined as a human ancestor.
0401 Recall, the natural history of human morality occurs in generations prior to the appearance of anatomically modern humans. In previous works, Tomasello identifies three eras of intentionality.
Here is a picture.
0402 The era of individual intentionality shows interdependence with respect to family (5) and intimate friends (5). The band (50) is not interdependent in the same sense of the word. The band (50) is large enough to deter predators.
0403 The era of joint intentionality begins once bipedal “southern apes” collaborate in order to forage. The advance is so productive that collaborative foraging becomes obligatory. Obligatory collaborative foraging is conducted in teams (15). Teams have more members than family (5) or friends (5) but less than the band (50).
0404 Teams cultivate the capacity for joint attention2a. If joint attention2a is behavioral, then joint or shared intentionality2a is the corresponding cognitive capacity. This cognitive capacity is what cognitive psychologists observe in newborns and infants in their experiments in human ontogeny1c. This cognitive capacity2a embodies sociogenesis1a, where sociogenesis is more subtle than the mere naming of social circles. Sociogenesis1a is the potential of um… an actuality independent of the adapting species.
0405 Cooperation1b requires participants in joint-attention activities2a to serve different roles while sharing the team’s shared intention2a… that is… purpose2a.
Is there a problem?
Free riders must be excluded.
Well, the solution turns out to be remarkably simple. If an individual does not pull weight, for whatever reason, then the team meets without the slackard. How simple is that?
Or, should I say, “How awkward is that, especially when the excluded individual discovers the secret that everyone else knows?”
Ah, members of a team respect one another. They do not respect the grifter.
0406 Tomasello never says that morality is pretty.
Those who only appear to share the team’s purpose are dangerous to others, as well as themselves. They lower the reproductive success of all concerned. They are killjoys. Each member of the team should move according to the team’s purpose. Such movements are fair and good. Yet, hand-talk words for “fair” and “good” do not exist. What is there to picture or point to? When do hominins figure out that they can smile or grimace, in order display approval or disapproval?
Yes, team activities are all about “me” and “you”.
Tomasello calls the natural, embodied, team-based moralityof the era of joint intentionality, “second-person morality”.
0407 In the era of collective intentionality, hominin interdependence2b cultivates sociogenesis1a in band (50), community (150), mega-band (500) and tribe (1500). Today, these correspond to neighborhood (50), church (150), farmer’s market and festival (450) and diocese (1500). These larger social circles come into play because the domestication of fireincreases the number and diversity of teams.
The morality that characterizes teams infiltrates smaller social circles as well as larger. Collective intentionality is no longer motivated by the slogan, “We work for food.” Collective intentionality says, “We work for organizational objectives, that are based in righteousness and goodness.” But, hand-talk cannot gesture the words, “organizational objectives”, “based”, “righteousness” and “goodness”. These spoken terms are explicit abstractions. Hand-talk facilitates implicit abstractions, characteristic of the exemplar sign.
0409 So what is a hominin, in the era of collective intentionality, to hand talk?
Can the hominin gesture, “The morality that characterizes the community and the tribe extends to the living, the dead and those who are yet to be born.”?
What fully linguistic gesture-words suffice?
Can the hominin gesture, “We belong to the one who gives, without us knowing why?”
[POINT to self][SWEEPING POINT to others][CAST EYES to SKY][CRADLE ARMS Then LOOK AT CRADLED ARMS as if receiving something from SKY][LOOK back up at SKY][SHRUG]
0410 Those who accept their gifts, their missions, their community roles, the mantle of tradition, their responsibilities and yes, their fates, are blessed with reproductive success.
But, enter the modern, who asks, “Does this associate to the term, ‘conformity’?”
How far have we fallen?
0411 Tomasello envisions a kind of cultural and group-minded “objective” morality.
The term, “objective”, is modern. It means “independent of anyone’s particular judgment”. The premodern Latin schoolmen use the term, “suprasubjective”, which means, “simultaneously encompassing and transcending our subjectivities”.
Here, in Tomasello’s selections of terms, this reader spies a bias towards the scientific. Scientific facts and theories are “objective”.
This modern term fails to capture what collective intentionality expects of us. “Objective” morality is independent of anyone’s point of view. “Suprasubjective” morality interpellates us to align our judgments, our species intelligibili, with the truth, the foundation of all human institutions that promote human flourishing.
Yet, as noted above, there is no hand-talk gesture-word for “truth”.
What is there to image or indicate?
0412 What does this imply?
Truth is built into the hominin brain and body. We are on the lookout for signs of truth. Truth is the foundation of the righteous and the good. We know this in our heart and bones. We ourselves are gifts of the one who gives, without us knowing why.
We, the living, and we, the dead, and we, the ones to come, constitute the tree of life.