0512 Imagine trying to elaborate the nature of the preceding figure using explicit abstraction?

Spoken words pile onto spoken words in a litany of statements, qualifications, and oh-that-reminds-me-ofs.

Tomasello is a disciplined scientist.  He is very organized.  But, the above image breaches every item on his list because it composes the medium upon which the list is inscribed.  Even though each and every one of us appears to be a tabula rasa, a blank slate, at the time of birth, evolution has already contoured that slate so that cultural traits that conform to its apparently blank surface will absorbed like ink into parchment.

0513 Does collective intentionality bring diverse teams into harmony by putting their team organizational objectives into perspective?

Does collective intentionality bring different social circles into harmony as well?

0514 Chapter four strives to explain how second-person morality lays the groundwork for later hominin’s group-minded “objective” morality, characterized by (1) the creation of “objective” normative values of right and wrong, (2) nascent institutions (broadly described as conventions, manners and traditions) and (3) the obligation of a person with a moral identity to the moral community.

0515 In Razie Mah’s framework, two actualities reflect one another.  One is an actuality₂ that makes an institution within the community into a person writ large.  The other is an actuality₂ that makes an individual within the community into an institution writ small.

0516 Where do I get these metaphors?

Consider A Primer on How Institutions Think, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  This primer reviews a book by anthropologist Mary Douglas.

0517 Here is a picture of those two actualities.

0518 The three characteristics listed by Tomasello may be found within these two hylomorphes.  Surely, without a sense of right and wrong (1), an organizational objective cannot animate an institution…. er… organization.

Institutions are not the same as organizations.  A team is an organization that has an obvious mission.  The mission is captured in the slogan, “we work for food”.  Everything about the team concerns sensible construction.  Only later, when the community overflows with normative values, not only of right and wrong, but of all sorts of dichotomies, do teams engage in works of art (that is, social construction).

0519 Institutions put organizations into perspective (2). If an organization works to get a job done, then the institution puts that job into the perspective of right and wrong, or some other dichotomy.  In short, institutions have souls.  Organizations have bodies.  So, when an organizational objective [animates] an organization, the entire being acts like a person writ large.

0520 Finally, an institution’s organizational objective interpellates a person’s perceptive soul (3).  The term “interpellates” is composed of two Latin words.  “Inter” is often translated as “between” and “pellates” means “to call someone”.  The call comes from the third person, the institution, and is received by a person in community.  After receiving the call, the perceptive soul brings the reactive body into an act of collective intentionality (that is, into an organization).  Thus, a person becomes like an institution writ small.

0521 Well, the term, “third-person morality” is not what it first appears to be.

It may be also be called, “third-category morality”.

If second-person morality concerns the rights and the wrongs that go into productivity_2H and having fun_2V, in the sensible constructions of team activities, then this third-person morality must concern the rights and wrongs that go into something more than productivity_2H, such as an organizational objective_2H, and that go into something more than having fun_2V, such as the joy of being called_2V or the satisfaction of a moral identity_2V.

0522 The third-person of third-person morality is not a third individual, as depicted in Figure 4.1.  It is a person writ large, belonging to Peirce’s category of thirdness.

Third-person morality_C brings the actuality of second-person morality_B into relation with the potential of first-person morality_A.

Here is a picture of how each hylomorphe associates to an element in the nested form.

0523 Now, I portray a the third-person morality of Figure 4.1.

Does this look familiar?

Each gray figure in the preceding cartoon, if released from the “you-me” relationship of the team (in blue) and the institutional relationship (in green), could easily return to a primal world of power_2H and affiliation_2V.  To any person in our current Lebenswelt, this return would be experienced as a nightmare beyond imagination.

The individuals in team-related “you-me” relations (the figures in gray) live in a world of productivity_2H and having fun_2V (the figures in blue).  This is the sweet spot for many in our current Lebenswelt.  This is a world of sensible construction.  Everything makes sense because spoken words refer to things that can be pictured or pointed to.

Obviously, we all agree

Don’t we?

Sensical things consist in matter [substantiating] form.  Implicit abstractions are obvious.  Explicit abstractions are technical.  And yet, the run-of-the-mill person senses that, if there is no third-person, our world of sensible constructionmay be swamped by inner conflict or external threat.

So, what is a common person to do in our current Lebenswelt?

Join a congregation.

Especially, join a team within that congregation.

0524 Each green figure puts more than one “you-me” relation (blue figure) into perspective.  A congregation manifests something more than productivity_2H and something more than having fun_2V.

A government agency does not.  Government does something less than productive and something less than having fun. Taxation is not the same as spontaneously sharing abundance.

Faith is the more than sweet spot for many in our current Lebenswelt.  Faith is a world of social construction.

Yet, faith faces a difficulty.  Nothing makes sense, because spoken words refer to things that cannot be pictured or pointed to.  Nonsensical things consist in being [substantiating] form, which seems a lot like matter [substantiating] form, but who knows?  Beings are relational structures, which may or may not entangle matter. So, beings can be… um… difficult to comprehend, yet seem real.  Yes, spoken words can name beings, that seem actual and support implicit abstractions.  These implicit abstractions then support convictions that resist analysis through explicit abstraction (using spoken words).

Which is to say, spoken words can be misleading and slippery.

And… what does that mean?

In our current Lebenswelt, a snake resides in the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

0525 Institutions_C become persons writ large.  Individuals in community_A become institutions writ small.

Clearly, my discussion of third-person morality runs on a parallel track to Tomasello’s discussion of objective morality in chapter four.  They run through the same anthropological territory, but they stop at different stations.

At this junction, I am tantalizingly close to articulating the intersection for Era 2.

Here is the general version.

0526 The community has a slogan.  What that slogan is, I do not know.

0527 What do I know?

The community latches all the productive_2H and fun-loving_2V teams behind the locomotive of one big slogan.

Also, the community spawns its own teams.  These teams are more than productive_2H and more than fun-loving_2V.  Teamsare interpellated into being by institutions within the community.

In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, the community (150) harmonizes all other social circles: family (5), intimates (5), teams (15), bands (50), mega-bands (500) and tribe (1500).

0528 What is a good substitute for more than productivity_2H?

Does an interpellating organizational objective_2H fit the slot?

0529 What potentiates an organizational objective_2H?

Perhaps, the power of deservingness_1H will do.  An organizational objective_2H emerges from the power of deservingness_1H that comes from serving the “me” of a person writ large. An organizational objective_2H situates the potential of the power of deservingness_1H with a recognition_2H that an individual deserves power_2H within the institution_3H.

So, the power of deservingness_1H is situated as deserving of power_1H.

Is that confusing enough?

I love explicit abstractions.

0530 What is a good substitute for more than having fun_2V?

Well, congregations are about more than having fun.

Tomasello discusses these types of issues in the subsection titled, “Culture and Loyalty”.

An institution_C calls the individual_A to align his or her individual perceptions_A with the perceptions of a person writ large_C.

0531 Surely, interpellation brings a common cultural ground_C into relation with individual cultural practices_A (or “conventions”).

Interpellation keys into Tomasello’s explicit terminology, including “identification”, “loyalty”, “legitimization” and “moralization”.

0531 Interpellation offers a societal identity_2V to the person_A who aligns his or her judgments, perceptions and feelings to the person writ large_C.  The Germans have a word for this.  The word is “denkalign”.  “Denk” means “thought”.  If a person may be characterized as a perceptive soul [animates] a reactive body, then denkalignment offers a way for the perceptive soul to train its body’s emotions.

0533 Oh, now I can start to appreciate what Tomasello means by the term, “objective morality”.

Through denkalignment, I train my emotions according to a worldview that exists independently of what anyone thinks of it.

0534 Here is a picture of the substitutions.

0535 Natural philosophy is not the same as natural history.

Modern science offers objective natural history.  “Objective” means “independent of what anyone in particular thinks about it”.

Does that imply that “objective” must be true?

Premodern philosophers and scholastics offer a natural philosophy that starts with the recognition of (1) material things as hylomorphes where matter [substantiates] form and (2) immaterial things as hylomorphes where being [substantiates] form.

Clearly, immaterial things do not exist independently of what anyone in particular thinks about them, because they are what people are thinking.  Immaterial things structure human thought.

0536 Plus, immaterial things cannot be directly observed or measured with scientific instrumentation.

So, how is a scientist supposed to build a model, based on observations and measurements?

0537 Does Tomasello wrestle with angels… or maybe… demons?

Thank God that angels and devils are not material things.  Science can safely ignore them.  Why?  The positivist intellect can only build models based on observations and measurements of material things.

Indeed, how can “angels” and “devils” be material things?

They are merely spoken words, labeling what (superstitious) humans project from their own imaginations.  Their imaginations are the potentials underlying their perceptive souls [animating] their reactive bodies.  Their imaginations project internal actualities onto the external world.  Such projections reflect their own internal successes or failures at moral self-governance.

But, if this is so, then the above paragraph constitutes a scientific model that accounts for observations and measurements of phenomena associated with the terms, “angels” and “devils”.

Is that not curious?

0538 Here, I return to diagrams developed in Looking at Tomasello’s Book (2014) “A Natural History of Human Thinking”, and similar examinations (see point 0389).

We live in a world of judgment.  A judgment is a triadic relation with three elements: relation, what is and what ought to be.

0539 Here is a judgment as a purely relational being.  One could say that it is “objective”, because the relation exists despite what anyone thinks of it.

0540 Okay, as one watches the empty slots filled in, does that change its objectivity?

According to the Latin Age scholastics, if two of the empty slots are filled in by the universal aspects of an impression (a species impressa intelligibilis) and the intelligible aspects of a perception (a species expressa intelligibilis), then the resulting judgment may be labeled as a kind of intelligence (a species intelligibilis).

0541 Here is a picture.

Is this judgment_2c still “objective”?

I suppose that it_2c exists independently of what anyone thinks about it.

0542 At the same time, I can say that an impression_2a (a species impressa_2a) is subjective and a perception_2b (a species expressa_2b) is both objective (since it objectifies an impression_2a) and intersubjective (since members of a group share intentionality_1b and imagination_1b).

So, a species intelligibilis_2c, having the “objective” relational structure of judgment, may also be labeled, “suprasubjective”, because it_2c puts the intersubjective perception_2b and the subjective impression_2a into perspective.

0543 Here is a picture of the scholastic interscope of the way humans think.

0544 Now, I may perform some substitutions.

For the content-level actuality_2a, species impressa_2a or impression_2a, I substitute the hylomorphe, active body [substantiates] sensate soul_2a.

For the situation-level possibility_1b, the potential of ‘situating content’_1b, I substitute the potential of shared intention and imagination_1b.

For the situation-level actuality_2b, species expressa_2b or perception_2b, I substitute the hylomorphe, perceptive soul [animates] reactive body_2b.

For the perspective-level possibility_1c, the potential of ‘contextualizing the situation’_1c, I substitute the potential of a person as an institution writ small_1c.

For the perspective-level actuality_2c of species intelligibilis_2c, I substitute the term, “suprasubjective judgment_2c“.

0545 After all these substitutions are made, here is a picture of an updated scholastic interscope of the way humans think.

0546 The previous blog not only demonstrates that Tomasello’s natural history of human morality ties back to the natural history of human thinking, the origins of social communication and the cultural origins of human cognition, but it also moves me closer to bringing the intersection for Era 2 into alignment with David Hume’s views of the nature of human morality.

How so?

0547 Recall the nested form that comes into being during the era of collective intentionality.

The perceptive soul [animates] reactive body_2bA, or the perception_2bA, characterizes the individual in community_A.  An organizational object_2aC, belonging to the content-level of an interscope corresponding to society_C, animates an organization_B by interpellating the individual in community_A and bringing the perceptive soul_2bA into denkalignment.

0548 The institution is the third person of third-person morality.

You and me share intentions in joint attention in second-person morality.

You or me are the individuals in first-person morality.

0549 The institution goes with the society_C interscope.

You and me on the same team (or social circle) goes with an organization_B interscope.

You or me are humans who think in the way that the scholastics propose in the individual in community_A interscope.

0550 The interscopes of society_C, organization_B and individual in community_A belong to a primal category-based nested form, which is home to third-person morality.

0551 So, does perceptive soul [animates] reactive body_2bA bring the individual_A into organization_B?

Well, no, because denkalignment brings the perceptions_2bA into alignment with an interpellation by an organizational objective_2aC.  Another way to say the actuality is, “The perceptive soul trains skills and emotions according to tradition.” Perceptions_2bA characterize the individual in community_A.

Well, yes, get on board the denkalignment train.

0552 So, what brings the individual_A into organization_B?

It must be a suprasubjective judgment_2cA or “conviction_2cA” emerging from (and situating) the possibility that a person is an institution writ small_1cA in the normal context of making sense_3cA.

0553 The following associations characterize the living-world of third-person morality.

0554 At this point, I may propose a loop whereby social circles adapt to one another in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

Society contains individuals writ large.

Today, we may call these individuals, “institutions”, but such a word cannot be fashioned in hand-talk or hand-speech talk.  “Institution” is a purely symbolic label.  “Institution” is an explicit abstraction.  Hand-talk and hand-speech talk only facilitate implicit abstraction.  So, our ancestors can not name institutions, not like the way that we do today.

For example, after a person dies, we bring the corpse to the tree of life.

Tree of life?

[IMAGE tree][POINT to breath while inhaling][POINT to sky and exhale]

A gathering to mourn is an institution.

0555 The individual writ large_C interpellates other individuals_A.

Individuals_A denkalign with the interpellation_C.  In this, they serve as institutions writ small.

Individual convictions_2cA animate each organization_B, each team_B, and each traditional manifestation of a social circle_B.

Then, the events and processes of each organization_B, each team_B, and each tradition_B are contextualized by an individual writ large_C.  Such is the tree of life.

0556 Years later, the child of the deceased will say.

[NAME of deceased][IMAGE root][IMAGE tree][POINT to breath while inhaling][POINT to sky while exhaling]

0557 The tree of life represents the living and the dead.

The following proposed intersection for the era of collective intentionality does not quite capture poetic representation.

0558 I ask, “What tells me to bring the corpse of my father to the tree of life for preparation for burial?”

Does the tree of life tell me?

Is the tree of life an individual writ large capable of talking to me through its own version of hand talk?

Surely, the tree is planted by the one who gives, without us knowing why.

[POINT to sky] [CIRCLE POINT to all around][CIRCLE POINT to audience][PANTOMIME “give”]

0559 Perhaps, the apparent inadequacy of the prior intersection comes from the fact that the organizational objectiveassociates to society_C and social identity associates to the individual in community_A.  So, organization_B polarizes between society_C and individual_A.

That may be technically correct, but it does not move me towards the foundations of morality proposed by Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, David Hume.

0560 So, what if I return to the hylomorphe that associates to organization_B?

What if I substitute suprasubjective judgment or conviction for organizational objective_2H?

What if I substitute social circles for societal identity_2V?

0561 Then, the horizontal potential changes from the power of deservingness to… something close to the modern concept of “justice”.

 And, the vertical potential changes from denkalignment with a person writ large to… something close to the modern concept of “fairness”.

Here is a picture.

0562 Thus, I arrive at the same final station as Tomasello does, in his natural history of human morality.

All may now disembark.

Plus, I arrive at a novel way to define key words that Hume applies to human morality.

0563 Justice_1H underlies convictions_2H.  Justice_1H is also the potential_1H of underlying organizational objectives_2H. Without justice_1H, an organizational objective_2aC will fail to interpellate individuals in community_A.  With justice_1H, an organizational objective_2aC not only successfully calls the individual_A into organization_B, but the individual_A proves his or her worth.  Worth is honor that is not bestowed, but rather demonstrated through committed action.  With justice_1H, deservingness has power, not the establishment’s definition of “power”, rather, the power of righteousness_1aC.  If justice_1Hprevails, then establishment_3H power_2H is bestowed upon the deserving_1H.

0564 Fairness_1V underlies coming together into organization_2V.  Fairness_1V is more than having fun_1V.  Fairness_1V is the prerequisite for having fun.  If I agreed to play a game, then discover that the game is unfair (that is, rigged), then why continue playing?  The game is no longer fun.

One challenge faced by our ancestors in the era of collective intentionality becomes obvious.  Some teams are more productive than others.  Some teams have more fun than others.  So, if team members start to denkalign with a team, as if the team provides their societal identity, then pride (in productivity) and guilt (in having good fun) are countered by resentment and jealousy (by those who denkalign with other teams).  

Consequently, the team cannot provide a person with their societal identity.

There is someone more encompassing than any team.  That larger than life person embraces all teams, from way back to now to way to come. That third person interpellates every you and every me.  That person planted the tree of life.  We are the roots.  We are the branches.

0564 Chapter Five, the second to last chapter, is titled, “Human Morality as Cooperation-Plus”

Cooperation-Plus?

Makes me wonder what is cooking.

0565 Two evolutionary steps occur.

The first corresponds to a transition from individual foraging in bands in tropical forests to obligate collaborative foraging in mixed forest and savannah.

The second corresponds to what happens when more and more teams become successful after the domestication of fire.

0566 Here is a list of three eras and two steps.

0567 Tomasello writes in our current Lebenswelt about the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Tomasello proposes explicit abstractions to account for developments in a living world of implicit abstractions.  An evolutionary anthropologist may understand his terminology, but an ancestor would stand befuddled.  What do these technical terms picture or point to?

0568 The advantage of Peircean diagrams over the specialized terminology of evolutionary anthropology is clear.

The category-based nested form has three elements: normal context, actuality and potential.  A spoken word is an actuality₂.  In the normal context of definition₃ this actuality emerges from (and situates) three potentials: meaning, presence and message, corresponding to Peirce’s categories of thirdness, secondness and firstness, respectively.  This is the proposition underlying the masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion”, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

Diagrams provide a presence₁ that definitions₃ of technical terms₂ in evolutionary anthropology currently presume to be present.

0569 For example, what does the term, “caramelization”, presume to be present?

One needs to have a recipe in hand to know.  Each category-based diagram follows a recipe.

The results are delicious.

0570  Our current Lebenswelt, full of spoken words and explicit abstractions, is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, full of hand-talk, hand-speech talk and implicit abstractions.  

0571 So, I summarize by visualizing how our current Lebenswelt views the intersection of the group for each era of intentionality. 

0572 Here is the intersection for the zeroth era.

The band₂ is necessary for protection against predators.  Individuals compete within this constraint.  They compete for establishment power, that is, a place in their hierarchies.  They compete for alliances, affiliations where others are on my side.

Here is a world without justice and without fairness.

Or maybe, “justice” is me having a place in a hierarchy and “fairness” is me having others on my side.

0573 Next is the intersection for the first era.

The team₂ is the vehicle for collaborative foraging.  Collaborative foraging is unavoidable, because each individual cannot successfully forage the foods that other species either ignore or cannot get to.  Teams are required.

Successful teams are productive.  Everyone in a successful team gets along with everyone else.  How do I know this?  The team is having fun.

Of course, the ambiguous term, “having fun”, does not crop up in the vocabulary of evolutionary anthropologists.  Perhaps, it should.  Another word might be “camaraderie”.

0574 Next is an intersection for the second era.

0575 One irony is that the term, “establishment_3H“, cannot be stated in hand-talk or hand-speech talk.  Neither can the word, “institution_3H“.  Plus, the term, “social circle_3H“, seems inadequate, since there is a third person that is conjured in each manifestation of a social circle.

An institution is a individual writ large.

For example, the community (150) contains several bands (50), many teams (15) and many many families (5) and deep friendships (5).  Also, the community (150) is contained within mega-bands (450) that meet according to seasons and tribes (1500) that meet either according to the stars or by the bidding of messengers.

Each manifestation of a social circle₂ feels like a person writ large, that is, someone_C who interpellates individuals_A to come into organization_B.  Individuals_A enjoy societal identity_C.  Organizations_B pursue their objectives_C.  The successes and the failures of those pursuits_B empower individuals_A who are deserving and disempower individuals_A who are less so. 

0575 But, that is not enough.

Once again, here is an intersection for the second era.

0576 Here, the individual in community₂ is a single actuality constituted by suprasubjective judgments_2H and social circles_2V.  Conviction_2H emerges from and situates the potential of something more than deservingness_1H in the normal context of establishment_3H.  Social circles_2V emerge from and situate the potential of something more than mutual respect and trust_1V in the normal context of alliance_3V.  

An individual in community is an institution writ small.

0577 Given the prior four figures, the inquirer can trace the presence of the philosophical terms, “justice_1H” and “fairness_1H” backwards through human evolution, to the LCA.  The exercise is well worth the effort.

0578 What about other research into how human morality came to be?

Tomasello sorts current theories into three baskets: evolutionary ethics, moral psychology and gene-culture evolution.

In order to appreciate Tomasello’s view on the contents in each basket, I present (once again), his vision.  The perspective level associates to phenotype.  The content level goes with adaptation.  The intersections previously diagrammed are alternate portrayals of situation-level interdependence_2b.

0579 Evolutionary ethics focuses on reciprocity.

The idea of reciprocity applies, yet seems insufficient, to an explanation of interdependence_2b.  In Tomasello’s vision, interdependence_2b emerges from (and situates) cooperation_1b,  in the normal context of cultural selection_3b.  Cooperation_1b emerges from joint attention_2a, in the same way that a situation emerges from content.  Joint attention_2aemerges from (and situates) sociogenesis_1a in the normal context of natural selection_3a.

Reciprocity pertains to the ways that cooperation_1b virtually situates sociogenesis_1a. But, reciprocity cannot account for joint attention_2a, which directly situates sociogenesis_1a.

0580 Moral psychology investigates prosocial behaviors.  Unfortunately, the field has not drawn connections to human evolution.  Tomasello’s vision pencils in many connections.  

Indeed, Tomasello’s vision takes moral psychology into vistas beyond the term, “prosocial behaviors”.

For example, here is the virtual nested form in the category of firstness.

Surely, prosocial attitudes are foundational to each of these potentials.  Plus, each of these potentials keys into attitude-associated behaviors.

0581 Here is the virtual nested form in the category of secondness.

Ah, moral psychology models prosocial behaviors that potentiate the phenomena of these noumena.

0582 Here is the virtual nested form in the category of thirdness.

Oh, moral psychology has nothing to say about these three topics.

0583 What does this imply?

Moral psychology is a discipline that investigates the phenomena of actualities₂ that occur within the normal context of three styles of natural selection. 

On the phenotypic (perspective) level, natural (within culture) selection_3c is similar to selective breeding, in which each long-lived successful tradition breeds for individuals who are more and more capable of maintaining its survival.

On the cultural (situation) level, each manifestation within a particular social circle competes_3b with other manifestations.  For example, one teams competes with other teams in terms of productivity_2H and having fun_2V.

On the adaptation (content) level, natural selection_3a brings an adaptation_2a into relation with a niche_1a.  Tomasello labels the adaptation_2a, “joint attention_2a“, and its niche_1a, “sociogenesis_1a“.

0584 The problem?

A niche is the potential of an actuality independent of the adapting species.

The actuality independent of the content-level adaptive species does not appear in Tomasello’s vision.

Tomasello’s vision is like a house.

The actuality independent of the adaptive species is like a ghost in the basement.

The union of house and basement is called the Tomasello-Mah synthesis.

0585 Gene-culture co-evolution connects the scientific disciplines of genetics and natural history, not as an intersection (as Razie Mah does), but as a three-level interscope (as Tomasello does).

The following interscope, characterizing gene-culture co-evolution, appears in Looking at Lesley Newson and Peter Richerson’s Book (2021) “The Story of Us”.  This examination may be found in Razie Mah’s blog, from July 10 to July 31, 2023.

586 Note how the interscope for gene-culture evolution elevates adaptation over phenotype, in the opposite of the way that the interscope for Tomasello’s vision elevates phenotype over adaptation.

0587 Overall, do any of these three baskets contain Tomasello’s vision?

No, just the opposite, Tomasello’s vision contains the baskets of evolutionary ethics, moral psychology and gene-culture evolution, plus more.

The arc of Tomasello’s inquiry into the origins of humans is notable in this regard.

The house of Tomasello’s vision is an architectural achievement.

Yet, there is that ghost in the basement.

To that ghost, I now turn.