Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Third, the arrangement of moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎ and moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎ illuminates the nested form of intersubjective₃(objective₂(subjective₁)).

The objectivity of sin₂ is rarely articulated except through the perspectives of intersubjectivity₃ (the determination of subject₁ as a person₃ simultaneously with the determination of the status of subject₍₃₎) or subjectivity₁ (the potential inherent in subject₁).

Say what?

Take a look at the normal context for moral evil.  Two subjects are determined: Subject₁, the perpetrator and wolf, is contextualized as a person₃.  Subject₃, the victim and the sheep, is regarded as “the one whose limitations are tested₃“.

Whenever we judge the action, we talk about the actuality of sinful action through the normal context.  We say: What an injustice.

Out of this formulation, the intersubjective relationality of sin becomes an avenue for articulating moral evil.

Similarly, we talk about the possibilities that underlie the actuality of moral evil.  One subject₁, the perpetrator, is regarded.  The intersubjective relation to the victim does not appear, just like the town on a fault line does not appear in an analysis concerning earthquakes.  The objectivity of sin₂, the actual act, is articulated by discussion about the perpetrator.  We ask: Why would ‘he’ commit such a crime?

In sum, we rarely talk about the sinful act as actuality itself.  We talk about its intersubjective context and subjective motivations.

We articulate the objectivity of sin₂ by talking about moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎ and moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎.  This gives us a clue about how humans deal with actuality.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Second, human acts₂ in moral evil^physical₃ correspond to a sinful situation₂ for moral evil^metaphysical₃.  We have seen this structure elucidated before, where sinful acts serve as the intersection (in actuality) of two intersecting nested forms.

The entire nested form, in Latin, is:

malum hominis₃( actus et potenia hominis₂ et actus hominis₂( passio hominem₁)

In terms of the two category-crossing labels:

moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₍₎₎ and moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Three items should be noted.

First, the formulation indicates why moral evil feels like physical evil.  They have the same categorical structure.  In this regard, they feel like they are “connected”.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[In nested form, this would be:

Moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎:  __₃( human acts create situation₂( moral evil proceeds from subject₁ (who will be regarded as a person by the normal context))

___₃( actus hominis₂( passio hominem₁)

Moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎: … determines subject₁ as a person₃ & determines status of subject₍₃₎( limitations of subject₍₃₎ under the situation₂ ( __₁ )

malum hominis₃( actus et potenia hominis₂( ___₁ )

Typically, we label subject₁ as “culprit” and subject₍₃₎ as “victim”.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

Schoonenberg argued that natural evil lies in both a privation of a good [evil^physical₂₍₁₎] and the limitation of the subject [evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₍₎₎].

A new dimension arises when natural evil effects humans [that is; when humans occupy the terminus of “metaphysical evil” as subject₍₃₎].

The question arises: Does this connect natural and moral evil?

[A subsidiary question for the translator: Is ‘connect’ the correct word?]

Perhaps not and sort of.

Perhaps not.  Scientific inquiry will reveal the nature of the natural subject [that is, subject₁, the terminus in Firstness.  Therefore, the termini in Thirdness and in Firstness are only connected in actuality.]  This pertains to natural evil.

Sort of. Scientific inquiry cannot reveal the moral intentions [that would correspond to a moral agent as subject₁.  A connection between the termini in Thirdness and in Firstness is always a possibility for moral agents.  Why?  The moral status of subject₁ and the naturally limited status of subject₍₃₎ are simultaneously determined. This pertains to moral evil.

In sum,] our own feelings that “natural evil” has a “moral component” bears witness to some relation, which the translator of Schoonenberg labeled “connection”.

This connection concerns, what Schoonenberg called “a new dimension” that arises in regards to moral evil.  [That “new dimension” “connects” the termini in Thirdness and in Firstness.]

Summary of text [comment] page 41

[Schoonenberg’s example gives us a way to think about evil^physical and evil^metaphysical as “a deprivation of a good through subject₁” and as “a limitation built into subject₍₃₎”, respectively.

Let us say that an earthquake creates a tsunami that cascades over a coast, depriving animals of their habitat whereupon they die due to their limitations.

“Physical evil” pertains to “the change in habitat that emerges from the natural subject (of geological processes₁)”.

“Metaphysical evil” pertains to “the normal context (determination₃) that emerges from the actuality of the habitat change plus the limitations of animal life₍₃₎”.

In short, “physical evil” creates circumstances (the deprivation of goods) where “metaphysical evil” (the limitations of subjects₍₃₎) comes into play.

Technically, this may be expressed in nested form:

physical evil₂₍₁₎ :  ___₃(earthquake that radically alters habitat₂( … proceeds from natural subject₁; geological processes₁))

metaphysical evil₃₍₂₎ :  … determines status₃ of natural subjects₍₃₎; that is, living forms₍₃₎( radically altered habitat plus limitations of living beings₂( ___ ₁))

This precisely parallels the exposition of knowledge₃₍₂₎ and will₂₍₁₎ in prior blogs.]

Summary of text [comment] page 41

[“Evil₃” resonates with “determination of the status₃ of the … subject₍₃₎”.

Is subject₍₃₎ the same as subject₍₁₎, “the potential from which the action proceeds₁”?

The answer is typically “no”.

Consider Schoonenberg’s example.]

Schoonenberg used the example of an earthquake creating a physical evil – a privation of good – that catastrophically alters the status of living beings, changing the conditions so that these living beings – limited by metaphysical evil – die.

[This can be written in nested form:

… determines status of natural subjects₍₃₎; living forms₍₃₎( earthquake that radically alters habitat₂( … proceeds from natural subject₁; geological processes₁))

“The determination of status” pertains to “subject₍₃₎”.

Subject₍₃₎ is not necessarily identical to subject₁.]

Summary of text [comment] page 41

Natural evil is infrahuman. It is frequently expressed as pain, illness or deformity.

Natural evil may be distinguished from moral evil in humans.

Moral evil proceeds from the person, determines ‘him’ as a person, and encompasses human action.

[Notably, this resonates with the idea of nestedness.  The Latin terms are particularly evocative.

Consider the above sentence on moral evil.  Does it not sound like normal context₃( actuality₂( potential₁))?  Even more so in the Latin.

Moral evil₃( human acts₂( moral evil proceeds from the person …₁)

malum hominis₃( actus hominis₂( passio hominem₁)

Consider the above sentence on natural evil.

Determination of the status₃ of natural subject₍₃₎( pain, illness, deformity₂( … proceeds from a natural subject₍₁₎ that is not necessarily the same as the determined subject₍₃₎))]

Summary of text [comment] page 40

Section 6 of chapter 1 is titled, “ Analogy of Sin and Physical Evil”.

There is not only moral evil but physical evil.

The “moral” belongs to the human realm.  The “physical” belongs to the subhuman realm.  The “moral” coheres to “history”.  The “physical” coheres to “evolution”.

This raises some questions: Is physical evil analogous to moral evil?  Is “evolution” analogous to “history”?

Let us start here:  “Evil” is “the lack of some good”. This applies to both types of evil.

What about limits?  Each creature is limited to particular goods.  Are these limitations a “metaphysical evil”?  (Leibnitz suggested this.)

No and yes.

No, such a limitation is not the lack of some good.

Yes, if evil is considered “a thing in itself”, rather than a privation of a good.  This “thing in itself” is a feature that the creature could theoretically have, but does not.  Limitations, then, are privations of “goods that a creature might have had”.

[I am not sure whether such limitations should be called “metaphysical evils” (as Leibnitz called them).  I am sure that such limitations contextualize actuality.

Thus, it seems that the term “metaphysical evil” encompasses a categorical transition: normal context₃(actuality₂(₁)), just as the term “physical evil” encompasses the categorical transition actuality₂(possibility₁).]

Summary of text [comment] page 39

[Here, of course, I must place my own mea culpa.

What I am doing surely seems to be a fixation.  Look at this blog.  Who in their right mind would blog on a short theological treatise written by a now forgotten Dutch theologian?

I certainly operate within the parameters of my own dispositions.  I cannot claim a truly free conscience.  I always feel the call of a multitude of causes.  But these causes are magical.  They do not seek sovereign power.  They seek the laughter of the festival.  Lighten up.  Have some fun.  Do not be so intense.

These multitudinous causes should not be confused with religious causes, even though they may be accounted for by some religious institution.  They are play filled, like Disney’s Magic Kingdom.  They do not hold the possibility of grasping sovereign power. Perhaps, someday there will be a word for these phantasmagorical beings, a word that differs from the term “religion”.

The Sovereign does not need to maintain order in Disney’s Kingdom.  Unless, of course, a sovereign^infra religion motivates it to do so.

My play – my joy – is running around the landscape that Peirce discovered a century ago.  His joy – his madness – was to clear that field.  He called it “semiotics”.  I call it “postmodern scholasticism”.

At the same time, I wonder whether I will see the joy of freedom crushed, like a bird in a fist, as it has so many times before. Look at American Television in 2013.  It pretends to be our friend, while, at the same time, condescends and manipulates.  In fact, people on television claim to speak for me.  They tell me what I should think in order to me to be their friend.

The instruments of pro-objects occupy seats of sovereign power.  The television, that new way of talking, tells us “what we want to hear”.  I have a sickening feeling, culled from history, about where this will lead.  The Final Option (perhaps, the inevitable consequence of of a Single Payer Healthcare System) will be only one example of a Final Impenitence on a scale that dwarfs the individual as well as our imagination.

This topic, I suspect, Schoonenberg will tentatively approach.  Stay tuned.

And so I conclude my blogs on section 5, chapter 1, entitled: “Sin Unto Death – Mortal Sin – Venial Sin”.]