05/5/22

Looking at Thomas Michaud’s Essay (2021) “Anatomy of the Progressive Revolution” (Part 7 of 9)

0027 The personal is the political.

In the progressive agenda, the content-level actuality2a is a dyad, group [subsumes] individual2a.

The word, “individual”, no longer means a person who stands before God.   The individual reduces to someone carrying a group identification tag.

Similarly, identity1a potentiates group affiliation3a, not the person that I call “me”.

0028 Michaud calls this, “depersonalization”.

With this in mind, I consider the virtual nested form in the realm of possibility for the progressive interscope.

Figure 10

0029 The normal context of social justice1c virtually brings the actualities of ideological apparatuses (such as state education, justice system and corporate media, to name a few)1b into relation with the possibilities inherent in identity1a.

If “justice” is a virtue for traditional folk, then “social justice1c” is a hegemonic, demiurgic alternative.  Social justice1ccontextualizes the actuality of economics [transforming] morals [&] culture2b and answers the question, “When is justice (in the traditional frame) injustice (in the progressive frame)?” 

0030 Here is one of the resulting twists.

The category-based nested form for the traditional view appears below.

The arrows, however, depict trans-categorical flows from the progressive point of view.

Figure 11

0031 Is this a misperception?  Or, is this an accusation?

To the progressive, there is one deterministic flow to the traditional schema.  Religion3 flows through morality and culture2 and pours into alienating political systems and exploitative economic arrangements1.

To the traditionalist, there are two transcategorical flows.  Religion3 flows into morality2. Politics and economics1 enliven culture2, through cooperative and laborious human action.

05/4/22

Looking at Thomas Michaud’s Essay (2021) “Anatomy of the Progressive Revolution” (Part 8 of 9)

0032 According to progressive doctrine, traditional morals and culture2 yield economic and political structures1 that inherently victimize groups that do not adhere to the morals and the cultural expectations of the dominant tradition.  That is, religion3 promulgates a morality2, that sustains a culture2, bent on victimizing those who are “not religious”.  The victimization occurs through political and economic means1.

0033 In response, progressives encourage the sovereign state to expand in every fashion.  According to How To Define The Word “Religion”, progressive institutions are infrasovereign religions calling on sovereign power in order to implement their objectives.  They call on the sovereign to regulate the organization tier, through economic interventions.  They also call on the sovereign to fund ideological apparatuses1b that promote the doctrine of social justice1c and popularize the necessity of possessing an identity1a (as a badge of group subsumption2a).

0034 Consequently, the progressive (situation-level) category-based nested form has the same flows as the original, traditional category-based nested form.

In the original, religion3 flows into morality2, morality2 sustains culture2, and the potential of ‘politics and economics’1underlies the dynamism of culture2.  In terms of Adam Smith’s model, the first transcategorical flow corresponds to “moral sentiments” and the second transcategorical flow associates to the so-called “invisible hand”.  So, the arrows go from normal context3 and potential1 towards actuality2.

In the progressive, politics3 flows into economic interventions2, economics2 transforms (traditional) morals [&] culture2.  At the same time, the potential of ‘ideological apparatuses’1 undermines (traditional) morals [&] culture2 and reinforces (progressive) morals [&] culture2.

0035 Here is a picture.

Figure 12

0036 In sum, the progressive misrepresents the transcategorical flows for the traditional schema, while practicing the identical transcategorical flows as the traditional schema.

05/3/22

Looking at Thomas Michaud’s Essay (2021) “Anatomy of the Progressive Revolution” (Part 9 of 9)

0037 Michaud concludes that the progressive revolution hinges on redefining the human person.

Can “subsumption2a” be the sine qua non of the permanent revolution2c?

Does “subsumption2a” characterize infrasovereign religions?

Michaud writes, “The progressive revolution aims to change the way people understand themselves, understand their very humanity as collective beings.”

These category-based re-articulations picture the relational dynamics of Michaud’s argument.

There is much more to ponder in these diagrams.

But, these considerations are left to the readers.

0038 I conclude with the virtual nested form in the realm of normal context.

Figure 13

0039 A “not religious” normal context3c virtually brings the actuality of politics3b into relation with the possibility of group affiliation3a.

Surely, this “not religious” normal context3c fits the definition of the term, “religion”.

Plus, this normal context3c grasps for sovereign power in order to implement its objectives.

0040 I thank Thomas Michaud for his excellent essay.

Perhaps, this brief examination will lead to a more profound understanding of the nature of our current Lebenswelt.

04/29/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 1 of 18)

0001 Three faculty at the Universidad Santo Tomas, Columbia, publish an article with the title, “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Human and Social Sciences Research”, in the journal, Civilizar: Cienceas Sociales y Humanas(volume 20(38), 2020, 137 to 146, DOI: https//doi.org/10.22518/jour.ccsh./2020.1a10).  I thank the authors for presenting in English.

0002 In this series of blogs, the above article serves as a testing ground for four commentaries on phenomenology, contemporary Thomism and science.  The commentaries, available at smashwords and other electronic e-book vendors, follow.

Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”

Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean-Luc Marion and … First Philosophy”

Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology”

Comments on Jack Reynolds’ Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”

0003 Testing ground?

These commentaries contain particular category-based nested forms, interscopes and judgments, constructed from (or in reverie to) the essay and book under consideration.  These synthetic structures are abductions, constructed on Peircean frames.

So, what to do with a guess?

Test it.

04/28/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 2 of 18)

0004 My aim is to test the diagrams and arguments developed in four commentaries on phenomenology.

Perez Vargas, Nieto Bravo and Santamaria Rodriguez offer a suitable work.  Their article is composed of five sections, starting with an introduction (Part 1) and ending with a conclusion (Part 5).  The three central parts address three questions.

How are phenomenology and hermeneutics used in research (Part 2)?

How does phenomenology provide an epistemological setting for research (Part 3)?

How does hermeneutics provide an epistemological setting for research (Part 4)?

0005 Yes, here is a testing ground for the commentaries listed in the previous blog.

04/27/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 3 of 18)

0006 Test one.

In the conclusion (Part 5), the unspoken agenda of the authors becomes apparent.

Why are hermeneutics neglected in phenomenological inquiry?

0007 The authors offer several good reasons for why hermeneutics should be employed.

First, in history, Husserl’s project differentiates out of nineteenth century hermeneutic traditions.  Both refuse to accept the triumph of positivism.  So, if these two traditions have common ancestry, then why are they apparently not compatible?

Second, hermeneutics situates texts, in the same way that a reader situates an author’s writing.  So, hermeneutics situate the same phenomena as phenomenology.

Third, hermeneutic practices arise out of the potential of interpretation.  Phenomenological reductions arise out of the potential of identifying what the noumenon must be.  Why are these not complementary processes?

0008 An answer starts with the Positivist’s judgment, initially diagrammed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy.  Judgment has a triadic structure consisting of three elements: relation, what is and what ought to be.  When these elements are assigned to Peirce’s categories, the judgment becomes actionable.

0009 The relation is a positivist intellect, who has a rule, saying, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”  This relation belongs to thirdness, the realm of normal contexts.

What ought to be is an empirio-schematic judgment, consisting of a disciplinary language (relation), mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be) and observations and measurements (what is).  What ought to be belongs to secondness, the realm of actuality.

What is is a dyad, consisting of two contiguous elements.  The elements are a noumenon, the thing itself, and its phenomena, its observable and measurable facets.  The contiguity expresses a logical necessity.  In natural science, a noumenon cannot be reduced to its phenomena.  No arrangements of phenomena fully objectify their noumenon.  I place the contiguity in brackets.  A noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena.

0010 Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment.

Figure 01

This figure does not answer test one completely.  But, it is a start.

04/26/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 4 of 18)

0011 The first test posed by the authors concerns the apparent lack of compatibility between hermeneutics and phenomenology.

The lack is explained by the rule of the positivist intellect, saying, “No metaphysics.”

0012 Both phenomenology and hermeneutics are capable of situating the Positivist’s judgment.

However, hermeneutics arises from interpretation, which is necessarily metaphysical.  Interpretation is not physics.

0013 Can the same be said for phenomenology?

Phenomenological reduction self-identifies as not metaphysical, even as it elucidates what the noumenon ought to be.

0014 The positivist intellect’s rule gives permission to phenomenology, but not to hermeneutics.

Phenomenology, not hermeneutics, situates the Positivist’s judgment.

This answer is portrayed in Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”.

04/25/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 5 of 18)

0015 Test two.

What is the latent dilemma between phenomenology and hermeneutics?

Both phenomenology and hermeneutics are able to situate the Positivist’s judgment.  However, since the rule of the positivist intellect disallows metaphysics, only phenomenology is allowed to situate scientific discourse.  Hermeneutics is programmatically excluded.

0016 How am I to diagram this answer?

First, the Positivist’s judgment unfolds into a content-level nested form, according to the categorical assignments of the elements.  Here is a picture.

Figure 02

0017 According to Comments on Jack Reynolds’ Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”, another latent problem stands between science and phenomenology.  Practicing scientists are perfectly happy to work within this content level, as the mechanical philosophers of the 17th century intend.  Hands-on natural scientists3a build models2a of observations2a of phenomena1a.  They take the noumenon1a for granted.

But, by the 20th century, visionary scientists lobby to situate the Positivist’s judgment with a glorified unfolding of the empirio-schematic judgment.

Edward Husserl (1859-1938) counters visionary scientists with phenomenology.  Husserl’s project3b brings the actuality of phenomenological reduction2b into relation of the possibilities inherent in a return to the noumenon1b.

0018 Here is a diagram of the resulting two-level interscope.  The situation-level nested form virtually situates (and emerges from) the content-level nested form.

Figure 03
04/22/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 6 of 18)

0019 Before continuing, I note that the relational structures in the prior blogs are presented in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction.  A two-level interscope characterizes sensible construction.  Sensible construction presumes a functioning perspective level, even though that perspective level may not be articulated.

0020 Now, I move on to test two, the latent exclusion of hermeneutics by Husserl’s paradigm.

What would a situation-level hermeneutic look like?

0021 Here is my guess, based on the essay.

A hermeneutic paradigm3b brings metaphysical realism2b into relation with the possibilities inherent in interpretation1b.

Figure 04

0022 This arrangement is not permitted.

Obviously, the actuality2 of this situation levelb, metaphysical realism2b, grates against the positivist intellect3a, because it2b defies its3a rule against metaphysics.  Less obviously, a difficulty originates from the reality that hermeneutics3b does not share the same perspective as the positivist intellect3a.  

Where is the perspective level?  

It is latent.

The term, “latent”, qualifies, because the perspective level of the Positivist’s judgment is not articulated.  It2c is just there.

It2c is simply given.

0023 What does this further imply?

Perceptive phenomenologists, such as the Catholic Jean-Luc Marion, note this lack of perspective and wonder what to do with it.  Could hermeneutics apply?  If so, then a normal context of hermeneutics3c could virtually contextualize Husserl’s paradigm3b, as Husserl’s project3b virtually situates the positivist intellect3a.

Would a perspective-level hermeneutics3c condone the rule of the positivist intellect3a?

I do not think so.

04/21/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 7 of 18

0024 So, hermeneutics3c does not put Husserl’s project3b into perspectivec.

What does this imply?

Perhaps, the perspective level does not want to be articulated.  Perhaps, it flourishes on the basis of some trickery.  Take a close look at the two-level interscope and guess what that trickery may involve.

0025 At this juncture, I have answered test two.

The latent difficulty between phenomenology and hermeneutics concerns the perspective level, which is not articulated.  Who knows what is in the perspective level?  Many may guess.  But, two points are certain.  Husserl’s project3b and the positivist intellect3a align with an unspoken perspective.  A situation-level hermeneutics3b and the positivist intellect3a do not.

0026 This answer raises the third test, asking, “What is the subject matter of phenomenology3b?”