0930 “In 1919, I get a job at a place that distributes this new-fangled liquid, called ‘gasoline’ to these dispensaries around Chicago, in order to fuel the automobiles, which are fast replacing horse and carriage.  Instead of drinking water, like a horse does, these mechanical carriages drink gasoline.  And that is where I come in, I load barrels of this gasoline onto wagons to bring to the stations that… you know… don’t want to pay for the truck delivery.  Horse-driven wagons are much cheaper.”

“Anyway, I tried the gasoline.  It tastes horrible.  I prefer the home-distilled whiskey from Indiana.  And when its slow, I take an nip or two, and then smoke a cigarette over in the shed, where they keep the empty barrels.   Gasoline catches fire.  So, no smoking near the full barrels.  But, the empty barrels…. what harm can be done?”

0931 Four months later, an insurance investigator reads these words, uttered by a fellow who miraculously survives the explosion and fire in the shed, then the storage unit, and then about half a city-block in Chicago.  The investigator’s name is Benjamin Whorf (1897-1941) and his hobby… or is it side job?… is the linguistics of Mesoamerica.  Funny how the world works that way.

So, Mr. Whorf… or is it Dr. Whorf?… has an idea, that Dr. Enfield calls “linguistic framing”.  It concerns how spoken words can generate misleading realities and how misleading realities can burn down half of a city-block in Chicago.

0932 Here is the current version of Enfield’s interscope, with words in the fellow’s testimony placed in the proper places.

On the content level, the spoken words_2a of “empty barrel” frame a referent_2a, which I call “no gasoline”.  Now, the frame influences the normal context of what is happening_3a and the potential of ‘something’ happening_1a.  In this case, the worker knows that gasoline is explosive.  So ‘something’_1a is a full barrel of gasoline catching fire.

0933 So, what does “no gasoline_2a” imply?  

Of course, the worker is now primed to sensibly situate a referent, “no gasoline_2a“, on the content level , as “will not catch fire_2b“, on the situation level.

And, I know what that implies.

0934 In chapter seven, on framing and inversion, Enfield widens the scope of Whorf’s insight.  Each spoken language creates its own linguistic frame.  Enfield begins his graduate career studying the mother tongue of a society in Laos.  The linguistic distance between an indigenous tribe in southeast Asia and the British Empire must be considerable. However, both languages have something in common.  They are spoken.  They are classified as speech-alone talk.

0935 According to the hypothesis of the first singularity, both Kri and English belong to our current Lebenswelt.  Both traditions have histories.  Those histories trace back to ancestral hand-speech talking cultures that drop the hand-component of their hand-speech talk in the process of adopting speech-alone talk.

0936 The ancestral cultures make the transition spontaneously after exposure to representatives from “more advanced” speech-alone talking cultures.  The representatives could have been missionaries, traders or warriors.  It probably does not matter because they express wealth and power that each hand-speech talking culture cannot imagine.

Yeah, people in the hand-speech talking culture are really much happier that these aliens showing up at their huts, but look at what these strangers have to offer.  They want to give us gifts.  And, they have a spoken word for the process.  They call their gifts, “trade”.  In fact, isn’t it odd that they have no hand talk?  They just use their mouths, which we do, but we gesture as well.

0937 By the time that Enfield publishes his book, nominally 7822 years after the start of the Ubaid, the last remnants of hand-speech talk disappear into the mists of prehistory.  Four hundred years ago, both the North American Plains Indians and the Australian aborigines practice fully linguistic spoken and “signed” languages.  Yes, they practice hand-speech talk, however modified by exposure to alien civilizations.  Now, these ways of talking slip through humanity’s fingers even as the theory of the first singularity places them in high regard.  Here are samples of who we evolved to be.

0938 This is not exactly new, but it is fresh.

See Comments on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues) for a harbinger of the coming age when we (humans) realize precisely what Dr. Enfield is not aware of.  Our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

A portion of the above-mentioned commentary appears in Razie Mah’s blog in March 2023 titled Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why the State Has No Origin”.

0939 Once, our gesture-words pictured and pointed to their referents.

Now, our spoken words do not.

Indeed, as noted in the general picture of the current interscope, spoken words on the content level are entangled with two referents.   One referent associates to Frege’s term, “reference” and the second overshadows Frege’s term, “sense”.

Also, spoken words permit the differentiation of the content and situation levels.  Referent_2a for the content level may be explicitly differentiated from the reference_2b on the situation level.

Plus, the difference between reference_2a and reference_2b depends on the way that ongoing discourse_3b contextualizes the manner whereby reference_2a is situated_1b.

So, one might expect that those who are able to formalize the manner in which a reference_2a is situated_1b as reference_2bgain certain advantages over those who are not able.

Hmmm….

0940 Here is a picture of Enfield’s interscope as it currently stands.

0941 Once upon a time, each manual brachial-word pictured or pointed to its referent.

One referent precedes one gesture-word.

Now, spoken words do not picture or point to anything.

Plus, two referents follow each spoken word.

0942 This may seem like a disturbing turn of events.

Should someone step forth and say, “It’s all okay.  Spoken words do reference something other than themselves.”?

Maybe, those who study spoken languages should step up to the plate and say, “The function of words is to ‘refer’.”.

Does that suggest that reference_2a is the same as reference_2b?

0943 The Russian-born American linguist Roman Jakobsen (1896-1982 AD) realizes that the so-called “referential function” of spoken words is not sufficient.  This is clear by the sequence of transformations taking place in Enfield’s interscope.

0944 Take a look at the content-level actuality.

At first, particular spoken words_2a [stand for] a reference_2a.  This matches the age-old impression, where a particular cloud [stands for] a coming storm.

Then, the actuality_2a becomes particular words [frame] a reference, and that configuration reverberates into the content-level normal context_3a and potential_1a echoing back the message that particular words [can be primed for] a reference_2a.

Can this be the first step of the “conative function” of language?  After all, “empty gasoline barrels” cannot be explosive because they have “no gasoline”.  So, yes, smoking near the empty barrels is okay.  Go ahead and light up.

0945 Please, consider the so-called “phatic function”.

Here spoken words_2a may frame what is happening_3a and the potential of  ‘something happening’_1a while not indicating what the actual reference is.

If the actual reference is watch where you are walking, then I say, “Mind the gap.”

0946 How about the “emotive function” of language?

Well, after spoken words_2a [frame] reference_2a, then reference_2b [overshadows] sense_2a, in the same way that the soul of Stevie overshadows his sister and takes over her body even as her emotions overwhelm her, not because Mr. Verloc said anything, but because Mr. Verloc didn’t say anything about his responsibility for Stevie’s demise.

Surely, that does not make scientific sense.  But, it gives me the shivers.

0947 The two remaining functions that Jakobsen manufactures are the “poetic” and “metalingual” functions.  Do these put the other functions into perspective?

“Poetics” is about style, I suppose.  Rhetoric is the study of how all the other functions work to achieve a certain effect… or… affect_2a.

“Metalingual” is about… well… “meta” means “crossing out of” and “lingual” means “mother tongue”, so that sort of gets me back to Mrs. Verloc.  Metalingual is like a soul escaping a body, then looking back and labeling where it used to be.

Metalingual is like the art of translation.  What one might say “reference” (the body) translates into “sense” (the soul), forming a coherent unity, an embodied soul_2c, capable of situating the potential of ‘coordinating around reality’_1c within the normal context of spoken language_3c.

0948 Here is a picture, once again.

In the perspective_c-level actuality₂, something about reference [translates into] something about sense.

0949 But, what about the secret agent?

What about the revenge-seeking soul lurking in the shadows, ready to step in when emotional distress provides an incentive for a sensitive soul to step out of a world of cruelty, shock and humiliation?

0950 All spoken languages have one thing in common.

They are not hand-talk or hand-speech talk.

They are speech-alone talk.

Speech-alone talk allows explicit abstraction.

And, that is what Roman Jacobsen offers to the world, explicit abstractions bereft of an implicit abstraction.  He offers a model to replace the noumenon, the thing itself.

Enfield celebrates this triumph in the scientific study of language.

0951 The author cannot regard, because he does not know, the shamans in every hand-speech culture who resisted the transition to speech-alone talk, who fought the easy forgetting of the hand-component of their hand-speech traditions and who tried to prevent their culture from drifting into a diaphanous web of explicit abstractions, then into our current Lebenswelt.

Where is the celebration for them?

They are all dead.

Murdered, no doubt.

Indeed, one may wonder whether they will they return, like Stevie, in the guise of ideologies designed to capture the body when the soul is estranged?

Watch out when an alienated person, possessed by an ideology… er, shamanic spirit seeking revenge… quietly picks up the carving knife.

0952 All the origin stories of the ancient Near East depict a recent creation of humans.

Why?

The city-states of the Sumerian civilization cannot see beyond a time horizon defined as the first singularity.  They cannot remember the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  They cannot recall who we evolved to be.  They can only imagine that we (humans) are created, from mud, from seeds, from the blood or semen of gods, recently, in divine acts, not so long ago.

0953 Explicit abstractions, speech-alone labels, can carve up implicit abstractions as easily as Stevie can carve up Mr. Verloc with a carving knife held in the hand of Mrs. Verloc.  The labels come leisurely and academically, so it seems that they really do represent technical functions of the linguistic process.

The modern intellectual is so proud of these spoken words, which appear like gems in disciplinary discourse.  Oh, yes, clearly I aim for the emotive function, but the phatic function comes to the fore at the moment I say, “Beware.  Your spoken words veil a noumenon, the thing itself, with a mechanistic model.  And worse, you extol the veil, the shimmering screen of spoken words, as if you know what their referents really are.”

0954 What do humans need?

Well, if they are going to coordinate_1c, then they need to communicate_1b.

If they are going to communicate_1b, then they need to make sensible sense_2b of a referent_2b.

If they are going to make sensible sense_2b of a referent_2b, then they need to have the same label_1a for the referent_2a.

If they are going to share the same label for a referent_2a then they need to use spoken words_2a.

0955 Why?

Spoken words are all we have.

This is the dilemma of our current Lebenswelt.

Spoken words are purely symbolic.  They do not image or indicate their referents.  They are labels.  So, “communication” is all about the dynamics of sharing labels.

0955 Chapter six concerns communicative need.

In addressing the question of what humans need, answers track down the virtual nested form in the realm of possibility.

Here is a picture.

0956 Enfield tells of a magical moment when he is in a canoe with two village men, being transported down a river.  One has to read Enfield’s text in order to appreciate the magic of the moment.

0957 I suppose that once, I also experienced a similarly magical example.

I have a friend with a precocious two year old, who learned that the traffic sign reading “Not A Through Street” means “Dead End”.  While “not a through street” may be difficult to properly reference, “dead end” apparently is not.  This tyke yells “Dead End”, again and again, whenever the car passes a “Not A Through Street” sign, because of some “communicative need”.  Passengers not prepared for the display find it simultaneously humorous and disturbing.

What will this child grow up to be?

0958 Enfield wants to communicate one lesson. Since spoken words label only a fraction of things that can be labeled, then there must be a reason for why one spoken word exists while others do not.

I suppose the tyke in the above story has a reason for the display, which occurs with such an outburst of joy and excitement, that everyone in the car shares the revelry.

I know what that sign means!

0959 Enfield wants to communicate a second lesson which is even more notable.  All cultures around the world are remarkably alike in what they do capture.

0960 And, that reminds me of a religion and science conference that I attended, where all the scientists naturally took their seats on one side of the auditorium and the religious folk congregated in the seats on the other side of the auditorium.

0961 Of course, I am not saying that Enfield’s discussion concerning the structure of the Kri and English languages does not follow a model where there is a trade off between communicative costs and cognitive costs.  Nor am I saying that there is not an optimal frontier between having a vocabulary that provides more explicit information and takes more effort to learn as opposed to a vocabulary that provides less explicit information and takes (well, let’s be frank) less effort to learn.

However, I am wondering where the scientists and the theologians would place themselves in the spectrum of this optimal frontier.

0962 Of course, the scientists would claim the banner of the former, because scientific disciplinary languages provide very explicit information and take a lot of effort to learn.

At the same time, the theologians would not claim the banner of the latter, even though it is obvious to scientists that theological terms provide less explicit information and take less effort to learn.

0963 However, when it comes to theological subtlety, scientists find themselves clueless.  After all, the notion that Stevie could use Mrs. Verloc’s hand in order to stab Mr. Verloc with a carving knife is outside the bounds of science.  But, it is not outside the bounds of language and reality.

0964 Indeed, Enfield’s line of thought swerves after his scientific explanation, as if there is more to the optimal frontierthan a trade off between communicative and cognitive costs.

For example, the kinship terms of the Kri provide more detailed reference and are more difficult to learn because they aim not only to refer_2a, but to impress_2b.  As such, my father’s older sister must be situated differently than my father brother’s wife.  The kinship term for each_2a must be “sensed” with the appropriate sensibility_2b.

0965 In other words, a spoken label_2a decodes into its referent_2a and this referent_2b is a clue that should overshadow sense_2b.

This requires imagination_1b.

At the end of chapter six, Enfield calls language, “a tool for the instruction of imagination.”

0966 Enfield’s admission bring me back to the virtual nested form in the category of firstness, appearing earlier.

The normal context of “reference” and “sense” fostering coordination_1c brings the actuality that imagination is necessary for the referent to overshadow sense_1b into relation with the possibility of ‘something’ that words frame and that primes words_1a.

0967 Chapter seven concerns framing and inversion, where “frame” takes on a more expansive character and “inversion” involves a sudden change of awareness.  The background becomes the foreground and the foreground becomes the background.

So, I walk on my own path, as I saunter through this chapter.  The figure below stands in the foreground.  I have an inkling of what constitutes the background.  I suspect what lurks in the shadow.

0968 Here is the diagram of the current version of Enfield’s interscope.

0967 So, why am I suspicious?

Content-level spoken words_2a [frame] reference_2a is situated by reference_2b [overshadows] sense_2b.  What if reference_2bis not the same as reference_2a?  That question dwells in the potential of ‘coordinating around reality’_1c, which underlies a perspective-level actuality that recapitulates the situation-level and content-level actualities_2c in the normal context of language_3c.

Yes, what if the perspective-level actuality_2c can’t quite lock onto the foregrounded reference_2a,2b and sense_2b?

Does it throw a switch labeled, “Gestalt”?

0968 A hint at the character of my suspicion comes from the example of a religion and science conference in an auditorium.

Enfield is an expert in linguistics and cognitive psychology.  The above interscope reflects that.  The above interscopecould be used as a figure in a presentation by a psychologist.

Yet, it is an interscope.  The entire relational structure stands for an implicit abstraction.  So, the entire interscopecomposes a gestalt, where all the elements move as one awareness.

0969 Do I see it?

Yes, it is filled with explicit abstractions, which makes the application stand in the foreground, since the elements associate to Enfield’s argument.

No, Enfield’s explicit abstractions associate to elements in a relational structure (an implicit abstraction) that the author does and occasionally does not seem to recognize.

970 May I go back to the initial distinctions that this examiner and this author render?

When I look at this figure from the point of view of someone outside of the figure, the distinction between physical reality and social reality looks to be an explicit abstraction.

When I look at the distinction between physical reality and social reality from a point of view within the interscope in the cloud of implicit abstraction, the distinction looks to be a difference between academic scientists (sitting on the “science” side of the auditorium) and theologians (sitting on the “religion” side of the auditorium).

0971 Let me say that again.

The current version of Enfield’s interscope associates to academic science.  Enfield discusses language and cognition as if they are physical realities under investigation by linguistics and psychology.  So, he figuratively sits on the science side of the auditorium at the science and religion conference.  Dyadic material relations occupy the foreground.

At the same time, the same interscope, filled with almost the same explicit abstractions, may address the theological side of the auditorium at the religion and science conference.  Immaterial triadic relations occupy the background.  But, theologians do not have the methodology to bring them to the foreground.

0972 Let me take my suspicion to the next level, by proposing a pathway.

The story in Genesis 2.4 through Genesis 3 is a foundational fairy tale about the start of our current Lebenswelt.  And, even though Saint Augustine frames this story in terms of his doctrine of original sin, which has its own disciplinary-specific terminology, I submit that this story may also be regarded as a fairy tale about the way that speech-alone talk potentiates unconstrained social complexity, by changing the character of both language and reality.

Furthermore, I submit that this fairy tale dwells within the background of Enfield’s scientific treatise.

0973 How is that for a Gestalt switch?

But now, I walk the soggy ground of theology and scientists wriggle in their seats.

0974 Here are my claims.

The story in Genesis 2.4 through Genesis 3 may be regarded as a fairy tale about the way that speech-alone talk potentiates unconstrained social complexity, by changing the character of both language and reality.

Furthermore, I submit that this fairy tale unlocks the background of Enfield’s scientific treatise.

In order to demonstrate these two points, I must conjure an alternate Gestalt for Enfield’s interscope.

That means… an alternate interscope… to the scientific?

0975 I begin by associating the story of the temptation of Eve and the subsequent Fall with Enfield’s interscope.

Here is the starting location.

Behold.

There, in the center of the garden of Eden, stands the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.  Eve is attracted to it, because she sees animals and birds eating the fruit, with no ill effect.  However, she knows that God told Adam not to eat of it, for on that day he will die.  So, why would the fruit be fatal for Adam and her, but not fatal to the birds and the squirrels who eat of it?

The serpent, a creature who has no hands or arms and therefore, is incapable of hand talk, replies to her query.  They begin a conversation, in speech-alone talk.

0976 The serpent’s words frame the conversation_3a in terms of making a decision whether to eat the fruit or not_1a.  As soon as the serpent frames the possibility of making a decision_1a, Eve is primed to imagine what the fruit might mean_1b. If it does not mean poison, then what?

The serpent’s suggestions as to what the fruit might mean_1b, given God’s command not to eat of it_1a, soon overshadows her sensibility that the fruit is poisonous_2b along with her responsibility to keep God’s command_2b.  The serpent’s use of words_3b characterizes theoretical discourse_3b, such as the specialized discourses that build models in linguistics and cognitive psychology_3b.

0977 Indeed, the way that Eve refers to the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil_2a changes.  Her increasing sense of curiosity_1b and diminishing sense of responsibility_2b, generates a potential of coordinating around the reality of God’s command_1c, by getting Adam involved, not with her decision as much as her commitment to make a decision_2c.

Of course, Adam eats the fruit in an act of solidarity with the one he loves.

0978 Here is a picture of the story, entered into Enfield’s interscope.

0980 Can I feel a Gestalt shift?

Does the above interscope speak to the religion side of an audience in a religion-science conference?

After all, all I have done is place elements of the Adam and Eve story into slots for Enfield’s interscope.

Plus, the associations seem to be appropriate.

0981 Now, I want to compare the two interscopes, level by level, and discern another (background) interscope.  In order to do so, I look through the science interscope at the interscope with the Adam and Eve stories.  Then, I look through the religion interscope at the science side, and voila.  The background interscope becomes more and more apparent.

I start with the perspective level from the side of science.

How does language_3c coordinate reality_1c?

I suppose that the actuality_2c goes with a literal rendition of the Adam and Eve interscope.

The normal context of spoken language_3c brings the actuality of a decision [translating into] disaster_2c into relation with the possibility of coordinating around the reality of God’s command_1c.

What about the view from the religion side looking to the science side?

I guess that what I see is not quite literal, and not quite allegorical, and well, more like a voice that Enfield may agree with, while at the same time, disagree with.

The normal context of language_3c brings the actuality of physical reality (eating the fruit) [translating into] social reality(the recognition that they are naked)_2c into relation with the potential that ‘coordination may constitute rebellion against God’_1c.

0982 Next is the science side’s rendition of the Adam and Eves side for the situation level.

The normal context of theoretical discourse_3b brings the actuality of speculation on what the fruit might be [overshadowing] Eve’s sensibility and responsibility_2b in regards to the potential of ‘imagining what the fruit might mean’_1b.

I move into the rendition through the religion side.

The normal context of linguistics and cognitive psychology_3b brings the actualities of the use of spoken words_2b into relation with the potential of ‘imagination’_1b.

Now, something in the background seems to be moving towards the foreground.  An inversion constellates.

Why?

The religious side puts linguistic and cognitive psychology into the situation level, implying a recognition of the limitations of scientific inquiry.  Language_3c puts linguistics_3b into perspective.

0983 Next is the science point of view of the Adam and Eve fill-in on the content level.

The normal context of a conversation (between the serpent and Eve)_3a brings the actuality of the serpent’s words [framing] the fruit of the tree of good and evil_2a into relation to the potential of ‘Eve making a decision’_1a.

The corresponding religious view-through on the content level brings in parties that are not cognitive psychologists or linguists.  These parties stand in the background of an initial implicit abstraction, that is invisible to Enfield’s inquiry.

The normal context of Christian revelation_3a brings the actuality of the story of the fall in Genesis_2a into relation with the potential of ‘the doctrine of original sin’_1a.

0984 What have I accomplished?

Well, I suppose I have brought an interscope in the background into the foreground.

The explicit distinction that grounds Enfield’s work is viewed from the cloud of implicit abstraction.  The stories of Adam and Eve enter into the “body” of Enfield’s interscope, giving rise to two constellations (roughly) corresponding to Enfield’s grounding distinction.  One rendition plays out as a literal or “physical” association of the stories to elements in Enfield’s interscope.  The other rendition yields a more-comprehensive or “social” association of what the stories tell us about our current Lebenswelt.

The first rendition consists of Enfield’s interscope.

This second rendition constitutes an inversion of the first.

Weirdly, the ground beneath my feet is no longer so mushy and some scientists are leaving the auditorium.

Others remain.

0985 Once again, here are my claims.

The story in Genesis 2.4 through Genesis 3 may be regarded as a fairy tale about the way that speech-alone talk potentiates unconstrained social complexity, by changing the character of both language and reality.

Furthermore, I submit that this fairy tale unlocks the background of Enfield’s scientific treatise.

0986 Overall, there are two gestalts.. maybe more… involved in discourse.  Speech-alone talk always primes the mind to one gestalt.  So, one gestalt is foregrounded.  The other gestalt lurks in the background.

In this case, the foreground is the general structure of Enfield’s interscope and the background associates to the stories of Adam and Eve.

0987 The association allows me to read the background interscope in more than one way.

So, what better way than one for physical reality and one for social reality?

The result is a literal first reading (similar to “physical”) and a more evocative second reading (similar to “social”).

The former appeals to the science side of a conference on religion-science dialogue.  The latter appeals to the religion side.

0988 A comparison of the resulting virtual nested forms in the realm of normal context proves interesting.

0989 Why is the comparison interesting?

The literal-reading interscope that starts as the foreground of Enfield’s argument highlights the relevance of linguistics and cognitive psychology to the modern reader interested in both language and reality.  Note the virtual nested form in the category of thirdness.  The normal context of language_3c virtually brings the actuality of human discourse_3b into relation with what is happening_3a.

Surely, this virtual nested form describes research into linguistics and cognitive psychology. In fact, the superior nested form has always characterized these disciplines.  Enfield makes it a point to refer to early research in these fields.  Scientific advances start over a century ago.  These academic disciplines have some history.  The entire virtual nested form serves as the subject matter of these scientific disciplines.

0990 In contrast, the interscope dwelling in the background places Enfield’s academic disciplines into a situation-level nested form.  The normal context of linguistics and cognitive psychology_3b brings the actual use of spoken words_2b into relation with the potential of ‘human imagination’_1b.

0991 So, a more salient comparison should look like this.

For the foreground, the virtual nested form in the realm of normal context describes the disciplines of linguistics and cognitive psychology.

For the background, the situation level describes the same disciplines.

0992 What does this imply?

What we (regular humans) call, “language_3c“, is not the same as what linguists and cognitive psychologists call, “language_3c“.

Is the Gestalt switch obvious?

0993 The normal contexts for an association of the stories of Adam and Eve to Enfield’s current interscope describe the modern fields of linguistics and cognitive psychology.  Language_3c is topic for scientific inquiry concerning how human discourse_3b emerges from and situates what is happening_3a.

The Gestalt inversion interscope portrays the disciplines of linguistics and cognitive psychology as a situation_b-level nested form. So, the Enfield’s foregrounded interscope expand the situation level of an interscope lurking in the background.   But now that background interscope has entered the foreground.

Plus, language_3c, is something more than a topic for scientific inquiry_3b.  Language_3c puts scientific inquiry_3b into perspective.

Furthermore, scientific inquiry_3b situates Christian revelation_3a.  Surely, Christians feel that boot, because their perspective-level normal context of language_3c gets reduced to a topic for researchers such as Enfield_3b, leading to an expansion of the situation-level into a full blown interscope, that is then placed in the foreground by the science side of the auditorium in a religion-science conference.

0994 The theology side of the auditorium does not have the methodology to say that, what the scientists foreground is only the situation level of more comprehensive intrinsic abstraction, that is forced into the background, as scientists maintain the positivist intellect’s rule, outlawing metaphysics.

Once the inversion occupies the foreground, further reflection on Adam and Eve and the serpent strengthens associations.  The fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is, for Eve, is not the same as for the serpent.  Eve’s use of language_3c and her role in Christian revelation_3a differs from the serpent’s clinical observations of what the meaning, presence and message of the fruit might mean_3b.

0995 Here, the chapter on framing and inversion ends, concluding Part II, titled “Nudged by Language”.  The terminus inspires me to conjure the following play on the title of Enfield’s book.

0996 By now, the partial character of the titles of the three parts should be apparent.

For each, the full title would include the prescript, “Reality Is”

So Part III is fully titled, “Reality is Made by Language”.

0997 The full title of chapter eight is “Russell’s Conjugation and Wittgenstein’s Ruler”.

In this chapter, Professor Enfield cuts a few jokes.  He also mentions politics.

So, do not be surprised when I follow suit.

0998 The Russell conjugation is the first header in the title of chapter eight.

The Russell conjugation is a literary play on the conjugation of verbs in Latin and other romance languages.  I love, you love and he loves.  Well, the conjugation does not look impressive in English, but French and Spanish is a different story altogether.  So, a prankster comes up with a play that mimics conjugation and appeals to British humor.

I am hero, you are anti-hero and he watches us on screen.

0999 My example of the Russell conjugation plays on two dichotomies.  The first dichotomy is between hero and villain.  The second is between actor and viewer.  The two dichotomies seem to both apply to the same reality.  What is that reality?  The movies?  Theater?  Politics?

On top of that, the fact that there are two dichotomies but only three elements in the conjugation suggests that there is a missing term.

1000 That brings me to the Greimas square.  The Greimas square is invented by a linguist.  The Greimas square is a purely relational structure.  There are four elements corresponding to four corners of a two-dimensional box.  The first dichotomy occupies the upper two corners, A and B.  The second dichotomy occupies the lower two corners, C and D.

There are rules.  A is the focal term.  B contrasts with A.  C speaks against B and complements A.  D contrasts with C, speaks against A and complements B.

1001 Here is the Greimas square for the example.

1002 Yes, the Greimas square is a purely relational structure congruent with the purely relation structure of language.  Once rendered as a Greimas square, the Russell conjugation is actually an instruction to an audience.  Follow the intuition of the person, “he”, watching “me” and “you” on screen.

The ancient Greek chorus is an early instance of this “he” in theater.

1003 The Greimas square appears in many of Razie Mah’s blogs in 2023.  Look and see.

1004 The Russell conjugation morphs to “I say, you say, he says” in the following political example.

1005 Curiously, the Abu Ghraib story appears on page 128 (at the very start of Part III) and again on page 198 (at the end of Part III).

1006 One of the rules of thumb for reading philosophy texts is to look around the middle of the book for an esoteric message.  Also, look for topics that get revisited later.

Remember Schelling’s games of coordination?  The same applies to philosophy books.

Typically, philosophy texts are full of exoteric messages, from beginning to end.  So, a good hiding place for an esoteric treat resides right in the middle of the book.  Another hiding place is split into two locations.

Applied here, the rule of thumb says, “When you encounter an incident on page 128, and again on page 198, then be aware that it may be an esoteric message.”

The rule is fulfilled by Enfield’s split reflection.

1007 To me, this philosophical treat consists in comparing the passages concerning Abu Ghraib on page 128 and on page 198, side by side.  The comparison highlights the manipulative genius of Russell’s conjugation.

There is more to Russell’s conjugation than meets the eye.

1008 Russell’s conjugation, a comedic British play on the I, you, he conjugation of verbs in Romance languages, may present three elements in two dichotomies.  So, the word play should be on the I, you, he and we conjugation of verbs, but the we is left out. I am the focus.  You contrasts with me.  He is not the contrast between me and you.  Plus, he contrasts with we in a special sort of way.  We are supposed to agree with him.

1009 Enfield’s example?

I am firm, you are obstinate, he is a pig headed fool.

1010 Does that imply that we agree with the pig-headed fool?

Well, he is a pig-headed fool because he does not agree with me.

So, we should agree with me.

After all, Lord knows, we are not pig-headed fools.

1012 Here is a picture of the corresponding Greimas square.

1013 Unlike the Abu Ghraib Greimas square, where the informant is in slot C, the above Greimas square has the reporter in slot A.  That is the one who “we” (D) end up agreeing with.

Okay, the audience for Russell’s conjugation is supposed to agree with the speaker.

Plus, that initial response contains an implicit abstraction that asks, more or less, “Why would the presenter lie to me?”

1014 According to Comments on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019) (available at smashwords and other e-book venues, and appearing, for most part, in Razie Mah’s blog for January, February and March 2024), hand talk initially adapts to the social circle of the team.  Everything that is said in a team is sensible, because hand talk pictures and points to its referents.  Plus, the main incentives to perform hand talk are to be productive and to have fun.  Dishonesty and misconstrual are not rewarded in team work.

1015 After the domestication of fire, hand talk becomes fully linguistic as it adapts to the social circle of the community.  That includes all social circles within the community.

With fully linguistic hand talk, nonsensical statements can be made.  Some of these counterintuitive statements turn out to be very adaptive, because they provide insights that could not be rendered using sensible construction.  Indeed, social construction is not necessarily what makes counterintuitive statements adaptive.  Rather, it is the sensible constructionthat builds on social construction that produces the payoff.

Social construction is the meaning underlying the word, “religion”.

1016 My Paleolithic example has one of the deer hunting team say, in hand talk, the following.

[STORM] [TEETH][COLD][BITES]

1017 This counter-intuitive statement_2a frames the referent_2a, [STORM], and its sequela, [COLD], as a predator [TEETH][BITES].

We agree with the speaker by allowing the frame to prime the referent_2a for our imagination_1b.

And, in doing so, we activate a perspective-level potential_1c.

1018 Here are the elements of Enfield’s interscope that are activated in the Greimas square version of Russell’s conjugation.

1019 So, “we” implicitly abstract agreement with the one who is talking, in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, because everyone who talks to “us” is either on our team or in our community.

Why would the presenter lie?

1020 What does this imply?

Can I replace the content-level potential with the noun, “agreeability”?

The normal context of everyday conversation (as well as anything approaching conversation)_3a brings the actuality of spoken words [framing and priming] reference_2a into relation with the potential of agreeability_1a.

1021 So, the content-level question, “What is happening?”_3a, is answered.

The potential of ‘something’ happening_1a is also addressed.

1022 Speaking of ‘something happening_1a, I wonder, “What question does the potential of agreeability always avoid?”

1023 Does Eve ask the serpent, “Why would you lie to me?”

And, if she did, would the serpent have replied, “Why are you so disagreeable, today?”

This brings me to the second header in the title of chapter eight: Wittgenstein’s rule.

1024 Wittgenstein’s rule is deceptively straightforward.

A speaker’s statement may tell the listener more about the speaker than what the speaker is talking about. 

So, if the speaker’s motives are nefarious, then what the speaker is talking about could be misleading.

1025 Why is Wittgenstein’s rule deceptively straightforward?

It’s like telling someone that the way to get from the house to the bakery is to fly.

People don’t fly.

1026 Here is the Russell conjugation-inspired Greimas square for an argument between I (A) and you (B) that is being watched and reported on by he (C).

Now, how does Wittgenstein’s rule fit into this picture?

Oh, it fits in as the contrary of D.

1027 Here is another example.

In the introduction, Enfield mentions the sad tale of primatologist, who becomes a research scientist during the heyday of behavioralism.  The behavioralist treats the subject of inquiry as a black box.

The idea is to scientifically control the input that an animal receives and observe the animal’s behavior in response to the researcher introducing controlled input.

In order to study mother-newborn bonding in an animal model, this researcher follows a protocol that separates a newborn rhesus monkey from its mother and places it in an enclosure where inputs can be rigorously monitored.

He does this for years because behavioralists say that the results of these types of stimulus-response experiments will advance scientific understanding.

1028 Of course, the primate scientist agrees.

1029 Where does Wittgenstein’s rule fit into this picture?

Oh, it fits in only insofar as its violation explains the researcher’s inability to notice_1b that all the rhesus monkeys under investigation are suffering horribly.

So, without the primatologist even knowing it, the researcher’s publications tell us more about the agreeability_1a of the scientist than the actual results that are contained in the publications.

1030 Uh, I suppose that the last sentence restates Wittgenstein’s rule.

1031 Which only goes to show the value that this examination adds.

I have demonstrated that, since we evolved to be agreeable_1a, we are unable to follow Wittgenstein’s rule.

1032 But, there is a bright side.

After our inability to follow Wittgenstein’s rule leads to a nightmare so horrible that we could not have foreseen it, a Gestalt switch gets thrown.

Our imagination_1b transforms and we come to realize that Wittgenstein’s rule applies.

1033 Chapter nine is titled, “Stories and What They Do To Us”.

Chapter ten is titled, “Social Glue”.

The sequence follows Professor Enfield’s argument.  Chapter eight is examined.  What comes next is a chapter on stories.  Then, these stories are treated as social glue.

However, I have already touched the tar-baby of agreeability_1a.  So, the “tar” of agreeability_1a must be dealt with before the “baby” of the story.

1034 Here is the current version of the ever-modulating intrinsic abstraction that I call, “Enfield’s interscope”.

1035 If conversation_3a replaces the normal context of what is happening_3a…

…and if purely symbolic spoken words_2a replace the icons and indexes of hand talk_2a…

…and if the potential of ‘agreeability’_1a replaces the potential of ‘something happening’_1a…

…then language and reality become our adversaries.

Or… 

….maybe…

…we become their adversary, the “versus” standing between language and reality.

1036 In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, hand talk is a valuable resource in team work and community coordination.  Linguistic hand talk is not our enemy.  It is a guide that opens new cognitive spaces (that today, corresponds to the meaning underlying the word, “religion”).

Language is our friend because… well… why would the talker lie to us?

Language is a key ingredient to “our social glue”.

We evolve by adapting to be agreeable_1a.

Reality?

It is not so much a friend, but maybe, it is a companion.

1037 In our current Lebenswelt, speech-alone talk is a magical tool that creates realities that we never imagined, including the academic disciplines that Enfield discusses.

Yet, Enfield cannot fully and explicitly abstract the consequences of speech-alone talk.  He cannot tell us that we are the “versus” in the title.  This explains why he offers stories and story-telling as key ingredients to the human social glue.  This accounts for why he cannot recognize that Wittgenstein’s rule is as impossible as levitation.

We are not built for Wittgenstein’s rule.  We are designed to be agreeable_1a.

1038 Indeed, a close reading of chapter ten shows that Enfield concurs, even though he does not draw the conclusion explicitly.

1039 Here is a diagram of the virtual nested form in the realm of possibility for Enfield’s interscope.

The normal context of coordinating our reality_1c virtually brings the actuality of human imagination_1b into relation with the potential of agreeablity_1a.