0011 Idealism looks for something₂ that it can turn into an object₂ or an empirio-schematic judgment₂.

What about realism?

0012 In Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter and form are real elements and the contiguity is called “substance” (a technical use that may or may not cohere with traditional definitions of the word).  Here is a picture.

0013 I suppose Aristotle’s philosophy is realist.

So, let me see what happens to the hylomorphe when it is tossed into an appropriate category-based nested form.

Okay.  That is a little disappointing.  I thought I would have arrows going in every direction, as in the first blog.

0014 Let me try another.  “Stipulation” is a spoken word.  How does the spoken word, “stipulation” pan out as an actuality, according to Razie Mah in How To Define The Word “Religion”?

Another disappointment with realism.

0015 Well, what if I go one step further and remind myself that, according the linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913 AD), spoken language consists of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole and langue.  Parole is “talk”.  Langue is “language” (or whatever is going on in one’s head during conversation).

According to Saussure, for spoken words, parole [stipulates] langue₂.  

Now, I have another example of the idealist approach, with a parallel to modern epistemology.

0016 In chapter two, modern philosophy takes flight toward its twilight and, in chapter three, we enter the dawn of a new understanding of human beings.

0017 Two independent lines of thought develop in Europe and in America in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  The lines seem a little crossed.  On the American side, Charles Peirce reproduces the Baroque scholastic definition of the sign as a triadic relation.  Yes, Baroque scholasticism sounds like Europe.  On the European side, Ferdinand de Saussure recognizes that his novel model of language occasions an inquiry into sign-causality.  To me, this sounds quite American.  Language is a sign-machine, consisting of two arbitrarily related systems of differences.

0018 Consider a map of Pennsylvania.  This map is an example of a nonarbitrary or a motivated or a systematically related system of differences.  The roads on the map are signifiers.  The actual roads are the signified.

0019 Consider spoken languages.  Talk (in French, parole) consists in one system of differences.  Each uttered word is distinct from all other words.  Another term for a finite set of differences is a symbolic order.  What goes on in one’s head while talking (in French, langue) consists in the other set of differences.  According to Saussure, the relation between parole and langue is arbitrary.  Or, one can say, parole [stipulates] langue, where the contiguity, “stipulation”, is arbitrary.

0020 Note how I can depict these examples as hylomorphes.

A map [ overlays ] a landscape.

Parole [stipulates ] langue.

Plus, the latter dyad captures the flavor of Descartes’ original hylomorphe describing humans as thinking things.

0021 Saussure’s hylomorphe is versatile, because parole and langue can serve as bread for a sandwich filled with expansions of the contiguity, [stipulates].   The terms, signifier and signified, to an Aristotelian, are a little misleading, because the signified is typically “out there” (like a landscape) and the signifier is typically “ready to hand” (like a map).  But, the signified is simultaneously “in here”, because all one has to do is look to see the road that corresponds to a line on the map.  Even more “in here” are images of the road conjured when looking at a map while planning a trip at home.  No wonder Saussureans elevate the mental image of the road (“in here”) and ignore the road itself (“out there”).

Another pairing is acoustic signal (signifier) and neural signal (signified), the stuff of cognitive psychology.  These are a few of the obvious pairings that can expand the contiguity between parole and langue.

Imagine how many academic works can be formulated based on an ever-expanding “stipulation”.  Every researcher can discover or further develop one layer within the center of the intellectual sandwich.

0022 Yet, none of these sandwiches are satisfying, in the human sense of the word, because (if humans are semiotic animals, then) humans think in terms of signs… er… triadic relations.

0023 In order to understand an actuality₂, the human conjures (if that is the proper word for it) a normal context₃ and its potential₁.  This is apparent for Aristotle’s rational inquiry.  A thing is an actuality₂.  Actuality₂ belongs to secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements. So, the actuality₂ becomes matter [contiguity] form₂ as the normal context₃ (of rational inquiry₃) and its potential₁ (of Aristotle’s four causes and similar schema₁) are conjured.

Check points 0014 and 0015 for that one.

0024 What is odd about Saussure’s semiological and Decartes’ thinking-thing formulations is that the apparent dyadic actuality unwinds into something actual₂ (parole₂) as well as something that empowers an understanding of something actual₃₍₍₁₎₎, the normal context of langue₃ and the potential that a signified [cannot be objectified as] its signifier₁.

0025 This unwinding produces a nested form where someone saying something becomes Saussure’s parole₂, in the normal context of langue₃ (what is going on in one’s mind) with its potential that the signified [cannot be objectified as] the signifier₁.

0026 What does the normal context of langue₃ mean?

Langue is French for “language”.  It roughly corresponds to what is going on in one’s head during conversation in speech-alone talk.  For Saussure, langue consists of a system of differences.  As a normal context₃, langue₃ can be regarded as a highly evolved sorting machine, where a spoken word₂ is paired to a potential signified₁, all the while knowing that the spoken-word₂ signifier₁ does not really objectify the thing itself₁.  Neither does the mental-process signified₁, even though the mental-process₁ stands in the place of the thing itself₁.

Does this make sense?

0027 What does the potential of a signified [cannot be objectified by] its signifier(s)₁ imply?

Well, it seems that a signifier₁ potentiates parole₂, as each signifier₁ fills a place in vocal system of differences₂.  The corresponding signified₁ underlies langue₃, in so far as it₁ occupies a place in a mental system of differences.

Plus, parole₂ belongs to secondness, the realm of actuality, langue₃ belongs to thirdness, the realm of normal contexts₃, and the signified-signifier distinction₁ belongs to firstness, the realm of possibility₁.

Furthermore, Saussure’s semiology can be compared to the Positivist’s judgment, insofar as both may be portrayed as category-based nested forms.

Semiology applies to spoken language.  The Positivist’s judgment applies to scientific inquiry into nature.

0028 Note that the actuality₂ of the Positivist’s judgment is the empirio-schematic judgment₂, which consists of three elements: relation (disciplinary language), what is (measurements) and what ought to be (mathematical and mechanical models).  A judgment brings what is and what ought to be into relation.

The comparison bears fruit with the realization that semiology’s parole₂ corresponds to an empirio-schematic actuality₂that includes parole₂, in the style of a disciplinary language (relation)₂.  Both models (what ought to be)₂ and observations (what is)₂ are couched in terms of a disciplinary language (relation)₂.

Plus, signifiers₁ are comparable to phenomena₁.  A signified₁ is comparable to a thing itself₁.

Finally, the positivist intellect₃ appears to be a style of langue₃.

0029 What is interesting is the sequence of events in semiology and in the Positivist’s judgment.  For semiology, a speech act₂ enters into the slot for actuality₂ and activates the langue₃ signified-signifier₁ machine.  For the Positivist’s judgment, the positivist intellect₃ is always promoting awareness of phenomena₁ in such a manner that a scientist tries to put something (perhaps, corresponding to a noumenon) into words₂.  So, the normal context₃ and the potential₁ are hoping for and are prepared for a particular style of actuality₂.

0030 What does this imply?

Both Descartes’ and Saussure’s dyads have the structure of secondness.  Descartes and Saussure, each in his own way, promote the idea of the human as a res cogitans, a thing that thinks.  When these two speak of “relation”, they mean the dyadic structure of cause and effect.

Typically, a hylomorphic structure enters the slot for actuality₂ in a category-based nested form.  This fosters understanding.

However, we do not try to understand these dyads.  Instead, we unfold these dyads into category-based nested forms, in a systematic fashion.  One element of the dyad associates to actuality₂.  The other element of the dyad associates to both normal context₃ and potential₁.  One element of the dyad becomes like a fly.  The other element of the dyad becomes like the spider’s web.

0031 These lines of thought, using only category-based nested forms, supports Deely’s contention that humans are semiotic animals, rather than rational animals (a modern and a premodern view) or thinking things (a modern view).

Peirce publishes his New List of Categories on May 14, 1867.  Deely suggests this moment as the inaugural date for The Age of Triadic Relations.

0032 The hylomorphe does not really “unfold” into a category-based nested form.

A better word might be “expands”.

The hylomorphe expands into a category-based nested form.

The category-based nested form encourages an impulse to “fill in the blanks”.  On one hand, an actuality₂ demands a corresponding normal context₃ and potential₁.  On the other hand, a normal context₃ and its potential₁ draw in an appropriate actuality₂.

0033 For example, here is a picture of the Positivist Judgment as a category-based nested form.

How does this apply to the character of scientific discovery?

On one hand, a scientist investigates an actuality₂, calling for a corresponding normal context₃ and potential₁.

On the other hand, the normal context of the positivist intellect₃ is extremely aware of the potential of phenomena₁ to attract the curiosity of a scientist₂.

0034 Are there other ways to expand Saussure’s semiology, whose core claim is presented here as a hylomorphic structure?

0035 Another way for Saussure’s dyad of parole [stipulates] langue to worm its way into Peirce’s category of thirdnesscomes by way of A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

Parole_2a is a content_a-level actuality₂.

Langue_2b is a situation_b-level actuality₂.

Here is the resulting two-level interscope.

0036 On the content level, the normal context of speaking_3a brings the actuality of parole_2a into relation with the potential of ‘a vocal system of differences’_1a.

On the situation level, the normal context of thinking_3b brings the actuality of langue_2b into relation with the potential of ‘a mental system of differences’_1b. 

Going down the column for actuality₂, langue_2b virtually situates (and emerges from) parole_2a.

0037 This expansion is more than a passage from secondness into thirdness.  Unlike the direct expansion into a category-based nested form, discussed earlier, the two-level expansion enters the terrain of sign.

0038 Basically, a sign is a triadic relation, where a sign-vehicle stands for a sign-object according to a sign-interpretant.  Three elements are required: a sign-vehicle, a sign-object and a sign-interpretant.  Peirce uses his categories to create typologies of signs, based on the categorical-character of sign-vehicles, sign-objects and sign-interpretants.  Diagrams of category-based nested forms allow an alternate way to depict sign-relations.

Saussure’s two-level interscope contains (what I call) a “stipulating” sign.  Scholastics use the label “specifying”.  So the following figure exhibits extrinsic specificative formal causality.

0039 Of course, these associations are speculative.  They are consistent with Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, where the specificative and exemplar signs are diagrammed using category-based nested forms.

One attraction of this transition from Saussure’s dyad into Saussure’s specifying sign is that a finite system of differencesmay be called (in Peirce’s terminology) “a symbolic order”.  Consequently, grammar (for parole) corresponds to symbolic operations among elements within a symbolic order (for langue).

0040 Of course, one immediate implication places Descartes’ dyad into Saussure’s specifying sign, with modifications, as follows.

0041 The two-level interscope speaks in the disciplinary languages of category-based nested forms and of semiotics.

In the column of secondness, a construct of the mind_2b virtually situates (and emerges from) an object of experience_2a.

An object of experience_2a (sign-vehicle) stands for a construct of the mind_2b (sign-object) in regards to the normal context of thinking_3b arising from the potential of ‘a symbolic order’_1b (sign-interpretant).

0042 Compare that specifying sign to the first unwinding of Descartes’ dyadic pairing into a single category-based nested form.

0043 If I compare each depiction, I see that the two-level interscope’s sign-relation cannot manifest in the epistemological category-based nested form.

Still, matching epistemology and specifying sign in the realm of actuality produces an evocative comparison.

An object of experience₂ for the Kant-inspired epistemology corresponds to a construct of the mind_2b virtually situating the object of experience_2a in the manner of a sign-object being paired to a sign-vehicle (by a sign-interpretant).

Latin schoolmen apply the label of fundamenta proximata (a proximate fundament) to the Kant-framed object of experience₂, corresponding to the apparently simultaneous character of the sign-vehicle [stands for] the sign-object.  When I see a sign-vehicle (outside of me) as standing for a sign-object (inside of me), then the fundament, the sign-vehicle, is the proximate cause of, what I can call, a “sign”.

 0044 And that brings me back to Deely’s question, asking, “How do we define humans as semiotic animals?”

Well, for one, contemporary philosophers and intellectuals are not aware that modern dyads, such as the one from Descartes and the one from Saussure, can squirm their way into postmodern triads.  So, modern academics write about these dyads without realizing that their written words (parole) express triadic relations, whether as category-based nested forms or specifying signs (langue). 

I marvel at their genius.

0045 In chapters four and five, Deely retraces the history and etymology of the word, “semiotics”. 

He knows a lot about this topic, having written the masterwork, Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to The Turn of the Twenty-First Century (2001, University of Toronto Press).

But, the chapters for this book are brief.  Plus, they are sort of funny, in a Divine Comedy sort of way.  There are two styles of revelation.  Fast and slow.

0046 Descartes writes in the 1600s.  Saussure presents his course on linguistics in the early 1900s.  Their dyads are ideas, presented in the structure of Peirce’s secondness, where one real element [accounts for] another real element.  Secondness is the realm of actuality, so the ideas express the look and the feel of actuality.

However, these actualities are received by brains adapted to the realness of triadic relations in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  So, as modern intellectuals address these ideas as entities belonging to the realm of actuality, they unwittingly explore category-based nested forms and follow the contours of specifying signs.

0047 Deely does not have the diagrams to make this statement.  However, in chapter six (and in chapter one), he tells a story.

In 2003, then pope, John Paul II, calls a Congress of Thomistic Philosophers, in order to discuss what happened in philosophy in this Age of Ideas.  

John Deely attends, with his massive book in tow, intent on giving the pope himself a copy.

Yet, he does not succeed.

0048 The 2003 Congress of Thomistic Philosophers does not declare that humans are semiotic animals.

0049 Deely begins chapter seven by noting that Baroque scholasticism concludes (around 1650-1700) and Peirce begins (around 1850-1900) with the same question, “What is the nature of signification?”

0050 Modern science does not help.

No scientist can put a sign-relation directly under a microscope.  But, a scientist can observe and measure one or two of the termini.  Often, the sign-vehicle and the sign-object (the proximate fundament) presents scientists with phenomena, which are duly measured and used to build models of sign-behavior.  Consequently, the sign-relation, the thing itself, can be put into a variety of boxes, each labeled “noumenon”, for each suite of phenomena produced by that sign-relation.

0051 After all, science does not worry about noumena.  It only observes and measures their phenomena.

Did I say that correctly?

0052 Deely notes that Kant makes a fine distinction between the term, “noumenon”, the intelligible aspect of things, and “Ding an sich” (German for “the thing itself”), the sensible aspect of things.

To me, this aside calls to mind a Cartesian version of Saussure’s sandwich.

So, in my book, “noumenon” and “the thing itself” coincide.

0053 Here is a twist.

According to ancient Greek philosophy and scholasticism, a thing should be both sensible and intelligible.

Does matter go with sensible?  Does intelligible associate to form?  

If they do then, oops, the big modern sandwich gets pressed into a panini.

0054 Charles Peirce calls the modern inquirer back to the approaches of the old philosophers, by saying that sign-vehicles cannot serve as phenomena that cause associated behaviors.  A stop sign does not cause a moving automobile to slow to a rolling standstill anymore than a fly causes a hygienist to swat it.  A stop sign represents the laws of the road.  A fly represents potential contamination and disease.

The term “represents” is a substitute for “stands for”.

Consequently, science-mavens propose variations and descriptions of the term, “stands for”, when they describe the nature of humans.  Humans are rational animals.  Humans are signifying creatures.  Humans are a symbolic species.  The list is long.

0055 Further confusion follows with the following set of statements.

I experience my world as subjective, since I embody the potential for sign-objects.

My world is subjective, since the world is the subject matter of my experiences.

I experience the world as objective, since my world is perfused with sign-vehicles.

Sign-objects are objective, because they are objects, not things.

We experience our world as intersubjective, because several of us can embody similar sign-objects in response to a single… um… subjective sign-vehicle.

Even though we may encounter the same sign-vehicle, we are not thinking precisely the same sign-object because we have different bodies.  However, the sign-objects that we are thinking have relational structures so similar that they may serve as one sign-vehicle.

So, our objective sign-objects become an intersubjective sign-vehicle.  

The resulting sign-object is suprasubjective.  The suprasubjective sign-object may be judged.  Indeed, the suprasubjective sign-object may even constitute a judgment.  So, our own judgments may be couched in suprasubjective frameworks, such as the dichotomy of true versus false or honest versus deceptive.

0056 Do I notice that there are two sign-relations in this set of statements?

There is a sign-relation that seems to be properly a sign-vehicle standing for a sign-object in regards to a sign-interpretant.

Then, there is sign-relation according to the human as a semiotic animal.   The Latins called this relation, “relatio secundum esse” (a relation according to esse_ce, where esse_ce describes, not the essence of, but the presence of humans).  I don’t know whether the sign-relation whose sign-vehicle is intersubjective precisely corresponds to the Latin term.  But, the possibility intrigues.

0057 In section 8.1, Deely discusses how triadic relations challenge scholastic philosophers who are trained to draw distinctions.

0058 The Latin scholastics faced great difficulties in regards to triadic relations, whether they recognized them or not.

First, Aristotle loves distinctions.  And Plato loves to transcend distinctions.  So, the Latins, who retain Platonic traditions through the loss of the Roman Empire and the rise of Christendom, have some difficulties with Aristotle, who enters the scene through translations of Arabic texts, booty from the Crusades.  Saint Thomas Aquinas brings the Aristotelian aspect of Christian philosophy up to speed in regards to reflecting on distinctions.

Second, it is not exactly obvious how to go from distinctions to triadic relations.  It’s like the old adage of blind men observing an elephant.  Their tactile-based reports describe different creatures.  But, the elephant is a single creature.

0059 Here are two distinctions that crop up in Deely’s discussion.

0060 The proximal fundament, what we see (hear, smell, taste or touch) and what we think we see has a contrast, the remote fundament, the person who does the seeing and thinking.

Ens reale is mind-independent being.  Ens rationis is mind-dependent being.  Ens rationis is also called “a being of reason”.

The scholastics start with these distinctions.  So, it is not so obvious how they are going to elucidate a triadic relation, where a sign-vehicle (SV) stands for a sign-object (SO) in regards to a sign-interpretant (SI).

0061 The following figure shows how each element of each distinction views the sign-relation.

0062 Note how the sign-interpretant (SI) spans the gap between ens reale and ens rationis.  The reason?  The SI is the ens reale that makes ens rationis possible.

0063 I could say that the two distinctions are “protosemiotic”, but that is only looking from the answer to the problem.

Surely, the intellectual journey from protosemiotic to semiotic is not obvious.

The logics of contradiction and non-contradiction apply to secondness.  When I hear the word, “reason”, I typically think of this type of logic.

0064 I suspect that the logics of contradiction and non-contradiction apply to fundamenta proxima and to ens reale.  I am not so sure about fundamenta remota and ens rationis.

So, calling humans “rational or reason-based animals” does not do the trick.

Neither does calling humans “irrational or superstitious animals”.

0065 For animals, specifying signs constitute a creatures’ Umwelt (or Significant World).  The content and situation level of a two-level interscope are joined when a subject, a content-level actuality₂, appears.

0066 Consider the howl of a wolf.

In the scholastic world, a howl_2a is subjective (the subject matter is a thing) and an image of a wolf_2b is objective (the object is not the thing, but is a thought about the thing).

Both play a role in a specifying sign-relation.  A specifying sign traverses the content and situation levels.

0067 If I am a sheep, I hear the howl_2a (SV) and immediately conjure a phantasm of a wolf_2b (SO) within the normal context_3b of “what does it mean to me?” (SI) arising from the potential of situating the howl_1b (SI).

In the modern world, the howl_2a is objective (that is, not dependent on who is hearing it).  Also, a phantasm of a wolf_2b is subjective (that is, dependent on who is thinking it).  

Surely, when it comes to the terms, “subject” and “object”, the modern world presents an inverse of the scholastic.

The locus of “the subject” has switched from the subject matter to the thinking thing.  The former locus is scholastic.  The latter is modern.

0068 Keep that in mind when I say that there seems to be a backflow from the situation to the content level.  The situation-level question_3b, “What does it mean to me?”, flows back into the content-level query_3a, “What is happening?”.

In scholastic terms, the objective flows back into the subjective.

0069 At the same time, if I am a sheep, the situation-level phantasm of a wolf_2b stands for a perspective-level question, “Where is my shepherd?”_2c, in regards to the normal context of sensible action_3c and the possibilities inherent in ‘protection’_1c.

0070 The attempt to make sense_3c of what it means to me_3b and what is happening_3a belongs to the sign-interpretant of an exemplar sign.  So does its_3c potential_1c.  An exemplar sign traverses the situation and perspective levels.  In the exemplar sign, the situation level is intersubjective (rather than objective) and the perspective level is suprasubjective (a relation that everyone can agree upon… or maybe… at least, hold in mutual regard and, in the best case, turns out to be true).

Here is a picture.

The specifying and exemplar signs are discussed in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.