11/2/23

Looking at Andrew Ter Ern Loke’s Book (2022) ” The Origin of Humanity and Evolution” (Part 21 of 22)

0174 In chapter six, Loke considers Noah. Noah receives the tarnished title, “Image Bearer of God”, through descent from Adam. The title passes through the doctrine of Traducianism, so the lineage must be genetic. However, the tarnished title also seems to pass beyond Seth’s family line, so to speak, into those animals who are anatomically humans, who laugh at and ridicule Noah for imagining that God would or could punish them. Here, the passage must not be genetic. Maybe it is genealogical. Maybe it is the acquisition of speech-alone talk instead of hand-speech talk.

0175 Does Noah’s flood cover the whole earth?

It depends on how you define the word, “earth”.

0176 Here is a Greimas square that seems appropriate.

0177 The “earth” is the focal word (A). It is what is covered by Noah’s flood.

In contrast to the Genesis use of the word, “earth” (A), is the world of southern Mesopotamia (B). To everyone ridiculing Noah, the world of southern Mesopotamia is all there is. It is their “earth”. So, Noah’s flood destroys this “earth”.

The genealogies (of sorts) immediately following the flood (C) speak against the idea that southern Mesopotamia is the entire earth. The table of nations makes sense when Noah’s children are accepted into the royalty of other peoples based on the celebrity of Noah’s achievement. As far as Genesis is concerned, nations are founded because they receive direct descendants within the Image Bearer of God lineage. It is as if these jurisdictions are not relevant until then.

0178 What does this imply?

Southern Mesopotamia is the center of the world, if not the entire “earth”, until that catastrophic flood, which is noted as a break in the Sumerian king list (D).

This list (D) contrasts with the Genesis table of nations (C) because it represents the records of a public institution. It is entirely possible that the family of Seth lives entirely within public institutions in the Ubaid and Uruk (and later, Sumerian) traditions. So, the Genesis story of Noah’s flood is an insider’s view of a very public shaking of the Uruk political order.

The Sumerian king list (D) suggests that Noah’s flood (A) is indeed, not planetary, since the kingship descends (from heaven) soon afterwards. In this, the list (D) speaks against a literal reading of the Genesis story (A). Also, the list (D) supports the notion (what Loke calls Type C concordism) that Genesis belongs to the literature of the ancient Near East.

This list (D) complements the world of southern Mesopotamia (B), because the king list represents the establishment of order within the Sumerian world. The Sumerian king list is written centuries after the flood. The flood marks a break. The flood denotes the end of a Plutonic year, so to speak.

0179 What else does this imply?

Consider the following Greimas square.

0180 Speech-alone talk and Adam’s lineage starts in the Ubaid (A). Speech-alone talk spreads out from southern Mesopotamia to nearby hand-speech talking cultures.

The subsequent Uruk period (B) contrasts with this beginning. Uruk clearly differentiates from surrounding Neolithic cultures, who now practice speech-alone talk, but are far behind in terms of realizing the creative potential of this new tool of the intellect.

0181 Noah’s flood marks an ecological catastrophe, partially brought about by deforestation in northern Mesopotamia and partially brought about by (what modern insurance policy makers call) divine intervention. During the Uruk archaeological period, speech-alone talk floods into other lands. Egypt, Iran, the Indian subcontinent, China, the Mediterranean, eastern Europe and the lands north of the Caspian Sea, manifest social changes due to exposure to speech-alone talk.

Noah’s flood covers the “earth” of southern Mesopotamia.

The speech-alone talk flood covers the entire Earth.

This “flood” of speech-alone talk (C) speaks against Uruk as composing the entire earth (B) and complements the origination of speech-alone talk with the Ubaid (A).

0182 Consequently, the conditions for the table of nations, following Noah’s flood, are set (D) as the lands surrounding the Uruk, each in its own way, start to undergo trends towards unconstrained social complexity. These trends (D) contradict the exclusive claim of Sumeria as the only place where labor and social specialization increase wealth and power (A). At the same time, these trends (D) complement the achievements that already have occurred in southern Mesopotamia (B).

By the time that the Sumerian Dynastic coalesces, at 2800 U0′, dynastic civilization begins in Egypt and unconstrained social complexity is seeded along the Indus River Valley and the great rivers of China. On the Russian steppes, the proto-Indo-European cultures are already undergoing a transformation into formidable migratory chiefdoms. The Bronze Age is apparent in the Aegean. Even in the Americas, there are indications that speech-alone talk has arrived, on the western coast of what is now Ecuador.

0183 The entire Genesis sequence of stories and genealogies, stretching from Adam to Terah, coincides with the period from the start of the Ubaid (0 U0′) to the end of Ur III (3700 U0′).

If that is the case, then why isn’t the text longer and more elaborate? Why don’t the first eleven chapters of Genesis clearly blend in with the written historical material of the ancient Near East?

One suggestion is found in chapter 13C of An Archaeology of the Fall.

On one hand, when Abram starts his journey, he leaves Sumerian civilization behind. Not all of it, but nearly all of it. The story of the Tower of Babel is no accident. After Ur III, Sumerian is a dead language, known only in writing.

On the other hand, Sarai, remembers the fairy tales that her mother taught her.

11/1/23

Looking at Andrew Ter Ern Loke’s Book (2022) ” The Origin of Humanity and Evolution” (Part 22 of 22)

0184 In chapter seven, Loke concludes.

The concept of Adam and Eve as the “Image Bearers of God” stands at the core of this book.

0185 As much as the author tries to capitalize on the idea that Adam and Eve receive a title, and that this title passes to all humanity through a genetic… oh, a not genetic mechanism, Loke does not arrive at his destination, the answer to the question of the Fall.

How is Original Sin passed from Adam to us?

Why is Jesus the New Adam?

0186 Before Traducianism is challenged by the science of genetics, these questions are easy to answer.

Afterwards, Traducianism itself becomes an example of langue, the mental processing that is arbitrarily related to parole, that is, speech-alone talk.

0187 Yet, there is hope. The first singularity coincides with the fall of Adam and Eve. What is old is made new again.

0188 Future inquiry will extend beyond the book-ends of total depravity and the loss of original justice, into the natures of true versus false and honest versus deceptive.

0189 Who are we?

The behavior of humans in our current Lebenswelt is so different from the behavior of humans in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, that we might as well label ourselves a different species.

0190 Here is my suggestion.

We should call all humans living in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, Homo sapiens.

We should call all humans living in our current Lebenswelt, Homo boobiens.

0191 Only Homo boobiens can acquire specialized knowledge so exclusive that it makes them unbelievably stupid. In our world of unconstrained complexity, high intelligence empowers profound Dummheit. Just ask the experts. They will tell you that their recipes for disaster are utterly sensible and moral.

0192 Perhaps, in future academic controversies, the coincidence of the fall of Adam and Eve and the hypothesis of the first singularity will inspire evolutionary scientists to compete with Christian theologians in accounting for the Pascal sacrifice.

The Christian theologian says, “Christ dies for our sins.”

The scientist replies, “No, Christ dies for our stupidity.”

Sin results in death. So does stupidity.

Plus, we are never so stupid as when we play word games in order to lie to ourselves.

0193 The attraction of Loke’s theoretical framework, that Adam and Eve are the first to receive the God-given honorific, “Image Bearer of God”, is that the title is immediately spoiled in the Genesis 2.4-4 narrative, where Adam and Eve demonstrate that, while they are certainly created in the image of God, they cannot live up to the title. None of us can.

0194 There is good reason. Our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. So, we cannot even live up to who we evolved to be. We are tempted to believe that our own spoken words picture or point to their referents, when they are really placeholders in systems of differences (at least, according to Ferdinand de Saussure, the founder of modern language studies). We can place a label on anything, then use those labels to manufacture a coherent network of relational elements that seems totally convincing, because every element of the relational structure is occupied by a label.

0195 Inadvertently, the author reveals this in his defense of Traducianism.

In his innocence and earnestness, Loke demonstrates how we may use spoken words to confuse ourselves. Can we label the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, “intelligence” and “stupidity”? The moment that we do, some customers will demand the “intelligent” fruits and leave the “stupid” fruits for the less choosy.

Are the picky customers ahead of the game?

Or, are the less choosy correct in concluding that the fruits are all the same?

Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

0196 With that said, I conclude my examination of this work, full of intelligence and stupidity, just as one expects from a descendant of Adam and Eve. My thanks go to the author. The arguments offered in this book tell me that we stand on the verge of a new age of understanding, where everything old is made new again.

10/30/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 1 of 22)

0001 The full title of Deely’s book is Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of “Human Being” Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism: to supersede the ancient and medieval ‘animal rationale’ along with the modern ‘res cogitans’. The book is published in 2010 by St. Augustine’s Press in South Bend, Indiana.

John Deely (1942-2017 AD) starts as a Thomist interested in Heidegger and becomes a semiotician. He becomes a really, really good promoter of the study of signs. He writes a history of philosophy from the point of view of the revelation… or, is it discovery?.. that the sign is a triadic relation. For years, he teaches at University of Saint Thomas, Houston. He retires, moves to Latrobe, Pennsylvania, home of St. Vincent’s College, then dies.

This examination is to be read in parallel with or after reading (and writing marginalia) in Deely’s book. My argument may run like a dog on a long leash, compared to Deely’s argument. But, there is reason for the analogy. Thirteen years have passed since publication and five years since Deely’s burial, and the Age of Triadic Relations continues to manifest.

Semiotics is the study of signs. A sign is a triadic relation.

0002 Chapter one considers a question that we ask ourselves.

Humans, what type of animals are they?

Chapter two addresses the answer.

0003 Modern philosophy starts (more or less) when Rene Descartes (1596-1650 AD) presents a sensation, as an idea and an image where the object of experience directs a construct of the mind. Consequently, he regards humans as thinking things… or the owners of thinking things (minds)… or something like that.

In terms of Peirce’s philosophy, there are two contiguous actualities, characteristic of the category of secondness. They are an object of experience and a construct of the mind. The contiguity (which, for nomenclature, is placed in brackets) is “directs”.

Here is a picture of Descartes’ dyadic actuality. In Latin, the title is “res cogitans“.

0005 As already noted, this hylomorphic structure is coherent with Peirce’s category of secondness. The actuality corresponds to a sensation. Sensation exhibits a dyadic character. Sensation is like cause [and] effect or matter [substantiating] form.

There is an implicit claim that this dyad describes the way humans think.

Plus, a superior claim (not realized until Charles Peirce (1839-1914 AD) wrote about it) may be asserted. Humans think in terms of triadic relations, such a signs, mediations, judgments and category-based nested forms.

Say what?

See A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0006 With the superior claim in mind, it is no surprise that when later philosophers build epistemologies upon Descartes’ foundation, they end up shifting Descartes’ terms out of secondness, the realm of actuality, and into thirdness, the realm of normal contexts, and firstness, the realm of possibility.

Here is a category-based nested form that sort of captures Kant’s epistemology.

The normal context of the mind₃ brings the actuality of an object of experience₂ into relation with the potential of a particular condition₁. What is that condition? The thing itself [cannot be objectified as] what one sees, hears, smells, tastes or touches.

0007 So, the experience of the five senses₂ becomes an object₂ as it simultaneously is contextualized by the mind₃ and arises from the potential of a particular condition₁. Plus, the particular condition₁ is that the object of experience cannot be the thing itself₁.

It sort of like saying that my image in a mirror is not me, even though I appear to be the object of experience.

0008 Welcome to modern… philosophy?… er… science?

The Positivist’s judgment formalizes the quasi-Kantian category-based nested form by thirdly, replacing the mind₃ with a positivist intellect₃. The positivist intellect₃ rules out metaphysics. Secondly, the object of experience₂ is replaced by an empirio-schematic judgment₂, where disciplinary language (relation) brings observations and measurements of phenomena (what is) into relation with mathematical or mechanical models (what ought to be). Firstly, the thing itselfand what one senses₁ are replaced by Latin terms, the noumenon and its phenomena₁.

Here is a diagram of the Positivist’s judgment as a category-based nested form.

0009 The implications of the conversion of Descartes’ dyadic formula for sensation to a modern quasi-Kantian nested form for how humans think are most curious.

It seems that the construct of the mind weaves a normal context₃ and potential₁, sort of like a spider spinning a web in the hope of catching a flying insect. The metaphorical flying insect, is an experience₂ that immediately becomes an object₂as the manifestation of the realness of the normal context₃ and potential₁. Plus, the object₂ is inside of the observer and the thing itself₁ remains (potentially) on the outside.

Similarly, for the Positivist’s judgment, the scientist weaves the normal context of the positivist intellect₃ with the potential that phenomena₁ may be the observable and measurable facets of a noumenon₁, then waits for observations and measurements (what is) to reveal patterns that can be modeled (what ought to be) and discussed with disciplinary precision (relation between what is and what ought to be)₂. One of the oldest adages in science says, “First, observe phenomena. Second, explain them.”

0010 What a curious implication.

It is almost as if the construct of the mind is looking for an actuality₂ that fits its ideals. And when it does, it transforms whatever enters the realm of actuality, such as an experience₂ or a measurement₂, into an object₂ or an empirio-schematic judgment₂.

10/27/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 2 of 22)

0011 Idealism looks for something₂ that it can turn into an object₂ or an empirio-schematic judgment₂.

What about realism?

0012 In Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter and form are real elements and the contiguity is called “substance” (a technical use that may or may not cohere with traditional definitions of the word). Here is a picture.

0013 I suppose Aristotle’s philosophy is realist.

So, let me see what happens to the hylomorphe when it is tossed into an appropriate category-based nested form.

Okay. That is a little disappointing. I thought I would have arrows going in every direction, as in the first blog.

0014 Let me try another. “Stipulation” is a spoken word. How does the spoken word, “stipulation” pan out as an actuality, according to Razie Mah in How To Define The Word “Religion”?

Another disappointment with realism.

0015 Well, what if I go one step further and remind myself that, according the linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913 AD), spoken language consists of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole and langue. Parole is “talk”. Langue is “language” (or whatever is going on in one’s head during conversation).

According to Saussure, for spoken words, parole [stipulates] langue₂.

Now, I have another example of the idealist approach, with a parallel to modern epistemology.

10/26/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 3 of 22)

0016 In chapter two, modern philosophy takes flight toward its twilight and, in chapter three, we enter the dawn of a new understanding of human beings.

0017 Two independent lines of thought develop in Europe and in America in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The lines seem a little crossed. On the American side, Charles Peirce reproduces the Baroque scholastic definition of the sign as a triadic relation. Yes, Baroque scholasticism sounds like Europe. On the European side, Ferdinand de Saussure recognizes that his novel model of language occasions an inquiry into sign-causality. To me, this sounds quite American. Language is a sign-machine, consisting of two arbitrarily related systems of differences.

0018 Consider a map of Pennsylvania. This map is an example of a nonarbitrary or a motivated or a systematically related system of differences. The roads on the map are signifiers. The actual roads are the signified.

0019 Consider spoken languages. Talk (in French, parole) consists in one system of differences. Each uttered word is distinct from all other words. Another term for a finite set of differences is a symbolic order. What goes on in one’s head while talking (in French, langue) consists in the other set of differences. According to Saussure, the relation between parole and langue is arbitrary. Or, one can say, parole [stipulates] langue, where the contiguity, “stipulation”, is arbitrary.

0020 Note how I can depict these examples as hylomorphes.

A map [ overlays ] a landscape.

Parole [stipulates ] langue.

Plus, the latter dyad captures the flavor of Descartes’ original hylomorphe describing humans as thinking things.

0021 Saussure’s hylomorphe is versatile, because parole and langue can serve as bread for a sandwich filled with expansions of the contiguity, [stipulates]. The terms, signifier and signified, to an Aristotelian, are a little misleading, because the signified is typically “out there” (like a landscape) and the signifier is typically “ready to hand” (like a map). But, the signified is simultaneously “in here”, because all one has to do is look to see the road that corresponds to a line on the map. Even more “in here” are images of the road conjured when looking at a map while planning a trip at home. No wonder Saussureans elevate the mental image of the road (“in here”) and ignore the road itself (“out there”).

Another pairing is acoustic signal (signifier) and neural signal (signified), the stuff of cognitive psychology. These are a few of the obvious pairings that can expand the contiguity between parole and langue.

Imagine how many academic works can be formulated based on an ever-expanding “stipulation”. Every researcher can discover or further develop one layer within the center of the intellectual sandwich.

0022 Yet, none of these sandwiches are satisfying, in the human sense of the word, because (if humans are semiotic animals, then) humans think in terms of signs… er… triadic relations.

0023 In order to understand an actuality₂, the human conjures (if that is the proper word for it) a normal context₃ and its potential₁. This is apparent for Aristotle’s rational inquiry. A thing is an actuality₂. Actuality₂ belongs to secondness. Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements. So, the actuality₂ becomes matter [contiguity] form₂ as the normal context₃ (of rational inquiry₃) and its potential₁ (of Aristotle’s four causes and similar schema₁) are conjured.

Check points 0014 and 0015 for that one.

10/25/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 4 of 22)

0024 What is odd about Saussure’s semiological and Decartes’ thinking-thing formulations is that the apparent dyadic actuality unwinds into something actual₂ (parole₂) as well as something that empowers an understanding of something actual₃₍₍₁₎₎, the normal context of langue₃ and the potential that a signified [cannot be objectified as] its signifier₁.

0025 This unwinding produces a nested form where someone saying something becomes Saussure’s parole₂, in the normal context of langue₃ (what is going on in one’s mind) with its potential that the signified [cannot be objectified as] the signifier₁.

0026 What does the normal context of langue₃ mean?

Langue is French for “language”. It roughly corresponds to what is going on in one’s head during conversation in speech-alone talk. For Saussure, langue consists of a system of differences. As a normal context₃, langue₃ can be regarded as a highly evolved sorting machine, where a spoken word₂ is paired to a potential signified₁, all the while knowing that the spoken-word₂ signifier₁ does not really objectify the thing itself₁. Neither does the mental-process signified₁, even though the mental-process₁ stands in the place of the thing itself₁.

Does this make sense?

0027 What does the potential of a signified [cannot be objectified by] its signifier(s)₁ imply?

Well, it seems that a signifier₁ potentiates parole₂, as each signifier₁ fills a place in vocal system of differences₂. The corresponding signified₁ underlies langue₃, in so far as it₁ occupies a place in a mental system of differences.

Plus, parole₂ belongs to secondness, the realm of actuality, langue₃ belongs to thirdness, the realm of normal contexts₃, and the signified-signifier distinction₁ belongs to firstness, the realm of possibility₁.

Furthermore, Saussure’s semiology can be compared to the Positivist’s judgment, insofar as both may be portrayed as category-based nested forms.

Semiology applies to spoken language. The Positivist’s judgment applies to scientific inquiry into nature.

0028 Note that the actuality₂ of the Positivist’s judgment is the empirio-schematic judgment₂, which consists of three elements: relation (disciplinary language), what is (measurements) and what ought to be (mathematical and mechanical models). A judgment brings what is and what ought to be into relation.

The comparison bears fruit with the realization that semiology’s parole₂ corresponds to an empirio-schematic actuality₂that includes parole₂, in the style of a disciplinary language (relation)₂. Both models (what ought to be)₂ and observations (what is)₂ are couched in terms of a disciplinary language (relation)₂.

Plus, signifiers₁ are comparable to phenomena₁. A signified₁ is comparable to a thing itself₁.

Finally, the positivist intellect₃ appears to be a style of langue₃.

0029 What is interesting is the sequence of events in semiology and in the Positivist’s judgment. For semiology, a speech act₂ enters into the slot for actuality₂ and activates the langue₃ signified-signifier₁ machine. For the Positivist’s judgment, the positivist intellect₃ is always promoting awareness of phenomena₁ in such a manner that a scientist tries to put something (perhaps, corresponding to a noumenon) into words₂. So, the normal context₃ and the potential₁ are hoping for and are prepared for a particular style of actuality₂.

0030 What does this imply?

Both Descartes’ and Saussure’s dyads have the structure of secondness. Descartes and Saussure, each in his own way, promote the idea of the human as a res cogitans, a thing that thinks. When these two speak of “relation”, they mean the dyadic structure of cause and effect.

Typically, a hylomorphic structure enters the slot for actuality₂ in a category-based nested form. This fosters understanding.

However, we do not try to understand these dyads. Instead, we unfold these dyads into category-based nested forms, in a systematic fashion. One element of the dyad associates to actuality₂. The other element of the dyad associates to both normal context₃ and potential₁. One element of the dyad becomes like a fly. The other element of the dyad becomes like the spider’s web.

0031 These lines of thought, using only category-based nested forms, supports Deely’s contention that humans are semiotic animals, rather than rational animals (a modern and a premodern view) or thinking things (a modern view).

Peirce publishes his New List of Categories on May 14, 1867. Deely suggests this moment as the inaugural date for The Age of Triadic Relations.

10/24/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 5 of 22)

0032 The hylomorphe does not really “unfold” into a category-based nested form.

A better word might be “expands”.

The hylomorphe expands into a category-based nested form.

The category-based nested form encourages an impulse to “fill in the blanks”. On one hand, an actuality₂ demands a corresponding normal context₃ and potential₁. On the other hand, a normal context₃ and its potential₁ draw in an appropriate actuality₂.

0033 For example, here is a picture of the Positivist Judgment as a category-based nested form.

How does this apply to the character of scientific discovery?

On one hand, a scientist investigates an actuality₂, calling for a corresponding normal context₃ and potential₁.

On the other hand, the normal context of the positivist intellect₃ is extremely aware of the potential of phenomena₁ to attract the curiosity of a scientist₂.

0034 Are there other ways to expand Saussure’s semiology, whose core claim is presented here as a hylomorphic structure?

0035 Another way for Saussure’s dyad of parole [stipulates] langue to worm its way into Peirce’s category of thirdnesscomes by way of A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

Parole_2a is a content_a-level actuality₂.

Langue_2b is a situation_b-level actuality₂.

Here is the resulting two-level interscope.

0036 On the content level, the normal context of speaking_3a brings the actuality of parole_2a into relation with the potential of ‘a vocal system of differences’_1a.

On the situation level, the normal context of thinking_3b brings the actuality of langue_2b into relation with the potential of ‘a mental system of differences’_1b.

Going down the column for actuality₂, langue_2b virtually situates (and emerges from) parole_2a.

0037 This expansion is more than a passage from secondness into thirdness. Unlike the direct expansion into a category-based nested form, discussed earlier, the two-level expansion enters the terrain of sign.

0038 Basically, a sign is a triadic relation, where a sign-vehicle stands for a sign-object according to a sign-interpretant. Three elements are required: a sign-vehicle, a sign-object and a sign-interpretant. Peirce uses his categories to create typologies of signs, based on the categorical-character of sign-vehicles, sign-objects and sign-interpretants. Diagrams of category-based nested forms allow an alternate way to depict sign-relations.

Saussure’s two-level interscope contains (what I call) a “stipulating” sign. Scholastics use the label “specifying”. So the following figure exhibits extrinsic specificative formal causality.

0039 Of course, these associations are speculative. They are consistent with Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, where the specificative and exemplar signs are diagrammed using category-based nested forms.

One attraction of this transition from Saussure’s dyad into Saussure’s specifying sign is that a finite system of differencesmay be called (in Peirce’s terminology) “a symbolic order”. Consequently, grammar (for parole) corresponds to symbolic operations among elements within a symbolic order (for langue).

10/23/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 6 of 22)

0040 Of course, one immediate implication places Descartes’ dyad into Saussure’s specifying sign, with modifications, as follows.

0041 The two-level interscope speaks in the disciplinary languages of category-based nested forms and of semiotics.

In the column of secondness, a construct of the mind_2b virtually situates (and emerges from) an object of experience_2a.

An object of experience_2a (sign-vehicle) stands for a construct of the mind_2b (sign-object) in regards to the normal context of thinking_3b arising from the potential of ‘a symbolic order’_1b (sign-interpretant).

0042 Compare that specifying sign to the first unwinding of Descartes’ dyadic pairing into a single category-based nested form.

0043 If I compare each depiction, I see that the two-level interscope’s sign-relation cannot manifest in the epistemological category-based nested form.

Still, matching epistemology and specifying sign in the realm of actuality produces an evocative comparison.

An object of experience₂ for the Kant-inspired epistemology corresponds to a construct of the mind_2b virtually situating the object of experience_2a in the manner of a sign-object being paired to a sign-vehicle (by a sign-interpretant).

Latin schoolmen apply the label of fundamenta proximata (a proximate fundament) to the Kant-framed object of experience₂, corresponding to the apparently simultaneous character of the sign-vehicle [stands for] the sign-object. When I see a sign-vehicle (outside of me) as standing for a sign-object (inside of me), then the fundament, the sign-vehicle, is the proximate cause of, what I can call, a “sign”.

0044 And that brings me back to Deely’s question, asking, “How do we define humans as semiotic animals?”

Well, for one, contemporary philosophers and intellectuals are not aware that modern dyads, such as the one from Descartes and the one from Saussure, can squirm their way into postmodern triads. So, modern academics write about these dyads without realizing that their written words (parole) express triadic relations, whether as category-based nested forms or specifying signs (langue).

I marvel at their genius.

0045 In chapters four and five, Deely retraces the history and etymology of the word, “semiotics”.

He knows a lot about this topic, having written the masterwork, Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to The Turn of the Twenty-First Century (2001, University of Toronto Press).

But, the chapters for this book are brief. Plus, they are sort of funny, in a Divine Comedy sort of way. There are two styles of revelation. Fast and slow.

0046 Descartes writes in the 1600s. Saussure presents his course on linguistics in the early 1900s. Their dyads are ideas, presented in the structure of Peirce’s secondness, where one real element [accounts for] another real element. Secondness is the realm of actuality, so the ideas express the look and the feel of actuality.

However, these actualities are received by brains adapted to the realness of triadic relations in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. So, as modern intellectuals address these ideas as entities belonging to the realm of actuality, they unwittingly explore category-based nested forms and follow the contours of specifying signs.

0047 Deely does not have the diagrams to make this statement. However, in chapter six (and in chapter one), he tells a story.

In 2003, then pope, John Paul II, calls a Congress of Thomistic Philosophers, in order to discuss what happened in philosophy in this Age of Ideas.

John Deely attends, with his massive book in tow, intent on giving the pope himself a copy.

Yet, he does not succeed.

0048 The 2003 Congress of Thomistic Philosophers does not declare that humans are semiotic animals.

10/20/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 7 of 22)

0049 Deely begins chapter seven by noting that Baroque scholasticism concludes (around 1650-1700) and Peirce begins (around 1850-1900) with the same question, “What is the nature of signification?”

0050 Modern science does not help.

No scientist can put a sign-relation directly under a microscope. But, a scientist can observe and measure one or two of the termini. Often, the sign-vehicle and the sign-object (the proximate fundament) presents scientists with phenomena, which are duly measured and used to build models of sign-behavior. Consequently, the sign-relation, the thing itself, can be put into a variety of boxes, each labeled “noumenon”, for each suite of phenomena produced by that sign-relation.

0051 After all, science does not worry about noumena. It only observes and measures their phenomena.

Did I say that correctly?

0052 Deely notes that Kant makes a fine distinction between the term, “noumenon”, the intelligible aspect of things, and “Ding an sich” (German for “the thing itself”), the sensible aspect of things.

To me, this aside calls to mind a Cartesian version of Saussure’s sandwich.

So, in my book, “noumenon” and “the thing itself” coincide.

0053 Here is a twist.

According to ancient Greek philosophy and scholasticism, a thing should be both sensible and intelligible.

Does matter go with sensible? Does intelligible associate to form?

If they do then, oops, the big modern sandwich gets pressed into a panini.

0054 Charles Peirce calls the modern inquirer back to the approaches of the old philosophers, by saying that sign-vehicles cannot serve as phenomena that cause associated behaviors. A stop sign does not cause a moving automobile to slow to a rolling standstill anymore than a fly causes a hygienist to swat it. A stop sign represents the laws of the road. A fly represents potential contamination and disease.

The term “represents” is a substitute for “stands for”.

Consequently, science-mavens propose variations and descriptions of the term, “stands for”, when they describe the nature of humans. Humans are rational animals. Humans are signifying creatures. Humans are a symbolic species. The list is long.

0055 Further confusion follows with the following set of statements.

I experience my world as subjective, since I embody the potential for sign-objects.

My world is subjective, since the world is the subject matter of my experiences.

I experience the world as objective, since my world is perfused with sign-vehicles.

Sign-objects are objective, because they are objects, not things.

We experience our world as intersubjective, because several of us can embody similar sign-objects in response to a single… um… subjective sign-vehicle.

Even though we may encounter the same sign-vehicle, we are not thinking precisely the same sign-object because we have different bodies. However, the sign-objects that we are thinking have relational structures so similar that they may serve as one sign-vehicle.

So, our objective sign-objects become an intersubjective sign-vehicle.

The resulting sign-object is suprasubjective. The suprasubjective sign-object may be judged. Indeed, the suprasubjective sign-object may even constitute a judgment. So, our own judgments may be couched in suprasubjective frameworks, such as the dichotomy of true versus false or honest versus deceptive.

0056 Do I notice that there are two sign-relations in this set of statements?

There is a sign-relation that seems to be properly a sign-vehicle standing for a sign-object in regards to a sign-interpretant.

Then, there is sign-relation according to the human as a semiotic animal. The Latins called this relation, “relatio secundum esse” (a relation according to esse_ce, where esse_ce describes, not the essence of, but the presence of humans). I don’t know whether the sign-relation whose sign-vehicle is intersubjective precisely corresponds to the Latin term. But, the possibility intrigues.

0057 In section 8.1, Deely discusses how triadic relations challenge scholastic philosophers who are trained to draw distinctions.

10/19/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 8 of 22)

0058 The Latin scholastics faced great difficulties in regards to triadic relations, whether they recognized them or not.

First, Aristotle loves distinctions. And Plato loves to transcend distinctions. So, the Latins, who retain Platonic traditions through the loss of the Roman Empire and the rise of Christendom, have some difficulties with Aristotle, who enters the scene through translations of Arabic texts, booty from the Crusades. Saint Thomas Aquinas brings the Aristotelian aspect of Christian philosophy up to speed in regards to reflecting on distinctions.

Second, it is not exactly obvious how to go from distinctions to triadic relations. It’s like the old adage of blind men observing an elephant. Their tactile-based reports describe different creatures. But, the elephant is a single creature.

0059 Here are two distinctions that crop up in Deely’s discussion.

0060 The proximal fundament, what we see (hear, smell, taste or touch) and what we think we see has a contrast, the remote fundament, the person who does the seeing and thinking.

Ens reale is mind-independent being. Ens rationis is mind-dependent being. Ens rationis is also called “a being of reason”.

The scholastics start with these distinctions. So, it is not so obvious how they are going to elucidate a triadic relation, where a sign-vehicle (SV) stands for a sign-object (SO) in regards to a sign-interpretant (SI).

0061 The following figure shows how each element of each distinction views the sign-relation.

0062 Note how the sign-interpretant (SI) spans the gap between ens reale and ens rationis. The reason? The SI is the ens reale that makes ens rationis possible.

0063 I could say that the two distinctions are “protosemiotic”, but that is only looking from the answer to the problem.

Surely, the intellectual journey from protosemiotic to semiotic is not obvious.

The logics of contradiction and non-contradiction apply to secondness. When I hear the word, “reason”, I typically think of this type of logic.

0064 I suspect that the logics of contradiction and non-contradiction apply to fundamenta proxima and to ens reale. I am not so sure about fundamenta remota and ens rationis.

So, calling humans “rational or reason-based animals” does not do the trick.

Neither does calling humans “irrational or superstitious animals”.