0106 Here is a picture of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in compared to our current Lebenswelt.
Figure 27
0107 For evolutionary psychology, orthodox views3a are going to be influenced by hominin adaptations into social circles of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, even though, in our current Lebenswelt, a differentiated dynamic is in play. Indeed, social construction(3a)2aC, along with critical theory(3b)2aC and social justice(3c)2ab, constitute an organizational objective2aC in the societyC tier that interpellates individuals in communityA to enter organizationsB, either willingly (by voluntarily identifying onself as “oppressed”(2b)2aC) or unwillingly (by involuntarily being assigned the label of “oppressor”(2b)2aC).
0108 Professor Saad does not touch on the above, because this discussion extends beyond his expertise in evolutionary psychology pertinent to consumer behaviors.
These comments add value to Dr. Saad’s argument by explicitly posing how social construction(3a)2aC (which applies to our current Lebenswelt) cannot fully exclude evolutionary psychology3b (which applies lessons about the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt).
0109 What if human will in our current Lebenswelt is influenced by innate tendencies that are adaptations to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?
Then, social constructivism3a should not ignore that reality (rather than displace that reality beneath its own occupation of the content level of inquiry).
Then, critical theory3b cannot situate the actuality of identity as personal choice2a according to the potential of a system1bunderlying a manichaean division between “oppressed”2b and “oppressor”2b.
Also, social justice(3c)2aC cannot properly contextualize the division between “oppressed”(2b)2aC and “oppressor”(2b)2aC with the potential of protection(1c)2aC, because the demand for protection(1c)2aC may itself be an innate adaptive response to the existence of a system(1b)2aC that pretends to be an evolved social circle.
0110 Even weirder, what if the organizational objective2aC of the postmodern academy3aC, arising from the righteousness of radical individualism, marxist worldviews, and big government (il)liberalism1aC, is, as Dr. Saad claims, a self-deceiving parasitic syndrome?
What if the organizational objective2aC triggers susceptible individuals to identify as “oppressed”(2b)2aC because the privileges(2c)2aC of social justice(3c)2aC coincide with what one expects from participating in harmonious social circles?
0111 Wouldn’t that be freaky?
It is like drinking the Flavor-Aid.
0112 These comment bring the arguments in Dr. Gad Saad’s book into a strange revelation.
The reason why Dr. Saad is the target of animosity from colleagues in the postmodern multiversity unites with his chosen topic of expertise, evolutionary psychology.
Evolutionary psychology applies lessons about the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.
In doing so, it raises post-postmodern questions concerning the adaptive natures of human will(1a)2aC, systems(1b)2aC and protection(1c)2aC and their maladaptive expressions in our current Lebenswelt.
Plus, none of these topics can be discussed in the College of Social Construction.
0113 My thanks to Professor Saad for his excellent work.
0114 Our curent Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
Cheers for an expanded range of inquiry for evolutionary psychology.
The three masterworks of Razie Mah offer a treasure trove for those interested in human evolution: The Human Niche, An Archaeology of the Fall, and How To Define the Word “Religion”.
These are all available as electronic books. Just search for the author’s name, Razie Mah, along with the title.
0115 A Course on the Human Niche is a series, available at smashwords and other e-book venues, containing the masterwork, a primer, and commentaries, including the following.
Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big
Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) The Prehistory of The Mind
Comments on Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky’s Book (2016) Why Only Us?
Comments on Derek Bickerton’s Book (2014) More Than Nature Needs
Any literate adult can conduct a seminar class that reads and discusses these works.
0116 Another series, titled Buttressing the Human Niche, contains comments on articles and books on the topic of human evolution.
Here is a sample.
Comments on David McNeill’s Book (2012) How Language Began
Comments on David Reich’s Book (2018) Who We Are and How We Got Here
Comments on Christ Sinha’s Essay (2018) “Praxis, Symbols and Language”
Comments on Kim Sterelny’s Essay (2011) “From Hominins to Humans”
Comments on John Barrett and Krystalli Amilati’s Essay (2004) “Some Light on the Early Origins of Them All”
Comments on Stella Souvatzi, Adnan Baysal and Emma Baysal’s Essay (2019) “Is there Prehistory?”
These works may be purchased at smashwords and other e-book venues. They explore topics and demonstrate the practice of association and implication. They are ideal for throwing into an established study (or curriculum) on human evolution, in order to demonstrate the realness of triadic relations. Triadic relations are real enough to constitute a niche.
0117 Finally, the Razie Mah’s blog at www.raziemah.com looks at other publications. Each “looking at” blog consists of one to twenty parts. These may be used to spread the word, for enjoyment, discussion and erudition.
For example, the following appears in March 2021
Looking at Daniel Turbon’s Article (2020) “…Human Being in Evolution”
In May 2021
Looking at Chris Sinha’s Essay (2018) “Praxis, Symbol and Language”
0118 Currently, evolutionary psychology is narrowly practiced as an adjunct to cognitive psychology. Evolutionary psychology attempts to explain findings, models and evidence from cognitive psychology in terms of natural selection in the environment of evolutionary adaptation.
Now comes the Course on the Human Niche, Buttressing of the Human Niche, and other productions by Razie Mah,proposing that the ultimate human niche is the potential of triadic relations.
Yes, humans also evolve into very many proximate niches. But, all our proximate niches are bundled together by our ultimate niche. Proximate niches are like the various wooden rods bound together in the ancient Roman artifact called “religio”. This artifact serves as a metaphor for the human’s ultimate niche. Our ultimate niche binds all adaptations into proximate niches together.
0119 Professor Gad Saad’s book takes the reader outside of a narrow and closed practice of evolutionary psychology. However, since Saad does not know the hypothesis of the ultimate human niche, he cannot cross from complaining and demanding action to a wide-open practice of evolutionary psychology. Thus, he cannot fully comprehend what he is encountering in postmodern academics and elsewhere. He is moving towards a realization. It is just around the corner.
A wide-open evolutionary psychology examines our current Lebenswelt through the lens of adaptations accrued in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
That revolution in thought begins with Razie Mah’s masterwork, The Human Niche.
0001 Last month, the Razie Mah blog presented the end of Comments on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues). The blog is titled Looking at Graeber and Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “The State Has No Origins”.
The question arises, “Does the weird confounded diagram developed in this commentary have relevance to other inquiries covering the human condition in our current Lebenswelt?”
0002 This blog offers an answer, by way of example.
Three years before the conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter in the constellation of Aquarius, Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson publish an article in the Journal of International Political Theory (2017, Vol. 13(3) 282-295). The British scholars are experts in communication and sociology. Thier article investigates the role of anarchy… er, “anarchy”… in state securitization.
0003 The weird and confounded diagram that appears in the commentary on Graeber and Wengrow’s book looks like this.
Figure 01
The goal of this blog is to briefly review Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article and to demonstrate that a derivation of this figure maps onto the topic.
0004 What is this article about?
The full title is Schizorevolutions versus Microfascisms: The fear of anarchy in state securitisation. Needless to say, the terms are specialized descriptors. But of what?
0005 According to the above figure, academics may confound the state2b with sovereign acts and decrees2bC. The “state”2b is defined. What is defintion? Definition3 is the normal context bringing the actuality of a spoken word2 into relation with the potential of meaning, presence and message1.
The state2b‘ is a term arising from the presence of domination1b‘. But, domination2a must also be defined. The term, “domination”2a, emerges from (and situates) the possibilities inherent in the sole legitimate use of violence (similar to presence)1a’, the administration of information (like meaning)1a and the promotion and guidance of charismatic influence(like message)1a. I call policing, bureaucracy and maintaining reputation, “the three imperatives1a“. The three imperatives1a underlie domination2a.
0006 Here is a picture of the way that Graeber and Wengrow define “state”. This is the path of definition (P).
Figure 02
0007 The way of differentiation is developed in the chapter on presence in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues). Even though the differentiation of an originary, undifferentiated, social world follows the logic of Peirce’s categories, the process is also historic. Since the start of our current Lebenswelt, the societyC, organizationB and individuals in communityA have historically differentiated into three tiers of interscopes. As a result, realization of the two types of religion, corresponding to organizational objects2aC and a relational object2cC, follows the logic of the differentiation of category-based nested forms and occurs in history.
Here is a picture of the three-level interscope for the societyC tier. This is the path of differentiation (Q).
Figure 03
0008 Needless to say, neither Graeber and Wengrow nor Karatzogioanni and Robinson are aware of the the path of differentiation. So, they are not aware that they confound P and Q.
For example, in the introduction, the latter authors suggest that the securitisation discourse (the administration of information, P21a) by the state2b’ arises from the perception of “new threats” (charismatic influence outside of state supervision, P31a) and attempts to fix network flows (through violence, P11a). This also means that the normal context of sovereign power3bC brings the actuality of sovereign acts and decrees2bC into relation with the potential for ‘order’1bC. However, now sovereign power2bC is confounded with definition3b. The state2b is mixed up with sovereign acts and decrees2bC. Plus, ‘domination’1b is entangled with ‘order’1bC.
0009 Here is a picture of how the confounding seems to play out.
Figure 04
0010 Karatzogianni and Robinson immediately go on to say that their argument is based on a distinction between states and networks. Furthermore networks divide into two forms, such as affinity-active and non-affiliating-reactive, as well as between schizoid (non-affiliating active) and paranoic (non-affiliating reactive). Then, they discuss the ramifications in detail.
To me, the distinction between the state2b and its domination2a of organizational objectives2aC of insitutions3aCredefines3b institutions3aC as networks3a. Order1bC melds with efforts to control the content level1b. While “order” sounds legitimate. “Control” does not.
Order1bC establishes peace among instituions3aC working2aC independently based on their own righteousness1aC. Plus, that righteousness1aC does not pay tribute to the perspective level actuality2bC of fear.
Control1b envisions threats emanating from the open space of active desire1aC and aims to moderate these through domination2a (using P1, P2 and P3 of the three imperatives underlying the definition3a of domination2a). Consequently, attempts2b to supervise2b and narrow the space1b of righteousness1aC, sanction2b and outlaw2b objectsorg2aC, and wage war2b on institutions3aC that do not conform to state2b control1b expand into the fabric of everyday life.
0011 The state’s2b acts and decrees2bC are not oriented to protecting civilians or non-state actors. So, the normal context is not sovereignty3bC, but a defining power3b (responsible to a higher loyalty2cC, so to speak). Yet, this defining power3bspeaks the language of sovereignty3bC, just as Graeber and Wengrow do.
0012 But, who is doing the defining here?
Look at the perspective-level actuality2cC.
Fear2cC is not an emotion. Fear2cC is a demiurge, a relational object, an object that brings everyone into relation.
0013 At the end of the introduction, the authors list a number of dichotomies, including security and insecurity, schizorevolutionary and microfascist, autonomous desire and fear management, state insecurity and resistance movements. But, the existential dichotomy is not listed. Instead, the authors discuss the state in existential crisis.
The state2b (mis)perceives insecurity and disorder when the hustle, bustle and occasional squabbles among institutions3aCdoes not comport with the demiurge3cC that defines3b the state2b as emerging from the potential of ‘domination’1b. For the securitization state2b, that demiurge is fear3cC.
0014 When the state2b then responds to the perceived sources of insecurity, the state2b acts against institutions3aCpursuing their own organizational objectives2aC on the basis of their own righteousness1aC. The state2b defines some institutions3a as dangerous2b on the basis of promoting unsanctioned violence1a, spreading unsanctioned information1aand cultivating unsanctioned charismatic influence1a. The state2b will degrade these institutions3aC into networks.
What about the other institutions3aC?
Oh, they are not dangerous because they conform.
They are sanctioned.
0015 Consequently, the content level divides into conforming institutions and non-conforming networks.
Figure 05
0016 Even though conforming institutions3aC (such as education, healthcare, civic administration, industry, labor, and so on) retain their originating righteousnesses1aC, they adopt the three imperatives of domination, such as forced choice (violence, P1), restricted information (administration, P2) and reputation management (charisma, P3) according to state2bdecrees emerging from the possibility of ‘control’1b in a normal context3b defined by a higher loyalty2cC.
The situation… or is it the perspective?.. confuses.
Under the demiurge of fear2cC, certain institutions3aC may perceive themselves as operating under sovereign power3bC, but they are not. They are under suspicion by the state2b. They are networks3aC that are subject to domination2a because their righteousness1a cannot be put into perspective1c.
Why can’t institutions3aC defined as nonconforming be put into perspective?
0017 Unsupervised righteousness1a’ is not subject to the state control1c’.
As the authors say (more or less), “The state2c’ perceives chaos when the order of a network3a’ (that is, its ‘righteousness’1a’) is incompatible with the potential1c’ of the state2c’ (that is, ‘domination’ and ‘control’1c’).”
0018 How long has this been going on?
The authors speculate that the basic logic of dual power (the defining power3c’ humanizing conforming institutions3b’ and dehumanizing nonconforming networks3a’) goes back to the earliest states. As such, the state2c’ is a repressive, anti-productive force, that seeks to regulate, overdetermine, block and subjugate social relations3aC through domination1c’. It2c’ takes productive institutions3aC and turns them into organs of state production3b’, thus extending the reality of the state system. It2c’ takes productive institutions3aC and degrades them into networks3a’ through microfascist aggression, yielding distinctions such as schizoid (the state2c’ is an illusion) and paranoid (the state2c’ is out to get me and my network).
0019 What does this imply in terms of the content-level of institutions3aC splitting into two?
To me, it implies that the differentiated approach dissolves and a new interscope coaleses in the definition approach. Fear2cC, the perspective-level relational object, transcends this interscope. Hence, the resulting interscope is existential in the sense that situation-level state2b becomes a perspective-level actuality2c’ within an interscope conditioned by the demiurge of fear2cC. Then, conforming institutions3aC enter into the situation (or now, compliant) level of the new interscope. Plus, nonconforming networks3aC end up in the content (or anarchy) level of the new interscope.
0020 Here is a picture of the resulting interscope of fear2cC.
Figure 06
0021 Does this match Karatzogianni and Robinson’s argument?
Yes and no.
Yes, the interscope of fear2cC corresponds to the tenor of their argument in the section, “The State in Existential Crisis”.
No, the subsequent sections, “Anarchy and State Securitisation” and “State Terror Produces Network Terror”, deals with only the statec’ and the anarchya’ levels.
0022 I suppose, if the authors had the opportunity to tweak the interscope of fear2cC, then the interscope might look more like the following.
Figure 07
0023 The two levels of interest belong to content (Anarchy) and perspective (State). Both terms are misnomers.
The state is not the sovereign, because the normal context of sovereign power3bC is reconfigured by the perspective-level demiurge2cC of securitisation2cC (instead of the old-fashioned term, “fear”) into a defining power3c’. As such, the demiurge-defined power3c’ takes on all the characteristics of a perspectivec level. A perspective level is typically not questioned until something horrible goes wrong. A perspective level contextualizes the content level and the situation level in its own manners, giving state action2c’ the appearance of judgment2cA, necessity2cB and universal application2cC.
Anarchy is not complete disorder, because the normal context of institutions3aC is reconfigured into networks3a’ that have the character of institutions, including empowerment3caC, disciplinary power3baC and frame3aaC (as discussed in A Primer on How Institutions Think by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues). The authors refer to P. Virilio in this regard. The anarchy level is seen as a mess of badly-defined freedoms, spontaneous and contingent social relations, adding risk and uncertainty in an civilizational atmosphere of fear… er… securitisation.
Virilio uses the metaphor of war, because war involves tactics to deny communication among enemies, redefining the operational space of the adversary and seizing opportunities to rework perspectives. Applying the military metaphor to state action2c’, Virilio coins the word “endocolonialism”. If anything, this term should have given Karatzogianni and Robinson a hint that there is something more than State and Anarchy. Endocolonialism, the internalization of colonial power, opens the door to the ignored compliant level.
0024 So, how does the situational compliant level transform into a state-supporting implementation of control1c’?
The authors rely on a work by J. Scott, entitled Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1999, New Haven CT: Yale University Press). The lesson boils down to this: Control1c’ requires simplification. Simplification serves state functions2c’. When securitization2cC defines power3c’, simplification allows rapid risk assessment and “appropriate” responses2c’.
0025 However, simplification has consequences. Compliant-level institutions must adjust to state2c’ demands for control1c’ in regards to the three imperatives1b’, while maintaining a semblance of their original righteousness1b’. The problem? Implementing the three objectives (forced choices, limited information, and requiring, yet betraying, trust)1b’compromises the inspirations evoked by the original righteousness1b’ of the conforming institutions3b’.
0026 For example, when police detain a group of intoxicated young men celebrating the upcoming wedding of one of the fellows and write each one up as “exhibiting anti-social behavior”, the conforming institution3b’ of the police fulfills its sanctioned organizational objectives2b’ by filling in mandatory boxes1b’ and, at the same time, calling into question the righteousness of thier peace-keeping authority1b’.
Not all social facts fit into state-mandated boxes. State-mandated boxes may not apply to all circumstances. Plus, efforts to overcome the drawbacks of simplification may produce the illusion of increasing danger and need for intervention. So, the anarchy level adjusts to being situated by the ways that compliant-level institutions3b’ implement the three imperatives1b’ mandated by the state2c’.
The anarchy level may adjust by a variety of means. Networks3a’ may become more schizoid (that is, less responsive to fear) or more paranoid (that is, fear1a’ becomes focused on the realness and concreteness of the state2c’, rather than the ambiguous and atmospheric demiurge2cC that defines3c’ the state2c’). Indeed, all the young men tagged with anti-social behavior on that night belong to a variety of nonconforming networks3a’, sending a wave of concern through social arrangements refractive to the possibility of control1c’.
0027 In the section titled, “State Terror Produces Network Terror”, the authors explore implications for the state and anarchy levels, but not the compliant level. This distorts the conclusion, titled “Descecuritising Society”, because the authors’ proposed alternatives to the interscope of securitisation2cC only mitigate some of the thematic tensions between the state and the anarchy levels.
0028 This article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory (2017, vol 13(3), 282-295). So far, my examination describes how the weird confounded diagram developed in the commentary on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” is relevant to Karatzogianni and Robinson’s argument. This blog retells the story.
The weird diagram confounds two independent paths of articulation. The path of Graeber and Wengrow is the way of definition (P). After all, they are academics. Academics are devoted to defining their terms. The path of Razie Mah is the way of differentiation (Q). The differentiation of a nested form into the societyC, organizationB and individual in communityA tiers takes place in the chapter on presence in the masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.
Here is a picture of the situation and content levels of definition (P) confounded with the same levels of the societyC tier (Q).
Figure 08
0029 The above diagram does not include the perspectivec level of the societyC tier (Q). Karatzogianni and Robinson open by describing the securitisation state as exploiting and promoting an atmosphere of fear. Fear is the object that brings everyone into relation2cC.
Consequently, this confounding (P and Q) is put into perspective by a demiurge2cC, an entity standing above sovereign power, and this demiurge2cC defines the state2b.
Figure 09
0030 This configuration produces a split in the content level of defined3a institutions2aC.
Figure 10
Some institutions3b’ attempt to work with the state2b. These conforming institutions3b’ bring sanctioned organizational objects2b’ into relation with the potential1b’ of the three imperatives of domination1c’ as well as the institution’s original righteousness1b. This is useful for the state2c’, which relies on conforming institutions3b’ to situate institutions3a’ that (for whatever reason) cannot or will not conform.
Conforming institutions3b’ perform microfascist activities for the state2c’, increasing the possibility of state control1c’through forcing choices, limiting and misleading information, as well as protecting reputations. These activities are built into sanctioned organizational objectives2b’ that presumably emerge from (and situate) the potential of the institution’s original righteousness1b’. According to my reading this article, Karatzogianni and Robinson do not clearly ideate this side of the splitting.
Other institutions are downgraded (often, by state interference) into networks3a’. Nonconforming networks3a’ bring unsactioned organizational objectives2a’ into relation with the potential of ‘unsupervised righteousness’1a’. Conforming institutions3b’ are ofted viewed by the anarchy level as state apparatuses3b’ whose organizational objectives2b’ are compromised by the fact they follow the rules, even when not necessary, lie and cover up1b’.
0031 How do nonconforming networks3a’ respond?
Not as the state2c’ would like them do. The state2c’ now occupies the perspective level of an interscope that expresses the path of definition. Remember, the perspective level typically comes into play on;y when there is a failure on the situation level. In other words, the perspective level is taken for granted, until something goes wrong.
Here is the interscope of securitisation2cC.
Figure 11
0032 Once again, what about the response of noncomforming networks3a’ on the anarchy level?
Unsupervised righteousness1a’ inspires organization objectives2a’ that appear schizophrenic (they are listening to the voices in thier heads instead of the state) or paranoid (they think that the state is the one to fear, rather than the demiurge that defines the state). Consequently, the two actors of importance in Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article belong to the state and the anarchy levels.
0033 So, what is lacking in this article?
Situation-level institutionsb’ end up being drained of their original righteousness1b’ due to their compromise with the defining power3c’. Conforming institutions3b’ lose respectability by enforcing the three imperatives that underlie the word, “domination”1b’. Conforming institutions3b’ lose respectablity by sacrificing their original righteousness1b’ in the process of enforcing the three imperatives1b’. Yet, conforming institutions3b’ maintain respectablility by being the only ones whose organizational objectives2b’ are sanctioned by state decree2c’ and therefore less likely to suffer capricious state action2c’.
0034 It makes me wonder what the word, “respectable”, really means.
The sociological and psychological dynamics of the compliant level are ripe for exploration.
Coloration tells the story.
Figure 12
0035 So much for the political theory aspect of Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article, what about the “international” aspect?
After all, the article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory.
Well, in the introduction and the conclusion, the authors speculate that the security state may be a response to the anarchy generated by… or may be a strategy to control the wealth and innovations produced by… or may aim to wrest control from…
… global capitalism.
Which makes me wonder, “Could global capitalism be a demiurge, just like securitisation?”
If so, then Graeber and Wengrow’s weird confounding diagram is relevant.
And, the prior steps should apply to the following perspective-level nested form.
Figure 13
0036 The rest is left as an exercise for the intrepid inquirer.
0180 If David Graeber and David Wengrow’s recent book, subtitled, A New History of Humanity, is a breakthrough in postmodern anthropology, then it is so because it displays a semitic textual structure, instead of a greek textual structure.
These two styles are discussed in An Instructor’s Guide to An Archaeology of the Fall. Rather than eliminating possibilities in order to arrive at the most likely correct interpretation, these authors play literary tricks, coupling chapters one and twelve, A:A’, chapters two and eleven, B:B’, and chapters three through nine and chapter ten, C:C’.
Figure 24
0182 The semitic structure is A:B:C:C’:B’:A’. In Comments on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) The Dawn of Everything (by Razie Mah, available and smashwords and other e-book venues), the work is discussed in the pattern A:A’, B:B’ and C:C’. Notably, the bulk of the book covers the last layer, C:C’, and balances seven chapters (three through nine, C) against one chapter (ten, C’). Chapter ten is twice as long as any other chapter.
0183 Plus, chapter ten stands on its own, allowing me to place an examination in Razie Mah’s blog, with the title Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”. If the reader first encounters the blog, the commentary is available. If the reader first purchases the commentary, then the reader can call the blog to the attention of others.
0184 Chapter ten is the only chapter on theory in the entire book. The rest of the book concerns the inadequacy of current theory in archaeology and anthropology. The authors intuitively zero in on a problem. Neither science imagines that people have minds of their own. For example, modern histories do not admit that the so-called “Western Enlightenment” is influenced by reports coming from the Americas, including an indigenous critique of late-medieval and early-modern European civilization.
However, Graeber and Wengrow cannot pass into their promised land, because they have no models for appreciating or diagramming what is going on in people’s minds.
0185 Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913 U0′) has a model for speech-alone talk. Spoken language contains of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, consisting of parole (speech acts) and langue (mental acts). A model of langueshould provide a picture of what is going on in people’s minds. So, how can we model langue?
One answer is provided in Razie Mah’s first masterwork, The Human Niche, plus its companion work, Comments on Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky’s Book (2016) Why Only Us?. These are available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Langue may be modeled by diagrams of triadic relations.
In the ongoing commentary, two triadic relations are presented: the category-based nested form and judgment. If talk (parole) is related to a triadic relation (langue) then Saussure’s definition of language is satisfied. Plus, our innate sensibility that words are associated to the things that they referto is satisfied.
0186 Our innate sensibility that words refer to things and states of things arises in the milieu of hand talk. Here, the relation between parole and langue is not arbitrary, because langue (mentally) reproduces the icons and indexes of parole(well-executed manual-brachial gestures). This is the nature of natural signs.
Curiously, the word, “semiotics”, does not appear at all in Graeber and Wengrow’s weighty volume. Yet, the term is crucial to their claim that people have minds of their own. People have minds of their own because they are adapted to sign-processing.
0187 Fast forward through human evolution to the first singularity, dramatically portrayed in Razie Mah’s second masterwork, An Archaeology of the Fall. The first singularity consists in a cultural change. Hand-speech talking cultureslose the hand-component of their hand-speech talk, leaving them with speech-alone talk. The Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia is the first culture to practice speech-alone talk. The Sumerian language is a speech-alone creole, originating from two hand-speech languages. Speech-alone talk spreads from the Ubaid to the far corners of the world.
0188 The first singularity is a complex transition. There is great uncertainty about how it happens.
But, we can set down two markers with great certainty.
Before the Ubaid, in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, all cultures practice hand-speech talk.
In the present, 2023 U0′, in our current Lebenswelt, all civilizations practice speech-alone talk.
0189 Speech-alone talk does not picture or point to its referents. Instead, speech-alone talk projects meaning, presence and message into a purely symbolic label. This label belongs to parole. Parole consists of a system of differences. Langue is arbitrarily related to parole.
So, if we are to display… or imagine… or depict what people think, we may be begin with the proposition that those thoughts have the structure of triadic relations, such as the category-based nested form.
This is the proposition underlying Razie Mah’s third masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”. The propositionconcerns the nature of definition. The category-based diagram offers ways to picture the meaning, presence and message underlying the spoken word, “religion”.
0190 Here is a picture.
Figure 25
The normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of a spoken word2 into relation with the possibilities inherent in meaning, presence and message1.
0191 Such a diagram offers sites for explicit abstraction, without short-changing implicit abstraction. Standard dictionaries define spoken words with combinations of other spoken words, emphasizing the idea that words are placeholders in systems of differences (that is, “languages”). It does not evoke the idea that a spoken word (parole) is arbitrarily related to what people think (langue). In contrast, the category-based nested form for how to define a spoken word conveys what standard dictionaries cannot tell.
0192 Graeber and Wengrow begin their wide-ranging discussions concerning everything anthropological with a question on the origins of social inequality. In chapter ten, they implicate the state. But, they face a problem. Can the stateaccount for the origins of social inequality if there are no origins to the state?
0193 The spoken word, “state”, is the topic of chapter ten of Graeber and Wengrow’s book.
So is the spoken word, “domination”.
Here is a diagram of what these authors may be thinking.
Figure 26
The “state” is a placeholder in a system of differences for speech. Since the spoken word cannot picture or point to anything, as would be expected for hand talk, then we project meaning, presence and message into the langue that is arbitrarily related to this speech act. Graeber and Wengrow explicitly abstract the term, “domination”, as a label for (what I suspect is) the presence or the message underlying the term. The state2 emerges from (and situates) the potential of domination1.
0194 The masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”, offers another option.
The option arises while trying to elucidate the presence1 underlying the word, “religion”2. Religion includes institutions. These institutions are different from sovereign power. How so? Righteousness1a is the potential underlying institutions3a. Order1b is the potential underlying sovereign power3b. Order1b belongs to the situation-level of an interscope. Righteousness1a belongs to the content-level.
On the situation level, sovereign power3b is the normal context where sovereign acts and decrees2b emerge from (and situate) the possibilities inherent in order1b. Sovereign power3b virtually situates institutions3a.
What we call the “state”2b should correspond to the actuality2b of sovereign power3b contextualizing the potential for order1b.
Figure 27
0195 According to Graeber and Wengrow, the term, “state”, appears in the French lexicon in the late 1500s, about a century after Christopher Columbus’s voyage of 1492 U0′. In the late 1800s, a German philosopher defines the “state” as an institution, within a given territory, claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force.
This implies that the term, “state”, labels something more than the actuality of sovereign acts and decrees2b.
0196 Why does the state2b require a monopoly on coercive force?
How else can it enforce order1b?
0197 Does the above figure offer a definition of state2b that is familiar to modern social scientists?
No and yes.
No, this diagram of the “state” as an actuality2 located within a normal context3 and situating a potential1 is innovative. It belongs to the first comprehensive picture in anthropology composed of triadic relations. The diagram relies on the differentiation of nested forms. The first differentiation yields a nested form composed of three terms: society3, organization2 and individual in community1. Second, each of these terms differentiates into a nested form. Third, each element in each nested form differentiates, resulting in a three-level interscope. The result is three tiers of interscopes, corresponding to societyC, organizationB and individual in communityA.
0198 The first two levels of the societyC tier correspond to content-level institutions3a and situation-level sovereign power3b.
Figure 28
Graeber and Wengrow do not know this diagram. Yet, they write as if they do. Social complexityC arises as diverse institutions3aC pursue their organizational objectives2aC, based on a righteousness1aC that interpellates individuals in communityA. In our current Lebenswelt, righteousness1aC calls individuals in communityA into organizationB.
The need for order1bC may arise when institutions compete with one another and come into conflict.
I suppose that may occur when institutions find something to fight over.
