0090 Can I say that again?

Saad comes to awareness of an organization objective_2aC, that contains social construction_3a and celebrates radical individualism_1a.

Consumer research journals in the 1990s are already postmodern.  Their authors are already located in universities and research centers that are supported by grants from the federal government.  The journals promote the concept of social construction_3a(2aC) as the legitimate normal context for consumer research.  All other approaches are irrelevant.

0091 Professor Saad’s dedicates his academic career to showing that evolutionary psychology offers another relevant approach.  For this, he witnesses other professors display outrage.  Saad shows them what they are not supposed to see.

In chapter seven, Saad expresses confidence that the methodology inherent in nomological evidence₁ will demonstrate that social constructivism_3a(2aC) is bunk.

In doing so, raises a question about consumer behavior.

What is consumer behavior?

0092 Saad’s answer is that consumer behavior works according to (once) content-level orthodox views.

But, now, “right doctrine_3a” applies to questions such as, “What is the best way to purchase an automobile?”

0092 Here is a picture of Saad’s vision of consumer research, which stands opposed to the ideology of social constructionism_3a(2aC).

0093 In chapter eight, Saad issues a call to action.

Students should turn away from the following postmodern paradigm in consumer research.

0094 Okay, Saad’s call to action is far broader than that.

Why?

I already know that the ideology of social constuctionism_3b wants to take over the content level, the subject of inquiry, and replace it_3a with… itself_3b.

Saad is on target.

From the start, social constructivism_3b is not a legitimate science, because it produces its situation-level actuality_2b on the basis of an ideological commitment_1b.

Then, once it takes over the content level, social constructivism_3a expresses a philosophical commitment to radical individualism_1a.  Radical individualism is not a rational philosophy.  It extols human will.  It neglects human reason.

0095 These comments on Saad’s book raise additional reasons.

Social constructivism_3a(2aC) becomes an organizational objective_2aC that calls individuals in community_A to join organizations_B that fulfill a need in our current Lebenswelt_1aC.  But, that “need” may not be in the adaptive interests of the individual in community_A.  Rather, the “need” may serve the righteousness_1aC of a postmodern corporation_3aC.

Social construction_3a(2aC) is the content-level of a larger organizational objective_2aC, which encompasses a three-level interscope.  This larger organizational objective_2aC calls for sovereign power in order to sustain its institutions_3aC and to promote and enforce its righteousness_1aC.  In short, the College of Social Construction may be defined as a sovereign religion.

0096 In the last blog, the reader may have noticed a subtle shift in the representation of the potential of the content-level in the quest for a right doctrine_3a for inquiry into consumer behaviors_2a. 

Recall, evolutionary psychology is the situation level for Dr. Saad.  Social construction is the situation level for postmodern academics conducting research on consumer behaviors (but really, it serves as the content level of postmodern inquiry into the human will to consume_1a.)

0097 Here is a comparison of the content levels for the two situations.

Ah, the potentials are obviously different.

0098 Evolutionary psychology_3b strives to account for observations of modern consumer behaviors_2a in terms of scientific models_2b, presuming that human behaviors are influenced by adaptations to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in_1a.

0099 Social construction_3b strives to account for… well… not account for… but to establish that needs in our current Lebenswelt_1a, underlying consumer behaviors_2a, are fulfilled by the exercise of human will_1b.  All other accounts are irrelevant.  Each purchase is a personal choice_2b.

0100 Hmmm.  Say again.  What is the difference?

Evolutionary psychology_3b interprets evidence in cognitive psychology_1b in terms of adaptations in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in_1a.

Social construction_3a interprets all human behaviors, in our current Lebenswelt_2a, as exercises of human will_1b.

0101 What does this imply?

Our current Lebenswelt is not the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0102 This is one insight that may prove of value to scientists and modern philosophers.

The Lebenswelt that we evolved in cannot be declared irrelevant, even while admitting the primacy of human will in our current Lebenswelt, the key potential of social constructionism, with its commitment to radical individualism.

0103 How so?

0104 Consider Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big, an e-book by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

For the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, Dunbar’s headline claim is that the neocortex size is roughly proportional to group size.  The neocortex size for anatomically modern humans corresponds to a group size of 150.  Yet, the book by Gamble, Gowlett and Dunbar say more than the headline.  Hominins live in social circles within that community size of 150.  Indeed, an evolutionary psychologist would expect that cultural adaptations within each social circle would increase the reproductive success of participating individuals.  Since social circles are like nested Russian dolls, evolutionary psychologists further anticipate adaptations that increase the harmony among social circles.

0105 For our current Lebenswelt, civilization may be initially described as historic differentiations leading to the following category-based nested form: The normal context of society_C brings the actuality of organizations_B into relation with the potential of individuals in community_A.

0106 Here is a picture of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in compared to our current Lebenswelt.

0107 For evolutionary psychology, orthodox views_3a are going to be influenced by hominin adaptations into social circles of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, even though, in our current Lebenswelt, a differentiated dynamic is in play.  Indeed, social construction_(3a)2aC, along with critical theory_(3b)2aC and social justice_(3c)2ab, constitute an organizational objective_2aC in the society_C tier that interpellates individuals in community_A to enter organizations_B, either willingly (by voluntarily identifying onself as “oppressed”_(2b)2aC) or unwillingly (by involuntarily being assigned the label of “oppressor”_(2b)2aC).

0108 Professor Saad does not touch on the above, because this discussion extends beyond his expertise in evolutionary psychology pertinent to consumer behaviors.

These comments add value to Dr. Saad’s argument by explicitly posing how social construction_(3a)2aC (which applies to our current Lebenswelt) cannot fully exclude evolutionary psychology_3b (which applies lessons about the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt).

0109 What if human will in our current Lebenswelt is influenced by innate tendencies that are adaptations to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

Then, social constructivism_3a should not ignore that reality (rather than displace that reality beneath its own occupation of the content level of inquiry).

Then, critical theory_3b cannot situate the actuality of identity as personal choice_2a according to the potential of a system_1bunderlying a manichaean division between “oppressed”_2b and “oppressor”_2b.

Also, social justice_(3c)2aC cannot properly contextualize the division between “oppressed”_(2b)2aC and “oppressor”_(2b)2aC with the potential of protection_(1c)2aC, because the demand for protection_(1c)2aC  may itself be an innate adaptive response to the existence of a system_(1b)2aC that pretends to be an evolved social circle.

0013 At the end of the introduction, the authors list a number of dichotomies, including security and insecurity, schizorevolutionary and microfascist, autonomous desire and fear management, state insecurity and resistance movements.  But, the existential dichotomy is not listed.  Instead, the authors discuss the state in existential crisis.

The state_2b (mis)perceives insecurity and disorder when the hustle, bustle and occasional squabbles among institutions_3aCdoes not comport with the demiurge_3cC that defines_3b the state_2b as emerging from the potential of ‘domination’_1b.  For the securitization state_2b, that demiurge is fear_3cC.

0014 When the state_2b then responds to the perceived sources of insecurity, the state_2b acts against institutions_3aCpursuing their own organizational objectives_2aC on the basis of their own righteousness_1aC.  The state_2b defines some institutions_3a as dangerous_2b on the basis of promoting unsanctioned violence_1a, spreading unsanctioned information_1aand cultivating unsanctioned charismatic influence_1a.  The state2b will degrade these institutions_3aC into networks.

What about the other institutions_3aC?

Oh, they are not dangerous because they conform.

They are sanctioned.

0015 Consequently, the content level divides into conforming institutions and non-conforming networks.

0016 Even though conforming institutions_3aC (such as education, healthcare, civic administration, industry, labor, and so on) retain their originating righteousnesses_1aC, they adopt the three imperatives of domination, such as forced choice (violence, P1), restricted information (administration, P2) and reputation management (charisma, P3) according to state_2bdecrees emerging from the possibility of ‘control’_1b in a normal context_3b defined by a higher loyalty_2cC.

The situation… or is it the perspective?.. confuses.

Under the demiurge of fear_2cC, certain institutions_3aC may perceive themselves as operating under sovereign power_3bC, but they are not.  They are under suspicion by the state_2b.  They are networks_3aC that are subject to domination_2a because their righteousness_1a cannot be put into perspective_1c.

Why can’t institutions_3aC defined as nonconforming be put into perspective?

0017 Unsupervised righteousness_1a’ is not subject to the state control_1c’.

As the authors say (more or less), “The state_2c’ perceives chaos when the order of a network_3a’ (that is, its ‘righteousness’_1a’) is incompatible with the potential_1c’ of the state_2c’ (that is, ‘domination’ and ‘control’_1c’).”

0018 How long has this been going on?

The authors speculate that the basic logic of dual power (the defining power_3c’ humanizing conforming institutions_3b’ and dehumanizing nonconforming networks_3a’) goes back to the earliest states.  As such, the state_2c’ is a repressive, anti-productive force, that seeks to regulate, overdetermine, block and subjugate social relations_3aC through domination_1c’.  It_2c’ takes productive institutions_3aC and turns them into organs of state production_3b’, thus extending the reality of the state system.  It_2c’ takes productive institutions_3aC and degrades them into networks_3a’ through microfascist aggression, yielding distinctions such as schizoid (the state_2c’ is an illusion) and paranoid (the state_2c’ is out to get me and my network).

0019 What does this imply in terms of the content-level of institutions_3aC splitting into two?

 To me, it implies that the differentiated approach dissolves and a new interscope coaleses in the definition approach.  Fear_2cC, the perspective-level relational object, transcends this interscope.  Hence, the resulting interscope is existential in the sense that situation-level state_2b becomes a perspective-level actuality_2c’ within an interscope conditioned by the demiurge of fear_2cC.  Then, conforming institutions_3aC enter into the situation (or now, compliant) level of the new interscope.  Plus, nonconforming networks_3aC end up in the content (or anarchy) level of the new interscope.

0020 Here is a picture of the resulting interscope of fear_2cC.

0021 Does this match Karatzogianni and Robinson’s argument?

Yes and no.

Yes, the interscope of fear_2cC corresponds to the tenor of their argument in the section, “The State in Existential Crisis”.

No, the subsequent sections, “Anarchy and State Securitisation” and “State Terror Produces Network Terror”, deals with only the state_c’ and the anarchy_a’ levels.

0022 I suppose, if the authors had the opportunity to tweak the interscope of fear_2cC, then the interscope might look more like the following.

0023 The two levels of interest belong to content (Anarchy) and perspective (State).  Both terms are misnomers.  

The state is not the sovereign, because the normal context of sovereign power_3bC is reconfigured by the perspective-level demiurge_2cC of securitisation_2cC (instead of the old-fashioned term, “fear”) into a defining power_3c’.  As such, the demiurge-defined power_3c’ takes on all the characteristics of a perspective_c level.  A perspective level is typically not questioned until something horrible goes wrong.  A perspective level contextualizes the content level and the situation level in its own manners, giving state action_2c’ the appearance of judgment_2cA, necessity_2cB and universal application_2cC.

Anarchy is not complete disorder, because the normal context of institutions_3aC is reconfigured into networks_3a’ that have the character of institutions, including empowerment_3caC, disciplinary power_3baC and frame_3aaC (as discussed in A Primer on How Institutions Think by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  The authors refer to P. Virilio in this regard.  The anarchy level is seen as a mess of badly-defined freedoms, spontaneous and contingent social relations, adding risk and uncertainty in an civilizational atmosphere of fear… er… securitisation.

Virilio uses the metaphor of war, because war involves tactics to deny communication among enemies, redefining the operational space of the adversary and seizing opportunities to rework perspectives.  Applying the military metaphor to state action_2c’, Virilio coins the word “endocolonialism”.  If anything, this term should have given Karatzogianni and Robinson a hint that there is something more than State and Anarchy.  Endocolonialism, the internalization of colonial power, opens the door to the ignored compliant level.

0024 So, how does the situational compliant level transform into a state-supporting implementation of control_1c’?

The authors rely on a work by J. Scott, entitled Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1999, New Haven CT: Yale University Press).  The lesson boils down to this: Control_1c’ requires simplification.  Simplification serves state functions_2c’.  When securitization_2cC defines power_3c’, simplification allows rapid risk assessment and “appropriate” responses_2c’.

0025 However, simplification has consequences.  Compliant-level institutions must adjust to state_2c’ demands for control_1c’ in regards to the three imperatives_1b’, while maintaining a semblance of their original righteousness_1b’.  The problem?  Implementing the three objectives (forced choices, limited information, and requiring, yet betraying, trust)_1b’compromises the inspirations evoked by the original righteousness_1b’ of the conforming institutions_3b’.

0026 For example, when police detain a group of intoxicated young men celebrating the upcoming wedding of one of the fellows and write each one up as “exhibiting anti-social behavior”, the conforming institution_3b’ of the police fulfills its sanctioned organizational objectives_2b’ by filling in mandatory boxes_1b’ and, at the same time, calling into question the righteousness of thier peace-keeping authority_1b’.

Not all social facts fit into state-mandated boxes.  State-mandated boxes may not apply to all circumstances.  Plus, efforts to overcome the drawbacks of simplification may produce the illusion of increasing danger and need for intervention.  So, the anarchy level adjusts to being situated by the ways that compliant-level institutions_3b’  implement the three imperatives_1b’ mandated by the state_2c’.

The anarchy level may adjust by a variety of means.  Networks_3a’ may become more schizoid (that is, less responsive to fear) or more paranoid (that is, fear_1a’ becomes focused on the realness and concreteness of the state_2c’, rather than the ambiguous and atmospheric demiurge_2cC that defines_3c’ the state_2c’).  Indeed, all the young men tagged with anti-social behavior on that night belong to a variety of nonconforming networks_3a’, sending a wave of concern through social arrangements refractive to the possibility of control_1c’.

0027 In the section titled, “State Terror Produces Network Terror”, the authors explore implications for the state and anarchy levels, but not the compliant level.  This distorts the conclusion, titled “Descecuritising Society”, because the authors’ proposed alternatives to the interscope of securitisation_2cC only mitigate some of the thematic tensions between the state and the anarchy levels.