10/6/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 18 of 22)

0136 Does the falseness of common and scholastic opinions_2c (SV) stand for what ought to be_2a (SO), according to the Positivist’s judgment, in regards to relation_3a and what is_1a for the Positivist’s judgment (SV)?

0137 Once again, here is the category-based nested form version of the Positivist’s judgement, which is first described in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy.

0138 The sign-interpretant of the Cartesian interventional sign serves as an invitation for scientists to try to cast their systematic observations and measurements of phenomena as mathematical or mechanical models according to their disciplinary language.

0139 Of course, this leaves the common folk and the scholastics hanging.

What about their experiences and opinions?

Are they all to be replaced by empirio-schematic actualities?

Are we doomed to the fallacy that the external world, full of things themselves, reduces to its systematically observable and measurable facets (even though what is of the Positivist’s judgment says that a noumenon cannot be reduced to its phenomena)?

Can everything be modeled by science?

Deely confronts this issue in chapter ten.

0140 Where do moderns go wrong?

Here are my answers.

0141 Well, first of all, even though the Latin scholastics eventually discover the nature of signs, their conclusions are tossed into the waste-bin of modern philosophical history. Fortunately for John Deely, no one bothered to throw out the trash. John Poinsot’s writings survive.

0142 Second of all, common folk rely on their intuition. I call this intuition, “implicit abstraction”. Human capacities for implicit abstraction are honed by adaptations to the niche of the potential of triadic relations. This claim is the topic of one of Razie Mah’s masterworks, The Human Niche, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0143 Third, according to the scholastics, the sign-relation couples the world of subjects, corresponding to the ‘world out there’, with the world of objects, corresponding to the ‘world in here’. Furthermore, the sign-relation entangles material and instrumental causation. But, the sign-relation does not reduce to material and instrumental causalities that can be mathematically and mechanically modeled.

0144 Fourth, sign-objects do not reduce to things, nor to the things that give rise to them, nor to the thoughts that tell us what they are… um… supposed to be. On top of that, the sign-object for one sign can become a sign-vehicle for a subsequent sign, just as the sign-interpretant can. Plus, if that isn’t enough… did you see that salamander jump out of that fire?

Surely, failure to reduce opens one’s cognitive spaces to… oh look! There’s another one!

What interest does science have in such nonsense?

0145 Fifth, material and instrumental causalities are dyadic in nature and therefore can be modeled based on systematic observations and measurements under experimentally controlled conditions. Material causalities start to get fuzzy under uncontrolled conditions. Formal and final causalities cannot be modeled because measurements, even when they are made by experiments and surveys, tend to be specific to the ruses that permit such experiments and surveys to be conducted. Psychological experiments do not inform the subject about the formal topic of investigation. Surveys cannot directly ask about intentionality.

What does the fifth imply?

Formal and final causalities characterize the noumenon.

0146 Sixth, according to modern scientists, the noumenon must be avoided at all costs.

10/5/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 19 of 22)

0147 According to Aristotle, humans are political animals.

According to Porphyry, humans are rational animals.

According to Descartes, humans are thinking things (in Latin, res cogitans).

According to John Deely, humans are semiotic animals.

0148 Even though the previous blog mangled chapter ten of Deely’s book, a few crucial points may be salvaged from the wreckage.

0149 First, the specifying sign offers a paradigm for the sign-relation. In this sign, the proximate and remote fundaments are clearly apparent (as SV-SO and SI, respectively). So are ens reale (characterizing SV) and ens rationis (characterizing SO).

Second, the specifying sign operates even when the content-level normal context_3a and potential_1a are not apparent. The specifying sign operates on a content-level actuality_2a irrespective of whether one is prepared for the occasion.

Here is a picture.

0150 Second, specifying signs offer a way to appreciate an unnoticed activation of exemplar then interventional signs. The specifying sign seems to produce a flowback, where the situation-level actuality (the sign-object of the specifying sign) seems to serve as a sign-vehicle for a sign that introduces any missing content-level understanding.

In the following figure, the example of the salamander’s birth_2b offers a way to appreciate a flow, from the specifying sign, back into the content-level normal context_3a and potential_1a corresponding to a salamander scampering out of steaming wet log, just thrown onto a campfire_2a.

Aristotle’s foundational hylomorphe is matter [substantiates] form. For the situation-level phantasm_2b, fire serves as matter and salamander serves as form.

Note how Aristotle’s view concerning natural philosophy, operating on the perspective-level, manifests as the normal context_3a and potential_1a that makes the salamander’s appearance_2a less surprising.

Should I call this “flowback”? Or should I call it an activation of exemplar and interventional sign-relations? Both paths complete the content-level nested form. Signs support the further production of signs, giving me the impression of an unhinged and fantastic uncontrolled experiment.

0151 Third, Descartes rejects the realness of the objective world and alchemically distills humans into res cogitans.

So much for that wild and unscientific uncontrolled experiment.

0152 In terms of Deely’s formulation of the objective world, Descartes’ claim turns into the following.

0153 Is that crazier than the idea that we are living in a fantastic and uncontrolled objective world?

0154 And what are the consequences?

Scientists do not believe that the Positivist’s judgment belongs to Deely’s objective world.

Therefore, science cannot be situated.

10/4/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 20 of 22)

0155 What does it mean to say that science cannot be situated.

Here is a picture of the practice of natural science.

0156 The normal context of a positivist intellect_3a brings the actuality of the empirio-schematic judgment_2a into relation with the potential of … phenomena_1a.

Does this suggest that the noumenon can be safely ignored?

0157 The positivist intellect_3a has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed. Only instrumental and material causation may be discussed.

0158 The empirio-schematic judgment_2a has three elements: relation, what ought to be and what is. Each of these is assigned to one of Peirce’s three categories.

A specific disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be,secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness).

0159 The potential of … phenomena_1a is really the potential of the dyad, a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena_1a. From the point of view of the positivist intellect, observations and measurements concern phenomena, the observable and measurable facets of their noumenon, the thing itself. So, why worry about the noumenon?

The noumenon is there because philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant, says that it must be there. Philosophy cannot ignore the thing itself_1a anymore than the positivist intellect_1a cannot ignore its observable and measurable facets_1a.

0160 What does that mean in terms of the two-level interscope?

Phenomena_1a are potentials that are directly situated by observations and measurements_2a in the normal context of the positivist intellect_3a.

Their noumenon_1a is virtually situated by a potential₁ belonging a category-based nested form on the situation_b level.

Yes, the situation-level potential_1b virtually situates the noumenon_1a, just as the content-level actuality_2a directly situates its phenomena_1a.

0161 The practices of the natural sciences compose the content-level. If scientists have their way, their work focuses on instrumental and material causalities and ignores the objective world. Natural scientists are only interested in empirio-schematic inquiry into their subject matter. They are not interested in what it signifies.

Yet, some clever philosophers, responding to the birth and growth of science in the West, place a caveat that practicing natural scientists pragmatically ignore. But, no one else can ignore the noumenon_1a, because it is a gateway to the objective world, the intersubjective world, and the commerce of intellectuals who try to figure out what the thing itself means and what it can be used for.

0162 And, if Deely is correct, our objective world is real, even though it is filled with illusions, delusions, truths and revelations.

Why?

Triadic relations are real.

0163 As for the remainder of the situation-level nested form, consider the series of commentaries and articles titled, Phenomenology and the Positivist Intellect, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

10/3/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 21 of 22)

0164 In chapter twelve, Deely suggests that the new definition of the human being (as a semiotic animal) is beyond patriarchy and feminism.

Well, it is beyond social constructivism, critical theory and social justice, as well.

See Looking at Gad Saad’s Book (2020) “Parasitic Minds” in Razie Mah’s blog for April 2023.

So, this examination of Deely’s book suggests that Deely’s formulation accounts for the notions of patriarchy and feminism.

Why?

Because “patriarchy” and “feminism” participate in the objective world of an ideological constellation, called Big Government (il)Liberalism.

0165 A student recently complained to me, “Every feminist I meet sees only what she wants to see.”

But, the opposite is the case.

As far as he is concerned, a feminist only sees what she does not want to see.

0166 Consider the perspective level of feminist indoctrination. The category-based nested form says (more or less), “The normal context of social justice_3c brings the disciplinary language of feminism_2c, which virtually contextualizes the analysis of critical theory_2b and the results of social constructivism_2a, into relation with the potential of ‘equity’_1c“.

0167 The disciplinary language of feminism_2c is the sign-object of an exemplar sign.

It_2c is also the sign-vehicle for an interventional sign.

0168 Here is a picture of that interventional sign.

This interventional sign shows that the student’s intuition is on target, but, as noted, the target is the opposite of what the student’s intuition says.

The sign-object of the interventional sign is empty_2a, because the feminist is waiting, like a spider with its web, for someone to volunteer to serve as the content-level actuality_2a that her normal context_3a and potential_1a are waiting for.

Her interventional sign-vehicle cannot be sensed by the approaching male college student. That does not mean it_2c is not there. It is just not part of the objective world of the naive male college student.

0169 Well, the male also has a perspective-level nested form, which is not so explicitly honed, but is more implicitly abstracted. The normal context of college_3c brings the actuality of getting a degree and of networking_2c into relation with the potential of ‘getting along and getting ahead’_1c.

Consequently, his interventional sign is more like an invitation for interaction, like a raven landing nearby in hopes that someone will toss it a treat.

0170 As soon as the male student says hello, the feminist identifies him as a bigot.

She then gives him a clue as about her formal approach and final intentions.

What does he hear?

0171 Talk about objective worlds in collision!

The indoctrinated person who is trained in explicit abstractions will always win in a spontaneous encounter with a person guided by implicit abstractions.

But, the male student reflects about his encounter, leading him to come up with his explicit abstraction, that the feminist sees what she wants to see.

The irony is that she does not want to meet a bigot, she wants to meet someone who satisfies her academically trained expectations.

10/2/23

Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Part 22 of 22)

0172 Deely concludes with a sequel concerning the need to develop a semioethics.

The meeting of the two semiotic animals in the previous blog is a case study.

Surely, that brief clash of objective worlds entails ethics, however one defines the word, “ethics”.

Perhaps, the old word for “ethics” is “morality”.

0173 Deely publishes in 2010.

Thirteen years later, his postmodern definition of the human takes on new life. This examination shows how far semiotics has traveled, swirling around the stasis of a Plutonic publishing world where Cerebus guards the gates. Please throw a sop to the editors in order to publish, rather than perish. While academics guard the way to the underworld of professional success, Deely looks down from the heavens above.

And what does he say?

Humans are semiotic animals.

0174 Okay, I have to correct myself.

I don’t know whether Deely is looking down from a heavenly perch.

Surely, many will sheepishly testify to his devilish, as well as his angelic, qualities.

As a shepherd, he is always trying to lead his rag-tag flock of semioticians, explorers and Thomists. He gets so far as to impress upon every one in his flock the validity of his claim that humans are semiotic animals.

0175 Razie Mah takes that lesson to heart and asks, “If humans are semiotic animals, then how did they evolve?”

The resulting three masterworks are available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

An Archaeology of the Fall appears in 2012, followed by an instructor’s guide.

How to Define the Word “Religion” appears in 2015, followed by ten primers.

The Human Niche appears in 2018, along with four commentaries.

As it turns out, no contemporary scientist takes Deely’s claim seriously. Yet, the implications are enormous. If humans are semiotic animals, then triadic relations must be key to understanding human evolution.

0176 This examination of Deely’s book takes that lesson one step further.

The specifying and exemplar signs step out from Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings as expressions of premodern scholastic insight.

The interventional sign steps out from Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols” and establishes a postmodern life of its own.

0177 Humans are semiotic animals and how we got here shines like a revelation.

09/29/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 1 of 18)

0028 This is the second blog in a series.

Looking at Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “Intersection” appears in Razie Mah’s blog from May 15 through 18, 2023. In that brief examination (points 0001-0027), a technical category-based definition of the term, “intersection” is shown to mesh with the theme of Kemple’s book, whose full title is The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).

To me, that is fascinating.

0029 In this series of blogs, I examine Kemple’s appendices.

Yes, he has more than one appendix.

Plus, there are subdivisions.

0030 Appendix 1.1 is titled, “Presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence”. My associations will draw upon A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, as well as A Primer on Natural Signs, Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, and Comments on Newell Sasha’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”. These primers and comments touch base with Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion”, which is available, along with the other mentioned e-works, at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0031 The title of Appendix 1.1 contains two technical terms.

“Presentative forms” is a term coined by Jacques Maritain and literally means a form that is substantiated by its presentation, rather than by matter. The hylomorphe is presentation [substantiates] form, rather than matter [substantiates] form.

“The grounding of transcendence” is a phrase used by Martin Heidegger. It conveys what the presentative form accomplishes. The presentative form accomplishes more than matter-substantiated form, because it leads to (grounds) another form, which is located at a higher categorical level (transcendence).

0032 Surely, this implies that presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence coincide in a particular way. The “matter” of the presentative form associates to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”.

Is this is a general feature of presentative forms?

Well, the claim is a good working hypothesis.

09/28/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 2 of 18)

0033 So why are presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence important?

It seems that they govern the ways in which the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness appear. The process is not straightforward. After all, if one category associates with what is expressed and the adjacent higher category goes with what is experienced (with the caveat that thirdness in what is presented wraps around to firstness in form), then each presentative form expresses two categories.

Oh yeah, that makes sense.

0034 But, it does not make sense.

Kemple quotes from Peirce’s 1903 essay, “Sundry Logical Conceptions”, concerning the modes of appearance for the categories of experience. In the following table, nine presentative forms are listed. Vertical columns correspond to the category of experience for the presentative form. The rows correspond to expression according to category.

The columns denote forms and the rows denote appearance (presentation).

0035 For example, consider the form of firstness (first column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to an idea of secondness. Here, I depict it as ‘something’ in the realm of actuality. An idea pertains to ‘something’ actual.

Here is another example from the above table. The form of secondness (second column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to the fact of relations. To me, these relations are hylomorphic, consisting of two contiguous real elements, characterizing Peirce’s category of secondness. A thing is a fact of (hylomorphic) relation.

One more example will help. The form of thirdness (third column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to signs of secondness. Actions are signs of secondness. So are modes of conduct.

0036 Each element in the above table embodies a form in one category and an appearance in another category. So, two categories are involved for each item in the table. Plus, the matrix is exhaustive.

0037 What about the idea that transcendence is grounded in crossing categories?

My head swims. But, it’s not Kemple’s fault. It is the idea that the presentative form has a hylomorphic structure and that the element that corresponds to “matter” belongs to one category and the element that corresponds to “form” belongs to the adjacent higher category.

This idea is not apparent in Peirce’s table, pictured above.

Kemple continues…

0038 Going down the first column, forms in firstness may be labeled as “ideas”. So, the element in the first row and the first column, is an idea of possibility (or, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility). Likewise, ‘something’ in the realm of actuality corresponds to the idea of secondness. ‘Something’ in the realm of normal context goes with the idea of thirdness.

Going down the second column, forms in secondness may be labeled as “facts”. So, qualia are facts of firstness. Relations in the style of hylomorphes are facts of secondness. Signs and other triadic relations are facts of thirdness.

Going down the third column, forms in thirdness may be labeled as “signs”. Feelings, such as awareness of a thing of beauty, are signs of firstness. Actions, such as modes of conduct, are signs of secondness. Thoughts are signs of thirdness.

0039 Still, I have a problem.

Even though each element in the above table references two categories. The rows and columns do not highlight the hypothesis about transcendence developed in the previous blog, where the “matter” of a presentative form belongs to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”.

Is there a ghost of a chance that Heidegger’s ground of transcendence haunts Perice’s table of presentative forms.

0040 Perhaps, I can conjure its specter by coloring a sequence of presentative forms, following the proposed hypothesis.

For each transition, from idea to fact, from fact to sign, and from sign to idea, there is a corresponding transition from firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.

The result is a seqence of novel presentative forms that are composed of elements of the table. The lower category presentative form for both appearance (row) and form (column) serves as “matter”… er, I mean “presence”… and the higher-category presentative form in both appearance (row) and category (column) serves as “form”.

0041 In the following diagram, sequences appear in color.

0042 The hylomorphic structure, lower-category presence [substantiates] higher-category form, embodies transcendence, defined as moving from one category to the adjacent higher category in both form and appearance. So, ways to imagine the coincidence of presentative forms and grounds of transcendence track the colors in the table above.

09/27/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 3 of 18)

0043 Okay, allow me to explore the most obvious diagonal.

0044 Consider ‘something’ in the realm of possibility [substantiates] the form of a hylomorphic relation. According to the hypothesis on grounding transcendence, the novel presentative form is ‘something’ possible [substantiates] a thing. An idea in firstness causes (or is contiguous with) the facts of a cause-and-effect relation. Element (column 1, row 1) substantiates element (column 2, row 2).

0045 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Moglichkeit (translated into English as “possibility”)?

Yes, Moglichkeit applies when ‘something’ in the realm of possibility serves as grounds for a cause-and-effect fact.

‘Something’ presents itself as a thing.

Okay, that sounds plausible.

0046 Let me consider the next novel presentative form.

Consider hylomorphic relations [substantiate] thoughts. A fact of secondness grounds a sign of thirdness. The thing is like matter. The thought is like form. Element (column 2, row 2) substantiates element (column 3, row 3).

Facts of secondness [substantiate] signs of thirdness. Things [substantiate] thoughts.

0047 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Ausweisen (previously rendered as “account” and now translated by Kemple into “pointing out”)?

A thing has significance.

Okay, here are two successes in a row. But, the trend is making me nervous.

The form of the first movement, presents itself as a fact and that presentation substantiates a sign in the realm of thirdness,corresponding to a thought.

I am afraid that this trend will end up as a tortuous run-on sentence.

0048 One more step.

Consider thoughts [substantiate] ‘something’ in the realm of possibility. A sign of thirdness grounds an idea of firstness. Thoughts are like matter. ‘Something’ in the realm of possibility is like form.

0049 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Boden (previously translated as “basis” and now translated by Kemple as “surroundedness”)?

Is the originating ‘something’ in the realm of possibility subsumed into a form that is substantiated by a thought?

Okay, I am not nervous anymore.

I am perplexed, yet intrigued.

0050 Of course, the questionable character of the following hypothesis cannot be doubted.

Otherwise, I could present the following claims as fiat accompli.

First, presentative forms in the table in Appendix 1.1 are hylomorphes, where the column conveys experience (form) and the row represents appearance (presentative).

Second, presentative forms may contribute to a novel presentative form, corresponding to Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence.

Third, tabular presentative forms that cross adjacent categories constitute a grounding of transcendence. This is a hypothesis.

In other words, the grounding of transcendence follows diagonals within Kemple’s table of presentative forms.

0051 What transitions do Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden correspond to?

How about passages from idea to fact, fact to sign, and sign to idea?

Another option is firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.

One more option is that both passages are implicated.

0052 In section 6.3.1, Kemple notes that Peirce’s categories and Heidegger’s groundings do not map onto one another perfectly. Peirce’s categories pertain to semiosis. Heidegger’s labels are contained within a framework of ontic-ontological transcendent grounds that are specific to human beings.

0053 So far, my associations to Kemple’s appendix 1.1 yields a hypothesis and a challenge.

The hypothesis is that Maritain’s presentative forms and Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence coincide with the construction of novel presenative forms, composed of presentative forms. A tabular element in one categorysubstantiates the tabular element in the adjacent higher category, for both columns and rows, with a wrap-around at thirdness.

The result is three sequences of three transitions, depicted in colors in the above table.

0054 If this result is plausible, the elements in the table are not only presentative forms, but they are also elements in a novel hylomorphic structure: presentative (column A, row B) [substantiates] form (column A+1, row B+1).

Heidegger’s terms seem to jive with these novel presentative forms.

0055 Is that confusing? If so, then I wonder.

Does Moglichkeit (possibility) start with the column of idea or with the row of firstness?

09/26/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 4 of 18)

0056 I repeat. Here is a table that colors in the hypothesis of the coincidence between a sequence of novel presentative forms and grounding of transcendence, with one diagonal strand colored in bold.

0057 First, I associate two contiguous elements, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility (presentative) and hylomorphic relations or things (form) to Heidegger’s term, Moglichkeit. ‘Something’ (presentation, idea in firstness) substantiates a thing (form, fact in secondness).

Kemple elaborates in section 6.3.1. Heidegger identifies the dimensions of Moglichkeit (possibility) as Shiften (translated as establishing, finding, causing, as well as inducing) and Weltenwurf (translated as projection of world).

0058 What do these dimensions suggest?

Following the argument of the previous blog, the presentation of Moglichkeit rests primarily in firstness, rather than the idea of firstness and the form of Moglichkeit rests in secondness, rather that the fact of hylomorphic relations.

That would associate Moglichkeit with a contiguity between firstness and secondness, more or less mirroring the relation between content_a and situation_b-level actualities₂ for a two-level interscope.

0059 If this association to Moglichkeit is plausible, then the presentation of Ausweisen rests primarily in secondness (the row), rather than the fact of secondness (the column), and the form of Ausweisen touches base with thirdness (the row), instead of signs of thirdness (the column). Maybe, I should say, essentially with thirdness, and accidentally with signs of thirdness.

How to translate the term, Ausweisen? Kemple recommends the term, “pointing out”, while other translators choose the term, “account”. “Pointing out” distinguishes an object from its surroundings. An object is “laid out in consciousness”.

Finally, Boden (surroundedness) connects thirdness (the row) with firstness (the row) in the same manner as Moglichkeitand Ausweisen. The presentation belongs to row 3 and column N. The form belongs to row 1 and column N+1, unless N+1 equals four, then the column returns to idea (the form of firstness).

Here is the summary for the ongoing diagonal.

0060 Does Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden associate to pairs of elements in a sign relation?

Here is a guess.

0061 For Moglichkeit, the sign-vehicle (SV) associates to novel presentation in firstness (row) and the sign-object (SO) associates to novel form in secondness (row). The columns shift as well.

For Ausweisen, the SO associates to novel presentation in secondness (row) and the SI associates to novel form in thirdness (row). The columns shift as well.

For Boden, the sign-interpretant (SI) associates to novel presentation in thirdness (row) and a corresponding nacent SV associates to novel form in firstness (row). The columns shift as well. The nascent SV may sustain the next Moglichkeit.

0062 Here is a picture of how sign-elements key into the tabular presentative forms along one diagonal.

Each novel presentative form expresses the tabular presentative form (row M, column N) [contiguity based on the two manifesting sign elements] the tabular presentative form (row M+1, column N+1), with wrap-around from thirdness to firstness.

0063 Here is a picture of the flow of Heidegger’s terms and how they might associate to the elements of Peirce’s sign-relation for this particular diagonal.

0064 In general, Moglichkeit moves diagonally from the first to the second row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from firstness to secondness. A sign-vehicle makes a sign-object possible.

Ausweisen moves diagonally from the second to the third row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from secondness to thirdness. A sign-object points to the facet of a sign-interpretant in thirdness.

Boden wraps around diagonally from the third to the first row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from thirdness to firstness. The facet of the sign-interpretant in thirdness joins with the facet of the sign-interpretant in firstness.

0065 So far, I suggest that Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence corresponds to novel presentative forms.

Plus, these novel presenatitive forms further correspond to elements in a sign relation.

In the previous figure, couplings of sign-elements label the contiguity between the two tabular presentative forms that contribute to the novel presentative form.

0066 If these associations make sense, then I may claim the following.

Heidegger’s grounds of transcendence may be technically written as a novel presentation [substantiates] form. Plus, the novel presentation belongs to one category (foremost in appearance (row) and secondarily in experience (column)) and the novel form belongs to the adjacent higher category (for both row and column, with wrap around).

A sequence of dyads may be depicted by focusing on diagonals in a table of appearances versus forms. A table of presentative forms contains nine ” presentative forms” (or better, “tabular presentative forms”) according to the current normative use of the term, and supports three sequences of “novel presentative forms”. Each sequence associates to Heidegger’s three terms describing the grounds of transcendence.

0067 Finally, the contiguity between novel presentation and novel form along one particular diagonal juxtaposes two elements within a sign relation.

09/22/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 5 of 18)

0068 So far, I have considered one diagonal in a table of presentative forms.

Here is a different diagonal.

0069 I arrive at the following associations.

0070 These associations touch base with the following story about how Sam got a new job.

Sam recently graduated from IIT with a degree in accounting. He lost his job at a tax-assistance company because of the impact of inexpensive computer software programs designed for tax returns. He hears from one his professors that there may be a job at a small accounting software company on Halstead. So, he calls, and they tell him to come by. When? How about tomorrow at 11? Oh, by the way, could you e-mail us your resume?

The next day, Sam gets off the bus in front of a chicken-baking restaurant. Where is the company? Oh, there, on the second floor. How to get there? The only other door is in the back of the restaurant. Plus, there are outside stairs.

0071 Obviously, Sam has to enter the restaurant. They are broiling chicken for lunch. It smells just like grandma’s house (presentation of qualia as a fact). Gramma had a saying, “Don’t judge a book by its cover.” (form signifying mode of conduct). So, Sammy asks one of the cooks. The broiler points to the stairs halfway down the restaurant.

At the foot of the stairs, Sammy remembers what gramma counseled (presentation of an action or mode of conduct), and tells himself, “Remember why you are here.” (form as an idea of a normal context). Up the stairs he goes. He recounts to himself the parts of his resume having to do with understanding accounting programs. By the time he stands at the door, the only door, at the top of the stairs, Sam already asks his Grandma to be a guardian angel looking over him (presentation of a normal context). The chicken restaurant is the cover. The software company is the book (form is a fact of qualia).

0072 In terms of Peirce’s formulation of the sign-relation, the smell of chicken (sign-vehicle) stands for Sam’s grandmother (sign-object) in regards to Grandma advising Sam and her advice applying to the current situation (sign-interpretant).

In terms of Heidegger’s three features in the grounding of transcendence, Moglichkeit (possibility) is the presentation of the smell of broiling chicken substantiating the form of a slogan, “Don’t judge a book by its cover”, Ausweisen (pointing-out) is the presentation of asking for directions, going to and going up the stairs substantiating the formation of a normal context that literally manifests the slogan, and Boden (surroundedness) presents a manifestation of the slogan as the door at the top of the stairs.

0073 Both Peirce’s sign-relation and Heidegger’s three components grounding transcendence play into the table of presentative forms, each in a different manner. If Peirce’s and Heidegger’s approaches pertain to a single reality, then I may say that the single reality contains the nine presentative forms in the table.