12/17/24

Looking at Tomasz Duma’s Article (2023) “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations…” (Part 9 of 14)

0082 Section three of Duma’s article wrestles with the views of thinkers within the scholastic tradition.

0083 Right after Aquinas, scholars want to classify relationes secundum dici (relations according to talk) as ens rationis(mind-dependent beings).  They are like opinions, which are also ens rationis.  So, maybe they may be safely ignored.

They cannot be ignored.

0084 Four hundred years after Aquinas, John of St. Thomas (or John Poinsot) says that relationes secundum dici (speech-alone talk) matter.  They are real beings.

Indeed, relationes are the ens reale (mind-independent beings) that brings ens reale (mind-independent being) into relation with ens rationis (mind-dependent being).

Here, relationes are mind-independent even though they are immaterial beings.  So, they are not like matter.  But, they are like form, because they entangle mind-independent material things.

So, there are two styles of ens reale (mind-independent being), one is purely relational (where the relation can be depicted as a figure with empty slots) and the other is material (which is what comes to mind immediately with the term, ens reale).

Surely, Poinsot’s realization is significant.

0085 Yet, difficulties are apparent, expecially when four hundred years later, this examiner notes that there are two styles of dici, hand-talk and speech-alone talk.

0086 Overall, I can imagine two buckets for relationes secundum X, as shown below.

0087 Yes, the two buckets have appropriate labels.

I’m talking about relationes secundum X.

With X=”esse“, the foundational contiguity is [secundum] or [according to].

Relation associates to form.  Relation is like essence.  Esse_ce associates to matter.  So, essence accords to esse_ce.  Form accords to matter.

With X=dici (hand talk), the foundational contiguity includes a qualifier, either “categorical” or “transcendental”, as discussed earlier.  In both cases, dici (hand talk) is like matter because the referent is like esse_ce.  Once again, the essence (the relation) accords to esse_ce (the images and indicators of hand talk).  Form accords to matter.

0088 With X=dici (speech-alone talk words), humans expect the same type of performance as dici (hand talk).  Take the words, “chair” and “raven”.  These terms seem to be located in the esse bucket, because the accordance is categorical.

However, the spoken words “chairperson” and “ravenous” are not so categorical.  They are more transcendental.  The bucket turns dicey, especially as a spoken term becomes more and more like a statement, as in the adjective-noun combination, “ravenous chairperson”.

To wit, I always make it a point to bring a dozen fresh donuts to faculty meetings.

0089 With X=dici (speech-alone statement), one cannot expect the same type of linguistic performance as with hand-talk.  The relation becomes like matter and the spoken statement slips into the slot for form.

The switch is awkward, in so far as the relation enters the slot previously held by esse and dici (hand talk) and the spoken statement enters the slot previously held by the relation.  It is as if the term, “ravenous chairperson” is a form (a dici (speech-alone talk)) that brings the appearance of donuts at each faculty meeting (a relationes) into um… accordance, as if saying, “Donuts [in accordance with the] ‘ravenous chairperson'”.

That is not all.

The relation can shift from “donuts” to “an invitation to co-author a publication that the chairperson has made no contribution, outside of mere administration”.

Yes, relationes secundum dici (speech-alone talk) can be dicey.

0090 The dyad can be shifty.

I ask, “What is a thing?”

And the listener hears, “What is your thing?”

Dici (speech-alone talk) goes into the slot for form and offers the aroma of essence.

Relation goes into the slot for matter and makes me wonder and ask, “Who nose?”

I hope that makes scents.

0091 For the scholar working in Peirce’s tradition, the relatives that Aquinas mentions belong to Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  Here, one real element is relationes (for Aquinas) and the category of secondness (for Peirce).  The other real element is dici (speech-alone talk) (for Aquinas, dici is speech) and Aristotle’s fundamental hylomorphe, matter [substance] form (for Peirce).

In both cases, the realness that associates to matter substantiates the realness that associates to form.

For matter, relationes, expressed as dyadic structures, exemplify Peirce’s category of secondness. 

For form, matter [substance] form is an example of dici (speech-alone talk).

12/16/24

Looking at Tomasz Duma’s Article (2023) “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations…” (Part 10 of 14)

0092 Then, there is the distincdtion between implicit and explicit abstraction.

0093 This figure intimates the difficulties faced by 20th century commentators, writing long after 13th century Aquinas.  The dyadicity of relationes secundum X engages Peirce’s category of secondness, even though none of the commentators knows this.  Plus, Aquinas’s discussion of relatives, along with similar terms, leads to the discovery of the nature of triadic relations, such as signs and mediations, in the 16th century.

0094 Georg W. Volk captures one facet of the conundrum.  Relationes secundum dici signify the relation itself as well as what is related by the relation.  Does this apply to the distinction between categorical (the referent for each hand-talk word-gesture) and transcendental (the referent for an entire grammatically correct counter-intuitive hand-talk statement)? Or does this apply to two ens reale, the relation (which does not seem like ens reale, because it consists of empty slots in a purely relational structure) and its contents (which seem to be mind-independent, especially with technical terms like “cushion” and “job”).

Relationes secundum dici (speech-alone talk) may be particularly dicey, because of juxtapositions, such as “cushy job”, a term (going into the slot for form) that accords to certain relations (going into the slot for matter).

And, that is no accident.

Or is it?

0095 Krapiec starts with relationes secundum dici as an accidental being that is subordinate to substantial being, constructed as a relation or one of its components.  Similarly, the missing fingertip is subordinate to my friend and “cushion” is subordinate to my boss’s job.

This accidental being is “transendental”, because it is (or may be) characteristic of any being (depending on the normal context3 and potential1).

Three problems arise when considering these transcendental accidental beings. (1) How do the elements enter into the relation?  (2) Does the absolute (mind-independent) characteristic of the relational being violate the (mind-dependent) character of elements entering into relation? (3) How does a Creator God originate creation through speech acts that surely classify as relationes secundum dici?

Well, if relationes secundum dici is an accident, then can I say that this crashing success is worth raving about?

0096 Section four conveys how secundum dici relations are to be understood, according to the author, Thomasz Duma.

First, let go of the distinction between categorical and transcendental.

Second, all these relations have two termini, the relation and the elements that go into the relation.  Both are expessed in the diagram of Peirce’s category of secondness, using Aristotle’s hylomorphe as an standard.  Both dici and relationes are real elements.  The contiguity is [secundum], translated into English as [according to].  The contiguity may be considered as “mental” or “logical”.  The contiguity may be associated with implicit or explict abstraction.

Third, as soon as a relationes secundum X (X = esse or dici) is formulated as a dyad in Peirce’s realm of actuality2, it is subject to the laws of contradiction and noncontradiction.  For Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter and form are real elements associated to explicit abstraction.  If the contiguity between them is labeled, [substance], then internal contradictions should be resolved.

0097 In this examination, I swerve from what Duma actually says.

Am I trying to avoid an accident?

Or, am I on my way to create one?  

My course correction adds one more item to the list.

Fourth, because relationes secundum X cohere to a dyadic expression consistent with Peirce’s secondness, in order to be understood, this actuality2 requires a normal context3 and potential1.

Here is an example.

Ah, this sort of looks like Krapiec’s point about accidental being acting subordinate to substantial being.

But, now the dyadic actuality2 is ordinate and its normal context3 and potential1 are subordinate.

Which makes me wonder whether the ordinate (the actuality2) is really subordinate (to the entire nested form).

Or worse, if actuality2 is missing, does the normal context3 and potential1 act like an accident waiting to happen?

0098 No wonder the hominin brain increases in volume over evolutionary time.  Imagine a hominin building an adaptive neural network2 devoted to the normal context3 and the potential1 of a subordinate being adding value to an ordinate being2 for a number of social circles3, including diverse teams3.  Surely, natural selection can work on that.  As each hominin grows up, other members of the band learn the range of this hominin’s aptitudes and respond accordingly, with either invitations to join a team or neglect, due to perceived lack of “talent” or “interest”

In other words, the normal context3 of the team and the potential of the individual1 are subordinate to the ordinate, the individual joining a team2.

Joining a team correlates to reproductive success.

The irony is that no element is fully subordinate or completely ordinate in a category-based nested form.

The category-based nested form is triadic relation.

0099 May I add one more item?

Five, what does the contiguity between esse or dici and relation imply for the esse bucket?

Surely, implicit abstraction consists of the operations of adaptive neural networks, honed by evolution in the service of some team or other social circle.  Implicit abstraction comes “naturally”, so to speak.

Explicit abstraction is the outlier. It is not necessarily “naturally” easy unless it somehow coheres with the mental and logical processes of an innate implicit way of thinking.

For example, why do humans learn to read so easily.  Of course, some kids (and adults) have more difficulty than others, but once literate, the human mind effortlessly performs an implicit abstraction between a set of written words and its corresponding meaning, presence and message?

The answer is that so-called, “decoding”, of spoken and written words on the content-level consists of the same implicit abstractions involved in hand talk.  Dici corresponds to parole.  Relationes corresponds to langue.

Thus, the definition of “language”, formulated by Ferdinand de Saussure early in the 20th century, looks very much like a style of relationes secundum dici.

0100 Implicit and explicit abstraction (as well as the terms “categorical” and “transcendental”) appear to associate to the contiguity between dici and relationes, that is [secundum].  “Secundum” is often translated as “according to” or “accordance”.  Secundum is not a real element.  Secundum is a contiguity between two real elements.  It cannot be reduced to something comparable to matter or form.

12/14/24

Looking at Tomasz Duma’s Article (2023) “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations…” (Part 11 of 14)

0101 Oh my, this examination is already as long as the article.

Oh, maybe I can use a different label for what I am doing.

May I call this examination “a reconfiguration”?

The reconfiguration starts with a distinction between esse, dici (hand talk) and dici (speech-alone talk), drawing human evolution into the discussion.

In the long run, I suspect that Aquinas’s philosophy may be (to a significant degree) “re-expressed” using Peirce’s diagrams, if only because diagrams allow one to visualize a relation, as well as content within the relation.

Okay, maybe I should call this examination, “a speculation”.

0102 I conclude by offering a couple more blogs, with lots of pictures.

One blog focuses on the difference between implicit and explicit abstraction in regards to relationes secundum X.

The other blog concern the category-based nested form and how Peirce’s categories may be regarded in terms of explicit and implicit abstraction.

0103 I start with the counter-intuitive hand-talk statement discussed earlier.

Here is relationes secundum dici for this implicit abstraction.

0104 In the statement, each gesture-word categorically pictures or points to its referent.  In doing so, each hand-talk wordassociates to matter.  The form, here provided in speech-alone talk, is a relation that is counter-intuitive because ravens do not swim.

0105 But, maybe they do not have to.

0106 In speech-alone talk, the matter-slot is occupied by an interpretation (a relationes), corresponding to the form-slot for hand talk.  The speech-alone word which solves the riddle of the slogan is “drought”.  This word mimimizes contradictions to the extent that the interpretation only requires sensible construction.

0107 At this moment, I pose a question in regards the way that my attention proceeds in the previous two figures.

To me, it seems easy to proceed from (A) the matter-slot for implicit abstraction to (C) the form-slot for explicit abstraction.   Dici (hand talk) flows through relationes to dici (speech-alone talk).

The other direction seems much more problematic.  For example, if I say the word, “drought”, I do not spontaneously imagine that a drought allows ravens to pick up pebbles from the bottom of creeks.

The difficulties multiply when considering a return passage from dici (speech-alone talk) to dici (hand-talk).

12/13/24

Looking at Tomasz Duma’s Article (2023) “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations…” (Part 12 of 14)

0108 How does explicit and implicit abstraction apply to the category-based nested form.

0109 I now go through explicit, then implicit abstraction, for each of the three categories.

To start, the category-based nested form is a triadic relation.  Triadic relations implicate implicit abstraction.

The category-based nested form entails explicit abstraction, because it is a specific application of Peirce’s category of thirdness.  Thirdness is the realm of normal contexts, signs, mediations and so forth.  Each of these triadic reations may be diagrammed as “empty-slot” relational structures.  Then, the inquirer enters explicit abstractions into the empty-slots.

Accordingly, a diagram of the category-based diagram offers a general (universal and transcendental) example of dici(speech-alone talk)(as form) in contiguity with Peirce’s definition of thirdness (as relation).

The following dyad displays two real elements: a general way of articulating the category-based nested form,(corresponding to form) and what is implicated by a relation among Peirce’s categories (occupying the slot for matter) in the manner of relationes secundum dici (speech-alone talk).

Even though this relationes secundum dici (speech-alone talk) appears legitimate, this dyad goes into the dicey bucket.

0110 What happens when I bring the form from the dicey bucket (B) over to the slot for matter in the esse bucket  (B)?

In this instance, a formalized diagram of a category-based nested form containing elements of speech-alone talk is treated as if it is has the same semiotic qualities as hand talk.  The articulated diagram of Peirce’s secondness (dici (speech-alone talk)) now acts like matter, substantiating a specific relational expression (like form) for relationes secundum dici (hand talk).

In the following figure, the relation (form) expresses the ways that the logic of the normal context expresses itself as an explicit abstraction, even though its realness manifests as an implicit abstraction.

This is an example of a dyad in the esse bucket.

The logics of the normal context comes to the fore as form for the implicit abstraction, because thirdness (matter for explicit abstraction) presents itself as a category-based nested form (form for explicit abstraction and matter for implicit abstraction).

So, the above figures picture a transit from the dicey to the esse bucket.

One transit from explicit to implicit abstraction starts with a relationes (in the slot for matter, for explicit abstraction, A), proceeds through dici (speech-alone talk, first as form, B, and then as matter for hand-talk, B), to a relationes (in the slot for form, for implicit abstraction, C).

0111 Is this how a relation (A), in our current Lebenswelt, somehow “translates” into various innate operations of implicit abstraction, consisting of mental adaptations to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in (C)?

Or, is this how dici (speech-alone talk) (B) corresponds to a relation in our current Lebenswelt (A), while performatively activating a phenotypic relation adapted to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in (C)?

12/12/24

Looking at Tomasz Duma’s Article (2023) “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations…” (Part 13 of 14)

0112 Of course, Duma does not go into such disturbing and discombobulating scenarios.  Duma does not even mention Peirce.  But, the last two questions frame a very important concern for philosophers.

The concern is not whether the theory of evolution is philosophically viable or not.

The question asks, “Given that human evolution consists of adaptations to the potential of triadic relations in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, then what the hell is going on in our current Lebenswelt?”

0113 Peirce’s diagrams offer opportunities to express ways that implicit relations (as forms in the esse bucket, C) may be triggered when speech-alone talk (as a form in the dicey bucket, B) accords to explicitly configured relations (as matter in the dicey bucket, A).

Trust (implicit relation, C) the science (explicit relation, A).

0114 Ready for the next category?

The flow of A,B,C may start with Peirce’s category of secondness as explicit matter (A).

What is the corresponding explicit form?

Aristotle’s hylomorphe (B) exemplifies this category, consisting in two contiguous real elements.  Here, the contiguity could hold the word, “transcendental”, because it applies to all expressions of secondness.  The contiguity could also contain the word, “categorical”, for a specific application.  For Aristotle’s hylomorphe, the first real element is “matter” and the second real element is “form”.

0115 Once again, dici (speech-alone talk), expessed as a diagram of a hylomorphic dyad, goes from form (in the dicey bucket, B) to matter (in the esse bucket, B).  The corresponding form (C) consists of icons and indexes as sign-relations,as well as the logics applicable to expressions that belongs to Peirce’s realm of actuality.  Actuality is subject to the (logics or) laws of contradiction and noncontradiction.

0116 An example?

Consider the actuality of a bridge (A), in a fancy high-rise hotel, spanning across the atrium.  This construction should follow the laws of non-contradiction. In order to pass safety inspection,  a little sign is placed at either end of the bridge, saying, “Only 100 people allowed.”  This little sign (B) satisfies the attribution of this architectural thing to Peirce’s category of secondness (matter, explicit abstraction, A).

The two real elements to the relationes secundum dici (speech-alone talk) are the integrity of the bridge’s construction (A) and the safety limits placed on the bridge (B). The contiguity is [supports].

0117 Now, imagine a meeting of a philosophical society full of inquirers who know nothing of either Aquinas or Peirce.  After the final academic session of the day, some wealthy donor throws a party in the atrium featuring the deep-state trance rave-master remixer named Crashing Success.

My pals say that the best place to watch the show is from the bridge suspended over the atrium floor.  So, we go, and the bridge is already packed with fellow travelers.  Lots of fellow travelers!  But, right at the moment that I am about to step onto the bridge, I see the little sign: “Only 100 people allowed” (B).

So, I defer, and go back to the food court, while casting worrying glances at the party scene further down the atrium (not C).

0118 The transit from explicit (A) to implicit abstraction (C) intimates disaster.

For similar scenarios, see Looking at N.J. Enfield’s Book (2022) “Language vs. Reality”, appearing in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2024, as well as in Original Sin and The Post-Truth Condition Part 3 (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

12/11/24

Looking at Tomasz Duma’s Article (2023) “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations…” (Part 14 of 14)

0119 The conceptual-flow apparatus of A,B,&C also applies to Peirce’s category of firstness as explicit matter (A).

0120 An explicit definition of firstness (B) stands as form in the dicey bucket, then as matter in the esse bucket.  

In the esse bucket, dici (speech-alone talk acting as hand-talk) relates to whatever follows the logics of inclusion and allows contradictions.

0121 Rather than giving another example, I proceed to section four, where the author formulates how we should understand relationes secundum dici.

Since this examination is already disruptive, let me proceed to some suggestions that sort of correspond to the author’s points and some that do not.

0122 First, let go of the distinction between categorical and transcendental.  Even though the distinction is helpful, it does not appear to be critical to the speculations at hand.

0123 Second, all dici relations have two termini, the relation itself (portrayed as a hylomorphic dyad consistent with Peirce’s definition of secondness) and the elements that go into the relation (for Aristotle’s hylomorphe, “matter” and “form”, and for the dici relation, “dici” and “relationes“).

0124 Third, as soon as relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) is formulated as a dyad in the realm of actuality, the relation is subject to the laws of contradiction and noncontradiction.  The label for the contiguity is placed within brackets for clear notation.  The contiguity’s label is selected on the basis that [it] minimizes contradictions between the two real elements.

[Secundum] may be regarded as a contiguity that minimizes contradictions.

0125 Fourth, relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) is an actuality2.  A normal context3 and potential1 are required to attain understanding.   An entire (filled-in) category-based nested form associates to understanding.  Understanding encompasses the three distinctly different logics of thirdness, secondness and firstness.

In hominin evolution, our genus adapts to the potential of triadic relations, including “understanding”, defined as “the completion of a category-based nested form”.  Implicit abstractions produce complete nested forms holistically (that is, without explicit articulation of the three elements).  Hand-talk favors implicit abstraction.

Explicit abstractions may articulate elements within a relation, by using the purely symbolic labels of speech-alone talk.  At the same time, the conceptual-flows of A,B,&C suggest that speech-alone talks engages implicit abstraction (and visa versa).

Nonetheless, A and C are not precisely the same relationes, even though they are contiguous with B, dici.

Nor, are A and C the same dici, even though they are contiguous with B, relationes.

0126 Fifth, what does [secundum] (translated as [according to]) in relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) imply?

Secundum compares to substance, in Aristotle’s hylomorphe of “matter [substance] form”.

Secundum also associates to either implicit abstraction or explicit abstraction, depending on the dyad.

Secundum entangles the distinction between categorical and transcendental relations, for those who cannot let go (see first point).

0127 Sixth, Peirce’s diagrams allow an inquirer to consider labels (from explicit abstractions) within a visual framework (that coheres with implicit abstraction).

0128 This examination adds value to Tomasz Duma’s contribution to our current appreciation of relationes secundum X,by suggesting that the philosophies of Aristotle, Aquinas and Peirce are (1) congruent and (2) illuminate cognitive features of both our current Lebenswelt as well as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0129 Furthermore (3), this congruence allows contemporary philosophers to consider the difference between explicitly abstracted relations that act as matter to dici (speech-alone talk) as form and implicitly abstracted relations that act as form to dici (hand talk) and esse as matter.

Now, that is one complicated “furthermore”.

0130 Oh, one more “furthermore”!

Recall that Duma gives five cases where relatives appear in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.

In this examination, I also provide five examples for relationes secundum X.

The Oldowan stone tool is a case for X=esse.

The hand-talk gesture-word, [RAVEN], is a case for X=dici (hand talk).

[WOLF][FINGER] is a case for X=dici (hand talk) and then X=dici (speech-alone talk).

“Ravenous chairperson”, “cushy job” and “drought” are cases for X=dici (speech-alone talk).

“A bridge that meets code” is a case for X=dici (speech-alone talk).

0131 Is this what the author anticipated when he sent his article for publication?

I suppose not.

0132 Okay, the author may chuckle during the course of this examination, as it tracks from Aquinas’s relatives straight into a key question concerning human evolution.

Why is our current Lebenswelt not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

Are relationes secundum dici integral to an answer to this question?

What if.

0133 Indeed, laughter is an appropriate response.

Who would have guessed that Aristotle, Aquinas and Peirce, all strangely brilliant yet incomplete philosophers, are (inadverently) in the business of illuminating differences between who we are and who we evolved to be?

0134 My thanks to Tomasz Duma for his article on this very intriguing topic.

12/10/24

Looking at Brandon Wanless’s Article (2023) “…on the State of Original Innocence” (Part 1 of 12)

0001 The full title of the article before me is “St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John Paul II on the State of Original Innocence”.  The work is published online by the journal Studia Gilsoniana 12(4) (October-December 2023), pages 617-634.  The work is brief, a mere seventeen pages.

0002 Indeed, I suspect that this examination will be far more extravagant, in the same way that twentieth century American advertising transforms a winter celebration of the birth of Christ into a two month bazaar hawking any item that can be purchased and given to a loved one (who, praise God, will be too embarrassed to return it).  Like scented body wash.

0003 Modern Americans already practice a theology of the gift.

Modern Americans already practice a theology of the body.

And, the enterprise makes even the angels laugh, because it is a parody of every grace that it proclaims, in the same way that original sin is a parody of original justice… or… as certain Protestants would have it… total depravity is a parody of total innocence.  What is “original” in one Christian schema is “total” in another.

0004 In this thought-piece, theologian Brandon Wanless aims to demonstrate how Pope John Paul II, in his proclamation, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, takes the theology of Thomas Aquinas as a platform, a soap-box, if you will, to stand upon while formulating a judgment.  An honest, contemplative, Christian intellect (relation) brings the what is of original innocence into relation with the what ought to be of the ethnos of the gift.

0005 Ethnos?

Is that the same as “ethos”?

“Ethnos” is a term that appears in the discipline of political theology, around 2006, the same time as when the English translation of John Paul II’s commentary on Humanae Vita (1968) is released for publication.   The term is coined by Russian philosopher, Alexander Dugin.  “Ethnos” is the people that we once were, but cannot return to being.  “Ethnos” contrasts with the Russian word, “narod”, which is who we once were, before political theories turned us into a “people”.

0006 What does this imply?

The term, “ethnos”, is an element in a Greimas square.  A Greimas square is a purely relational structure consisting of four terms.  As it turns out, the Greimas square is useful in appreciating how one spoken word differs from other spoken words.

Here are the four elements, along with the rules of the Greimas square.

0007 Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism”, appearing in Razie Mah’s blog, February 16-28, 2023, elaborates the “ethnos” as an element in a Greimas square.

Here is a picture.

0008 The focal term (A), for political theology, is “the people“, as in the slogan, “We, the People…”.

0009 Various political theories (B) contrast with the people (A), even as they (B) try to define it (A) according to various explicit abstractions.  These explicit abstractions become bound in a religion, of sorts.  The label is awarded the postfix, “-ism”.  “Communism” and “capitalism” are good examples.

0010 The being (C) that speaks against (literally “contra” and “diction”) B is difficult to define.  It is pre-political, at least, pre-modern political theory.  The narod is where where a man marries a woman and they have children.  They live in villages, or maybe, towns.  The “narod” reminds me of first title in John Paul II’s theology of the body.  The relational nature of the family is addressed in the First and Second Primers on the Organization Tier and A Primer on the Family, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

The narod (C) belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

0011 Finally, the ethnos (D) contrasts with the narod (C), because it is the narod before the first singularity.  The ethnos is the narod in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  As such, it speaks against the people (A) who are framed by various political -isms (B).  The people can never return to the ethnos.  The ethnos is the condition of total innocence.

And yet, a return to the original innocence (D) is weirdly what every political theory (B) promises.

0012 How crazy is that?

12/9/24

Looking at Brandon Wanless’s Article (2023) “…on the State of Original Innocence” (Part 2 of 12)

0013 Now, the original judgment must be corrected, not only for the spelling error, but with the spelling error in mind.

0014 Theoretically, John Paul II addresses concerns about Humanae Vita, an encyclical written and approved in the treacherous year of 1968.  The scope is narrow.  This proclamation expresses a theology of the body.  And, it is not about scented body-wash, which is now on sale at commercial venues, as an X-mas gift for whoever is significant to the one making the purchase.

0015 As already intimated, John Paul II uses the theology of Aquinas as a platform on which to stand and proclaim a truth concerning who we evolved to be.  We evolved to live as images of God.

To date, no philosopher in the tradition of Aquinas follows the pope’s daring lead.

John Paul II cannot be put into the box of Aquinas’s theology.  Instead, Aquinas’s theology is the box that John Paul II stands on to proclaim a theology to the modern world, that contests all the mercantilist, and fraternalist, and normativist theories proposing materialist solutions to our immaterial condition.  We are created in the image of God.

0016 So, of course, current scientific theories of human evolution must be reconfigured with the pope’s daring stand in mind.

And oddly enough, this is precisely what Razie Mah does in his three e-masterworks, The Human Niche, An Archaeology of the Fall and How To Define The Word “Religion”.

Now, should I say that these would make wonderful Christmas gifts?

0017 Okay, Pope John Paul II offers a broad challenge to the tradition of Aquinas while concentrating on a narrow issue: the theology of the body.

How do elements of the biblical teaching of Genesis key into the above (broad) judgment?

Here is a picture.

0018 Does the judgment that John Paul II develops in Theology of the Body point to Alexander Dugin’s conceptualization of the ethnos?

Here is how to read the above diagram.

An honest and holistic intelligence (relation, thirdness) brings the creation of male and female in an evolution-sounding revelation (what is, secondness) into relation with the moral of Adam’s reaction to Eve upon presentation of a “helper” (what ought to be, firstness).

This judgment belongs to the divine suprasubjectivity of original justice, and is manifested as a commitment in human subjectivity.  Marriage is not a thing, or only a ritual.  Marriage is a transubstantiation of this judgment.

0019 Of course, I use the term, “transubstantiation”, in an unfamiliar, yet technically precise, manner.  Transubstantiationis a “change in substance”, corresponding to a change in assignment of Peirce’s categories.  For example, ‘something1‘ in firstness becomes an actuality2 in secondness.

For this particular judgment, what is and what ought to be change categories when the relation becomes the sacrament of marriage (a relation consistent with the honest Christian intellect of Pope John Paul II).

0020 Here is a picture.

0021 Once again, the sacrament of marriage (relation, thirdness) brings the creation of male and female in an evolution-sounding revelation (what is, firstness) into relation with the moral of Adam’s reaction to Eve upon presentation of a “helper” (what ought to be, secondness).

12/9/24

Looking at Brandon Wanless’s Article (2023) “…on the State of Original Innocence” (Part 3 of 12)

0022 Marriage is an adaptation to life in an ethnos, belonging to Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

The closest that we currently can get to the ethnos is to live in the pre-political narod.  The narod is the closest way of life in our current Lebenswelt, to who we evolved to be.

0023 Wanless quotes John Paul II’s comments on Jesus’s reply to the Pharisees in Matthew 19:3-12, saying (more or less), “When Christ appeals to the ‘beginning’, he asks his interlocutors to go beyond the… um… first singularity, the transition from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.”

Christ asks us to consider the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  That is no small feat, because our current Lebenswelt is not the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Indeed, we can never truly return to who we evolved to be.

0024 So, how to proceed?

0025 First, note that in the previous judgments, both what is and what ought to be correspond to the Genesis account before the… you know… “incident”.  Adam and Eve are (somehow) one with the ethnos, yet destined to enter the narod.  Similarly, human evolution in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in precedes the first singularity, yet is destined to enter the first singularity.

0026 Here is a thumbnail sketch of the hypothesis of the first singularity.

Language evolves in the milieu of hand talk in two steps, as described in The Human Niche, as well as Comments on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019), by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  Also consider Razie Mah’s blog for January through March 2023.

0027 Speech is added to hand-talk at the start of our own species, Homo sapiens.  Homo sapiens practice hand-speech talk for over 200,000 years until something happens, around 7800 years ago, to the dry land that is now called the “Persian Gulf”.  Yes, 10,000 years ago, the Persian Gulf is dry land.  By 7800 years ago, water fills the shallow geological basin.

0028 An interglacial begins.  The ocean levels rise.  Sea-water fills the ravine carved by the confluence of four rivers, including the Tigris and Euphrates, during the so-called “Wet Neolithic” archaeological period.  A mesolithic culture moves out of the ravine and begins to settle in with a developed neolithic culture occupying the (then) dry-land surrounding the ravine.  Two hand-speech talking cultures are forced into the same territory.  Because they have complementary economies, they make love, rather than war.

0029 The linguistic consequences?  The new hybrid culture starts with pidgin, then the children of later generations create a creole, a new language.  Plus, this new language does not have hand-talk.  Sumerian is the first speech-alone language.  Not surprisingly, Sumerian is unrelated to any family of languages.  The technical term is “linguistic isolate”.

As it turns out, the semiotic qualities of hand-speech talk and speech-alone talk are very different.  Hand-talk and hand-speech talk ground reference through iconic and indexal manual-brachial gestures.  In short, even fully linguistic gesture-words picture or point to their referents.  The referent precedes the word-gesture.  In contrast, speech-alone talk has no iconic or indexal sign-qualities.  It is purely symbolic.  A symbol is a sign-relation whose sign-object is based on habit, convention, law, and so forth.  A spoken word cannot picture or point to its referent.  Therefore, the spoken word precedes the referent.

0030 So, at the start of the first singularity (as well as our current Lebenswelt), the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia stands as the only speech-alone talking culture in a world filled with hand-speech talking cultures.  I mark the nominal start of the Ubaid with a new chronological marker, Zero U0′ (Ubaid Zero Prime or “uh-oh prime”).  0 U0′ corresponds to 5800 B.C.

Of course, that may change.  The correspondence is a first approximation.

By 2800 U0′, the Sumerian Dynastic archaeological period begins.  Populations within city-states are not a “people”, yet, unless the origin myths of the ancient Near East can be labeled “political theory”.  They are narods.  These narods traditionally support the city-state.  They clear the irrigation canals.  They build a stairway to heaven in order for their local god to descend from the firmament to earth.  They build a palace to house the king, who is charged with the protection of the city, as well as tasked with the impossible job of talking to the priests… at the temple next to the ziggurat, in order to ascertain the intentions of whoever comes down the staircase from the firmament.

0031 At 7000 U0′, Thomas Aquinas defines the philosophical parameters for discussing the ethnos (belonging to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in) by conducting an inquiry into the nature of the pre-lapsarian Adam (who, after the Fall, definitely belongs to our current Lebenswelt).  Because Adam is made by the working of an artisan, he belongs to our current Lebenswelt, and so he must be counted at a narod.  He also practices speech-alone talk.

At the same time, pre-lapsarian Adam is called ‘adam-ah’, meaning “humanity”, or “the human one”, which associates to the ethnos, living before the first singularity.  This precisely fits Pope John Paul II’s suggestion that, if we stand on the soap-box of Aquinas’s philosophy, we might be see over the fence of the first singularity, to envision who we evolved to be.

12/7/24

Looking at Brandon Wanless’s Article (2023) “…on the State of Original Innocence” (Part 4 of 12)

0032 What is John Paul II up to?

Well, I suspect that he asks God to bless his honest Christian intellect (relation, thirdness) as he strives to look over the fence of the first singularity (what ought to be, secondness) while standing on the soap-box of Aquinas’s formulation of original innocence (what is, firstness).

Just as with the sacrament of marriage, John Paul II’s proclamation of a theology of the body, involves a transubstantiation.  What is is now imbued with firstness, the realm of possibility.  What ought to be is now assigned to secondness, the realm of actuality.

0033 So, why fuss about “transubstantiation” technically defined as a change of category of elements?

When each element of a judgment is assigned to one of Peirce’s categories, then the judgment is actionable.  If not, the judgment is contemplative.  Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms on the basis of the categorical assignments.

Consequently, the judgment rendered above (the result of a transubstantiation of the what is of Aquinas’s theology from secondness to firstness) unfolds into the following category-based nested form.

0034 The normal context of a blessed, honest and Christian intellect3 brings the actuality of a vision of the gift, as a reality embedded within the ethnos2 into relation with the possibilities inherent in Aquinas’s theology in regards to the prelapsarian Adam1.