0564 Chapter Five, the second to last chapter, is titled, “Human Morality as Cooperation-Plus”

Cooperation-Plus?

Makes me wonder what is cooking.

0565 Two evolutionary steps occur.

The first corresponds to a transition from individual foraging in bands in tropical forests to obligate collaborative foraging in mixed forest and savannah.

The second corresponds to what happens when more and more teams become successful after the domestication of fire.

0566 Here is a list of three eras and two steps.

0567 Tomasello writes in our current Lebenswelt about the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Tomasello proposes explicit abstractions to account for developments in a living world of implicit abstractions.  An evolutionary anthropologist may understand his terminology, but an ancestor would stand befuddled.  What do these technical terms picture or point to?

0568 The advantage of Peircean diagrams over the specialized terminology of evolutionary anthropology is clear.

The category-based nested form has three elements: normal context, actuality and potential.  A spoken word is an actuality₂.  In the normal context of definition₃ this actuality emerges from (and situates) three potentials: meaning, presence and message, corresponding to Peirce’s categories of thirdness, secondness and firstness, respectively.  This is the proposition underlying the masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion”, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

Diagrams provide a presence₁ that definitions₃ of technical terms₂ in evolutionary anthropology currently presume to be present.

0569 For example, what does the term, “caramelization”, presume to be present?

One needs to have a recipe in hand to know.  Each category-based diagram follows a recipe.

The results are delicious.

0570  Our current Lebenswelt, full of spoken words and explicit abstractions, is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, full of hand-talk, hand-speech talk and implicit abstractions.  

0571 So, I summarize by visualizing how our current Lebenswelt views the intersection of the group for each era of intentionality. 

0572 Here is the intersection for the zeroth era.

The band₂ is necessary for protection against predators.  Individuals compete within this constraint.  They compete for establishment power, that is, a place in their hierarchies.  They compete for alliances, affiliations where others are on my side.

Here is a world without justice and without fairness.

Or maybe, “justice” is me having a place in a hierarchy and “fairness” is me having others on my side.

0573 Next is the intersection for the first era.

The team₂ is the vehicle for collaborative foraging.  Collaborative foraging is unavoidable, because each individual cannot successfully forage the foods that other species either ignore or cannot get to.  Teams are required.

Successful teams are productive.  Everyone in a successful team gets along with everyone else.  How do I know this?  The team is having fun.

Of course, the ambiguous term, “having fun”, does not crop up in the vocabulary of evolutionary anthropologists.  Perhaps, it should.  Another word might be “camaraderie”.

0574 Next is an intersection for the second era.

0575 One irony is that the term, “establishment_3H“, cannot be stated in hand-talk or hand-speech talk.  Neither can the word, “institution_3H“.  Plus, the term, “social circle_3H“, seems inadequate, since there is a third person that is conjured in each manifestation of a social circle.

An institution is a individual writ large.

For example, the community (150) contains several bands (50), many teams (15) and many many families (5) and deep friendships (5).  Also, the community (150) is contained within mega-bands (450) that meet according to seasons and tribes (1500) that meet either according to the stars or by the bidding of messengers.

Each manifestation of a social circle₂ feels like a person writ large, that is, someone_C who interpellates individuals_A to come into organization_B.  Individuals_A enjoy societal identity_C.  Organizations_B pursue their objectives_C.  The successes and the failures of those pursuits_B empower individuals_A who are deserving and disempower individuals_A who are less so. 

0575 But, that is not enough.

Once again, here is an intersection for the second era.

0576 Here, the individual in community₂ is a single actuality constituted by suprasubjective judgments_2H and social circles_2V.  Conviction_2H emerges from and situates the potential of something more than deservingness_1H in the normal context of establishment_3H.  Social circles_2V emerge from and situate the potential of something more than mutual respect and trust_1V in the normal context of alliance_3V.  

An individual in community is an institution writ small.

0577 Given the prior four figures, the inquirer can trace the presence of the philosophical terms, “justice_1H” and “fairness_1H” backwards through human evolution, to the LCA.  The exercise is well worth the effort.

0578 What about other research into how human morality came to be?

Tomasello sorts current theories into three baskets: evolutionary ethics, moral psychology and gene-culture evolution.

In order to appreciate Tomasello’s view on the contents in each basket, I present (once again), his vision.  The perspective level associates to phenotype.  The content level goes with adaptation.  The intersections previously diagrammed are alternate portrayals of situation-level interdependence_2b.

0579 Evolutionary ethics focuses on reciprocity.

The idea of reciprocity applies, yet seems insufficient, to an explanation of interdependence_2b.  In Tomasello’s vision, interdependence_2b emerges from (and situates) cooperation_1b,  in the normal context of cultural selection_3b.  Cooperation_1b emerges from joint attention_2a, in the same way that a situation emerges from content.  Joint attention_2aemerges from (and situates) sociogenesis_1a in the normal context of natural selection_3a.

Reciprocity pertains to the ways that cooperation_1b virtually situates sociogenesis_1a. But, reciprocity cannot account for joint attention_2a, which directly situates sociogenesis_1a.

0580 Moral psychology investigates prosocial behaviors.  Unfortunately, the field has not drawn connections to human evolution.  Tomasello’s vision pencils in many connections.  

Indeed, Tomasello’s vision takes moral psychology into vistas beyond the term, “prosocial behaviors”.

For example, here is the virtual nested form in the category of firstness.

Surely, prosocial attitudes are foundational to each of these potentials.  Plus, each of these potentials keys into attitude-associated behaviors.

0581 Here is the virtual nested form in the category of secondness.

Ah, moral psychology models prosocial behaviors that potentiate the phenomena of these noumena.

0582 Here is the virtual nested form in the category of thirdness.

Oh, moral psychology has nothing to say about these three topics.

0583 What does this imply?

Moral psychology is a discipline that investigates the phenomena of actualities₂ that occur within the normal context of three styles of natural selection. 

On the phenotypic (perspective) level, natural (within culture) selection_3c is similar to selective breeding, in which each long-lived successful tradition breeds for individuals who are more and more capable of maintaining its survival.

On the cultural (situation) level, each manifestation within a particular social circle competes_3b with other manifestations.  For example, one teams competes with other teams in terms of productivity_2H and having fun_2V.

On the adaptation (content) level, natural selection_3a brings an adaptation_2a into relation with a niche_1a.  Tomasello labels the adaptation_2a, “joint attention_2a“, and its niche_1a, “sociogenesis_1a“.

0584 The problem?

A niche is the potential of an actuality independent of the adapting species.

The actuality independent of the content-level adaptive species does not appear in Tomasello’s vision.

Tomasello’s vision is like a house.

The actuality independent of the adaptive species is like a ghost in the basement.

The union of house and basement is called the Tomasello-Mah synthesis.

0585 Gene-culture co-evolution connects the scientific disciplines of genetics and natural history, not as an intersection (as Razie Mah does), but as a three-level interscope (as Tomasello does).

The following interscope, characterizing gene-culture co-evolution, appears in Looking at Lesley Newson and Peter Richerson’s Book (2021) “The Story of Us”.  This examination may be found in Razie Mah’s blog, from July 10 to July 31, 2023.

586 Note how the interscope for gene-culture evolution elevates adaptation over phenotype, in the opposite of the way that the interscope for Tomasello’s vision elevates phenotype over adaptation.

0587 Overall, do any of these three baskets contain Tomasello’s vision?

No, just the opposite, Tomasello’s vision contains the baskets of evolutionary ethics, moral psychology and gene-culture evolution, plus more.

The arc of Tomasello’s inquiry into the origins of humans is notable in this regard.

The house of Tomasello’s vision is an architectural achievement.

Yet, there is that ghost in the basement.

To that ghost, I now turn. 

0192 Chapter one presents the shared intentionality hypothesis.

The early hominins cannot say, “We work for food.”

Yet, that is what they do.

0193 So how is it, that today, Tomasello can inscribe, “Human thinking is individual improvisation enmeshed in a sociocultural matrix.”?

What a great sentence!

Er… question?

0194 Tomasello notes that answers to this question may be thrown into one of two bins.  The first bin is labeled “culture”.  The second bin is labeled “social coordination”.  If an inquirer wants to upset an evolutionary anthropologist, use these terms interchangeably.

Notably, there is another bin, concealed by his proposed theoretical construction, way back in 1999.  That bin is labeled “triadic relations”.

0195 To make the concealment even more provocative, Tomasello’s project has already been diagrammed in an examination of that 1999 book.  Here is a picture of the resulting three-level interscope, with the headline hypothesis_2astanding in for joint attention_2a.

0196 What is concealed?

I call it “Tomasello-Mah synthesis”.

The following figure corresponds to the Darwinian paradigm, applied to the evolution of the hominins.

0197 The Darwinian paradigm appears in Razie Mah’s The Human Niche, as well as Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome.  Both are available for sale at smashwords and other e-book venues.

This particular expression of the Darwinian paradigm synthesizes the insights of Tomasello and Mah.

0198 Note how the situation level of the Darwinian paradigm corresponds to the content level of Tomasello’s vision.  If Tomasello’s vision is a house, then the content-level of the Tomasello-Mah synthesis dwells in the basement.

In 1999, Tomasello identifies joint attention_2a as a key adaptation.  Other adaptations build on this foundation.  Joint attention_2a associates to hominin behavior.  In theory, if an evolutionary anthropologist could time-travel back to the Pliocene, he could observe (and perhaps measure) occasions of joint attention_2a, especially when the australopithecines and early Homo are working for food in teams.

In 2014, Tomasello identifies shared intentionality_2a as a key adaptation.  Shared intentionality_2a refers to the cognitive mechanisms underlying joint attention_2a.  Food is not the shared intentionality in the slogan, “We work for food.”  Working together is.

0199 With the previous blog in mind, I may return to the magnificent sentence at the start of chapter one.  I will compare it to the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality for Tomasello’s vision.

0200 The first half of the sentence, “Human thinking is individual improvisation…”, corresponds to the normal context and the actuality of the following nested form.

The second half of the sentence, “…enmeshed in a sociocultural matrix.”, corresponds to the actuality and the potential.

0201 Human thinking_2c’ is phenotypical.  Each phenotypic expression (or individual) must improvise in response to events in nature and in human culture.  Fortunately, for me, the topic of how humans think has been around a long time.  Premodern medieval schoolmen use Aristotle to construct a formula that (ironically) may be diagrammed by a postmodern scholar, Razie Mah, using category-based nested forms.  The scholastic three-level interscope for the way humans think contains three sign-relations, carrying the labels of specifying, exemplar and interventional.

0202 Human culture_2b’ habituates all three types of sign.

0203 Chimpanzees embody specifying signs.  Specifying signs present puzzles that require general intelligence. Many chimpanzee interventional signs are innate.  For example, some gestures and vocalizations are involuntary signals.  At the same time, many gestures are voluntary.  Requests involve voluntary gestures.

0204 Early hominins, such as some australopithecines and early Homo, use voluntary gestures to request, inform and share.  This promotes the exemplar sign as an adaptation.  The sign-object of an exemplar sign does not yield an involuntary sign-vehicle for the interventional sign.  Rather, following Tomasello, a perspective-level judgment_2c,occurring in the normal context of a common ground_3c and emerging from the potential of shared intentionality_1c,initiates a voluntary, gesture-based interventional sign.

Also, I can say, “Following medieval scholastics, a perspective-level judgment_2c, occurring in the normal context asking, ‘Does this make sense?’_3c and operating upon the potential of ‘putting the situation into perspective’_1c, initiates a species impressa_2a.”

0205 Human culture_2b’ enhances the reproductive success of joint attention_2a’ and grounds the ontogenetic development of individual thought_2c’.

0206 What solidifies hominin culture_2b’ as a situation-level actuality?

Is it the substance of Tomasello’s research hylomorphe?

0207 Or is it a manifestation of an adjusted scholastic interscope for the way humans think?

Or both?

0208 Tomasello presents his shared intentionality hypothesis in chapter one.  The cognitive adaptation of shared intentionality joins a behavioral adaptation of joint-attention.

The term, “shared intentionality”, like the term, “joint attention”, is difficult to define.

Perhaps, the term is too broad.

So, to narrow the field of inquiry, Tomasello breaks out several components which are more compatible with positivist approaches.  The three components are first (1), the ability to takes one’s perception’s “off-line”, second (2), the ability to make inferences that transform a perception causally, intentionally and logically, and third (3), the ability to self-monitor and evaluate those inferences and how they may produce a desirable behavioral outcome.

0209 Yeah.  The three components sound way more scientific.

At the same time, these three components associate to the one of the three signs contained in the scholastic three-level interscope.

Here is a picture.

0210 The exemplar sign says, “A perception_2b (SV_e) stands for a judgment_2c (SO_e) in regards to a common conceptual ground_2c operating on the potential of ‘mutual intentions’_1c (SI_e).”

The perspective-level of the scholastic interscope says, “The normal context of a common conceptual ground_3c brings the actuality of a judgment_2c into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘mutual expectations’_1c. The potential of ‘mutual intentions’_1c puts the individual’s perceptions_2b into perspective.”

0211 What about the three components?

First (1), the exemplar sign takes one’s perceptions_2b “off-line”, because the sign-object is a judgment_2c (which is itself a triadic relation, SO_e).  The perception_2b (SV_e) does not generate an action.

Second (2), the exemplar sign-object (SO_e) becomes what the perception (SV_e) stands for.  A judgment_2c puts a perception_2b into perspective.

Third (3), the exemplar sign-object (SO_e) is a relation between what is and what ought to be.  If a unique Peircean category is assigned to each element, then the judgment is actionable.  Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.  If a unique Peircean category is not assigned, then the judgment is reflective.  Reflective judgments are more likely to involve self-monitoring, evaluation and estimation.

0212 Surely, the three components that Tomasello identifies as subjects for research in cognitive psychology apply to the exemplar sign.

0213 How are Tomasello’s three components in play in the exemplar sign embedded within the scholastic three-level interscope for the way humans think?

Here is a diagram.

0214 Species intelligibilis_2c takes the phantasm_2b off-line (1).  How does this occur?  Species intelligibilis_2c engages a triadic relation, called “judgment”, consisting of a three elements: relation, what is and what ought to be.  As noted before, when each element is assigned a unique category, the judgment becomes actionable (on the basis of those assignments).

0215 What goes into elements A, B and C?

A relation goes into element C.  For a typical species intelligibilis_2c, the relation associates with thirdness.  Thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness (2).

A universal aspect of species impressa (the content-level actuality) goes into element B.  What does a “universal aspect” mean?  Consider fiat currency in America.  All the one-dollar bills are the same (the universal aspect).  Yet, none of them are exactly the same, since they have been folded and carried in different purses and wallets.  Some are slightly ripped up.  Some are pristine.

So, when I ask, “What is it?”

You say, “A one-dollar bill.”

An intelligible aspect of species expressa (the situation-level actuality) goes into element A.  What does “intelligible aspect” mean?  Consider the one-dollar bill.  It is labeled a “federal reserve note”.  So it is merely a promise by an institution called “The Federal Reserve”.  What is the promise? The piece of paper is legal tender.  Legal tender?  Exactly, how does this “legal tender” materialize?  Who substantiates this “legal tender”?  Ah, if I ruminate too long on this term, “legal tender”, it starts to make no sense at all.  When I enter a grocery store, then it makes sense again.

0216 Here is a picture of species intelligibilis_2c, the sign-object of the exemplar sign (SO_e).

Note how the schoolmen qualify the intelligibility of the situation-level and universality of the content-level with the same label, “intelligibilis“.

“Intelligibilis” implies both intelligibility and universality.

0217 Clearly, the situation-level perception_2b, the sign-vehicle of the exemplar sign (SV_e), stands for a causally, intentionally and logically transformed perspective-level judgment_2c, the sign object of the exemplar sign (SO_e) (2).

0218 Finally, the exemplar sign-object (SO_e) employs an exemplar sign-interpretant (SI_e) consisting in a perspective-level normal context_3c and its corresponding potential_1c (3). The normal context_3c asks, “Does this make sense?”.  Its corresponding potential_1c replies, “Well, my perception_2b stands for my judgment_2c about what is going on.  Plus, my judgment seems to be in line with our shared intentions.”

0219 Our “shared intentions”?

Yes, the subject-matter of our joint attention.

Plus, the joys of working together.

0220 Okay, Tomasello’s shared-intentionality hypothesis fits, like a hand, into the glove of the exemplar sign.

The exemplar sign is embedded within the situation and perspective levels of the scholastic interscope for the way humans think.

0221 What are the implications in terms of hominin evolution?

Tomasello addresses this question at the conclusion of chapter one.

To me, the first implication is that the exemplar sign contains the components that are missing within great ape cognition.

The second implication is that the exemplar sign is part and parcel of the adaptation of joint attention.  Reflective and normative characteristics of the exemplar sign adapt to the opportunities and the dangers of collaboration and cooperation with others.

0222 In contrast, the LCAs are not so much interested in whether their perceptions make sense.  They are more inclined toward individual goals.  So, an interventional sign is typically triggered as a reaction to a situation (which humans would not typically label a “judgment”, but may have the same relational structure as judgment).  Plus, the specifying sign is the bread and butter of daily life in the band.  In particular, the specifying sign addresses the question, “Should I eat this thing or not?”

0223 Chapter two is titled, “Individual Intentionality”.

Here is a diagram of the actualization of the scholastic interscope for our last common ancestor.  The sign-interpretant for the exemplar sign is missing.  The sign-object for the exemplar sign has the same relational structure as judgment, but we (modern humans) would not call it that.  The interventional sign pales in comparison to the specifying sign, because it rarely occurs and engages involuntary gestures and vocalizations.  The specifying sign reflects those cognitive features that are under voluntary control.

So, the depth of color reflects actualization of each element.

0224 This interscope manifests during the era of individual intentionality, lasting from our last common ancestor (7Myr) to the start of bipedalism, coinciding with the earliest appearance of the southern apes (around 3.5Myr).   Bipedalism emerges in the Pliocene.  The Pliocene marks a change of global environment starting a little over 5Myr.  The emergence of bipedalism opens the door to the era of joint attention (which I tentatively locate between 3.5 and 0.8Myr).

Technical note: Bipedal australopithecines and Homo were once called “hominids”.  “Hominids” are bipedal apes or humans.  The subset of these who belong to our own lineage are called “hominins”.

0225 Tomasello suggests that our lineage is forced into cooperative lifeways, by a changing environment and ecology,.  In particular, individuals foraging alone could not quite acquire enough food to survive.  But, individuals working together not only acquired enough food for themselves, they acquired enough to share with other individuals in the band.

Tomasello’s suggestion makes sense in so far as (1) the Pliocene environment and ecology are changing enough for bipedalism to evolve and (2) bipedalism must be an adaptation to seasonally rich, yet widely distributed food resources, as expected in mixed forest and savannah.

0226 Tomasello does not combine his insights with that of British evolutionary anthropologists writing on the same topic in 2014.  The e-book, Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other venues), highlights the theme of social circles.

0227 Dunbar claims that, for mammals, relative brain size correlates to group size.

The relative cranial capacity of bipedal australopithecines corresponds to the size of a band (around 50).  This is the size of a collective that is large enough to be safe (from predators) when sleeping together at night.

The relative cranial capacity of humans corresponds to a community (around 150), indicating that hominin brains have grown larger over the past three million years.

Or, is it group size?

0228 What do the bracketing numbers for a band (50) and a community (150) imply?

The number increases by a factor of three, leading to the question of whether these numbers indicate waystations for optimal sizes with respect to social arrangements.  Does the pattern extend to larger and small social circles?

0229 Consider the following table.

0230 So, what am I suggesting?

Tomasello’s insight that early hominins (bipedal southern apes) are forced into more cooperative lifeways elevates the importance of one social circle, more than any other.  If an individual working alone is unlikely to forage enough food, then individuals working in teams might acquire enough food for themselves, as well as for members outside of the team.  If one team can gather enough food to feed themselves three times over, the team can feed the band. 

At first, teamwork is optional.  Over generations, teamwork becomes necessary.

0231 Yes, nature, being a fickle master, offers opportunities for such harvests only on occasion and in certain locations.  On any given day, the team that is the most prepared for the day’s opportunities will be more productive than other teams.  The team that is the most prepared will tend to be the one that is most experienced in a particular style of harvesting.  For example, if mushrooms are suddenly plentiful, the mushroom team will know which ones are safe and which ones are poisonous.  The same goes for tubers, and plants, and fruits, and so on.  For animals, each team will know hunting tricks for the prey that it specializes in.

0232 Each team shares the same intentions in regards to a particular endeavor.

We work for food.

0233 And, that is not all.

Each team gets better and better as generations pass, because the tricks for each team end up as adaptations, increasing the range of cognitive traits for the southern apes.  Each team ends up creating its own neural workspace, so to speak.  As collaborative teams succeed and diversify, hominin cranial capacity increases incrementally.