12/6/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 16 of 20)

0157 Now that I have arrived at a technical definition of the term, “meme”, within the framework of postmodern scholasticism, I may examine chapter nine of Dennett’s book (“The Role of Words in Cultural Evolution”) and chapter twelve (“The Origins of Language”).

0158 Dennett’s argument goes like this.

Words are a key ingredients to culture, because they belong to language. Spoken words make excellent examples of memes. Spoken words are like viruses.

But, I wonder, what about hand-talk words?

0159 Apparently, the idea that language evolves in the milieu of hand talk does not cross Dennett’s mind. Indeed, many evolutionary biologists treat culture, in general, and language, in particular, as the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a, rather than an adaptation_2b. Why? They are convinced that humans have no ultimate niche, only a blend of proximate niches, all of which offer material or instrumental advantages or challenges.

0160 Au contraire.

According to the masterwork, The Human Niche (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), our lineage adapts to an ultimate niche_1b, the potential_1b of triadic relations_2a, as well as diverse proximate niches, including various Pliocene and Pleistocene ecologies and environments.

Practical language_2b is an adaptation to team activities and contributes to the expansion of the hominin neocortex between 2000kyr (thousands of years ago) and 800kyr. Hand talk evolves from pantomime to rudimentary (team-specific) grammars.

General language_2b is an adaptation that evolves within the milieu of hand talk, after the domestication of fire, around 800kyr (800 thousand years ago). Hand talk evolves from rudimentary team-specific languages to fully grammatical general languages.

Here is a picture of the latter step.

0161 What is language in the milieu of hand talk?

Hand-talk consists of manual-brachial gestures. Manual-brachial gestures work (that is, have the character of memes) because they picture or point to their referents. In terms of semiotics, manual-brachial gestures are icons and indexes.

When these are routinized, symbolic processing starts to occur, enhancing the distinctiveness of each gesture, and turning each into a word-gesture in a system of differences. The modern linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913 AD) defines “spoken language” as two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole (speech) and langue (mental action). A finite system of differences (for Saussure) is a symbolic order (for Peirce). Grammar consists of operations within a symbolic order.

In hand talk, the relation between parole and langue is motivated by the natural sign characteristics of hand-talk words. Manual-brachial gestures are icons and indexes. Gestures image and indicate their referents. At the same time, hand talk also routinizes gestures into words. Words operate as symbols. They form a symbolic order. A symbolic order allows grammar. Grammar makes hand talk linguistic.

0162 Our ancestors never imagine that their gesture-words are icons, indexes or symbols.

Nevertheless, they become better and better at hand talk.

0163 How do manual-brachial word gestures fit the definition of meme?

A perspective-level actuality_2c may be a conviction that cannot be explicitly expressed using iconic and indexal signs. After all, how can a hand-talk word point to or picture a species impressa_2a, a species expressa_2b or a species intelligibilis_2c?

Nevertheless, the conviction_2c is real. Plus, if the hypothesis proposed in The Human Niche is credible, and if the scholastic interscope for how humans think describes what it claims to describe, then conviction_2c is an adaptation.

So, how do our ancestors express their convictions_2c?

They express their convictions through hand-talk expressions_2a (SO_i) in the normal context of what is happening_3a and with the potential of ‘something’ happening_1a (SI_i).

Then, the hand-talk words_2a are linguistically decoded into an icon or index (SV_s).

0167 Here is a picture of hand-talk as a meme.

0168 Before general language, the practical hand-talk languages of each team activity are distinct and only occur within the normal context of each team activity. Many of the characteristics that we associate with spoken words remind me of how hand-talk languages adapt to the crucible of team activities.

During the team activity, conviction_2c judges whether the ongoing content-level normal context of what is happening_3asupports the ongoing situation-level normal context of what this means to me_3b. This conviction_2c (SV_i) substantiates hand-talk words (SO_i) that either maintain the situation-level potential_1b in the face of content-level potentials_1a or not.

0169 For example, we don’t gather mushrooms at locations where lions are known to prowl. Plus, when a lion is nearby, everyone wants to get back to the band. There are hand-talk words that convey these tidbits of semantic information. We expect that our words refer to things and states of things. We expect our words to be honest. We insist that certain words are used appropriately. We expect words to contribute to our awareness of the ongoing situation. We expect words to convey, sometimes with comic zeal, what is happening and what it means to me.

0170 So, is there a problem with this scenario?

Have you noticed that no one talks with their hands anymore?

According to the masterwork, An Archaeology of the Fall (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), around 7800 years ago, the only culture on Earth practicing speech-alone talk is the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia. All other Epipaleolithic, Mesolithic and Neolithic cultures practice hand-speech talk.

0171 Why?

For one, speech is added to hand talk at the start of our species, before 200kyr. Our human ancestors practice a dual mode of talking, hand-speech talk, for over 190 thousand years. Then, the first singularity occurs.

For two, the first singularity starts with the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia. Today, all civilizations practice speech-alone talk. In fact, every civilization throughout history practices speech-alone talk, raising the question, asking, “Did the adoption of speech-alone talk potentiate civilization?”

For three, the answer is yes.

0172 Here is a picture of speech-alone talk as a meme.

The difference between hand-talk words and speech-alone words may seem subtle. Nevertheless, the difference is substantial.

0173 Hand-talk and hand-speech talk facilitate constrained social complexity.

Speech-alone talk potentiates unconstrained social complexity.

12/5/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 17 of 20)

0174 When Dennett says that words are great examples of memes, he considers only spoken words. He does not suspect that language (that is, grammar) evolves in the milieu of hand talk. He knows that, today, all civilizations practice speech-alone talk. Plus, his reading audience is civilized.

Consequently, Dennett’s claim that words play a role in cultural evolution carries an ironic overtone. His assertion is much larger that he supposes. In southern Mesopotamia, speech-alone is first realized by the Ubaid culture.

(This is discussed in The First Singularity and Its Fairy Tale Trace, as well as An Archaeology of the Fall, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.)

Outside of southern Mesopotamia, early civilizations are potentiated by the adoption of speech-alone talk. After exposure to a speech-alone talking culture, hand-speech talking cultures drop the hand-component of their hand-speech talk. Mimesis is key. Speech-alone talks spreads from a single site to the entire world.

0175 The different semiotic qualities of hand talk and speech-alone talk play a key role in human evolution. Human evolution comes with a twist. I label that twist, “the first singularity”.

The first singularity illustrates Dennett’s key point. Speech-alone talk offers affordances that hand-talk lacks. The consequences are obvious. Cultures practicing speech-alone talk exhibit greater wealth and power than cultures practicing hand-speech talk.

Yes, the advantages are obvious.

The dangers are hidden.

0176 I wonder.

Is one of the main tasks of postmodern philosophers, such as Dennett, to reveal the dangers inherent to speech-alone talk? Or, is their main task to conceal them?

Indeed, Dennett’s postmodern philosophical approach distracts me from the manifest image of the scholastic interscope of how humans think and substitutes a scientific image of memes replicating and being selected through cultural evolution.

This is very similar to how I got the dead cat out of Daisy’s mouth, by offering one of her favorite treats as a substitute.

0177 Has the author come to a judgment_2c?

0178 The species impressa intelligibilis_2c, the universal aspect a content-level species impressa_2a, corresponds to what is_2c.

According to Dennett, the meme is a basic unit of culture, a word-like being, carrying semantic information, and offering ‘something’ that makes a difference. The meme is the source of behavioral phenomena observed and measured by social scientists, who then build models, using the specialized languages of psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics and so on.

0179 The species expressa intelligibilis_2c, the intelligible aspect of a situation-level species expressa_2b, corresponds to what ought to be.

The meme offers models neglected by social scientists. The meme offers models couched in the disciplinary language of the biological sciences. Can a meme be accounted for by way of a Darwinian model of descent with modification, in the normal context of cultural selection? Yes, a meme is a replicator that survives only because it replicates. Therefore, the differential replication of memes offers a scientific image for cultural evolution.

0180 The relation between what is and what ought to be passes from biological evolution (“Bacteria”) to the pinnacle of human creative engineering (“Bach”) and back to cultural evolution (“and Back”).

0146 Here is a picture.

0181 If this judgment serves as a sign-vehicle for an interventional sign, then the resulting sign-object is a scientific account of the evolution of human brains (SO_i).

Part III of Dennett’s book is titled, “Turning Our Minds Inside Out”.

Inside is the noumenon, the thing itself, the human mind.

Outside is a scientific model of a brain, the observable and measurable conjurer of the thing itself.

Or do I have that backwards?

Does the mind conjure the brain?

Or does the brain conjure the mind?

0182 Here is a picture of Dennett’s work as a meme.

12/5/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 18 of 20)

0183 If human culture is to be modeled as the replicative success of memes, then what would empirio-schematic researchentail?

Well, if the term, “meme”, labels a cultural adaptation_2b, in the normal context of cultural selection_3b operating on various affordances_1b, then the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a must relate to the scholastic interscope of how humans think_2a.

Indeed, I may highlight one particular element in the scholastic interscope_2a, the species impressa_2a, as the premier feature of the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a.

0184 But, didn’t I offer the above content-level actuality_2a as a technical definition for the term, “meme”?

So, how can the term, “meme”, also stand for a situation_b-level actuality₂ in the normal context of cultural selection_3b?

If that is not confusing enough, consider that the content-level actuality_2a also belongs to the manifest image (which is described by all three actualities of the scholastic interscope).

Plus, we are conscious of a manifest image, not its scientific image.

0185 Consciousness is the user-illusion of competition among neurons for active synapses_3b. Synaptic networks form and are maintained in response to memes. The qualia that we feel are most likely memes, sign-objects of interventional signs substantiating sign-vehicles of specifying signs.

Consequently, another term for [substance] is [implicit abstraction]. The sign-objects of interventional signs (SO_i) are like matter. The sign-vehicles of specifying signs (SV_s) are like form.

So, a meme may be denoted as SO_i [implicit abstraction] SV_s.

0186 Another word for [substance] might be, “projection”.

In projection, the situation-level potential_1b projects continuity into the content-level contiguity.

For example, there is no motion in cinema. There is only a rapid sequence of images cast upon a screen. The user illusion projects (or implicitly abstracts) smooth motion in time. This is only possible if the situation allows it.

Similarly, there is no sweetness to the fact that the neighbor’s cat is dead. There is only a corpse in the refrigerator and Daisy’s querying gaze, asking, “When are you going to give the dead cat back to me?”

So, the term, “meme”, also labels a neural network_2b, in the normal context of neural selection_3b operating on the potential of creating and destroying synapses_1b, in the process of situating a species impressa_2a.

But, once again, didn’t I offer the above content-level actuality_2a as a technical definition for the term, “meme”?

Yes, but neural networks are clearly implicated, since they constitute the adaptation_2b, and the adaptation is um… what?… a meme?

0187 If that is not enough, the designs of the most intelligent human designer cannot be compared to the adaptivity that arises from a variation of Darwinian natural selection operating on units of culture, in all their varieties. Why? There is always a cultural… er… cognitive space that even the most neurotic and attentive-to-detail engineer cannot plan for.

Consequently, cultural selection_3b yields memes that survive and flourish on their own and some of these memes are so strange and resilient that they appear miraculous, even to the positivist intellect. Therefore, they must be ruled out as “not scientific”.

0188 Here is one confounded empirio-schematic judgment characterizing this discussion.

Here is another.

12/4/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 19 of 20)

0189 In Dennett’s version of the evolution of our minds, consciousness and user-end illusion coincide. There is no example greater than the musical memes concocted by Johann Sebastian Bach.

Tunes are memes.

0190 Words are memes.

When it comes to spoken words, sometimes the less said, the better. Fewer words allow the user to engage neurons with less forward guidance. Clues to the content-level normal context_3a and potential_1a are not present to guide the evolution of an adaptive perception_2b.

So, when I go to the neighbor, to present the dead cat, and to confess Daisy’s guilt, I only say, “I took Daisy off her leash this morning and she got away and killed your cat. Here it is. If you want me to bury it, then I will. If you want me to buy you a new cat, I will.”

0191 Then she starts to cry and says, “It’s not my cat. It’s my mother’s.”

Her mother died around five years ago.

The man who I thought was her husband? That is her brother. Her brother and her lived with mother until her death. Mother would not let her children go. She would not let anything go. She was a maven of the world and her concerns were with the world. She was an activist who took her children to demonstrations in order to signal that she, above all, cared for the children. Her last request to her daughter? Take care of the cat.

0192 My neighbor continued her tale.

The old house was too full of mother’s memes… er… memories of her mother. So, she and her brother agreed to sell the old house and to move somewhere new. They bought the house next door to mine.

Soon, her brother realizes that this is his opportunity to construct a life of his own. That is why he comes by with less and less frequency. The verge is overgrown. Her brother is engaged to be married. He has made a down-payment on a house in a different neighborhood.

0193 No, that is not her cat. It is her mother’s. I can go and bury it. She does not want another.

After a pause, I say, “This Sunday, do you mind coming to church with me? Service is at nine o’clock. I can come by at eight-thirty.”

0194 The words that I speak are memes, units of culture, pieces of semantic information, offering something that makes a difference, a novel affordance, a clue to what is happening_3a and a new sense that something can happen_1a. The reason that these memes are present, at this moment, is not because the words want to replicate, but because I want the words to bear a meaning, a presence and a message.

0195 Just as a biologist reflects upon an adaptation_2b, according to a normal context_3b and potential_1b, in order to become aware of the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a, my neighbor will reflect on the phantasm_2b that adapts to this moment and provides an illusion_3b of consciousness_1b. The entire scholastic interscope_2a comes alive. What is happening_3a? What does it mean to me_3b? Does this make sense_3c?

12/4/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 20 of 20)

0196 Razie Mah offers three masterworks on human evolution.

The Human Niche concerns the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

An Archaeology of the Fall dramatizes the first singularity, the transition from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.

How To Define The Word “Religion” concerns our current Lebenswelt.

These works sustain this examination of Dennett’s book.

0197 In these blogs, the term, “meme”, is technically defined using the scholastic interscope for how humans think. This interscope is also in play in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”. A “meme” corresponds to a species impressa_2a with a hylomorphic structure whereby the sign-object of an interventional sign substantiates a sign-vehicle for a specificative sign.

0198 According to Dennett, a spoken word is a good example of a meme.

Notably, our current Lebenswelt must face the question, asking, “What is the nature of spoken words?”

Why?

Spoken words facilitate explicit abstraction, while hand-talk words allow only implicit abstraction. We innately expect that spoken words image and point to their referents. But, they do not. Symbols are natural signs whose sign-objects are defined by convention, habit, law, tradition and so on. Yet, no hand-talk language has words that can picture or indicate these terms. “Convention”, “habit”, “law” and “tradition” label explicit abstractions that cannot be articulated using hand talk. They may exist, but cannot be named, while using hand talk.

0199 Recall that actualities₂ are encountered.

Such actualities₂ are understood by ascertaining an appropriate normal context₃ and potential₁.

0200 How To Define The Word “Religion” applies these lessons to a familiar and contentious term. This examination of Dennett’s book applies these lessons to the word, “meme”.

Here is a picture.

0201 The message? The meme exemplifies cultural evolution.

The presence? The meme embodies neural selection.

The meaning? A scientific image of the word, “meme”, should overlay what is going on in my mind, that is, the manifest image. My consciousness is an user-end illusion produced by the message and the presence of cultural and neural selection.

0202 My thanks to the author. This well-documented work conveys that impression that inquiry into memes may account for the evolution of the human mind. Whether this impression is productive or unproductive depends on how one defines the word, “meme”.

12/1/23

Information on the Series: Phenomenology and the Positivist Intellect

In the Fall of 2021, the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly publishes three essays on phenomenology. Each author asks, “Why does phenomenology exclude other philosophical traditions, such as Thomism, when they share similar concerns?” The essays are not only remarkable for what they say, they are also remarkable for what they do not say. None mention natural science.

Of course, this lacunae demands exploration. Edmund Husserl (1856-1938 AD) lives in the heyday of modern science. He calls for a “return to the noumenon”. He names his method, “phenomenological reduction”. So, phenomenology concerns the noumenon and its phenomena.

The series on empirio-schematics serves as a resource. The noumenon and its phenomena appear in the Positivist’s judgment, initially derived in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy.

Contributions to this series are listed below, in order of production. Most are available at smashwords and other electronic book vendors. Those that appear on the blog at www.raziemah.com are noted, along with dates.

Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions” (e-article, note on blog September 2021)

Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean-Luc Marion and … First Philosophy” (e-article, note on blog October 2021

Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology” (e-article, note on blog October 2021)

Comments on Jack Reynolds’ Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”. (e-article, note on blog March 2022)

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (blog only, www.raziemah.com, April 2022)

11/30/23

Looking at Andrew Ter Ern Loke’s Book (2022) ” The Origin of Humanity and Evolution” (Part 1 of 22)

0001 The book under examination is published by T&T Clark in New York, London and Dublin, carries an ISBN number: 978-0-5677-0635-5, and presents the full title of The Origin of Humanity and Evolution: Science and Scripture in Conversation.

This examination considers the book from the point of view of Razie Mah’s three masterworks, The Human Niche, An Archaeology of the Fall and How To Define The Word “Religion”, corresponding to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, the first singularity and our current Lebenswelt, respectively.

Needless to say, in this volume, Andrew Ter Ern Loke is not aware of the scientific proposals offered by Razie Mah’s masterworks. His goal is to formulate a point of view whereby the role of Adam and Eve in Augustine’s Christian tradition does not contradict the modern view of human evolution, which is surpassed by Razie Mah’s corrective.

The goal of this examination is to show that Loke intimates the proposed scientific corrective, even though he is unaware of its existence.

0002 According to the back cover, in 2022, Andrew Ter Ern Loke is an associate professor at Hong Kong Baptist University. In the acknowledgements, the author thanks scientists, philosophers, a historian of science, biblical scholars and theologians for helpful discussions. Among the list is William Lane Craig, whose recent book, The Historical Adam, is reviewed in November 2022 in Razie Mah’s blog.

Loke’s book is dedicated to a computational biologist, Joshua Swamidass, who proposes a technical solution that permits all humans to descend from one male, named “Adam”, and that one “Adam” corresponds to the one mentioned in Genesis 2.4 on.

0003 Technical solution?

There are two stories of human origins in the formerly Christian West, the Christian ones are found in Genesis and the modern Western ones concern the scientific disciplines of natural history, genetics and archaeology. So the question arises, asking, “How do these match?”

They would match if “Adam” is the first human. After all, the name, “adamah”, is ambiguous, referring to humankind, the male of the species, as well as one apparently ill-fated fellow once living on an island, in a special place called, “Eden”, near the confluence of four rivers, including the Tigris and Euphrates.

0004 Unfortunately, the scientific discipline of genetics rules out that option. Adam and Eve are not the first pair of humans. Contemporary human population genetics shows no sharp bottleneck that would correspond to a single pair as the first humans (as proposed by Saint Augustine, over 1600 years ago, during the twilight of the Roman Empire). This lack of correspondence opens the opportunity for other technical solutions, such as the genealogical approach by Joshua Swamidass and the approach formulated in Loke’s book. Neither Swamidass nor Loke propose that Adam and Eve are the first humans. Loke designates Adam as “God’s Image Bearer” and works from there.

0005 Here is a different way to look at the issue.

Imagine a map of the Nile, running up through Africa to the Mediterranean Sea. Now, pick up a mental pencil and relabel parts of the great river.

0006 The first chapter of Genesis is the upper reaches of the southern Nile, with the great lake, named “Victoria” (to those who speak English). Genesis 2.4-10 is like the lower reaches of the northern Nile, ending in the magnificent delta. The Mediterranean is where history begins.

Imagine that there is a great waterfall between the upper and lower reaches, instead of a series of impassable rapids. Upland from the waterfall is the time of De Nile. Downland from the waterfall is the time of DeNial. The waterfall is the first singularity.

A traveler, starting at the falls, can theoretically walk in both directions, along De Nile or along DeNial. But, there is the challenge of the descent and the ascent. Looking from the top of the falls, one cannot see the bottom. Looking from the bottom of the falls, one cannot see the top. However, at either location, the traveler knows that there must be a bottom and there must be a top.

Well, the traveler does not really know for certain.

The traveler only looks down from the top or up from the bottom and makes a guess about the other realm.

0006 As if to repeat the pattern, Loke’s book takes a turn near the middle of the text, in section five of chapter five, carrying the title, “The Image of God”.

Loke writes that Adam and Eve, labeled by God as “Image Bearers of God”, are the first human beings. This does not require them to be the first anatomically modern humans or the genetic founders of all humans. Rather, the key issue is how humans are defined.

0007 It is sort of like that imaginary waterfall.

If one stands upstream, which is highland and south, human beings are defined by the scientific scenario summarized in section 5.1.

If one stands downstream, which is lowland and north, various philosophers and religious traditions offer opinions as to what humans are. Loke mentions Plato, Aristotle, Upanishadic Hinduism, Buddhism, Marxism, existentialism, sociobiology and contemporary philosophy. Each has a unique definition of “the human”.

The waterfall is neither upstream nor downstream. The waterfall is contiguous with both.

How does this division within continuity work?

0008 The Greimas square may assist. The Greimas square is a purely relational structure that is useful for discerning a constellation of meanings that surround a particular spoken term.

A century ago, the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure proposed that spoken language consists in two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole (French for “talk”) and langue (French for “language”). One system is external. Parolecan be scientifically observed and measured. Langue is internal, only certain changes in physiological conditions can be observed and measured.

0009 So, the question arises, “How does one define any particular spoken phrase or word?”

That is the subject of Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0010 Happily, for this examination, there is method that respects the purely relational configuration posed by Saussure.

That method is the Greimas square.

0011 Here is a picture.

0012 The focal term goes with A.

The first contrast of A that comes to mind enters B.

Then, a term that contradicts B goes into C. The term, “contradicts”, may be transliterated into “speaks against”. So, C speaks against B. Then, one finds that C complements A.

Finally, a contrast that comes to mind with C goes into D. Then, one should find that D speaks against A and complements B.

0013 The Greimas square is a probe of the terms that are adjacent to (or metaphorically “near”) a focal term (A).

0014 The following figure applies to Loke’s discussion of Adam and Eve as the first “Image Bearers of God”.

0015 We are the descendants of Adam (A), so we are heir to his title, “Image Bearer of God”.

But, there is a problem. Adam falls. So do we.

In contrast, many philosophies and traditions define who we are (B) without regard to God’s original appellation.

Speaking against the philosophers and traditionalists, Adam is the first holding the title (C), which will be passed on to the rest of humanity by means that are not genetic. So, despite all other opinion, Adam is… er, at least… was… until, you know, the unfortunate incident… the first bearer of this title. I suppose he never lost the title…

…he just made a bad decision that doomed all of subsequent humanity.

In contrast, the Biblical use of adam (technically, “adamah”) is a pun which means “earth man” or “humanity” (D).

This raises the question as to whether adam as humanity (D) contradicts (A) humans labeled as the Image Bearers of Godand complements (B) “humans” defined by philosophers and other religious traditions.

I suppose that one could argue for “yes”, as well as “no”.

0016 As it turns out, the metaphor of a map of the Nile River, altered by a number 2 pencil, also fits into a Greimas square.

11/29/23

Looking at Andrew Ter Ern Loke’s Book (2022) ” The Origin of Humanity and Evolution” (Part 2 of 22)

0017 What is a Lebenswelt?

A Lebenswelt is German for a “living world”.

0018 In chapter three, Loke discusses the time spans of creation. The universe is around 14Byr (billions of years old). The Earth is 4.5Byr. If the solar system rotates around the galactic center every 250 million years, then the solar system has completed only 18 orbits of the galactic center. The solar system is 18 galactic years old.

Does that seem old?

0019 Could there be an eyewitness to the evolutionary construction of our home, the Earth?

Plus, why would an eyewitness portray the vision as a sequence of seven days?

The answer to the second question is straightforward. The Creation Story, the first chapter of Genesis, is used to establish the sabbath as the day of the Lord. Work six days and rest, along with God, on the seventh. If someone loses count, watch the phases of the moon. The heavens keep track of time. Time passes on Earth, as it does in heaven.

0020 The Creation Story takes us far upstream the river of time, to long before De Nile. Loke quotes Saint Augustine, asking what kind of days are these. They defy our sensibilities and challenge our imagination. The Young Earth Creations reply, saying, “These are literal days, with evening and morning.”

So, they could belong to a visionary.

0021 To me, the first chapter of Genesis belongs to our current Lebenswelt, yet looks past its beginning (which I call, “the first singularity”) into the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. It is a recital, in speech-alone talk, describing a sequence of… can I say?.. developments that could not be witnessed by a person, except as a series of visions.

Here is a Greimas square where the Creation Story is the focus of attention.

The final term, D, contrasts with C, speaks against A and complements B.

D contrasts with C because it is like a formal cause compared to C as a final cause.

D speaks against A in that the story does not proclaim itself to be a vision. How can it be a vision if the Genesis text does not say that it is a vision? Well, some Biblical scholars say that the Creation Story is something like a vision. It is the construction of the Temple of the Heavens and the Earth.

Finally, D complements B, because the first chapter of Genesis is one of the oldest written origin stories known to scholars. In fact, archaeologists conclude that the literary style of the Creation Story is very much in tune with other written religious proclamations of the ancient Near East. The first chapter of Genesis may be older than writing.

0022 And, that brings me back to the term, “Lebenswelt”.

The animal version of this word is “Umwelt”, technically defined as the world of significance for any particular animal. The dog’s Umwelt is full of aromas. The bat’s Umwelt is full of acoustic echoes. The eagle’s Umwelt includes tiny clues to the motion of animals through grass. The human’s Umwelt includes all of nature, plus ourselves. As soon as hominins start walking on two feet, their hands are free to gesture to one another. So begins the evolution of our Lebenswelt, our world of significance. Our Lebenswelt includes both nature and culture. The German word, “Lebenswelt”, transliterates into “living world”.

0023 According to Razie Mah’s masterwork, The Human Niche (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), the human niche consists of the potential of triadic relations. Signs are triadic relations. So are category-based nested forms. Consequently, our Lebenswelt is perfused with signs and category-based nested forms (which can be proto-semiotic). Sign-processing is one of the key hominin adaptations.

0024 So, a question arises, “Is the first chapter of Genesis a sign of the evolutionary record?”

Loke does not address this question.Nevertheless it bears on his discussion on the time spans of geological and biological evolution in contrast to the days of creation.

11/28/23

Looking at Andrew Ter Ern Loke’s Book (2022) ” The Origin of Humanity and Evolution” (Part 3 of 22)

0025 Is Genesis 1 a sign of the evolutionary record?

If it is, then it is a sign composed of signs.

In other words, the answer is not straightforward.

0026 Charles Peirce (1839-1914 AD), the founder of postmodern semiotics, defined a sign as a triadic relation. A sign-relation consists of a sign-vehicle, a sign-object and a sign-interpretant.

Here is a picture of the sign-relation.

An encountered thing (sign-vehicle) stands for the hylomorphe, matter [substantiates] form (sign-object) in regards to Aristotle’s natural philosophy (sign-interpretant).

On the surface, the sign-vehicle associates to Peirce’s category of firstness, which contains only one element (however complex that element may be). For example, an image or a person belongs to the category of firstness (there is only one of them) and may serve as a sign-vehicle. Firstness is the realm of possibility.

On the surface, the sign-object associates to Peirce’s category of secondness, which contains two contiguous real elements. Perhaps the most famous example is Aristotle’s hylomorphe. Matter and form are two real contiguous elements. According to my nomenclature, the contiguity is placed in brackets. In the previous figure, I use the term, “substance”, to label the contiguity between matter and form. Secondness is the realm of actuality.

On the surface, the sign-interpretant associates to Peirce’s category of thirdness, which contains three elements, one belonging to each category. Thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness. Thirdness is the realm of signs, normal contexts, mediations, judgments and so on.

0027 So, why the qualifier, “on the surface”?

Take a look at the sign-vehicle. Obviously, the sign-vehicle should belong to firstness, because it makes the sign-relation possible. At the same time, the sign-vehicle is an encountered thing. So, it must belong to the realm of actuality. The sign-vehicle must be so actual as to trigger the operation of a sign-interpretant. For example, a silver coin (sign-vehicle) stands for the metal silver [substantiating] a round imprinted form (sign-object) in regards to an Aristotelian view of money (sign-interpretant). Come to think of it, the sign object also belongs to the realm of actuality.

0028 Why is the triadic structure of the sign-relation important?

Both Genesis One and the evolutionary record are actual. Yet, on the surface, the Creation Story associates to firstness and the scientific evolutionary record associates to secondness. So, the former should be taken as a sign-vehicle and the latter should be regarded as a sign-object.

What do these associations imply?

Genesis One is a sign of the evolutionary record.

So, in a day-age association, the day corresponds to a passage in the Genesis text and the age corresponds to a period in the evolutionary record. The day is the sign-vehicle and the age is the sign-object. The sign-interpretant will rely on a sign-typology based on natural signs.

0028 To start, here are the day-age associations for days one through three.

0029 Here are the day-age associations for days four through six.

0030 Here are the verse-age associations for the creation of humans in the image of God.

0031 The first chapter of Genesis concludes with a sign of the Developed Neolithic, setting the stage for a second creation of humans, starting with Genesis 2.4.

0032 The Genesis day is the sign-vehicle. The corresponding scientific epoch is the sign-object.

What about the sign-interpretant?

Peirce identifies three types of natural sign, based on the categorical qualities of the sign-object.

For an icon, the sign-object carries the categorical qualities of firstness. So, I read a Genesis verse as a picture of the corresponding epoch.

For an index, the sign-object carries the categorical qualities of secondness. So, I read a Genesis verse as something that points to a characteristic of the corresponding epoch, especially in regards to what the visionary must be wondering about the ongoing revelation. An index points to the location of the witness. The Genesis statements about morning and evening are indexes.

For a symbol, the sign-object carries the categorical qualities of thirdness. So, I read a Genesis verse in terms of convention. The declaration at the end of most days, where God declares the day, “good”, associates with symbols.

0033 Here is a list of the three types of natural sign.

0034 For example, in day four, the text points to a visionary, located on the surface of the Earth, looking up, and witnessing the haze of the atmosphere of the early Earth clear away as the atmosphere increases in oxygen content.

Here is a picture of the associations, based on sign-typology as the sign-interpretant.

0035 In sum, in day four, the stars, planets, moon and sun become visible.

11/27/23

Looking at Andrew Ter Ern Loke’s Book (2022) ” The Origin of Humanity and Evolution” (Part 4 of 22)

0036 Of course, none of this sign business shows up in Loke’s chapter three, concerning the time span of creation, or chapter four, concerning the process of evolutionary creationism.

Nonetheless, the sign business is relevant because we are moving upstream from the falls along the metaphorical Nile. Yes, this is the one on the map that we altered with a pencil.

0037 We regard the seven days of creation (A), while looking though abstractions that are typical of our current Lebenswelt (B). In doing so, we cross a epistemological boundary between scripture and science (C), which must imply that a conversation may take place. But, can a conversation proceed if one of the conversants says that each Genesis day is literally true and is composed of what we current label a “day”? Yes, if the Creation Story is a sequence of visions (D).

0038 Here is a picture of the corresponding Greimas square.

0039 The focus is the first Genesis Creation Story (A, sign-vehicle).

The contrast is the idea that each day keys into Peirce’s typology of natural signs (B, sign-interpretant).

The actual correspondences (C) speak against the idea (B), just as any application of an idea speaks against the idea. Since when are ideas perfectly applied?

0040 For example, the end of day three associates with the earliest photosynthetic life, which looks like slime. Yes, mats of green or red or purple slime, bearing according to their slimes. So, the visionary must be a little perplexed.

In day three, the Genesis text breaks the previous pattern, by mentioning two creations in one day. The associations are to the formation of the earliest continents and to the earliest appearance of life on Earth, which includes photosynthetic bacteria, which form colorful mats on most anything wet. In fact, the slime looks like anything but fruit trees bearing fruit and plants bearing seed. These bacteria do not have chloroplasts, the photosynthetic organelle in almost all multicellular plants. They are the precursors to chloroplasts.

0041 Consequently, the application of the idea of sign typology requires some interpretive flexibility.

0042 But, that does not mean that the interpretant of sign-typology does not work. Rather, the idea seems even more promising, because the vision (D) is necessarily mind-boggling.

0043 Consider three titles.

The Creation Story and Evolution

Genesis One As A Sign of the Evolutionary Record

The Creation of Man and Human Evolution

These titles are over twenty years old.

Yet, they are as fresh as the dawn of a new Age of Understanding.