0778 What does this day:age scenario do, besides re-describing the noumena and the phenomena of human evolution, as currently elaborated by genetics and natural history?

Shall I consult the optics of Tabaczek’s mirror?

0779 Is the focus is on the six days of creation or the scientific study of evolution?

Well, in a day:age comparison, then it must be the former, no?

Or, must it be the latter?

Perhaps, I should think in terms of the interventional sign.  If the sign-object is the thing that I recognize_2b, and I recognize the text before_2b me as the first chapter of Genesis, then I sense that the sign-vehicle is in the mind of God_2c, because only God could have witnessed the evolutionary development of our world.

0780 Say what?

Is the first chapter of Genesis the interventional sign-object_2a (SO_i) of the evolutionary record as an interventional sign-vehicle_2c (SV_i)?

Is Genesis One a sign-object (SO_i) of the evolutionary record (SV_i)?

0781 An affirmative answer suggests that evolution is in the mind of God_2c.

And, that is a little confusing.

0782 If advocates of science have their way, then scientific models should overlay the noumenon, the thing itself.  Such an overlay buries various metaphysical implications of the noumenon, while simultaneously exploiting human interest in metaphysical implications.

Does that make sense?

If not, then welcome to the modern world.

0783 On top of that, if the scientific scenario is regarded as the noumenon then the noumenon [is objectified by] phenomena of the evolutionary record.

Typically, a noumenon, the thing itself, [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena, its observable and measurable facets.

For example, consider a fork.  The noumenon of a fork [cannot be objectified as] the phenomena of a fork, such as its dimensions, composition, tensile strength and so on.

I mention this because in the multicourse meal that the author is presenting, the waiter has taken my fork along with the empty first plate, and just brought me a second fork, for the second plate.

0784 Here is a picture of the optics of Tabaczek’s mirror for this application, so far.

0785 Tabaczek opens chapter five, titled “Aquinas and Evolution”, by claiming that chapter four shows that Thomistic theology is open to evolution.

Unfortunately, this examiner devoured that dish and already digested it by presenting a surprisingly evocative day:age correlation using Aquinas’s key terms.

Fortunately, Tabaczek is in the kitchen, and is not aware of the digestive prowess of some of his readers.

0786 So let me continue.

If a theology^agent constructs a day:age scenario using Aquinas’s key terms embedded in a Peircean category-based nested form, then the resulting work of art is as evocative as any Paleolithic cave painting.

How so?

Take a look at some examples of paleolithic art, such as the unbelievable cave paintings, rendered tens of thousands of years ago at Lascaux.

A modern cannot explicitly abstract these expressions, because these expressions belong to an interventional sign, where an evaluator’s recognition of say, particular species within a cave painting, seems to be a content-level sign object_2a and the sign-vehicle resides in the mind of the Paleolithic “artists”_2c.

0787 Here is a picture.

0788 What is going on in the minds of the paleolithic people who rendered those cave-paintings?

Do models based on evolutionary psychology account for what is going on?

Or is creativity embedded in having two ways of talking in one language?

The hand-component of hand-speech talk images and indicates its referent, so the referent ontologically precedes the word.

The speech-component of hand-speech talk does not violate this ontological reality.  However, it adds a caveat, because the spoken word cannot picture or point to its referent.  For spoken words, the word ontologically precedes its referent.

Paleolithic art expresses the referentiality of hand-talk and the ontological sleight-of-hand of speech-talk.  Modern viewers recognize the types of creatures portrayed in cave paintings.  At the same time, the images, the place, the atmosphere and the flicker of a small fat-burning flame speak to the viewer.  They say, “Hear our song!”

0789 The second plate of Tabaczek’s theological banquet (B1) arrives.

The aroma moves me from the issues of paleolithic art, to the topic at hand.

0790 Now, that the positivist intellect is dead, but not really gone, scientific researchers in the various evolutionary sciences (A1) project their models, woven into a scientific scenario, onto the noumenon, the thing itself (D2), and, almost magically, the scientific scenario is objectified by phenomena of the evolutionary record (D2). 

0791 Typically, a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena.  This hylomorphe stands as what is in the (now defunct) Positivist’s judgment.  Too bad the positivist intellect is no longer in control.

What is associates to the realm of possibility, because a noumenon and its phenomena are… well… the same entity.  There are no two real elements.  There is only one, viewed from two points of view.  A noumenon is the thing as a metaphysician sees it.  Its phenomena are the thing’s observable and measurable facets.  With luck, the resulting observations and measurements can be used to build a model, using scientific disciplinary language.

0792 What does this imply?

The projection of evolutionary science subject-matter (A1) into the mirror of theology (D2) produces the “evolutionary” of “evolutionary (D2) creation (B3)”, consisting of the Christian doctrine of creation (the noun, B3) modified by scientific models pretending to be the thing itself (the adjective, D2).

0793 Tabaczek’s project start fresh (B1), taking the pretense in the mirror of theology (D2) and using the terminology of Aquinas to fashion… well… not the day:age association that I just revealed… but… the possibility that such a day:age association or other associations can be fashioned at all.

Here is a picture of Tabaczek’s second plate.

0794 As already noted, Tabaczek has good reason to imagine that his course of renewal will be regarded as a culinary… er… intellectual success.

Or should I say, “glorious success”?

In biological evolution, metaphysics is intrinsic to the single actuality in the intersection between adaptation_2H and phenotype_2V.

Plus, in other sciences, intersections occur as well.

For example, light is the intersection of particle physics and wave physics.  The formation of solar systems may turn out to be an intersection between gravity & angular momentum and the electromagnetism produced by the motion of charged particles.  The degassing of rocky planets may entail another intersection, say between chemical phase transitions and collision mechanics.  The list goes on.

Plus, the hylomorphic structure of all things offers promise.  As already portrayed, the actuality of each day of creationmay be portrayed as the hylomorphic structure of seed [contiguity] principle.

0795 In short, Tabaczek aims to put “theism” into the mirror of science in such a way that researchers in the evolutionary disciplines cannot ignore.

0796 He offers a number of the main postulates for a Thomistic version of theistic (C2) evolution (A3).

0797 Here is my reading of each item.

First, pay attention to models generated by the evolutionary sciences (A1).  Pay particular attention to models in natural history and genetics.

Second, ask questions.  Do these models correspond to what the believer expects to see in the mirror of theology (D2)?  Does the scientist project the image of a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena.  Or does the advocate of science overlay the noumenon with models, so that models may be regarded as the thing itself, in which case the model-manifesting thing itself [can be objectified by] its evolutionary phenomena?

Third, after examining the image in the mirror of theology for biological evolution (D2), the tehologian (B3) should consider evolutionary phenomena as both matter [substance] form  and disposition [property] powers.  In short, the theologian works with the intersection of body development_3V and natural selection_3H.  So, the image in the mirror of theology (D2) transforms from either natural history or genetics to both (C3).

Yes, the noumenon, species, is the single actuality that is the intersection of phenotype_2V and adaptation_2H.

Fourth, other aspects of Thomist philosophy concerning the doctrine of creation come into play.  Chapter four includes discussion of the six days of creation in the first chapter of Genesis.

In sum, the theologian (B3) starts over (B1′) by reconfiguring what he sees in the mirror of theology (D2).

0798 If I place the day:age scenario from points 0762 to 0777 in for B1, I arrive at an application of these four points.

0799 In order to constellate the “theism” of “theistic (C2′) evolution (A3′)”, something must appear in the mirror of science (C2′).

That ‘something’ (C2′), must reflect a theological construction (B1′), which is, in this instance, a day:age scenarioutilizing Augustine’s notion of rationes seminales.

At the same time, that ‘something’ (C2′) should be engage the evolutionary scientist (A3′), indirectly nullifying his (A1) original image of an evolutionary model overlaying the noumenon in the mirror of science (B2).

0800 In this instance, the day:age correlation_2a triggers the concept of an interventional sign-vehicle_2c.  This interventional sign-relation becomes ‘something’ that may appear in the mirror of science (C2′).

0801 The scientist (A3′) cannot ignore the image in the mirror of science (C2′).

The interventional sign-relation defines humans as semiotic animals.

See Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animals” appearing in Razie Mah’s blog for October, 2023.

How does the interventional sign-relation become innate in humans?

An answer (A3′) should produce a fascinating reflection in the mirror of theology (D4′).

Thus, the optics of theistic evolution in Tabaczek’s mirror challenges the theologian (B) and the scientist (A) in ways that evolutionary creation does not.

0802 At the end of the second plate, Tabaczek responds to an objection (section 5.3).

Fortunately (for me), the objection comes from a fellow Thomist, Michal (in English, Michael) Chaberek.  Razie Mah has already considered one of Chaberek’s articles.  See Comments on Michal Chaberek’s Essay (2019) “Classical Metaphysics and Theistic Evolution”, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

Unfortunately (for me), I suspect that Tabaczek may object to my examination of Chaberek’s work.

But, why should I worry?

Tabaczek is in the kitchen and I am on the third… or is it the fourth plate?… of his intellectual banquet.

So, to me, I hear Tabaczek’s objection.  But, I am like a patron sitting in a restaurant when a little squabble takes place in the kitchen.  I cannot frame the dispute very well.  But, I hear raised voices and I know it is everyone in the kitchen potentially has a knife.

0803 The kerfluffle concerns the definition of the term, “species”.

Tabaczek offers a list of the categories of interest.

I present my own list.  As soon as the list meets the reader’s eyes, the reader should know where I am going with this.

0804 Of course, items two through five may be regarded as a manifestation of item one.

I wonder, “Does Chaberek conflate items two through five with term one?  Does he fail to differentiate items two through five sufficiently?”

Who cares?  The fourth plate still tastes great.  Plus, it shows the difficulties faced by the proponents of theistic evolution.  

0805 Here is the Greimas square.

When a science^agent (A) looks at the image of theology^agent in the science^mirror (C), he sees “biblical kinds”.

Oh, “biblical kinds” are not scientific.  Therefore, the term can be readily ignored.

0806 To me, this indicates that, despite Tabaczek’s objection to Chaberek’s apparent misconceptions, the advocates of theistic evolution need to choose their intellectual battles carefully.

0807 Chapter six of Theistic Evolution is titled, “Evolution and Creation”.

If evolutionary processes and transformations (A1) occur throughout the history of the created universe (D2), then we (B3) should treat evolutionary processes as an integral part of divine governance of the created world (B3), leading to its eschatological fulfillment (C4).

0808 Should we treat evolutionary processes (A) as intrinsic to God’s creation (D)?

Or should we (B) consider Thomistic terms, such as creatio ex nihilo, creatio continua, rationes seminales, transformation and governance as intrinsic to evolution (C)?

Ah, I am thrown back to a point well before Tabaczek’s banquet.

In the Greimas square, C qualifies A and D qualifies B.

Which will I follow, evolutionary creation or theistic evolution?

Uh-oh, I am starting to feel that I am going to be handed a bill for the meal.

Pay the bill before dessert?

0809 What on earth will dessert be?

Will it consist in the way that the meaning of nature is compounded with the presence of God and the message that the creation (that is, nature itself) is not God?

This is precisely what my impression of the Creation Story offers.

0810 What does the spoken word, “nature” mean₁ when it underlies um… the actuality of what we recognize as things in the world₂.

After all, all natural things have esse_ce and essence.  It is only when their contiguity, their substance, is revealed to be a creation of God that we become aware that all natural things₂ occur in the normal context of God’s word₃, which is also God’s Self-Manifestation_3a, and with the potential₁ of natural meaning.

What is the message of natural meaning?

Nature is not God.I think that may indicate that there will be a decorative swirl in the dessert.

0811 The problem (or is it the bill?) arrives in the next chapter, the seventh, titled Concurrence of Divine and Created Causes in Evolutionary Transitions.

Here is a problem for evolutionary creation (as opposed to theistic evolution).

If a theology^agent (B) uses Aquinas’s distinction between primary and secondary causation to account for the “mechanics” of evolutionary transitions, then the theological account becomes fuzzy, due to a lack of precision in defining secondary causes.

On top of that, the notion of the union of primary and secondary causes in evolutionary transitions, called “divine concurrence” (B), ends up confirming the scientist’s projection of his model into the mirror of theology (D), in so far as God “withdraws” in the face of scientific mathematical and mechanical propositions (C).

Of course, the reflection is reasonable.

Why would God break the rules that God created?

0812 Here is a picture of the resulting Greimas square of Tabaczek’s mirror.

0813 Tabaczek offers a refinement to one exercise in evolutionary creation, in an effort to translate it into an exercise in theistic evolution.

Tabaczek focuses on the slow transition of one species to (say) two species over time, due to (say) a geographical separation of the species induced by a geological barrier.  The two species genetically drift apart due to random walks of DNA modifications. This isolation model relies on the constant production of variability with offspring, with very little natural selection.

The isolation model is one of the favorite explanations for speciation by geneticists, because it relies only on the phenotype side of the intersection for species.  Forget those natural historians with their excursions into nature.  The genetics lab is the place to be.

0814 By now, the reader of this examination is familiar with the use of the Greimas square for elaborating the optics of Tabaczek’s mirror.

It is not perfect.  But, it is certainly suggestive.

Here are the first three steps to evolutionary creationism.

0815 For example, a geneticist models the speciation of isolated populations with simulations of DNA-sequence drift due to random errors induced by extra-terrestrial gamma rays plus random assortment of chromosomes in sexual reproduction.  Actually, one does not really need the gamma rays, but I thought I would throw that in because gamma rays increase modification in the slogan “descent with modification”.

0816 Then, the scientist (A1) looks in the mirror of theology (D2) and declares, “My model is really better than the noumenon of speciation due to geological barriers because it is way more scientific than ‘Hey look, the butterflies on this side of the mountain are different than the ones on the other side.’.”

The evolutionary creationist (B3) then takes what he sees in the mirror of theology (D2) and makes a distinction between transcendent and immanent orders of causation.  The transcendent order associates to primary causation.  The immanent order associates to instrumental and secondary causations.  Instrumental causation goes with the scientific overlay of the noumenon.  Secondary causation goes with the dispositions [properties] powers of the parents and offspring… and well… all the phenomena that go with a single act of “descent with modification”.

0817 Whew!

Was that the dessert?

0818 Tabaczek (B3) concludes that when parental organisms give birth (over time, in section 7.5) to a new exemplar of their own species, the parents act as proper causes (which is basic), secondary causes (of the instantiation of a new essence) and instrumental causes (of the new organism’s esse_ce and essence, that is, the new exemplar itself).

0819 I ask, “What appears in the mirror of science (C4)?”

Here is a picture of the Greimas square.

0820 Yes, dessert tastes like evolutionary creationism.

While I pay the bill, I wonder, “Do all the figures in chapter seven of Theistic Evolution foundationally conform to a category-based nested form?”

0821 My recent encounter with the terms, “primary and secondary causation” suggests the answer is “yes”.

So does the passage, ranging from points 0391 to 0413, concerning the nature of the interventional sign-relation.

Here is the figure presented at that time.

0822 Another instance appears a passage covering points 0582 to 0588 and inspires the following diagram.

0823 What does this imply?

All of Tabaczek’s figures in chapter seven can be reconfigured as category based nested forms.

0159 I suppose that Tabaczek’s element of surprise is precisely the message that all the scientists and most philosophers of science have not received.  No one has gotten the memo.  The positivist intellect is dead.

So, Tabaczek survives and is rewarded his doctoral degree.

0160 So, what does this particular book concern?

The full title is Divine Action and Emergence: An Alternative to Panentheism.

The subtitle reveals Tabaczek’s concern.

0161 Tabaczek wants to establish an Aristotelian alternative to what contemporary science-loving theologians project from the science side of Tabaczek’s mirror into the theological side.

Remember, these science-justifying theologians are looking at their own image.

0162 What do they see?

Is God like the thing itself, a noumenon?

Is the world like its phenomena?

If so, then here is what the theologians on the science side see in Tabaczek’s mirror.

0163 Of course, every Christian theologian will admit that God cannot be objectified as the world.  The theological position that God can be objectified as the world is called pantheism.

But, one wonders, what does the contiguity, [cannot be objectified as], imply?

Remember that hylomorphes belong to Peirce’s category of secondness and that the logics of secondness are that of contradiction and noncontradiction.

Surely, [cannot be objectified as] involves a contradiction that cannot be resolved.

0164 So, is there a metaphor that expresses this type of contradiction?

An obvious metaphor is containment.  What is contained cannot objectify its container.  Wine cannot objectify its bottle.  The stomach cannot objectify Mr. Tummy.

Consequently, a metaphor stands ready at hand to replace the contiguity, [cannot be objectified as].

Here is a picture.

0165 The term, “world in God”, transliterates into the technical label, “panentheism”.

0166 Tabaczek’s introduction summarizes some of the material in Emergence.

Everyday science focuses on “truncated” material and efficient causes.  “Truncated” represents “a divorce from formal and final causation”.

Typically, material causes meet the requirements of formal causes and efficient causes are intentionally bound to final causes.  So “truncated” also implies that a scientist may surreptitiously slip formal and final causes into his models by defining terms in such a way that they appear to describe modern material and efficient factors, while harboring the shadows of the other causalities.

0167 For example, consider the claim that glucose tastes sweet because it is full of calories.

Yes, that sounds like truncated material and efficient causalities.

Plus, there is the added hint of formal (calories is a formal requirement) and final (sweetness is an incentive) causes.

0168 Why do scientists rely on truncated material and efficient causalities?

These serve as constants and variables in mathematical and mechanical models.

Models are what ought to be (secondness) in the empirio-schematic judgment.  The category of secondness is the realm of actuality.  So, oddly enough, models are more actual than observations and measurements (what is, firstness, the realm of possibility).

Here is a picture.

0169 The empirio-schematic judgment describes the actual practices of modern science.  Disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mechanical and mathematical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements (what is, firstness).  Since each element is assigned to one of Peirce’s categories, the judgment is actionable.  An actionable judgment unfolds into a category-based nested form on the basis of the assigned categories.

The empirio-schematic judgment corresponds to what ought to be (secondness) in the Positivist’s judgment, where a positivist intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the monadic “hylomorphe”, a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena (what is, firstness).

The thing itself cannot be objectified as its observable and measurable facets.

0170 Here is a diagram.

0171 Now I have a question concerning ‘what is’ in the Positivist’s judgment.

If hylomorphes exemplify Peirce’s secondness, then why is this “hylomorphe” assigned to the category of firstness?

A hylomorphe may be assigned to firstness, when both sides of the hylomorphe correspond to the same thing.  Why? There is only one (not two) real element(s).  In other words, if there is no noumenon, then there are no phenomena.  If there are no phenomena, then it is doubtful that there is a noumenon.

0172 An apparently sleeping student suddenly raises a hand and asks, “But, if there are phenomena, but there is no noumenon, then can one assign a noumenon and pretend that it is the thing itself?”

Then another student pipes in, “And what about when a noumenon does not have any phenomena, but one is certain that the thing itself must exist?  Based on the conviction that there is a noumenon, can one identify its phenomena?”

0173 Uh-oh.  I should not have asked that question.

Meanwhile, since each element in the Positivist’s judgment is assigned to one of Peirce’s categories, the judgment may “unfold” into a category-based nested form.