Looking at Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions” (Part 2 of 4
0006 The scenario depicted in the prior blog appears in Comments on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”, available for purchase at smashwords.
Search for Razie Mah, Mark Spencer, and phenomenological reductions. The electronic article in smashwords, or some other electronic literature venue, should appear.
0007 The engagement between phenomenology and science is delicate. Phenomenologists attend to the same phenomena as scientists. But, they do not compete with scientists.
Scientists directly situate phenomena using the empirio-schematic judgment (which is first diagrammed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy), in the normal context of a positivist intellect. The positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
Phenomenologists sidestep science, by contemplating phenomena, while reducing their field of consciousness to exclude the machinations of science, among other distractions. The goal is to identify what the thing itself must be, without any metaphysical baggage… er… I mean… terminology. Anything that sounds like metaphysics will raise the ire of scientists.
0008 It is like tiptoeing around a sleeping dog. The metaphorical dog protects science against metaphysics. It has been known to gnaw on the bones of its victims, especially the ones who uttered the word, “hylomorphism”. That word sounds totally metaphysical. “Hyle” is Greek for “matter”. “Morphe” is Greek for “form”.
To the sleeping dog of science, physics is the master of the house.
The master of the house says, “No metaphysics.”