0120 Of course, since Deacon is much more clever than this examiner, Deacon’s preference allows a generalization of the adjusted thermodynamic level.

Here is a picture of the  generalization, along with the hydrogen-oxygen fuel-cell example.

0121 Almost all emergent phenomena are unique, each in its own way.

0122 Does a general description work?

0123 To me, the normal context_3a of the general description (tendency towards equilibrium) fits the normal context_3a of the example (adjusted orthograde reaction).  Without the adjustment, the thermodynamic example is a chemical reaction that releases lots of free energy.  Boom!

In Deacon’s schema, the “downward causation” of situation-level potential_1b is apparent in the content-level adjusted category-based nested form.  There is a certain pedagogic advantage to this.  The method becomes obvious.  The actuality is a contained circulation of ingredients_2a.  Specifically, this corresponds to the construction of the fuel cell itself.  The fuel cell physically separates the oxidation of hydrogen from the reduction of oxygen.

0124 Oh, did I mention that the “contained circulation” and the “physical separation” correspond to Aristotle’s material causes, not divorced from formal cause?

Yes, the material causes are integrated with the formal cause.  In general, the formal cause aims to maintain a tendency towards equilibrium_3a for the circulating ingredients_2a.  For the specific application, this requires the physical separation of the reagents, molecular hydrogen and molecular oxygen, as well as the separation of the sites where electron loss and gain occur.

Tabaczek intuitively couples material and formal causes.  He puts them into the same basket, so to speak, without explaining why.

0125 So, the tendency towards equilibrium_3a is formalized by the way that ingredients are circulated and contained_2abased on the potential of maintaining a displacement from equilibrium_1a.  One efficient cause is obvious in the specific case.  The physical separation_1a of the anode and cathode_2a forces the hydrogen to give up its electrons at the anode and the oxygen to take up its electrons at the cathode.  But, that is not the only efficient cause.  The addition of a polysulfonate barrier, creating a forest of negative charges for positively charged hydrogen ions to enter, improves “the circulation of ingredients”.

0126 The couplings of actuality_2a and potential_1a in the efficient causes cannot be divorced from the final cause, which says, “There is more to the potential that what the scientist maintains.”

Yes, the normal context_3a and potential_1a simultaneously select for and give rise to the actuality_2a.  Darwinian natural selection for multicellular organisms offers an analogy.  On one hand, natural selection selects.  On the other hand, sexual reproduction offers variation.  The logic of normal contexts is to exclude, align or complement.  The logic of potential is to include, even to allow contradictions.  So, in the scientific laboratory, a lot of failed experiments take place before the proper conditions, the proper “containment of circulating ingredients” is isolated within the constraints of the normal context_3a (the scientific question at hand) and out of the ordered chaos of the laboratory_1a (the instruments and equipment at hand).

“Final causes” label the manifestation of an actuality_2a within its normal context_3a and out of its potential_1a.  They also describe intentionality.

0127 The problem?

Final causes are metaphysical.

The ghost of the positivist intellect has a rule, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”

And, that rule spooks the agents on the science side of Tabaczek’s mirror.

That is the specter that fogs their mirror.

0128 Here is the homeodynamic (or situation) level general and specific nested forms.

0129 The fuel cell_3b is the normal context for the example.

Does the fuel cell amplify the non-equilibrium dynamics_3b of the adjusted orthograde reaction_3a?

Of course it does.

0130 Final causes come to the fore.

The normal context of a fuel cell_3b operates on the potential of ‘a contragrade arrangement for the orthograde chemical reaction of molecular hydrogen and molecular oxygen’_1b in order to produce an electric current_2b.

A normal context that amplifies a nonequilibrium dynamic_3b brings an emergent being_2b into relation with the potential of ‘constraints and biases imposed on an orthograde process’_1b.

If I, as a scientist, say, “The contragrade arrangement_1b of the adjusted orthograde reaction_3a explains the emergent phenomenon_2b, the electric current_2b, in terms of instrumental and efficient causality.”, I really am saying, “I have imported the shadow of final causality into my declaration of modern instrumental and efficient causes.”

0131 The emergent phenomena_2b, the electric current_2b, has “a life” of its own, in the sense that it represents the capture of some of the free energy of an orthograde process.  It is a “non-self” self, within the “self” of the entire interscope, the fuel-cell driven motor for sale by corporation A.  The motor dissipates the energy represented by the current and translates it into movement.  So, the power_2c of the emergent being_2b that virtually situates (and emerges from) the fuel cell_2a is dissipated as mechanical movement_2c.  The dissipated power_2c persists as movement_2c.

0132 Here is a picture of the virtual nested form for all three levels in the realm of actuality.

0133 Now, I can look at the emergent phenomenon_2b, as a thing in itself, an actuality that needs to be understood in material terms.  Here, Aristotle’s hylomorphe is a good place to start: matter [substantiates] form.

On one hand, the electrical current_2b is directly contextualized in the normal context of a fuel cell_3b arising from the potential of a contragrade arrangement of hydrogen and oxygen gases_1b.  On the other hand, the emergent phenomenon_2bis part of a grander scheme (or virtual normal context_2c) that formalizes the phenomenon_2b and orders its material_2b(anode, wire, motor, wire, cathode) and efficient (design of fuel cell) causations_2a.

The above nested form portrays the “on the other hand”.

0134 This virtual nested form is such a discovery that Deacon deserves a commendation that philosophers talking about “emergence” and “downward causation” may not deserve.

Deacon presents his discovery entirely within the science side of Tabaczek’s mirror.

Here is a picture.

0135 The “dullard” Tabaczek notices the subtle change and that gives him inspiration.  Deacon clearly (and significantly) alters Aristotelian notions so that formal causes fall under the label of “material” and final causes sort into the title of “efficient”. 

Or something like that.

Nevertheless, when looking into the mirror of natural philosophy, Deacon sees the ghost of the positivist intellect conjuring a smoky image of a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena.

0136 How so?

Well, Deacon (sort of) regards the constraints and biases imposed on the orthograde reaction_1b and the simplifications demanded from the emergent phenomenon_1c as “causes”.

Tabaczek wrestles with this apparent misapplication of the term, “causes”.  Deacon’s “causes” do not seem, at first blush, to correspond to Aristotle’s four causes.

However, if I have learned anything from this examination, it is the following.

0137 First, in emergence, “downward causation” follows the nature of a passage from a lower-level category-based nested form to a higher-level and the subsequent ordering of the lower-level in response to the new situation or new perspective.

Second, in emergence, both the category-based nested forms that compose each horizontal level and the vertical virtual category-based nested forms that compose each vertical column in Tabaczek’s interscope exercise all of Aristotle’s causesin a holistic manner.

0138 With that in mind, I turn to the morphodynamic level.

The morphodynamic level puts the homeodynamic level into perspective, just as the homeodynamic level situates the adjusted thermodynamic level.

0139 Here is a comparison of the general formulation and the ongoing application.

0140 For the example, the dynamic form_3c is the fuel-cell driven motor_3c.

The power_2c of the emergent phenomenon_2b is intentionally dissipated as movement_2c.

So, the example’s potential_1c is ‘mechanical work’.

So, why does Deacon, the Professor Scientist-Educator, choose the label, ‘simpification’_1c?

0141 Perhaps, ‘simplification’_1c better evokes final causality hidden in the shadow of the image of ‘mechanical work’_1c as an efficient cause.

Certainly, it evokes the virtual formal cause that says, “If this fuel cell is going to work for this motor, it had better be both reliable and small.”

0142 What does that call for?

Simplification.

Each feature of the fuel cell adapts to this formal requirement_1c, commanding from its perch as the perspective-level potential_1c.

0143 Indeed, some emergent phenomena_2b, self-less “selves” operating within a even more emergent “self”, are stunning in their simplicity and beauty.  They are amazing in the way that they arise from constraints_1b imposed on processes_2a that would otherwise occur without them.  It is as if a designer sees an opportunity_1b to take a little of that “otherwise” energy_2a and fashion it to produce something that might otherwise not occur_2b.

Emergent phenomena_2b are what we think of when we think about creation. 

0144 Part two of Tabaczek’s book builds a case for the noumenal side of the mirror.

Needless to say, I cover much of this territory during my account of the historical development of Tabaczek’s mirror.

0145 Chapter four presents six theories that associate to emergent phenomena in our world.

When a philosopher of science looks from the empirio-schematic side into Tabaczek’s mirror, the following describes what appears in the looking glass.

Yes, the focus is on emergent phenomena.  The rest of the mirror is clouded by the ghost of the positivist intellect.

0146 Agents on the metaphysical side of the mirror are also not pleased.

In section 4.7, Tabaczek concludes that no current proposal recognizes that emergent phenomena are better described as dispositions [properties] powers, rather than the observable and measurable facets of… what?  What is the thing itself in a world where one emergence is incorporated and taken for granted by another?  When does the scientist realize that emergent phenomena coincide with the dispositions [properties] powers within a noumenon.  Plus, the noumenon is an emergent being.

0147 In particular, inadequate models cannot substitute for the emergent being.

Disciplinary languages bound to truncated material and efficient causalities sneak in the characteristics of formal and final causation, under the table, so to speak.  The contiguity between a noumenon and its dispositions [properties] powersincludes both whole and parts.

Dispositions [properties] powers of parts and whole are what give rise to emergent phenomena that can be observed and measured.

0148 Who do I blame?

The ghost of the positivist intellect?

0397 Tomasello’s book opens with a hypothesis.  Interpendence₂ emerges from (and situates) cooperation₁.  In terms of Tomasello’s vision, interdependence₂ replaces human culture_2b and cooperation_1b virtually situates joint-attention_2a as an adaptation to sociogenesis_1a.  Cooperation_1b may be defined as the potential of joint- and collective-attention_2a.

0398 Of course, the other option is to consider cooperation_2b as an actuality and interdependence_1b as a possibility.

The option that I offer captures Tomasello’s claim that there are two forms to cooperation: mutualistic collaboration andaltruistic helping.  Classical philosophers discuss these two forms in terms of motives.  Mutualistic collaboration harbors a motive for justice (that is, the right, as in “righteous”).  Altruistic helping carries a motive for beneficence (that is, the good).  Yes, philosophers distinguish fairness from sympathy.  Each exhibits is own style of morality, where morality associates with the possibility of what is righteous and good_1b.

0399 So, why say that cooperation_1b is the potential_1b of joint attention_2a?

Joint attention_2a holds the potential of justice and beneficence, the motives for cooperations_1b.

Plus, moral dilemmas reside in the way that interdependence_2b, the actuality emerging from (and situating) cooperation_1b, plays out.

0400 Remember, the sociogenesis_1a of teams entails competition (each member of the team is selected by all others) for the honor of cooperating (that is, manifesting the potential of joint attention_2a).

Hominins compete to cooperate.

Morality plays roles in both competition and cooperation.

Ah, that must mean that morality is embedded in cultural selection_3b.

0400 Tomasello intends to provide an evolutionary account for the natural history of human morality_3b, as the normal context for unique forms of social interaction and organization of the Homo genus_2b (that is, interdependence_2b), emerging from the cultivation of fairness and sympathy_1b (that is, cooperation_1b).

Here are two pictures of one situation-level nested form.

0401 Have Tomasello’s previous books laid the groundwork for an exploration into the natural history of human… or is it?… hominin morality?

So, remember to cross out the word, “human”, and write the word, “hominin”, where “hominin” is technically defined as a human ancestor.

0401 Recall, the natural history of human morality occurs in generations prior to the appearance of anatomically modern humans.  In previous works, Tomasello identifies three eras of intentionality.

Here is a picture.

0402 The era of individual intentionality shows interdependence with respect to family (5) and intimate friends (5).  The band (50) is not interdependent in the same sense of the word.  The band (50) is large enough to deter predators.

0403 The era of joint intentionality begins once bipedal “southern apes” collaborate in order to forage.  The advance is so productive that collaborative foraging becomes obligatory.  Obligatory collaborative foraging is conducted in teams (15).  Teams have more members than family (5) or friends (5) but less than the band (50).

0404 Teams cultivate the capacity for joint attention_2a.  If joint attention_2a is behavioral, then joint or shared intentionality_2a is the corresponding cognitive capacity.  This cognitive capacity is what cognitive psychologists observe in newborns and infants in their experiments in human ontogeny_1c.  This cognitive capacity_2a embodies sociogenesis_1a, where sociogenesis is more subtle than the mere naming of social circles.  Sociogenesis_1a is the potential of um… an actuality independent of the adapting species.

0405 Cooperation_1b requires participants in joint-attention activities_2a to serve different roles while sharing the team’s shared intention_2a… that is… purpose_2a.

Is there a problem?

Free riders must be excluded.

Well, the solution turns out to be remarkably simple.  If an individual does not pull weight, for whatever reason, then the team meets without the slackard.  How simple is that?

Or, should I say, “How awkward is that, especially when the excluded individual discovers the secret that everyone else knows?”

Ah, members of a team respect one another.  They do not respect the grifter.

0406 Tomasello never says that morality is pretty.

Those who only appear to share the team’s purpose are dangerous to others, as well as themselves.  They lower the reproductive success of all concerned.  They are killjoys.  Each member of the team should move according to the team’s purpose.  Such movements are fair and good.  Yet, hand-talk words for “fair” and “good” do not exist.  What is there to picture or point to?  When do hominins figure out that they can smile or grimace, in order display approval or disapproval?

Yes, team activities are all about “me” and “you”.

Tomasello calls the natural, embodied, team-based morality of the era of joint intentionality, “second-person morality”.

0407 In the era of collective intentionality, hominin interdependence_2b cultivates sociogenesis_1a in band (50), community (150), mega-band (500) and tribe (1500).  Today, these correspond to neighborhood (50), church (150), farmer’s market and festival (450) and diocese (1500).  These larger social circles come into play because the domestication of fireincreases the number and diversity of teams.

The morality that characterizes teams infiltrates smaller social circles as well as larger.  Collective intentionality is no longer motivated by the slogan, “We work for food.”  Collective intentionality says, “We work for organizational objectives, that are based in righteousness and goodness.”  But, hand-talk cannot gesture the words, “organizational objectives”, “based”, “righteousness” and “goodness”.  These spoken terms are explicit abstractions.  Hand-talk facilitates implicit abstractions, characteristic of the exemplar sign.

0409 So what is a hominin, in the era of collective intentionality, to hand talk?

Can the hominin gesture, “The morality that characterizes the community and the tribe extends to the living, the dead and those who are yet to be born.”?

What fully linguistic gesture-words suffice?

Can the hominin gesture, “We belong to the one who gives, without us knowing why?”

[POINT to self][SWEEPING POINT to others][CAST EYES to SKY][CRADLE ARMS Then LOOK AT CRADLED ARMS as if receiving something from SKY][LOOK back up at SKY][SHRUG]

0410 Those who accept their gifts, their missions, their community roles, the mantle of tradition, their responsibilities and yes, their fates, are blessed with reproductive success.

But, enter the modern, who asks, “Does this associate to the term, ‘conformity’?”

How far have we fallen?

0411 Tomasello envisions a kind of cultural and group-minded “objective” morality.

The term, “objective”, is modern.  It means “independent of anyone’s particular judgment”.  The premodern Latin schoolmen use the term, “suprasubjective”, which means, “simultaneously encompassing and transcending our subjectivities”.

Here, in Tomasello’s selections of terms, this reader spies a bias towards the scientific.  Scientific facts and theories are “objective”.

This modern term fails to capture what collective intentionality expects of us.  “Objective” morality is independent of anyone’s point of view.  “Suprasubjective” morality interpellates us to align our judgments, our species intelligibili, with the truth, the foundation of all human institutions that promote human flourishing.

Yet, as noted above, there is no hand-talk gesture-word for “truth”.

What is there to image or indicate?

0412 What does this imply?

Truth is built into the hominin brain and body.  We are on the lookout for signs of truth.  Truth is the foundation of the righteous and the good.  We know this in our heart and bones.  We ourselves are gifts of the one who gives, without us knowing why.

We, the living, and we, the dead, and we, the ones to come, constitute the tree of life.

[POINT to breath][PANTOMIME tree]

0413 Tomasello proposes three interlocking movements to the natural history of human cognition.

Then, he discusses two steps.  First, there is the era of joint intentionality.  Second, there is the era of collective intentionality.

So, there is terminological confusion, leading me to number the era of individual intentionality as “zero”.

0414 My explanation for this incoherent nomenclature calls to mind Tomasello’s vision, where the phenotype of human ontogeny_2c occupies the perspective-level actuality and the adaptation of joint and collective attention_2a occupies the content-level actuality. Research into early human cognitive development_2c must somehow connect with research into the cognition of great apes_2a.  Tomasello projects the cognitive development of newborns and infants backwards, into evolutionary time, towards the last common ancestor (LCA), represented by cognitive research into the behaviors of great apes.

So, there are three eras and two steps, which does not sound bad, because not much happens in the first era.

But, there is another issue.

0415 On top of the incoherent nomenclature, Tomasello frames the era of joint intentionality as occurring after the appearance of the Homo genus, which occurs 1.8Myr (millions of years ago).  He starts the era of collective intentionalitywith the appearance of new species, such as Homo heidelbergensis, around 0.5Myr.  The first guess is not reasonable.  The second is more plausible.

How so?

0416 Consider the archeological record for artifacts.

0417 Two pairs stand out.

The first is the pair of Oldowan, then Acheulean stone-tool technologies.  These archaeological artifacts associate to one team among many.  Consequently, they represent the era of joint intentionality.

The second pair is intimations of the use of fire, and then, the domestication of fire.  These archaeological artifacts associate to the era of collective intentionality, for the obvious reason that cooking presents the opportunity for common meals that are not like the prior sharing of abundance from teams.  Cooking produces qualitatively different food sharing opportunities.  More teams means more food and a more varied menu.  Then, the hearth itself provides a site for parties to linger and tell stories in hand talk.  During this era, hand talk become fully linguistic.  General grammar evolves.

0418 To me, these two pairs associate to the two steps in human evolution that Tomasello identifies.

0419 Consequently, my associations to Tomasello’s eras does not coincide with his own.

0420 But, that is not all.

With this adjustment in mind, I would think that the natural history of morality would commence in step one.  But, Tomasello does not start in step one.  Chapter two, titled “Evolution of Cooperation”, points to step zero… er… the first era.

0421 Tomasello introduces the question, “Why sociality?”

The first and most primordial answer says, “Bands serve as protection against predators.”

But, safety in numbers comes at a cost.  Each member of the band competes for access to resources.  Hierarchies get established.  Alliances form.  Hierarchies and alliances are not the same.  Each bears its own actuality.

0422 Here are two nested forms.

0423 Power₂ does not situate affiliation₂.  Affiliation₂ does not situate power₂.

Both are in dynamic equilibrium.

0424 Such is life in the era of individual intentionality.

0425 Evolutionary anthropologists observe and measure the behaviors of great apes, who come as close to any creature to our ancestors living during the millions of years between the LCA and the bipedal “southern apes”.  Evolutionary anthropologists model ape-behavior by asking the question, “How does each strategy of group living contribute to getting one’s genes into the next generation?”

Strategies for success include kin selection, group selection and selection for mutualism and reciprocity.  I suppose the first item coheres to establishment₃ and the latter items go with alliance formation₃.  Group selection is the odd inclusion, due to the fact that neither establishment₃ nor alliances₃ can exclude one another, try as they might.  If establishment₃dominates, then the group fails from passivity and free-riding.  If alliance₃ dominates, then the group fails from internal conflict.

0426 What does this imply?

Ah, power₂ and affiliation₂ must constitute a single actuality₂.

That actuality₂, in this case, is a social circle, or a group, called “band”.

The technical term for this relational structure is “intersection”.  Two actualities intersect.

0427 Kin selection favors establishment_3H.

Selection for mutualism and reciprocity favor alliances_3V.

Group selection contains the contradictions between power₂ and affiliation₂.

So, the group must be the single actuality.

0428 I wonder, “Do evolutionary anthropologists, such as Tomasello, implicitly (not explicitly) realize this?”

In other words, if the single actuality₂, the group₂, associates to one of the actualities in Tomasello’s vision, then I would say that it₂ is neither shared intentionality_2a nor human ontology_2c.  Therefore, the group₂ must associate to culture_2b… I mean to say… interdependence_2b.

Here is a picture.

0429 Why is the intersection so important?

Interdependence_2b belongs to secondness, the realm of actuality, for both the nested form and the level.

On the content level, natural selection_3a is the normal context where joint attention_2a emerges from (and situates) sociogenesis_1a (which turns out to be the potential of triadic relations).

On the situation level, cultural selection_3b is the normal context where interdependence_2b (starting with the either family, intimates or the band, in the era of individual intentionality) emerges from and situates cooperation_1b (which is the potential_1b of shared intentionality_2a).

On the perspective level, natural selection (in milieu of culture)_3c is the normal context where the hominin phenotype_2cemerges from and situates the potential of ’embodying interdependence’_1c.

0430 What factor is an evolutionary anthropologist to fixate on?

On top of that, interdependence_2b exhibits the relational structure of an intersection.

An intersection is full of contradictions.

In the extreme, establishment_3H without alliance_3V produces the magnificent peacock and his fickle and easily seduced hens.   

In the extreme, alliance_3V without establishment_3H produces the ant, where each worker shares the genes of every other worker and the queen holds authority because she is the one who gives life to the colony.

0431 Weirdly, both the peacock and the ant serve as metaphors for hominin society.

If the group₂ embodies interdependence_2b, then specialized academic inquiry into human evolutionary history tends to focus on the trees, without regard to the forest.  Kin selection promotes establishment_3H.  Selection for mutualism and reciprocity promotes alliance_3V.  And group selection?  How on earth can group selection contribute to reproductive success for an individual?

0432 Computer simulations abound.

But, the resolution stands beyond mere calculation.

Why?

Intersections are inherently mysterious.